1、本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目INDUSTRIALPOLICYINANIMPERFECTWORLD出处JOURNALOFDEVELOPMENTECONOMICS作者ROLANDHODLERABSTRACTTHEORETICALANALYSESOFINDUSTRIALPOLICYNORMALLYRESTRICTTHERANGEOFPOSSIBLEOUTCOMESBYABSTRACTINGFROMEITHERMARKETORGOVERNMENTFAILURESTHISPAPERTHUSSTUDIESINDUSTRIALPOLICYANDITSEFFECTIVENESSINAMODELTHATINCL
2、UDESBOTHMARKETANDGOVERNMENTIMPERFECTIONSWEINTRODUCEAPUBLICAGENCYRESPONSIBLEFORINDUSTRIALPOLICYINTOTHEMODELOFHAUSMANNANDRODRIK2003,ANDASSUMETHATTHISAGENCYHASLIMITEDINFORMATIONANDISPARTLYPOLITICALLYMOTIVATEDWEFURTHEREXTENDTHEMODELTOALLOWTHEPUBLICAGENCYTOCOMMUNICATEWITHENTREPRENEURSANDTHEENTREPRENEURST
3、OENGAGEINRENTSEEKINGWEFINDTHATINDUSTRIALPOLICIESAREINEFFECTIVEIFTHEPUBLICAGENCYISPOORLYINFORMED,BUTTHATTHEYARENOTNECESSARILYINEFFECTIVEIFTHEPUBLICAGENCYISHIGHLYPOLITICALLYMOTIVATEDGIVENAHIGHLYPOLITICALLYMOTIVATEDPUBLICAGENCY,INDUSTRIALPOLICIESAREEFFECTIVEIFANDONLYIFTHEINSTITUTIONALSETTINGENSURESTHAT
4、SUCHPOLICIESAREMODESTEGBYRESTRICTINGTHEPUBLICAGENCYSBUDGETMOREOVER,OURMODELHELPSUSTOUNDERSTANDWHYTHESAMEINDUSTRIALPOLICIESTHATHAVEFAILEDELSEWHEREHAVEBEENRELATIVELYSUCCESSFULINSOUTHKOREAANDTAIWANINTRODUCTIONSOMEECONOMISTSSUGGESTTHATINDUSTRIALPOLICIESSHOULDBEUSEDINDEVELOPINGCOUNTRIESTOCIRCUMVENTMARKET
5、FAILURESTHATHINDERDEVELOPMENTOTHERSBELIEVETHATINDUSTRIALPOLICIESTHEMSELVESHINDERDEVELOPMENTBECAUSEOFGOVERNMENTFAILURESMOSTOFTHEEVIDENCEFROMTHEPOSTWORLDWARIIERASUPPORTSTHELATTERVIEWHOWEVER,THEREARESOMEEASTASIANCOUNTRIES,MOSTNOTABLYSOUTHKOREAANDTAIWAN,THATHAVEUSEDINDUSTRIALPOLICIESWIDELYANDTHATHAVEDEV
6、ELOPEDEXTRAORDINARILYFASTTHEREISNOCONSENSUS,BUTITISPLAUSIBLETHATINDUSTRIALPOLICIESHAVECONTRIBUTEDTOTHESECOUNTRIESEXTRAORDINARYPERFORMANCETWORELATEDQUESTIONSTHEREFOREARISEWHYHAVEINDUSTRIALPOLICIESBEENRELATIVELYSUCCESSFULINSOUTHKOREAANDTAIWANWHILETHEYHAVEFAILEDELSEWHEREAND,WHATINSTITUTIONALSETTINGMAKE
