1、 外文翻译 原文 Industry cluster of different theories of judgment: sexual unscramble Material: http:/ 2.1Standard Agglomeration Theorv.From Marshall Onwards Marshall,in his writings on Sheffield .Lancashire and other British regions,viewed the main source of external economies as the commons,the infrastru
2、cture and other services from which each individual firm in an industrial district might draw.Examples include,in modern term inology ,improved job matching,more favorable access to capital finance and inter-firm labor migration.The availability of such common resources to a number of firms then enh
3、ances their size and diversity as both capital and labor are attracted to such areas to exploit the larger markets for their services.This in turn leads to reductions in factor prices and in creases in factor productivities .These are the ways in which the external benefit to firms of a location in
4、the industrial district manifests itself.Unit production costs will be lower within the industrial district out with it. Parallel to his studies of industrial organization,in the various editions of his Principle of Economices,Marshall helped develop what was to become standard agglomeration theory.
5、This was then built upon subsequently by a number of writers.For exampie,Scitovsky identified a further category of pecuniary external economies,Perrous contributed his famous theory of growth poles,and Chinitz applied the notion of agglomeration economies to the economic development of New York and
6、 Pittsburgh.More recently,Krugman has emphasized the importance of increasing returnas as a favorable condition for the development of external economies.Porter can also be understood as belonging to this lineage in the sense that external economies make up many of the key relationships winth his fa
7、mous diamond. Standard agglomeration theory provides an expianation of why firms might cluster together,sharing a commons of business service and a diversified labour force,and forming extensive local linkages with other firms.However,it conforms to neo-classical theory in that local economies are v
8、iewed as collections of stomistic businesses,aware of one another solely through the intermediation of price singnals.Firms continue to compete with each other althong Marshall was keen to warn of the risks that firms collaboration,in the development of shared inputs,risked blunting competitive forc
9、es. 2.2Transaction Cost:TheCalifornion school In the writings of the Californion school,the disintegration of productive systems leads to an increase in firms transacion costs.Changes in market and of being locked into redundant technologies. The response of deepening the organizational division of
10、labour leads to an incresse in the number of formal market transactioms external to the firm.There may also be an increase in the unpredictability and complexity of transactions.The costs of carryying out certain types of transaction-especially those where tacit knowledge is important or trust is re
11、quired and thus complete contracting is impossible-varies systematically with distance.thus,agglomeration is the result of the minimization of these types of transactions costs in a situation where such minimization outweighs other production cost differentials. The Californian school sought to expl
