1、本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译题目政府审计公告制度的现状分析及其对策专业会计学外文题目GOVERNMENTAUDITINGINCHINAPROBLEMSANDREFORM外文出处GOVERNMENTAUDITINGINCHINAPROBLEMSANDREFORMNINCORPORATINGADVANCESININTERNATIONALACCOUNTING2008，24119127外文作者杨寿昌，贾森泽忠孝，莫里斯彭德尔伯里1原文GOVERNMENTAUDITINGINCHINAPROBLEMSANDREFORM1INTRODUCTIONFOR30YEARSAFTERITSFOUNDATIONIN
2、1949,THEPEOPLESREPUBLICOFCHINAWENTTHROUGHASERIESOFMAJORMASSPOLITICALMOVEMENTSWHICHLEFTITEXTREMELYISOLATEDFROMTHERESTOFTHEWORLD,ESPECIALLYCAPITALISTCOUNTRIESATTHEBRINKOFATOTALECONOMICCOLLAPSE,CHINASHIFTEDITSFOCUSTOECONOMICDEVELOPMENT,BEGANMARKETORIENTEDECONOMICREFORMS,ANDADOPTEDANOPENDOORPOLICYIN1978
3、3THESECHANGESREVIVEDBOTHGOVERNMENTAUDITINGANDINDEPENDENTAUDITING,WHICHHADBEENREPLACEDBYOTHERMONITORINGMECHANISMSINTHE1950SASREQUIREDBYTHE1982CONSTITUTIONOFTHEPEOPLESREPUBLICOFCHINAPRC,1982,THENATIONALAUDITOFFICENAOWASSETUPIN1983ASADEPARTMENTOFTHESTATECOUNCILINADDITION,REGIONALAUDITOFFICESWEREALSOSET
4、UPASDEPARTMENTSOFPROVINCIAL,MUNICIPALANDCOUNTYGOVERNMENTSAREGIONALGOVERNMENTAUDITOFFICEISUNDERTHELEADERSHIPOFBOTHTHEGOVERNMENTAUDITOFFICEATAHIGHERLEVELANDITSSUPERVISINGREGIONALGOVERNMENTFOREXAMPLE,THEAUDITOFFICEOFAPROVINCIALGOVERNMENTISSUBJECTTOTHEJOINTLEADERSHIPOFTHENAOANDTHEPROVINCIALGOVERNMENTUND
5、ERTHEDUALLEADERSHIPSYSTEM,FORAPROVINCIALGOVERNMENTAUDITOFFICE,THENAOPROVIDESAUDITINGANDREGULATORYGUIDANCEANDMONITORINGWHILETHEPROVINCIALGOVERNMENTPROVIDESRESOURCESANDEXERCISESPERSONNELCONTROLINADDITION,THENAOOPERATESANETWORKOFBRANCHOFFICESINCENTRALGOVERNMENTMINISTRIESANDVERYLARGEMUNICIPALITIESTOAUDI
6、TVARIOUSGOVERNMENTDEPARTMENTS,AGENCIES,STATEOWNEDENTERPRISESUNDERTHECONTROLOFTHECENTRALGOVERNMENT,ANDTHEIRASSOCIATEDINSTITUTIONSTHESEBRANCHAUDITOFFICESLOCATEDINMINISTRIESANDVERYLARGEMUNICIPALITIESAREUNDERTHEDIRECTLEADERSHIPOFTHENAOALTHOUGHTHISGOVERNMENTAUDITSYSTEMHASMADESIGNIFICANTCONTRIBUTIONSTOWAR
7、DCHINASECONOMICREFORMANDOPENINGUPTOTHEWORLDINTHEPAST20YEARSCHINESEAUDITINGSYSTEMRESEARCHGROUP,1999,ITALSOSUFFERSFROMTHELACKOFAUDITINDEPENDENCETHEEXISTINGPROBLEMSOFGOVERNMENTAUDITINGMAINLYSTEMFROM2ITBEINGUNDERTHEDIRECTCONTROLOFTHEEXECUTIVEBODYTHESTATECOUNCILUNDERTHISSYSTEM,VARIOUSGOVERNMENTDEPARTMENT
