1、外文翻译CORPORATEFINANCIALCONTROLMECHANISMSANDFIRMPERFORMANCETHECASEOFVALUEBASEDMANAGEMENTSYSTEMSMATERIALSOURCEHTTP/WEBEBSCOHOSTCOM/EHOST/DETAILAUTHORHARLEYERYAN，JRANDEMERYATRAHANABSTRACTWEEXAMINETHEPERFORMANCEOF84FIRMSTHATADOPTVALUEBASEDMANAGEMENTVBMSYSTEMSDURINGTHEPERIOD19841997THETYPICALFIRMSIGNIFICA
2、NTLYIMPROVESMATCHEDFIRMADJUSTEDRESIDUALINCOMEAFTERADOPTINGVBMTHISIMPROVEMENTPERSISTSFORTHEFIVEPOSTADOPTIONYEARSSTUDIEDAFTERCONTROLLINGFORPOSSIBLESAMPLEBIAS,WEFINDTHATLARGEFIRMSSHOWLESSIMPROVEMENTTHANSMALLFIRMSWEFINDANEGATIVERELATIONBETWEENTYINGCOMPENSATIONTOVBMANDPOSTADOPTIONPERFORMANCEWEALSOFINDTHA
3、TFIRMSREDUCECAPITALEXPENDITURESFOLLOWINGVBMADOPTION,BUTTHATTHEREDUCTIONSINSPENDINGDONOTDIFFERBASEDONTHEFIRMGROWTHOPPORTUNITIESOVERALL,THEEVIDENCESUGGESTSTHATVBMIMPROVESECONOMICPERFORMANCEANDTHEEFFICIENTUSEOFCAPITALKEYWORDSVALUEBASEDMANAGEMENT,RESIDUALINCOME,MANAGEMENTCOMPENSATION,CORPORATEGOVERNANCE
4、1INTRODUCTIONEFFECTIVECORPORATEGOVERNANCEANDFINANCIALCONTROLINCLUDESTHEUSEOFMONITORINGANDINCENTIVEMECHANISMSTOALIGNDIVERGENTINTERESTSBETWEENSHAREHOLDERSANDMANAGERSANDENCOURAGETHECREATIONOFSHAREHOLDERVALUEVALUEBASEDMANAGEMENTSYSTEMSVBMPROVIDEANINTEGRATEDMANAGEMENTSTRATEGYANDFINANCIALCONTROLSYSTEMINTE
5、NDEDTOINCREASESHAREHOLDERVALUEBYMITIGATINGAGENCYCONFLICTSINCONCEPT,VBMREDUCESAGENCYCONFLICTSANDHELPSCREATESHAREHOLDERVALUESINCEITREVEALSVALUEINCREASINGDECISIONSTOEMPLOYEES,ALLOWSFOREASIERMONITORINGOFMANAGERSDECISIONS,ANDPROVIDESAMETHODTOTIECOMPENSATIONTOOUTCOMESTHATCREATESHAREHOLDERVALUEHOWEVER,THED
6、EGREETOWHICHVBMSYSTEMSACTUALLYIMPROVETHEECONOMICPERFORMANCEOFPUBLICLYHELDFIRMSISANOPENQUESTIONTOGAININSIGHTINTOTHISISSUE,WEEXAMINETHEUSEANDECONOMICEFFICACYOFVALUEBASEDMANAGEMENTSYSTEMSBY84FIRMSTHATADOPTVBMSYSTEMSFROM1984TO1997WEINVESTIGATETWORELATEDRESEARCHQUESTIONS1DOESTHEADOPTIONOFAVBMSYSTEMIMPROV