12、ain agglomerations of economic activity.The argument centered on the localiization of traded interdependencies-or simple input-output relation-but this is at best only a partial explanation,not leastin being unable to distinguish convincingly between goodand bad agglomerations.Agglomerations have be
13、en found in high wage,technologically advanced industries and low wage technologically stagnant ones alike while there are technologically dynamic agglomerations which lack the dense inter-fire linkages and coordinating institutions of a new industrial district. Nor is it clear whether markets will
14、succeed in coordinating transactions within clusters.The managemment of traded interdependencies is exactly what we think of as the business of markets but there may nevertheless be market failure.Thus,certain“transactions-in labor markets,in inter-firm relations,in innovation and knowledge developm
15、ent-tended to have points of failure in the absence of appropriate institutions”。 With this concern for the institutional arrangements within clusters,theCalifornian schoolcame to share certain of the arguments of the flexible specialization theorists who are discussed next and the institutional and
16、 evolutionary who are considered shortly. 2.3Flexible Specialization,Trust and Untraded Interdependencies While neo-classical economics views firms as atomistic businesses,aware of one anthor only through formal market signals,modern industrial distrial theory emphasize the interdependence of firms,
17、flexible firm boundaries,and the importance of trust in creating and sustaining collaborqtion between economic actors within the districts. These themes arose first in the literature on flexible specialization in the Third Italy but was later extended to Baden-Wu rtemberg and other regions .The sour
18、ces of flexibility lay in collaborative networks of small firms and supporting institutions.These networks permitted the estsbilshment of trust between actors,a crucial argument within most contemporary approaches to clusters.The reasoning is that firms within networks of trust benefit from the reci
19、procal exchange of information-particularly tacit information that cannot be codified-but are simult aneously bound by ties of obligation which regulate behavior.Trust thus reinforces mutually beneficial relationships between firms.The implicit assumption is that trust is more likely to be sustained
20、 in geographically concentrated networks than more disperate ones. Firms may cooperate in seeking to get new work and may bid together on large projects. They may from consortia to access cheaper finance.They may jointly purchase materials and conduct or c3ommission joint research.They may plan toge
21、ther and receive technical,financial and other services from thecommons.However,despite all these examples of cooperative relationships,founded on or reinforced by trust ,because they remain privately owned businesses,firms within clusters continue To compete,with one another and other firms,often m
22、ore on quality than price. The embedding of economic relating into a wider social framework appears to be most common where business activity is conditioned by local politics,religion and close kingship and friendship relationships.Thus,“it is probably not a coincidence that the most successful dist
23、ricts have tended to be the most racially homogeneous”.Equally,nature economic,legal and policy traditions are relevent.The development of inter-firm cooperation is more likely in some countries,such as Italy ,than in others,such as the Uk,because of differences in the operation of labor markets and