7、SINDUSTRIALPOLICIESEFFECTIVEINTHEIRSEARCHFORANSWERS,MANYSTUDIESINTHEVASTLITERATUREONINDUSTRIALPOLICIESFOCUSONTHERELATIVELYSUCCESSFULINDUSTRIALPOLICIESOFSOUTHKOREAANDTAIWANEGPACKANDWESTPHAL1986,AMSDEN1989,WADE1990,CHANG1994,ANDRODRIK1995AORCOMPARETHEINDUSTRIALPOLICIESOFTHESECOUNTRIESWITHTHELESSSUCCES
8、SFULINDUSTRIALPOLICIESOFOTHERSEGDATTACHAUDHURI1990,EVANS1995,ANDRODRIK1995BTHESESTUDIESFINDTHATTHEINDUSTRIALPOLICIESOFSOUTHKOREAANDTAIWANWERECHARACTERIZEDBYCOMPETENTBUREAUCRATS,INTENSIVECOMMUNICATIONBETWEENBUREAUCRATSANDENTREPRENEURS,SOCIALCOHESION,ANDHARD,AUTONOMOUSSTATESREADYTOCUTPUBLICSUPPORTFORU
9、NPROFITABLEPROJECTSTHEREISALSOALARGETHEORETICALLITERATUREONINDUSTRIALPOLICIESMOSTTHEORETICALCONTRIBUTIONSAREHOWEVERBASEDONMODELSTHATABSTRACTFROMEITHERMARKETORGOVERNMENTFAILURES,WHICHINGENERALRESTRICTSTHERANGEOFPOSSIBLEOUTCOMESIFTHEREARENOMARKETFAILURES,INDUSTRIALPOLICIESCANBYASSUMPTIONNOTDOMUCHGOOD,
10、ANDIFTHEREARENOGOVERNMENTFAILURES,INDUSTRIALPOLICIESCANBYASSUMPTIONNOTBEMISMANAGEDORMISUSEDTOOURKNOWLEDGE,THEONLYCONTRIBUTIONANALYZINGINDUSTRIALPOLICIESINASETTINGWITHMARKETANDGOVERNMENTFAILURESISADESANDDITELLA1997SHOWINGTHATTHEDIRECTPOSITIVEEFFECTSOFINDUSTRIALPOLICIESONINVESTMENTARESUBSTANTIALLYMITI
11、GATEDBYANINCREASEINCORRUPTIONBUTSINCETHEIRMODELSERVESPRIMARILYTOMOTIVATETHEIREMPIRICALANALYSIS,ITISKEPTFAIRLYSIMPLEWEATTEMPTAFURTHERSTEPTOWARDSANINDUSTRIALPOLICYMODELTHATALLOWSFORBOTHMARKETANDGOVERNMENTFAILURESANDTHATISSUFFICIENTLYRICHTOANSWERTHEQUESTIONSPOSEDABOVEOURINDUSTRIALPOLICYMODELBUILDSONHAU
12、SMANNANDRODRIK2003INTHEIRMODEL,THEPROFITABILITYOFVARIOUSACTIVITIESISUNCERTAINANDTHESOCIALRETURNSONDISCOVERINGAPROFITABLEACTIVITYEXCEEDPRIVATERETURNSSINCEOTHERENTREPRENEURSCANEASILYCOPYTHEENTREPRENEURWHODISCOVEREDTHATACERTAINACTIVITYISPROFITABLEINTHEGIVENECONOMYASARESULT,TOOFEWENTREPRENEURSENGAGEINTH