7、EECONOMICPERFORMANCEAND2WHATFACTORSENHANCEORHINDERTHEEFFECTIVENESSOFVBMSYSTEMSOURPRIMARYGOALISTOEXAMINEWHETHERTHEADOPTIONOFAVBMSYSTEMIMPROVESECONOMICPERFORMANCEWERECOGNIZETHATFIRMPERFORMANCEANDTHEDECISIONTOTIECOMPENSATIONTOAVBMMETRICCANBEENDOGENOUS,WHICHCREATESAPOTENTIALSAMPLESELECTIONBIASFORINSTANC
8、E,FIRMSTHATAREPERFORMINGPOORLYFACETOUGHERCHALLENGESTOCREATINGECONOMICVALUEANDCOULDBEMORELIKELYTOTIECOMPENSATIONTOVBMTOPROVIDEMANAGERSTHEINCENTIVESTOOVERCOMETHESECHALLENGESALTERNATIVELY,MANAGERSWHOEXPECTTOACHIEVEACERTAINLEVELOFPERFORMANCECANNEGOTIATEACOMPENSATIONCONTRACTBASEDONTHEVBMMETRICTHATESSENTI
9、ALLYASSURESABONUSPAYOUTOURSAMPLEINCLUDESFIRMSTHATBASECOMPENSATIONONVBMMETRICS,BUTALSOFIRMSTHATUSEVBMFORANALYSISANDEVALUATIONONLYTHUS,WECANEXAMINEWHYFIRMSCHOOSETOTIECOMPENSATIONTOVBM,WHICHALLOWSUSTOCONTROLFORPOTENTIALSAMPLESELECTIONBIASTHATRESULTSFROMENDOGENOUSRELATIONSBETWEENCOMPENSATIONPLANSANDFIRM
10、PERFORMANCEWITHREGARDTOOURFIRSTRESEARCHQUESTION,WEFINDTHATFIRMPERFORMANCEINCREASESFOLLOWINGTHEADOPTIONOFVALUEBASEDMANAGEMENTSYSTEMSCOMPAREDTOAMATCHEDFIRMBASEDONINDUSTRY,PRIORPERFORMANCE,ANDSIZE,FIRMSTHATADOPTVBMSYSTEMSINCREASERESIDUALINCOMEFORTHEFIVEYEARSSUBSEQUENTTOTHEADOPTIONOFAVBMSYSTEMRELATIVETO
11、THEYEARBEFOREADOPTIONTHEMEDIANFIRMINOURSAMPLEINCREASESINDUSTRYANDPERFORMANCEADJUSTEDRESIDUALINCOMEDIVIDEDBYINVESTEDCAPITALBYOVER7PERCENTAGEPOINTSFORTHEFIVEYEARPERIODSUBSEQUENTTOVBMADOPTIONWEDONOTFINDEVIDENCETHATVBMENCOURAGESUNDERINVESTMENTINHIGHGROWTHFIRMS,SUGGESTINGTHATTHEIMPROVEMENTINRESIDUALINCOM
12、EDOESNOTCOMEATTHEEXPENSEOFLONGTERMVALUEWITHREGARDTOOURSECONDRESEARCHQUESTION,WEFINDTHATFIRMSIZEISTHEONLYFIRMSPECIFICCHARACTERISTICTHATRELATESTOTHEEFFECTIVENESSOFVBMINALLYEARSAFTERCONTROLLINGFORPOSSIBLESAMPLESELECTIONBIAS,WEFINDTHATLARGEFIRMSSHOWLESSIMPROVEMENTTHANSMALLFIRMSWENOTE,HOWEVER,THATTHESERE
13、GRESSIONSHAVELOWADJUSTEDR2SIFIRMSTHATPERFORMBETTERPRIORTOADOPTIONAREMORELIKELYTOTIECOMPENSATIONTOVBMANDIITHEPOSTADOPTIONADJUSTEDPERFORMANCEINTHEFIRSTTWOYEARSAFTERADOPTIONNEGATIVELYRELATESTOTHEUSEOFVBMTODETERMINECOMPENSATIONTHISEFFECTISNOTSTATISTICALLYSIGNIFICANTAFTERTWOYEARSITISPOSSIBLETHATFIRMSTHAT