8、SANDOFFICIALSCAN,BOTHTHEORETICALLYANDPRACTICALLY,INTERFEREWITHGOVERNMENTAUDITING,THUSWEAKENINGTHEOBJECTIVITYANDFAIRNESSOFTHEAUDITHOWEVER,THEPEOPLESCONGRESSESATVARIOUSLEVELSHAVEBEGUNTOATTACHSIGNIFICANTIMPORTANCETO,ANDMAKEINCREASINGUSEOF,THEAUDITREPORTATTHESAMETIME,MOREANDMORETAXPAYERSHAVEBEGUNTOPAYAT
9、TENTIONTOHOWTHEIRMONEYISUSEDBYTHEGOVERNMENTWHILETHENAOSLACKOFINDEPENDENCEHASALWAYSBEENAPROBLEMEVERSINCEITSESTABLISHMENT,THISPROBLEMISCREATINGINCREASINGTENSIONSINTHECURRENTPOLITICALSETTINGBECAUSEOFTHEACCOUNTABILITYNEEDSOFTHELEGISLATUREANDTAXPAYERSTHEACCOUNTABILITYRELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEGOVERNMENTANDTH
10、ELEGISLATUREISCOMPROMISEDBYTHEFACTTHATTHEAUDITORISNOTINDEPENDENTOFTHEGOVERNMENTNOTWITHSTANDINGTHESEPROBLEMS,THENAOHASSTEPPEDUPTHELEVELOFPUBLICDISCLOSUREOFAUDITFINDINGSINRECENTYEARSIN2003,THENAOFORTHEFIRSTTIMEDISCLOSEDTOTHEPUBLICTHATSERIOUSFINANCIALPROBLEMSEXISTEDINFOURMINISTRIESOFTHECENTRALGOVERNMEN
11、TTHISDISCLOSUREANDTHEPROBLEMSEXPOSEDATTRACTEDMUCHMEDIAATTENTIONANDTHEPHRASE“AUDITSTORM”WASUSEDTOREFERTOTHEDISCLOSUREANDTHEISSUESRAISEDTHIS“AUDITSTORM”CONTINUEDIN2004AND2005WHENTHENAOINITSANNUALREPORTDISCLOSEDTHESERIOUSILLEGALACTSINOTHERMINISTRIESOFTHECENTRALGOVERNMENTHOWEVER,ALTHOUGHTHISSTORMHASBEEN
12、USEFULINDRAWINGATTENTIONTOSOMEOFTHEPROBLEMSTHATHADOCCURRED,THELEVELOFAUDITINDEPENDENCEMEANSTHATONLYASMALLPERCENTAGEOFTHETOTALWEREEXPOSEDALSO,EVENWHEREPROBLEMSAREEXPOSED,THISDOESNOTENSURETHATTHESAMEPROBLEMSWILLNOTRECURTHUS,THE“AUDITSTORM”HASHEIGHTENEDTHEAWARENESSOFTHENEEDFORGOVERNMENTAUDITINGREFORM2P
13、ERCEIVEDPROBLEMSOFTHECURRENTGOVERNMENTAUDITINGSYSTEMMOSTINTERVIEWEESBELIEVEDTHATTHECURRENTPROBLEMSOFGOVERNMENTAUDITINGHAVETHEIRORIGINSINITSRELATIONTOTHEGOVERNMENT,IE,THENAOISINEFFECTANINTERNALAUDITINGDEPARTMENTUNDERTHEGOVERNMENTSDIRECTCONTROLTHEFOLLOWINGPARAGRAPHSELABORATETHEMAINPROBLEMSIDENTIFIEDIN
14、THEINTERVIEWS21LACKOFAUDITINDEPENDENCETHEMAJORITYOFOURINTERVIEWEESACKNOWLEDGEDSOMEDIRECTORINDIRECT3INTERVENTIONBYPEOPLEORORGANISATIONSFROMOUTSIDETHENAOTHESEHAVEASTRONGNEGATIVEIMPACTONAUDITPLANNING,THETRAININGANDAPPOINTMENTOFAUDITINGPERSONNEL,THEDETERMINATIONOFAUDITTASKS,THEDEALINGWITHPROBLEMSIDENTIF