13、ECOSTLYSEARCHFORPROFITABLEACTIVITIESUNDERLAISSEZFAIRESUCHTHATINDUSTRIALPOLICIESTARGETEDATENTREPRENEURSSEARCHINGFORPROFITABLEACTIVITIESCOULDPOTENTIALLYINCREASEWELFAREANDFOSTERDEVELOPMENTWEINTRODUCEAPUBLICAGENCYINTOASIMPLIFIEDVERSIONOFTHEHAUSMANNRODRIKMODELANDEQUIPTHISAGENCYWITHANINDUSTRIALPOLICYINSTR
14、UMENTSINCE”GOVERNMENTSARENOTOMNISCIENT,SELFLESSSOCIALGUARDIANS”KRUEGER1990,P11,ASCRITICSOFINDUSTRIALPOLICIESRIGHTLYCLAIM,WEASSUMETHATTHISPUBLICAGENCYHASLIMITEDINFORMATIONANDTHATITDOESNOTONLYCAREABOUTSOCIALWELFARE,BUTALSOABOUTPOLITICALMOTIVESWHICHLEADITTOSUPPORTENTREPRENEURSWHOAREPOLITICALLYCLOSERATH
15、ERTHANTHOSEWHOAREMOREDISTANTTHISRELATESOURMODELTOTHESEMINALCONTRIBUTIONOFGROSSMANANDHELPMAN1994,WHICHANALYZESTRADEPOLICIESUNDERTHEASSUMPTIONTHATPUBLICAUTHORITIESCAREABOUTSOCIALWELFAREANDABOUTCERTAINPOLITICALMOTIVESTHEMAINFINDINGSFROMOURINDUSTRIALPOLICYMODELARETHATIFTHEPUBLICAGENCYISPOORLYINFORMED,IN
16、DUSTRIALPOLICIESAREINEFFECTIVEOREVENHARMFUL,BUTTHATTHISISNOTNECESSARILYSOIFTHEPUBLICAGENCYISHIGHLYPOLITICALLYMOTIVATEDGIVENAHIGHLYPOLITICALLYMOTIVATEDPUBLICAGENCY,INDUSTRIALPOLICIESINCREASEWELFAREANDFOSTERDEVELOPMENTIFANDONLYIFTHEPUBLICAGENCYHASASMALLBUDGETORARELATIVELYHOSTILEATTITUDETOWARDSENTREPRE
17、NEURSPOLITICALLYMOTIVATEDAGENCIESARETHUSNOTAREASONTOABSTAINFROMINDUSTRIALPOLICIESALTOGETHER,BUTAREASONFORANINSTITUTIONALSETTINGTHATENSURESTHATSUCHPOLICIESAREMODESTSEVERALOTHERFINDINGSHELPINUNDERSTANDINGWHYINDUSTRIALPOLICIESHAVEBEENRELATIVELYSUCCESSFULINSOUTHKOREAANDTAIWANFIRST,WEFINDTHATHIGHLYCOMPET
18、ENTBUREAUCRATS,ASOBSERVEDINTHESETWOCOUNTRIES,RAISETHEEFFECTIVENESSOFINDUSTRIALPOLICIESBYINCREASINGTHESUPPORTFORPROJECTSTHATAREEXPECTEDTOBEPROFITABLEASWELLASTHESHAREOFPROJECTSTHATAREEXPECTEDTOBEPROFITABLEANDTHATTURNOUTTOBESOTHEREASONFORTHEFORMERISTHATHIGHERCOMPETENCEANDBETTERINFORMATIONMAKEITMORECOST
19、LYFORTHEPUBLICAGENCYINTERMSOFFOREGONEWELFARETOSUPPORTCLOSEENTREPRENEURSWITHPROJECTSITEXPECTSTOBEUNPROFITABLESECOND,WEFINDTHATINDUSTRIALPOLICIESAREMOREEFFECTIVE,THELOWERTHEVARIABILITYINTHEENTREPRENEURSDISTANCESFROMTHEPUBLICAGENCYTHEETHNICHOMOGENEITYINSOUTHKOREAANDALSOINTAIWANMAYTHUSHAVECONTRIBUTEDTOT