14、ALREADYFOCUSONVALUECREATIONAREMORELIKELYTOTIEVBMTOCOMPENSATIONANDTHATTHESEFIRMSSIMPLYHAVELESSPOTENTIALFORIMPROVEMENTALTERNATIVELY,FIRMSMIGHTCAPBONUSPAYOUTSTOOLOWWHENTHEYIMPLEMENTPLANS,WHICHREDUCESINITIALEFFICACYWEALSOFINDTHATFIRMSREDUCECAPITALEXPENDITURESFOLLOWINGVBMADOPTIONTHESEREDUCTIONSINSPENDING
15、DONOTDIFFERBASEDONTHEFIRMSGROWTHOPPORTUNITIESTHUS,THEIMPROVEMENTINPERFORMANCEDOESNOTAPPEARTOCOMEATTHEEXPENSEOFLONGTERMVALUEOVERALL,OURRESULTSPROVIDESUPPORTTHATVALUEBASEDMANAGEMENTSYSTEMSAREEFFECTIVEMECHANISMSFORIMPROVINGCORPORATEPERFORMANCETHEREMAINDEROFTHEPAPERISORGANIZEDASFOLLOWSINSECTION2WEPROVID
16、EASUMMARYOFTHEVALUEBASEDMANAGEMENTLITERATUREANDTHEOBJECTIVESOFTHISRESEARCHINSECTION3WEDESCRIBETHESAMPLEANDRESEARCHMETHODSECTION4CONTAINSTHEEMPIRICALRESULTSINSECTION5WEPROVIDEASUMMARYANDCONCLUSION2VALUEBASEDMANAGEMENTTHELITERATUREONPROPERTYRIGHTSEG,ALCHIANANDDEMSETZ,1972ANDAGENCYTHEORYEG,JENSENANDMEC
17、KLING,1976MAINTAINSTHATDIFFERENTINCENTIVESLEADTOCONFLICTSBETWEENSHAREHOLDERSANDMANAGERSOFTHEPUBLICFIRMTHATRESULTINALOSSINFIRMVALUEULTIMATELY,THESHAREHOLDERSBEARTHISLOSSVALUEBASEDMANAGEMENTPROVIDESANINTEGRATEDMANAGEMENTSTRATEGYANDFINANCIALCONTROLSYSTEMDESIGNEDTOMITIGATETHESEAGENCYCONFLICTSANDINCREASE
18、SHAREHOLDERVALUE1VBMSYSTEMSATTEMPTTOACCOMPLISHTHISGOALBYPROVIDINGMANAGERSWITHASETOFDECISIONMAKINGTOOLSMETRICSTHAT,ATLEASTINTHEORY,IDENTIFYWHICHALTERNATIVESCREATEORDESTROYVALUE,ANDOFTENBYLINKINGCOMPENSATIONANDPROMOTIONSTOSHAREHOLDERVALUEFIRMSCANUSETHESEMETRICSTOMONITORANDREWARDMANAGEMENTPERFORMANCETH
19、EYPROVIDEAMECHANISMFORLINKINGMANAGERSDECISIONSTOFIRMPERFORMANCEOUTCOMESTHATCREATESHAREHOLDERVALUEANDPROVIDEAMEANSTOFURTHERALIGNSHAREHOLDERANDMANAGERIALINTERESTSVALUEBASEDMANAGEMENTHASCAPTUREDTHEINTERESTOFTHECORPORATEANDINVESTMENTCOMMUNITIESRYANANDTRAHAN1999REPORTTHAT87OF86CFOSSURVEYEDINDICATETHATTHE