15、IEDINTHEAUDIT,ANDTHEDISCLOSUREOFAUDITRESULTSASARESULT,THENAOCANHARDLYPERFORMANYINDEPENDENTAUDITINGADIRECTORGENERALOFAPROVINCIALGOVERNMENTAUDITOFFICECOMMENTEDTHEPROBLEMSIDENTIFIEDINTHEAUDITSHOULDBEDEALTWITHINACCORDANCEWITHLAW,BUTIFTHEPROBLEMSINVOLVETHEGOVERNMENT,THEAUDITOFFICEWILLEXPERIENCEINTERFEREN
16、CEFROMTHEGOVERNMENTALOFFICIALINCHARGEORFROMOTHERAUTHORITIESSOMEINTERVIEWEESACKNOWLEDGEDTHELACKOFINDEPENDENCEOFGOVERNMENTAUDITING,BUTATTHESAMETIMETHEYDIDNOTWANTTOEXAGGERATETHEPROBLEMBEINGADEPARTMENTDIRECTEDBYTHEGOVERNMENT,HOWCANTHEAUDITOFFICEWORKINDEPENDENTLYFREEFROMTHEINTERFERENCEOFTHEGOVERNMENTORTH
17、ECHIEFGOVERNMENTOFFICERSCGOISTHERESULTOFINTERFERENCEINEVITABLYDETRIMENTALTHEINTERVIEWEESFOUNDITHARDTOANSWERTHESEQUESTIONSBESIDES,THEAUDITOFFICEANDTHEGOVERNMENTAREATDIFFERENTADMINISTRATIVELEVELSANDMAYNOTALWAYSHAVECONSISTENTPERCEPTIONSONAUDITINGUNDERTHISCIRCUMSTANCE,ASWASREVEALEDINTHEINTERVIEWS,THEAUD
18、ITOFFICE,BEINGATTHELOWERLEVEL,WOULDNORMALLYFOLLOWTHEGOVERNMENTSWILLANDTHISISUNDERSTANDABLEWEARGUETHATIFAUDITINGISSUPPOSEDTOSATISFYMERELYTHENEEDSOFTHEGOVERNMENT,ORIFGOVERNMENTAUDITISSUPPOSEDTOPLAYASUPPORTINGROLETOGOVERNMENTALWORK,THENTHEPROBLEMOFLIMITEDAUDITINDEPENDENCEISRELATIVELYPARTIAL,BECAUSEGOVE
19、RNMENTAUDITINGSTILLACHIEVESITSMAINOBJECTIVEBUTIFTHEPEOPLESCONGRESSANDTAXPAYERSOUTSIDETHEGOVERNMENTAREALSOAUDITCLIENTS,ANDENTRUSTTHEGOVERNMENTAUDITOFFICETOINVESTIGATEHOWTHEGOVERNMENTIMPLEMENTEDFISCALBUDGETSAPPROVEDBYTHEPEOPLESCONGRESS,THENTHECONTROLRELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEAUDITOFFICEANDTHEGOVERNMENTBEC
20、OMESASEVEREPROBLEMANIMMEDIATECONSEQUENCEOFTHELACKOFAUDITINDEPENDENCEISTHATTHEAUDITREPORTMAYNOLONGERPOSSESSOBJECTIVITYANDFAIRNESSANDITISTHEREFORELESSLIKELYTOGAINTHETRUSTANDACCEPTANCEBYTHEPEOPLESCONGRESSANDTHEPUBLIC22RESTRICTEDDISCLOSUREOFAUDITRESULTS4THEINTERVIEWEESGENERALLYFELTTHATTHEDISCLOSUREOFAUD
21、ITRESULTSMIGHTBERESTRICTEDADEPUTYCGOADEPUTYMAYOROFAMUNICIPALGOVERNMENTCOMMENTEDINTHEINTERVIEWTHEAUDITREPORTFOLLOWSGOVERNMENTALARRANGEMENTS,BUTTHISDOESNOTNECESSARILYINDICATETHATTHEGOVERNMENTWILLPREVENTTHEDISCLOSUREOFAUDITISSUESWHOEVERACTSASTHECGOFACESEXTERNALPRESSUREANDTHUSS/HEWILLDISCLOSESOMETHING,E