20、HESUCCESSOFTHESECOUNTRIESINDUSTRIALPOLICIESWEEXTENDOURMODELINTWODIRECTIONSFIRST,WEINVESTIGATEWHATHAPPENSWHENTHEPUBLICAGENCYCANTALKTOENTREPRENEURSABOUTTHEIRPROJECTSWEFINDTHATCOMMUNICATIONENABLESTHEPUBLICAGENCYTOLEARNMOREABOUTTHEDIFFERENTPROJECTSEVENIFENTREPRENEURSWITHUNPROFITABLEPROJECTSCANOFTENCONVI
21、NCETHEPUBLICAGENCYTHATTHEIRPROJECTSAREPROFITABLEABENEVOLENTPUBLICAGENCYTHUSCOMMUNICATESWITHENTREPRENEURS,WHICHRAISESTHEEFFECTIVENESSOFINDUSTRIALPOLICIES,WHILEAPURELYPOLITICALLYMOTIVATEDPUBLICAGENCYHASNOINCENTIVETODOSOSECOND,WEINVESTIGATEWHATHAPPENSWHENENTREPRENEURSCANENGAGEINCOSTLYRENTSEEKINGACTIVIT
22、IESTOCOMECLOSERTOTHEPUBLICAGENCYWEFINDTHATRENTSEEKINGCANLEADTOASOCIALLYSUPERIORALLOCATIONOFTHEPUBLICAGENCYSBUDGETIFTHISBUDGETISSMALLORIFBENEFITSFROMPUBLICSUPPORTARELOWFORENTREPRENEURSWITHUNPROFITABLEPROJECTSTHEFORMERIMPLIESTHATTHEPOTENTIALPRESENCEOFRENTSEEKINGISYETANOTHERREASONFORENSURINGTHATINDUSTR
23、IALPOLICIESAREMODESTPOLICYANDINSTITUTIONALIMPLICATIONSINTHISSECTION,WEDISCUSSONTHEBASISOFOURTHEORETICALFINDINGSWHATINSTITUTIONALSETTINGSHOULDBECHOSENTOMAKEINDUSTRIALPOLICIESEFFECTIVEAFIRSTSETOFIMPLICATIONSFOLLOWSFROMTHERESULTTHATTHEWELFAREEFFECTOFINDUSTRIALPOLICYINCREASESINTHEQUALITYQGOFTHEIPASSIGNA
24、LSANDTHATINDUSTRIALPOLICYCANONLYRAISEWELFAREIFQGISSUFFICIENTLYHIGHTHEIPASHOULDTHUSBEEQUIPPEDWITHCOMPETENTSTAFFFURTHER,THEINSTITUTIONALSETTINGSHOULDENABLEANDENCOURAGETHEIPATOCOLLECTACCURATEINFORMATIONABOUTTHEDIFFERENTPROJECTSANDTOCOMMUNICATEWITHENTREPRENEURSASTHISWILLALLOWTHEIPATOUPDATEITSBELIEFSABOU
25、TTHEDIFFERENTPROJECTSPROFITABILITYEVENIFENTREPRENEURSOFTENMISLEADITHOWEVER,IFALLTHESEMEASURESAREINADEQUATETOMAKETHEIPASUFFICIENTLYWELLINFORMEDTOENABLEINDUSTRIALPOLICYTOWORK,THENTHERESHOULDBENOINDUSTRIALPOLICYSINCETHEWELFAREEFFECTOFINDUSTRIALPOLICYFURTHERINCREASESINTHEIPASBENEVOLENCE,THEINSTITUTIONAL