20、YAREFAMILIARWITHVALUEBASEDMANAGEMENTMOSTOFTHESECFOSALSOINDICATETHATTHEIRFIRMUSESONEORMOREVBMSYSTEMSTHISINTERESTHASALSOBEENDEMONSTRATEDINTHEBUSINESSPRESSARTICLESINFORTUNEEG,STIRES,2001COLVIN,2000ANDTULLY,1999INCLUDEALISTOF1,000COMPANIESRANKEDBYHOWMUCHMARKETVALUETHEYADDEDDURINGTHEPASTDECADE,BASEDONSTE
21、RNSTEWARTSMARKETVALUEADDEDMVAMETRICTHESEARTICLESPROFILESEVERALCORPORATIONSTHATHAVEADOPTEDAVARIETYOFMANAGEMENTSYSTEMS,BASEDONDIFFERENTVBMMETRICS,INANEFFORTTOINCREASETHEIRVALUEWEIDENTIFYFOURVARIATIONSOFVBMMETRICSFROMTHESEARTICLESINTHEPOPULARPRESSALLOFTHEMETRICSARESIMILARINTHATTHEYARESINGLEPERIODMEASUR
22、ESOFPERFORMANCETHATTAKEINTOACCOUNTRETURNONINVESTEDCAPITALANDTHERELEVANTCOSTOFCAPITALTHEYAREALLCONSISTENTWITHDISCOUNTEDCASHFLOWVALUATIONALTHOUGHCONSULTINGFIRMSHAVEPOPULARIZEDTHESEMETRICSFOREXAMPLE,EVAISWIDELYADAPTEDANDMARKETEDBYSTERNSTEWARTCOLVIN,2000ANDTULLY,1999包括一个列表的1000家公司市场价值排行榜多少他们补充说在过去的十年中,斯
23、特恩斯图尔特的市场基础上附加价值供电量的权值。这些文章简介家公司相继采用了各种各样的管理系统,基于不同VBM的度量标准,以增加他们的价值。我们找出四个变化从这些文章VBM度量在广受欢迎的新闻界。所有的标准是相似的,它们是单时期措施的表现,考虑返回投资资本和相关的资本成本。他们都是符合现金流贴现估价。尽管咨询公司有推广这些度量例如,EVA广泛适应和销售有限公司,由斯特恩斯图尔特和那些有这个名字,许多公司使用他们自己的版本的度量标准。我们不采取任何给定的度量来代表一个咨询公司的工作,可能推广的方法。我们提供一个总结这些四个度量标准如下。贴现后的现金流量贴现DCF方法,比如股东价值增加的价值上海广电
24、,表达如预期的未来现金流量贴现后的公司资本成本。看到RAPPAPORT1998为一个更详细的讨论的缺陷型方法作为它们的价值管理。现金流量的投资回报率CFROICFROI表达艺术家的一个公司的SINGLEPERIOD估计现金流投资总量中所占的比例。马登1999提供的详细讨论CFROI。投资回报率ROIC回报率ROIC的定义是无益的比值NOPLAT调整税操作投资资本。科普兰孙俐2000为一个更详细的讨论ROIC。国际扶轮RI剩余收益的超额收益措施在资本收费的基础上的投资机会的类似的风险。斯特恩斯图尔特和公司的市场推广扶轮名称下EVA。华莱士1997为一个更详细的讨论国际扶轮。我们的样品选择方法区分
25、我们的研究进一步证实了前期研究的。这些相关研究也只有对数据的访问在VBM补偿计划对于高层主管来说,以及排除的企业,在VBM体系使用评估与预算见ITTNER和LARCKER,1998年和2001年。我们的样品包括公司赔偿,领带VBM的企业,在VBM也使用系统和监测评价,预算,但不要求赔偿。这项功能可以让我们去探索VBM更为广泛的运用,也使得我们能够解释内生决定的过程。我们的样品也使得我们检查一个更广泛的群价值管理系统,CFROIROIC缺陷,其他方法,国际扶轮社长及,而非仅仅系统的基础上,EVATYPE剩余收益用于措施这些之前的研究。我们的方法使三个额外的贡献。首先,我们扩大我们的岗位绩效分析,采用五年内超越的那一年,让我们来检查收养的长期效果。第二,我们使用不同的税率基于法定税率效应对某一特定年度作为反对假设一个不变的税率为所有年。第三,我们用一种基于其股权成本的资本资产定价模型的基础上,一个人的借贷成本穆迪债券收益率,而且公司的资本结构来估算加权平均资本成本为我们的每一个样本公司,并一切所有的,都可以在COMPUSTAT公司数据,进行匹配这种贡献使得我们可以更准确地估计出每个公司的剩余收入,更准确的说,是贡献和检查费用的变化而调整资本在岗位上采用的性能。