22、XPLAINITTOTHEPEOPLESCONGRESS,ANDALSOSAVETHEFACEOFTHEAUDITOFFICEBUTWILLTHECGODISCLOSEALLTHEISSUESORIMPORTANTISSUESTHENWILLTHEISSUESCONCERNINGHIS/HERANNUALREPORTBEDISCLOSEDASTHEYREALLYAREONECANNEVERTELLADIRECTORGENERALFROMTHENAOADMITTEDINFACT,SOMEGOVERNMENTOFFICIALSINTERFEREWITHTHEAUDITOFFICEINREPORTI
23、NGAUDITRESULTSTOTHEPEOPLESCONGRESSTHEYEVENDIRECTLYDEMANDTHEAUDITOFFICETOREMOVEBIGISSUESTHATVIOLATEREGULATIONSFROMTHEAUDITREPORTANOFFICIALFROMTHENAOALSOADMITTEDINTHEINTERVIEWTHATSOMELOCALGOVERNMENTSANDRELATEDAUTHORITIESINTERFEREWITHTHEDISCLOSUREOFAUDITFINDINGSANDTHERESOLUTIONOFAUDITRESULTSINORDERTOSH
24、IRKRESPONSIBILITIESANDAVOIDEXCESSIVEDISCLOSURETHATMIGHTOVERSHADOWTHEIRPOLITICALCAREERTHEINTERVIEWDATATHUSSUGGESTSTHATTHEAUDITOFFICEISNOTONLYCONSTRAINEDBYTHEGOVERNMENTINTERMSOFAUDITPLANNINGANDTHEDETERMINATIONOFAUDITTASKS,BUTALSOTHEDISCLOSUREOFAUDITRESULTSTHATIS,THEAUDITOFFICECANNOTMAKEITSOWNDECISIONS
25、ONWHATTODISCLOSE,HOWTODISCLOSE,ANDWHENTODISCLOSECONSEQUENTLY,THEREISNOASSURANCEONTHEAUTHORITYANDTRANSPARENCYOFAUDITREPORTSWITHTHESUBMISSIONOFAUDITREPORTSTOTHEPEOPLESCONGRESS,THISPROBLEMOFALACKOFINDEPENDENCEANDTRANSPARENCYHASAROUSEDINCREASEDCONCERNSSINCETHECONSTITUTIONPRC,1982ANDTHEAUDITLAWPRC,1994AL
26、ACKCLEARANDRIGIDRULESONTHEDISCLOSUREOFAUDITRESULTS,THECONTENTANDDEGREEOFDISCLOSUREINTHECURRENTAUDITINGSYSTEMAREDETERMINEDANDCENSOREDBYTHEGOVERNMENTSDISCRETIONARYDISCLOSUREPOLICIESONGOVERNMENTAFFAIRSANDAREALSOHEAVILYAFFECTEDBYTHEATTITUDESOFCGOS23AUDITINGGAPSMOSTINTERVIEWEESMENTIONEDTHESAMEPROBLEMTHEA
27、UDITISONLYAPPLIEDTOGOVERNMENTUNITSATALOWERLEVELOFTHEHIERARCHYTHATIS,THEAUDITRARELYEXAMINES5THERESPONSIBILITYANDPERFORMANCEOFTHEGOVERNMENTITSELFORITSCGO,ANDHENCETHEDEPTH,LEVEL,ANDSCOPEOFAUDITINGARERATHERRESTRICTEDTHEFOLLOWINGCOMMENTMADEBYANINTERVIEWEEWHOISADIRECTORGENERALATTHENAOISREPRESENTATIVEOFTHE
28、VIEWSFROMALEGALPOINTOFVIEW,THEREWILLNOTBEANYCONSTRAINTONTHEAUDITOFDECISIONSMADEBYHIGHERLEVELOFFICIALS,BUTINPRACTICEYOUCANNOTREALLYQUESTIONTHEMIFINTHEAUDITPROCESSWEDISCOVERPROBLEMSORMISTAKENDECISIONSMADEBYHIGHLEVELOFFICIALS,WEWOULDRATHERNOTDISCLOSETHEMWEWOULDASSUMETHATTHEGOVERNMENTALWAYSDOESTHERIGHTT
29、HINGTHATISTOSAY,IFTHEPROBLEMSAROSEFROMDECISIONSMADEBYTHEGOVERNMENT,WEWILLNOTBOTHERABOUTTHEMANYMOREHOWCANWESUPERVISEOURSUPERIORSWEAREONLYADEPARTMENTOFTHEGOVERNMENTSOMEOFOURINTERVIEWEESALSOMENTIONEDTHATINBUDGETAUDITING,SINCETHEAUDITDOESNOTACTUALLYINVOLVETHEFINANCIALRESPONSIBILITYANDPERFORMANCEOFTHEGOV