26、SETTINGSHOULDBEDESIGNEDSUCHTHATTHEIPABEHAVESASBENEVOLENTLYASPOSSIBLEBECAUSEPOLITICALLYMOTIVATEDPOLICIESPERSISTINMANYLESSDEVELOPEDCOUNTRIES,THISINSIGHTISNOTPARTICULARLYHELPFULBUTOURMODELFURTHERSUGGESTSTHATINDUSTRIALPOLICIESHAVEAPOSITIVEEFFECTONWELFAREEVENIFTHEIPAISHIGHLYPOLITICALLYMOTIVATEDGIVENTHATT
27、HEINSTITUTIONALSETTINGALLOWSONLYFORMODESTINDUSTRIALPOLICIESMODESTINDUSTRIALPOLICIESAREEFFECTIVEBECAUSEANYIPATHATCARESATLEASTMARGINALLYABOUTSOCIALWELFARESUPPORTSFIRSTPROJECTSITEXPECTSTOBEPROFITABLEMODESTINDUSTRIALPOLICIESCANMOSTEASILYBEACHIEVEDBYRESTRICTINGTHEIPASBUDGETPROPOSITION4IMPLIESTHATTHEWELFA
28、REEFFECTOFINDUSTRIALPOLICYISMAXIMIZEDIFTHEBUDGETSHOULDTHEREFORENOTONLYBESMALLER,THEMOREPOLITICALLYMOTIVATEDTHEIPA,BUTALSOTHEWORSEITSINFORMATION,THEHIGHERTHEVARIABILITYINTHEENTREPRENEURSDISTANCESFROMTHEIPA,THERARERPROFITABLEPROJECTSANDTHELOWERTHESOCIALRETURNSTOTHESEPROJECTSALTERNATIVELY,ONECANATTAINM
29、ODESTINDUSTRIALPOLICIES,IEINDUSTRIALPOLICIESTHATINCREASEWELFAREEVENIFTHEIPAISHIGHLYPOLITICALLYMOTIVATED,BYAPPOINTINGBUREAUCRATSWITHARELATIVELYHOSTILEATTITUDETOWARDSENTREPRENEURS,IEBYMAKINGRELATIVELYLOWNOTICETHESIMILARITYTOTHEWELLKNOWNARGUMENTTHATSOCIETYMAYBEBESTSERVEDBYACONSERVATIVECENTRALBANKERTHEP
30、OSSIBLEPRESENCEOFRENTSEEKINGISYETANOTHERREASONFORENSURINGTHATINDUSTRIALPOLICIESAREMODESTBECAUSEENTREPRENEURSWITHPROFITABLEPROJECTSARETHENMORELIKELYTOENGAGEINRENTSEEKINGTHANTHOSEWITHUNPROFITABLEPROJECTS,WHICH,INTURN,LEADSTOASOCIALLYSUPERIORALLOCATIONOFTHEIPASBUDGETTHESAMECOULDALTERNATIVELYBEACHIEVEDB
31、YENSURINGTHATBENEFITSFROMPUBLICSUPPORTARESMALLIFNOTZEROFORENTREPRENEURSWITHUNPROFITABLEPROJECTSTHISHOWEVERISPROBABLYMOREDIFFICULTTOENFORCETHANALIMITEDBUDGETFINALLY,ITSHOULDBEBORNEINMINDTHATTHEGOVERNMENTORTHEIPACOULD,UNDERCERTAINCONDITIONS,FOSTERDEVELOPMENTWITHOUTACTIVEINTERVENTIONSSIMPLYBYSHARINGITS
