1、本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译题目论财务报表列报的改革专业会计学外文题目THEECONOMICIMPLICATIONSOFCORPORATEFINANCIALREPORTING外文出处HTTP/PAPERSSSRNCOM/SOL3/PAPERSCFMABSTRACT_ID491627外文作者JOHNRGRAHAM，CAMPBELLRHARVEY，SHIVARAJGOPAL原文THEECONOMICIMPLICATIONSOFCORPORATEFINANCIALREPORTINGABSTRACTWESURVEY401FINANCIALEXECUTIVES,ANDCONDUCTINDEPTHINTE
2、RVIEWSWITHANADDITIONAL20,TODETERMINEHEKEYFACTORSTHATDRIVEDECISIONSRELATEDTOPERFORMANCEMEASUREMENTANDVOLUNTARYDISCLOSURETHEMAJORITYOFFIRMSVIEWEARNINGS,ESPECIALLYEPS,ASTHEKEYMETRICFORANEXTERNALAUDIENCE,MORESOTHANCASHFLOWSWEFINDTHATTHEMAJORITYOFMANAGERSWOULDAVOIDINITIATINGAPOSITIVENPVPROJECTIFITMEANTFA
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5、,BUTPROVIDEONLYMODESTEVIDENCECONSISTENTWITHOTHERTHEORIESOFTHESEPHENOMENASUCHASDEBT,POLITICALCOSTANDBONUSPLANBASEDHYPOTHESES1INTRODUCTIONWECONDUCTACOMPREHENSIVESURVEYTHATASKSCFOSTODESCRIBETHEIRCHOICESRELATEDTOREPORTINGACCOUNTINGNUMBERSANDVOLUNTARYDISCLOSUREOUROBJECTIVEISTOADDRESSTHEFOLLOWINGQUESTIONS
6、DOMANAGERSCAREABOUTEARNINGSBENCHMARKSOREARNINGSTRENDSAND,IFYES,WHICHBENCHMARKSAREPERCEIVEDTOBEIMPORTANTWHATFACTORSMOTIVATEFIRMSTOEXERCISEDISCRETION,ANDEVENSACRIFICEECONOMICVALUE,TOMANAGEREPORTEDEARNINGSHOWWELLDOVARIOUSACADEMICTHEORIESEXPLAINEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDVOLUNTARYDISCLOSUREWETRIANGULATEOURANS
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10、TSTOTHEEPSTARGET,THENMISSINGTHETARGETCANINDICATETHATAFIRMISMANAGEDPOORLYINTHESENSETHATITCANNOTACCURATELYPREDICTITSOWNFUTUREBOTHOFTHESESCENARIOSBREEDUNCERTAINTYABOUTAFIRMSFUTUREPROSPECTS,WHICHMANAGERSBELIEVEHURTSSTOCKVALUATIONMANAGERSAREWILLINGTOMAKESMALLORMODERATESACRIFICESINECONOMICVALUETOMEETTHEEA
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19、DENCEOFFERSFOURKEYINSIGHTSFIRST,ACCOUNTINGEARNINGSMATTERMORETOMANAGERSTHANCASHFLOWSFORFINANCIALREPORTINGPURPOSES,WHICHCONTRASTSWITHTHEEMPHASISONCASHFLOWSFOUNDINTHEFINANCELITERATURETHISMIGHTINDICATETHATEARNINGSHAVEMOREINFORMATIONCONTENTABOUTFIRMVALUETHANDOCASHFLOWSALTERNATIVELY,ITMIGHTINDICATETHATMAN
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21、OYEEBONUSESTHATHAVETRADITIONALLYBEENTHEFOCUSOFACADEMICWORKEG,WATTSANDZIMMERMAN1978,1990THIRD,HOLDINGCASHFLOWSCONSTANT,MANAGERSCAREALOTABOUTSMOOTHEARNINGSPATHSTHISCONCERNHASBEENSOMEWHATUNDEREMPHASIZEDINTHEACADEMICLITERATURESEERONENANDSADAN1981FORANEARLYREFERENCEONSMOOTHINGFINALLY,MANAGERSAREWILLINGTO
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24、UGHTTOBEUNPREDICTABLEIFTHEYAREVOLATILEORIFTHEFIRMUNDERPERFORMSEARNINGSBENCHMARKS,ANDUNPREDICTABILITYLEADSTOLOWSTOCKRETURNSAPOORREPUTATIONFORDELIVERINGTRANSPARENTANDRELIABLEINFORMATIONCANINCREASETHEINFORMATIONRISKOFAFIRM,ALSOHURTINGSTOCKPERFORMANCEEXECUTIVESBELIEVETHATTHEMARKETSOMETIMESMISINTERPRETSO