30、ERNMENTANDITSCGO,ITISUNAVOIDABLETHATMANYBIGISSUESAREOVERLOOKEDORNEGLECTED,ESPECIALLYTHOSERELATEDTOTHEGOVERNMENTORCGOSTHEMSELVESGIVENTHATMANYPROBLEMSRESULTFROMGOVERNMENTALACTIVITY,THEAUDITOFFICECANDONOTHINGANDTHEPROBLEMSCANAPPEAROVERANDOVERAGAINTHISKINDOFAUDITINGEXHIBITSASERIOUSPROBLEMOFPOWERCENTRALI
31、SATION24BUDGETAUDITASAMEREFORMALITYSOMEINTERVIEWEESQUESTIONEDWHETHERAUDITRESULTSWOULDBEREPORTEDACCURATELYTOTHEPEOPLESCONGRESSEVENIFTHEAUDITOFFICECARRIEDOUTBUDGETAUDITINGATTHEGOVERNMENTLEVELIFTHEGOVERNMENTDETERMINESTHECONTENTOFTHEAUDITREPORT,BUDGETAUDITINGISINEFFECTTHEGOVERNMENTS“SELFINSPECTION”THECO
32、NSTITUTIONPRC,1982EMPOWERSTHECGOWITHRESPECTTOBOTHAUDITINGANDFINANCIALMATTERSHOWEVER,INMANYLOCALGOVERNMENTS,THECGOHOLDSTHEFINANCIALDECISIONMAKINGPOWERSWHILETHEDEPUTYCGOISDELEGATEDTOTAKECHARGEOFAUDITINGTHISSITUATIONMIGHTMAKEITMOREDIFFICULTFORTHEAUDITOFFICETOMONITORFISCALANDFINANCIALACTIVITIESOFTHEGOVE
33、RNMENTANDITSCGOSIMPLYBECAUSETHEDEPUTYSUNWILLINGNESSTOEXPOSEACGOTHISISREFLECTEDINTHEREMARKSMADEBYONEINTERVIEWEE,ADEPUTYDIRECTORGENERALATAPROVINCIALGOVERNMENTAUDITOFFICETHEDIFFICULTYTHATTHEAUDITOFFICEFACESINPERFORMINGBUDGETAUDITINGISTRULYENORMOUS,BECAUSEFISCALAND6FINANCIALPOWERSRESTINTHEHANDSOFTHECGOI
34、MPORTANTFISCALANDFINANCIALISSUESANDTHEANNUALFISCALANDFINANCIALBUDGETMUSTBEDECIDEDBYTHECGOONCETHEBUDGETISSET,ANYBUDGETADJUSTMENTMUSTALSOBEAPPROVEDBYTHEGOVERNMENTANDITSCGOUNDERSUCHCONDITIONS,AUDITINGFISCALANDFINANCIALBUDGETSWOULDBEEQUIVALENTTOTHEAUDITOFTHEGOVERNMENTANDITSCGOTHUS,AUDITORSFACENOTONLYTHE
35、FINANCEDEPARTMENTBUTALSOTHECGOINTHEAUDITINGPROCESS,IFTHEFINANCEDEPARTMENTTELLSTHEAUDITORTHATTHECGODOESNOTGIVEPERMISSIONFORSOMETHINGTOBEAUDITED,THENTHEAUDITORWILLNOTHAVETHENECESSARYACCESSMOREOVER,ASTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEPEOPLESCONGRESSANDTHEGOVERNMENTISTHATOFSUPERVISORANDSUPERVISEE,ITISDIFFICULT,I
36、FNOTIMPOSSIBLE,FORTHEGOVERNMENTAUDITOFFICETOSERVETWO“MASTERS”INSUCHACONFLICTINGSITUATION,THEGOVERNMENTAUDITOFFICECANONLYPUTTHEGOVERNMENTSINTERESTSANDREQUIREMENTSFIRST,SINCETHEGOVERNMENTISITSDIRECT“BOSS”TOSERVETHEGOVERNMENTINESSENCEANDTHEPEOPLESCONGRESSINAPPEARANCEISANINEVITABLECHOICEOFTHEGOVERNMENTA