32、KNOWLEDGESINCETHISPASSIVEPOLICYREQUIRESNOPUBLICINVESTMENTINTOPRIVATEPROJECTS,ITISMOREDIFFICULTTOMISUSEITMIGHTTHEREFOREBEASERIOUSALTERNATIVETOACTIVEINDUSTRIALPOLICIESGIVENTHATITCOULDINDEEDFOSTERDEVELOPMENTIFPUBLICINVESTMENTCOSTSANDTHEIPASPOLITICALMOTIVATIONARERELATIVELYHIGHCONCLUSIONSWEHAVEPRESENTEDA
33、NINDUSTRIALPOLICYMODELWITHBOTHMARKETANDGOVERNMENTFAILURESONTHEONEHAND,THISMODELHELPSUSTOUNDERSTANDWHYTHESAMEINDUSTRIALPOLICIESTHATHAVEFAILEDELSEWHEREHAVEBEENRELATIVELYSUCCESSFULINSOUTHKOREAANDTAIWANITSHOWSHOWCOMPETENTBUREAUCRATS,ETHNICHOMOGENEITYAMONGENTREPRENEURS,INTENSIVECOMMUNICATIONBETWEENBUREAU
34、CRATSANDENTREPRENEURS,ANDTHEREADINESSTOCUTPUBLICSUPPORTFORUNPROFITABLEPROJECTSMAYALLHAVECONTRIBUTEDTOTHESUCCESSOFINDUSTRIALPOLICIESINTHESECOUNTRIESONTHEOTHERHAND,THISMODELPROVIDESSOMEGUIDANCEASTOTHEINSTITUTIONALSETTINGUNDERWHICHINDUSTRIALPOLICIESMAYWORKINPARTICULAR,ITHASHIGHLIGHTEDANASYMMETRYINHOWDI
35、FFERENTGOVERNMENTFAILURESSHOULDBEHANDLEDINCOMPETENTPUBLICAGENCIESSHOULDLEADTOTHEABANDONMENTOFINDUSTRIALPOLICIESSINCETHEYRENDERANYINDUSTRIALPOLICYINEFFECTIVE,WHEREASHIGHLYPOLITICALLYMOTIVATEDPUBLICAGENCIESAREMERELYAREASONFORMODESTINDUSTRIALPOLICIESGIVENTHATTHEPUBLICAGENCIESBUDGETISSUFFICIENTLYSMALLOR
36、THATPUBLICAGENCIESARESUFFICIENTLYHOSTILE,INDUSTRIALPOLICIESAREEFFECTIVEEVENIFPUBLICAGENCIESAREHIGHLYPOLITICALLYMOTIVATED,BECAUSEANYPUBLICAGENCYFIRSTSUPPORTSCLOSEENTREPRENEURSWITHPROJECTSITEXPECTSTOBEPROFITABLETHISLATTERRESULTASKSFORANUANCEDVIEWONINDUSTRIALPOLICIESTHOSEWHOCLAIMTHATINDUSTRIALPOLICIESC
37、ANNOTWORKBECAUSEOFRAMPANTGOVERNMENTFAILURESSHOULDBEAWARETHATMODESTINDUSTRIALPOLICIESMAYEVENWORKIFPUBLICAGENCIESAREHIGHLYPOLITICALLYMOTIVATEDANDTHOSEWHOCLAIMTHATINDUSTRIALPOLICIESARENECESSARYTOCIRCUMVENTRAMPANTMARKETFAILURESSHOULDBEAWARETHATINREALITYMODESTINDUSTRIALPOLICIESWILLBEMORELIKELYTOWORKTHANG