25、ROVERREACTSTOEARNINGSANDDISCLOSUREANNOUNCEMENTSTHEREFORE,THEYWORKHARDTOMEETMARKETEXPECTATIONSSOASNOTTORAISEINVESTORSUSPICIONSORDOUBTSABOUTTHEIRFIRMSUNDERLYINGSTRENGTH出处HTTP/PAPERSSSRNCOM/SOL3/PAPERSCFMABSTRACT_ID4916271译文企业财务报告的经济内涵摘要我们对401位财务总监进行调查研究，且又对另外的20位进行深度采访，目的是为了探究影响决定绩效评价和自愿披露信息程度间的关键性因素。
26、大多数公司认为收入，特别是每股收益是外部受众的主要度量因素，超过了对现金流量的关注。我们发现，如果一个积极的净现值项目所获得收入少于当前收入的四分之一，大多数管理者不会发起该项目。同理，调查中，超过四分之三的财务总监会放弃经济价值来获取平稳的收入。管理者们认为一次没有达到目标收入或者是不稳定收入的披露都会降低收入的可预测性，而这反过来，又因为投资者和分析家们不喜欢不肯定性而导致股票价格的下跌。我们还发现，管理者们会自觉地披露与股票相关的信息来降低信息风险，但与此同时，又会试图不披露对自己先前所做承诺不利得信息。大体上，管理层支持刺激股价上涨的收入管理和自觉披露，而又只提供与这些现象（如负债、政
27、治成本和红利分配计划等）的其他理论保持一致性的一些信息。我们做了一个全方面的调查，要求财务总监们说明他们如何决定会计信息列报数量和自觉披露的程度。我们的目的是解决如下问题管理者们是否关心收入基准或未来收入趋势如果是，那么那些收入基准是重要的呢促使企业选择谨慎地甚至牺牲经济价值来管理已经披露的收入的因素是什么多种解释收入管理和自觉披露的学术理论符合现实吗我们的研究结果表明财务总监们认为收入（而不是现金流）才是财务报表外部使用者认为的主要标尺。两个最重要的收入基准是同期季收入以及分析做出的一致的估计。符合或超过基准是很重要的。管理者们需要处理“送交收入”的短期需要和投资价值最大化的长期目标间的平衡
28、。财务总监们认为收入基准的实现建立市场的可靠性且有助于维持或提高公司股票的价格。每股收益的微小变动都会导致股票市场的剧烈反映能很好的证明市场信赖的是公司能否“找到钱”达到收入基准。比目标少了一两美分都被认为公司存在潜在的问题。此外，如果公司先前引导了分析家认为公司完全能达到目标，而最后却没能达到的话这就暗示了就准确预测公司未来方面，该公司管理不善。这些2情况都表明该公司未来预期的不确定性，而管理者认为这不不确定性会降低股票价格。因此，管理者们愿意做小的或中等程度的经济价值的牺牲来满足分析家和投资的收入预期，从而避免股票市场对未达基准的距离反应。相反地，他们说，他们对要利用GAAP的会计调整来达
29、到收入基准是很犹豫的，也许是过去安然会计欺诈事件的后果。绝大多数的的财务总监更喜欢平稳的收入（与不确定收入相比）。他们认为长期拥有现金、不稳定的收入比稳定收入的风险性更大。更甚的是，稳定收入免除了分析家们预测未来收入的工作。收入预期对财务总监来说是一个长期关注的问题。他们认为较少预期收入和未达收入目标或不稳定收入一样会增加市场的风险利息。让人惊讶的是，接受调查中的78的财务总监会用经济价值来换取稳定的收入。大多数的财务总监决定他们在为得到稳定收入或达到收入目标而牺牲经济价值时会做出合理的选择。由于消极的收入而导致的权益和债券市场的波动的成本是相当大的（至少在短期是这样的）。因此，许多财务总监们
30、觉得他们选择牺牲长期价值来避免短期的波动，后果不那么可怕。换句话说，考虑到市场对未达标收入的（过分）反应这个现实，财务总监们会对目前的均衡做出最理想的抉择。他们认为这个体系（也就是，融资市场的压力和过分反应）鼓励偶尔牺牲长期价值来满足收入目标的决策。这种逻辑和BRAV，GRAHAM,HARVEY以及MICHAELY2005对支出政策的研究中的证据是一样的，即股票市场的剧烈反应促使财务总监们不惜任何代价地避免分红，即使这意味着非积极净现值投资。公司觉发布易于投资者们“清楚和理解”的消息。财务总监们认为不清晰的信息或者不能持续提供精确的信息会使市场低估该企业的股票价格，这反过来又会降低回报。管理层
31、对竞争者披露敏感信息的关注以及对披露不利于先前判断（如管理层提供的收入预测）的信息的担忧限制了自觉披露的程度。有时，管理者认为先发布坏消息再发布号消息是为了保有资本市场的可信度和避免潜在的诉讼。同时，我们发现运行很差的公司更可能推迟不利消息的公布。如果依据当前的文化传统衡量标准，我们认为我们的证据提供四个主要内因。首先，会计收入会计披露对管理者来说比现金流的更重要，这与融资文化中强调现金流相反。这可能暗示着收入拥有比现金流更丰富的关于公司价值的信息3内涵。或者，这可能意味着管理层偏好收入而不是现金流。其次，管理者们对达到或超过收入基准感兴趣主要是为了影响股票价格以及通过自己的关注和外部的声誉为
32、自己谋求福利；而不是从有利于负债条约、借债利率、政策可见度以及雇员福利的角度出发，而这些传统学说研究的焦点。再次，如果长期拥有现金，管理者会更关注获取平稳收入的方式。这种关注在学术研究中很少受到关注的。最后，管理者们愿意洗了经济价值来管理财务报告。在我们的分析还出现了许多广泛的关注。公司管理层非常关注外部就业预期，这使得管理者注重个人声誉，从而努力赚钱并尽量管理好公司。股票市场价值评估（特别是与收入预期相关的评估）使得管理者关注他所在企业的名声，上报真实收入以及披露透明信息。如果收入是不稳定的或者是低于收入基准的，则该公司的收入被认为是不可预测的，而收入的不可预测会导致股票回报低。在发布透明且可靠信息方面的不好名声会增加一个公司的信息风险，也不利于该公司股票在市场上的表现。管理者们认为，有时市场误解或对收入和披露声明的反应过激了；因此，他们必须努力工作来满足市场预期，如此投资者才不会怀疑他们公司的潜能。