37、UDITOFFICEUNDERTHECURRENTSYSTEMTHELEGISLATURETHEREFORECANNOTDIRECTLYEXERCISEAUDITSUPERVISIONANDCANONLYINDIRECTLYMONITORTHEFISCALBUDGETTHROUGHAUDITINGTHELEGISLATUREALSOLACKSOTHERPRACTICALAPPROACHESANDTOOLSFORMONITORINGTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFFISCALBUDGETSANDTHISLIMITSITSABILITYTOOBTAINANINSIGHTINTOTHEWORK
38、INGSOFFINANCIALSYSTEMSANDBUDGETIMPLEMENTATIONTHELEGISLATURECANTHEREFOREPLAYAVERYLIMITEDROLEINMONITORINGFINANCIALSYSTEMSANDFISCALBUDGETS3REFORMINGANDCONCLUSIONWECARRIEDOUTINTERVIEWSIN2002INORDERTOCOMPREHENDANDEVALUATETHECURRENTGOVERNMENTAUDITINGSYSTEMINCHINAANDIDENTIFYARATIONALANDFEASIBLEAPPROACHTORE
39、FORMINGTHESYSTEMWEALSOEXAMINEDTHEIMPACTOFTHERECENT“AUDITSTORM”ONTHEGOVERNMENTAUDITINGSYSTEMTHERESULTSOFOURINVESTIGATIONSHOWTHATTHECURRENTGOVERNMENTAUDITINGSYSTEMINCHINALACKSINDEPENDENCEANDTRANSPARENCYTHELACKOFINDEPENDENCEAFFECTSTHEOBJECTIVITYANDRELIABILITYOFAUDITINGWHICHISPARTICULARLYIMPORTANTWHENAU
40、DITINGTHEIMPLEMENTATION,USEANDCONTROLOFBUDGETEDFUNDSBYCENTRALANDREGIONALGOVERNMENTSITISTHISASPECTOFGOVERNMENTAUDITING7THATHASTHEGREATESTNEEDFORAUDITINDEPENDENCEOURANALYSISOFTHE“AUDITSTORM”SHOWSTHATITHASINCREASEDAUDITINGTRANSPARENCYANDATTRACTEDMUCHATTENTIONFROMTHEPUBLIC,THENPCOFFICIALS,ACADEMICS,ANDG
41、OVERNMENTOFFICIALSTOTHESERIOUSPROBLEMSINMANAGINGPUBLICFINANCEITHASALSOSHOWNTHATGOVERNMENTAUDITINGHASANIMPORTANTROLETOPLAYINPROTECTINGPUBLICINTERESTSHOWEVER,MERELYDRAWINGATTENTIONTOTHEPROBLEMSCANNOTPREVENTTHEMFROMRECURRINGALSO,GOVERNMENTCENSORSHIPMEANSTHATMANYPROBLEMSARENOTDISCLOSEDANDITHASPROVEDDIFF
42、ICULTTOEXTENDTHE“AUDITSTORM”TOLOCALAUDITBUREAUSALLTHESEWEAKNESSESAREROOTEDINTHELACKOFINDEPENDENCEINTHECURRENTGOVERNMENTAUDITINGSYSTEMTHE“LEGISLATUREAPPROACH”HASBEENWIDELYDISCUSSEDAMONGCHINESEACADEMICSALTHOUGHITEMPHASISESAUDITINDEPENDENCE,ITNEGLECTSTHECENTRALISEDNATUREOFTHEGOVERNMENTSTRUCTURE,THEPOLI
43、TICALTENSIONBETWEENTHEGOVERNMENTANDTHELEGISLATURE,ANDTHEPROBLEMSTHATTHELEGISLATUREITSELFFACESTHEREFORE,IMPLEMENTINGTHISAPPROACHINTHECURRENTPOLITICALCLIMATEMAYWEAKENTHEGOVERNMENTSECONOMICCONTROLANDREQUIREAMAJORRESTRUCTURINGOFTHEGOVERNMENTANDTHELEGISLATURE,THUSLACKINGPRACTICALITYANDFEASIBILITYTOSMOOTH