38、ENEROUSINDUSTRIALPOLICIESNOTICETHATTHISIMPLICATIONISINSTARKCONTRASTTOTHEBELIEFTHATSUCCESSFULDEVELOPMENTREQUIRESTHEGOVERNMENTORINTERNATIONALDONORSTOFINANCEABIGPUSHEVENTHOUGHOURMODELHASPROVEDHELPFULTOGETREASONABLEANSWERSTOTHEQUESTIONSPOSEDINTHEINTRODUCTION,WEARECONVINCEDTHATFURTHERRESEARCHONTHEINTERAC
39、TIONSBETWEENMARKETANDGOVERNMENTFAILURESISNEEDEDTOIMPROVEOURUNDERSTANDINGOFTHEPOSSIBILITIESANDDANGERSASSOCIATEDWITHINDUSTRIALPOLICIESWETHINKTHATOURMODELCOULDPROVIDEAGOODBASISFORTHISRESEARCHFINALLY,WEWOULDLIKETOHIGHLIGHTTWOPOLICYIMPLICATIONSFORINTERNATIONALDONORSTHATFOLLOWFROMOURMODELFIRST,INTERNATION
40、ALDONORSSHOULDCONVINCEGOVERNMENTSINDEVELOPINGCOUNTRIESTOCHOOSEANADEQUATEINSTITUTIONALSETTINGFORTHEIRINDUSTRIALPOLICIESTHISENTAILSABANDONINGINDUSTRIALPOLICIESIFPUBLICAGENCIESLACKCOMPETENCE,ANDCHOOSINGMODESTINDUSTRIALPOLICIESIFPUBLICAGENCIESAREHIGHLYPOLITICALLYMOTIVATEDSECOND,FORTHESAMEREASONSINTERNAT
41、IONALDONORSSHOULDNOTPROVIDEFINANCIALAIDFOREXTENSIVEINDUSTRIALPOLICIESCONDUCTEDBYINCOMPETENTORHIGHLYPOLITICALLYMOTIVATEDPUBLICAGENCIESBUTINSOFARASCONVINCINGGOVERNMENTSANDPUBLICAGENCIESREQUIRESFINANCIAL”INCENTIVES”,THESEPOLICYIMPLICATIONSAREPARTLYCONFLICTING译文产业政策的不完美的世界摘要产业政策的理论分析，通常限制了范围由政府或抽象市场而导致失
42、败。因此本文在研究产业政策和其有效性的一个模式（包括市场和政府）的不完善之处时，我们引入一个公共机构，负责把产业政策模型HAUSMANN和RODRIK（2003年），并假设该机构有限的信息和部分政治动机。我们进一步扩展模型，使公共机构的沟通与企业家从事寻租。我们发现产业政策是无效的，如果是不好的公共机构通知。但他们不一定是无效的，如果市民机构是高度政治动机。给定一个高度政治目标的公共机构，产业政策是有效的，当且仅当机构设置，确保这些政策通过重新温和如限制公共机构的预算。此外，我们的模型可以帮助我们明白，为什么在其他地方有没有同样的产业政策和韩国和台湾一样成功。一、简介一些经济学家建议，应在产业
43、政策用于发展国家规避市场失灵，阻碍发展。其他相信自己的产业政策阻碍发展，因为政府失灵。大部分从后二战时期的证据支持后者考证，但是，也有一些东亚国家，最显著的是韩国和台湾，已使用的工业政策相当广泛，并且发展非常快速。虽然并无共识，但它是合理的，工业政策促成了这些国家的非凡功能。因此出现两个相关的问题为什么要在产业政策比较成功的，韩国台湾虽然他们没有其他地方吗而且，什么机构设置使产业政策有效在他们的答案中，在许多工业大量文献检索研究政策的重点是比较成功的产业政策韩国和台湾（如包和韦斯特法尔1986年，阿姆斯登1989年，韦德1990年，张1994年，罗德里克1995年）或比较这些产业政策与别人的不
44、太成功的产业政策的国家（如达塔乔德赫瑞1990年，埃文斯1995年，罗德里克1995年）。通过这些研究发现，韩国和台湾的产业政策进行了表征主管官僚，官僚之间的沟通和集约化企业家，社会凝聚力和勤奋，自主的国家准备削减公众支持无利可图的项目。还有一个大型的产业政策理论文献。然而大多数的理论贡献是抽象模型基础上的市场或政府失灵，这在一般的限制范围可能的结果如果没有市场失灵，产业政策可通过假设没有多少好；如果没有政府的失败，产业政策可以通过假设不能管理不善或滥用。据我们所知，唯一的贡献分析与市场和政府制定产业政策是失败。迪特利亚阿德斯（1997年）认为，该投资产业政策的直接正面影响是腐败的大幅增加。他