44、THISPROPOSEDTRANSITION,WEPUTFORWARDA“DUALTRACKSYSTEM”ASANINTERIMSTEPTOWARDAFULLYFLEDGEDLEGISLATURELEDSTATEAUDITSYSTEMOURPROPOSALSUGGESTSTHATTHELEGISLATUREANDTHEGOVERNMENTSHOULDSETUPSEPARATEAUDITORGANISATIONSTOEXERCISEDIFFERENTAUDITRESPONSIBILITIESTHE“DUALTRACKSYSTEM”TAKESINTOACCOUNTBOTHTHENEEDTOIMPR
45、OVEAUDITINDEPENDENCEANDTHEFEASIBILITYOFREFORMTHISAPPROACHSATISFIESTHEINCREASINGWILLOFTHECHINESELEGISLATURETOSTRENGTHENBUDGETAUDITINGWHILEATTHESAMETIMEMEETINGTHENEEDOFTHEGOVERNMENTTOMAINTAINSTRONGECONOMICCONTROLSOURCESUCHANGYANG,JASONZEZHONGXIAO,MAURICEPENDLEBURYGOVERNMENTAUDITINGINCHINAPROBLEMSANDRE
46、FORMNADVANCESINACCOUNTING,INCORPORATINGADVANCESININTERNATIONALACCOUNTING，2008，241191278译文中国政府审计问题和改革1、简介1949年后的30年，中华人民共和国经历了一系列重要大众政治运动,使它在世界各地极其孤立，特别是资本主义国家。在一个经济全面崩溃的边缘，中国将重点转移到经济发展，开始了以市场为导向的经济改革，并通过了1978年3月的门户开放政策，同时恢复政府审计与独立审计并取代了20世纪50年代所实行的监测机制。按照中华人民共和国1982年宪法规定，国家审计署（NAO）作为国务院的部门成立于1983年。此
47、外，区域审计办公室还成立了省，市，县政府部门。一个地区的政府审计办公室是根据双方的政府审计办公室在更高水平上监督区政府的领导。例如，一个省级政府审计办公室是受审计署和省级政府共同领导。在双重领导体制下，为省政府审计署，审计署的审计和监管提供指导和监督，而省政府提供资源和演习人员控制。此外，审计署经营在中央部委和分支机构网络非常大的直辖市审计根据中央的政府来管制各政府部门，机构，国有企业，其他关联机构。这些分支审计机关各部委由超大型城市设下的国家审计署直接领导。虽然在过去的20年，这个政府审计制度已给中国的经济改革开放做出了重大贡献（中国审计制度的研究小组，1999年），但是在面向世界时也遭受了
48、缺乏审计独立性的质疑。政府审计中存在的问题主要源于其下的行政机构（国务院）的直接控制之下。在这个制度下，各政府部门和官员可以在理论和实践中干扰政府审计，从而削弱了审计的客观性和公正性。然而，随着审计报告越来越多的使用，各级人民代表大会也开始重视其重要意义。与此同时，越来越多的纳税人开始注意他们的钱是如何由政府使用。虽然审计署的缺乏独立性一直是公司成立以来的问题，这个问题正在创造出越来越多的创造了电流，因为问责的政治环境日益引起了立法机关和纳税人的关注。政府与立法机关之间的关系受到损害责任的事实是审计人员不独立于政府的重大原因。由于存在这些问题，审计署已加紧在近几年的审计结果公开披露的水平。20
49、03年，审计署首次向公众披露了四个中央部委存在的严重财政问题。此披露和曝光的问题备受媒体的关注，“审计风暴”一次也由此而来。在2004年和20059年，在其年度报告中披露了审计署对中央其他部委的严重违法行为。然而，尽管这场风暴已在提请人们注意所发生的问题，但是审计独立性的一些有用的手段，只有一小部分的总暴露。此外，即使问题暴露出来，这并不能确保不会再发生同样的问题。因此，“审计风暴”已加深了对政府审计改革必要性的认识。2、当前政府审计制度审计改革已知的问题大部分受访者认为当前的政府审计的问题是与政府密切相关的，这实际上是一种行为的内部审计部门在政府的直接控制。以下各段阐述的访谈中发现的主要问题。（1）缺乏审计独立性我们的大多数受访者承认，审计署的一些人或组织从外面直接或间接干预。在审计发现的问题时，与审计结果公开，这些审计规划，培训和审计人员的任命，对审计任务的决心具有强大消极影响。因此，审计署也很难执行任何独立审计。一个审计局局长说道在审计中发现问题应依法处理，但如果问题涉及到政府，审计机关将将会干扰负责的政府官员或其他机关。一些受访者承认政府审计缺乏独立性，但同时他们也不想夸大这个问题。由政府指导的一个部门，审计机关如何能从政府或行政政府官员的干预中独立工作这是不可避免的结果。受访者觉得难以回答这些问题。此外，审计署和政府是在不同的行