45、们的模型主要是为了激励他们提供实证分析，它是保持相当简单。我们尝试对工业政策模式，允许以进一步加强市场和政府失败和足够丰富的回答上面提出的问题我们的工业政策模型基于HAUSMANN和RODRIK（2003年）。在他们的模型是不确定的各项活动的盈利能力和社会回报发现一项有利可图的活动超过私人返回，因为其他企业家可以轻松地将复制发现某一项活动是在给定的经济中获利的企业家。因此，太少企业家在昂贵的搜索聘请下放任这种有利可图的活动产业政策是针对企业家寻找有利可图的活动可能增加福利和促进发展。我们HAUSMANNRODRIK模型的简化版本中引入的一个公共机构，该机构具备工业政策的工具。因为“政府不是无所
46、不知，无私的社会监护人“（克鲁格1990年，第11页）。像工业政策的批评者正确地说，我们假定此公共机构具有有限的信息和它不只关心社会福利，但也对导致它支持企业家的政治动机谁在政治上接近，而不是那些谁更遥远。这涉及GROSSMAN和HELPMAN（1994年）的模型，其中分析公共当局关心社会福利和某些政治动机的假设下的贸易政策的贡献。从我们的产业政策模型的主要发现是，如果公共机构是不明智，产业政策是无效或甚至有害，但这不一定是这样如果公共机构是高度政治动机。给予高度政治动机的公共机构，工业政策提高福利和促进发展当且仅当公共机构有一个小的预算（或企业家的相对敌对态度）。出于政治动机的机构是因此不完
47、全，弃权的工业政策的一个原因，但一个机构设置的理由可以确保这种政策是温和。其他几个研究结果有助于理解为什么产业政策在韩国和台湾相对成功。首先，我们发现高素质的官僚，因为在这两个的国家提高工业政策的成效所增加的工程项目，预计将会有利可图，以及共享的项目，预计将会有利可图，将得到支持。前者的理由是，更高的能力和更好的信息使它更昂贵的支持项目预计可赢利，与此密切的企业家项目预计将无利可图。第二，我们发现的工业政策的更有效的公共机构的企业家的距离的低变异性。在韩国和台湾的民族均匀性因此可能造成这些国家的工业政策的成功。我们扩展我们的模型在两个方向首先，我们调查公共机构可以在向企业家谈他们的项目时，预计
48、会发生什么情况。我们发现，沟通使公众更多地了解机构不同的项目，即使不盈利的项目，与企业家经常说服公众机构，他们的项目是有利可图的。因此，仁慈的公共机构与企业家进行通信，引发工业的政策的成效，而纯粹出于政治动机的公共机构有没有动力去这样做。第二，我们研究时会发现什么样的企业家可以从事昂贵的寻租活动，以更接近公共机构。我们发现寻租可能导致一个社会上级分配的公共机构预算如果这份预算案是小或者受益于公众的支持是低企业家不盈利的项目。前者意味着，可能存在寻租又是因此，确保产业政策是温和的。二、政策和体制影响在这一节中我们讨论我们的理论研究结果的基础上，使有效的工业政策应选择什么机构的设置。第一组的影响下
49、，社会福利效应的结果在投资促进机构的信号质量资历组别的增加和产业政策产业政策只能提高福利，如果QG是足够高。在国际出版商协会因此应配备主管人员，此外，该机构设置应允许和鼓励投资促进机构，以收集准确的信息对不同的项目，并与企业家沟通，这将允许国际救援更新对不同项目的盈利其信仰即使企业家往往误导。但是，如果所有这些措施都不足以使，投资促进机构的充分了解，使工业政策，以工作，然后应该没有产业政策。自从IPA的产业政策进一步增加投资促进机构的税收，这样，国际出版商协会作为体恤尽可能的行为，应设计机构的设置。因为很多的（较不发达）国家出于政治动机的政策坚持，这种认识是不是特别有帮助的。但我们的模型进一步表明工业政策有积极福利的影响，即使在国际出版商协会是高度政治动机的因为该机构设置允许仅为温和的工业政策。温和的工业政策是有效的因为任何至少轻微关心社会福利的投资促进机构支持预计有利可图的第一个项目。温和的工业政策最容易通过限制国际出版商协会的预算。建议4意味着工业政策的福利影响处于最大化状态，如果。预算应该因此不只是更小，更多出于政治动机的的国际出版商协会但也，更糟的是其信息、较高的国际出版商协会、罕见的盈利项目和低社会企业家的距离变化返回到这些项目。另外，可以达到适度的产业政策，即工业即使是增加福利的IPA是高度政治动机，政策任命本着对企