24、 competition policy. According to theorists such as Granovetter,trust arises from the digestionof experience .Trust accumulates from repeated interactions between firms and other actors in which they contract,formally and informally,strike deals,and help each other out at times of crisis.Trust resul
25、ts from a process of learning through experience which actors can be relied upon.Personal contact facilitates such reqeated interactions and this in turn is likely to depend on proximity.This focus on untraded interdependeccies is wery differennt to the transactions costs approach to agglomeration.T
26、he latter concerns the cost minimization of traded relations while untraded interdependencies point to wider processes of the optimization of non-market or non-contract exchanges. Finally,it is important to note that untraded interdependencies can not noly facilitate effective collective learning an
27、d action but also impede it. Especially where familior conventions become well established,sclerosiscan set in .Areas can become locked into outdate and inferior teachnologies and institutions. 译文 产业集群：对不同理论的判断性解读 资料来源 :http:/ 2.1 标准的聚焦理论 从马歇尔开始。从马歇尔起马歇尔，在他的写作在谢菲尔德。兰开夏郡，其他的英国地区的著作中认为外部经济主要来源是共同的，即个体
28、企业在一个产业地区可能享有的基础设施和其他服务等。用现代术语来阐述，例如增加的工作寻找和匹配机会，更加便捷的融资通道和企业之间的劳动力转移。因为被吸引到这个地区的资本和劳动力开拓了更广阔的市场，所以对大量的企业而言，这些共享资源的可获得性提高了企业的规模和多样性。这些 反而导致了要素价格的减少或者要素生产效率的增加。这就是在一个地区产业集群内，企业获得外部利益的方式。单位生产成本在一个产业区内将低于在产业区之外。 与他的产业组织理论类似的，马歇尔在他的各种版本的经济型原理书中，发展了标准的聚焦理论。之后的很多理论发展都是基于这个标准聚焦理论。例如进一步认证了无偿劳动的外部经济的种类，发表了著名
29、的增长极理论，将聚焦经济设想应用于了纽约和匹兹堡的经济发展中，更近的，开始强调增加收益的重要性 外部经济的发展的有利条件。也被理解在其著名的钻石理论中，认为外部经济占有极 其重要的位置。 标准的聚焦理论试图解释为什么企业会聚集在一起，分享共同的商业服务和多样化的劳动力，与当地的企业建立广泛联系。然而，与新古典主义一致的是，俩者都认为当地经济只是由很多微型商业所组成的集合体，彼此之间通过价格或者成本信号为媒介机制来观察。尽管马歇尔已经预警在投入共享发展过程中，企业合作将面临日益钝化的竞争力风险，但是企业之间还是不断的进行竞争，在发展共同投入时，风险将减弱竞争的力量。 2.2 交易成本 加州学派
30、在加州学派的著作中，生产力系统的分散性导致了企业交易成本的提高。市场和技术条件 的变化增加了不确定性，加大了劳动力和资本过剩以及被过剩技术锁定的风险。对深化劳动力组织分散的反映导致企业外正常市场交易数量的增加，甚至会增加交易的不确定性和复杂性。实施特定交易类型 特别是那些需要默契和相互信赖，因此完全合同又是不可能的交易成本，会随着距离不同而出现系统性差异。因此集聚是最小化此类交易成本的产物，因此此类最小化超过了其他生产成本的差异。所以，在交易成本最小化超过其他生产成本差异时，集聚就是最小化这些交易成本类型的结果。 加州学派试图对现存的经济聚焦活动寻求解释。他们争论的焦点集中于贸易依赖的本地根植
31、性，单最多也只是部分解释，至少能信服地给出好和坏集群之间的区别。有高工资、技术先进的产业，低工资且技术停滞的产业，同时也存在技术上很有活力但缺乏新产业区应有的企业间联系和协调机构的产业。 然而市场是否会在协调集群内交易方面获得成功，仍然是不明显的。交易依赖性管理正如我们所看到的市场商业一样，也存在着市场失灵。因此在缺乏适当的机构的情况下，交易在劳动力市场、在企业内部联系、在创新和知识发展方面的将倾向于出现失灵出于对集群内机构安排 担忧，加州学派与提倡灵活专业化的专家，制度和演化经济学家在某些观点上具有相似之处，这两个学派在接下来将会谈到。 2.3 灵活的专业化， 信赖和非贸易相互依赖性。新古典
32、学派企业为微型商业体，企业间仅仅通过正常的市场信号来观察彼此，现代产业区域理论强调企业间的相互依赖，灵活的企业边界和信任在创造和维系区域经济主体之间合作的重要作用。 这个议题的文字记载最早出现在“第三意大利”的灵活专业化理论中，但是之后在巴登 -符腾堡和其他地方得到拓展。灵活性来源于小企业和协助机构的合作网络。这些网络允许主体之间信任 感的建立，而这个信任感恰恰是通向集群的现代途径的竞争焦点。这其中的推论过程是这样的，在相互信任网络内，企业得益于信息的相互交换，特别是那些不能制宪的默契信息，但是同时又受到规范企业行为的义务约束。信任因此加强了企业间的利益关系。其中的隐含假设是信任更有可能发生在
33、地域上集中而不是分散的网路上。 企业间可能会为寻找新项目而进行合作或者由一个大的工程项目建立联系。他们可能会合伙以获得更便宜的融资方式，相互合作购买原料或主导共同研究，一起计划并取得来自于公共物品上的技术上，财务上等的服务。然而，尽管有这么多 由信任建立或者加强企业间合作关系的例子，但是因为这些企业仍然是私有企业，集群内企业间仍然存在着彼此之间的竞争，这种竞争更关注与质量而不是价格。 在商业活动以地方政策，地域和亲密的亲戚和朋友关系为条件的地区，经济关系逐渐牢固以致发展成为更加广阔的社会框架的现象是最普遍的。因此，“最成功的地域往往是那些在民族和文化上和谐的区域往往不是偶然”。同样的，民族经济
34、，法律和政策传统是相关的。由于劳动力市场运行机制和竞争政策的差异，企业间相互合作更有可能发生在在意大利这类的国家而不是英国等国家。根据等的看法，信任 源于对经验的消化。信任积累于企业和其他经济主体之间重复的相互作用，他们不断的重复签订合同，正式或非正式的，进行交易，相互帮助渡过危机。信任源于经济主体对可信经验的学习过程。私人接触加速了重复的相互合作，而这反之也是依赖于时间和空间上的接近性。这种关注与非贸易的相互依赖性形成集群，与通过交易成本形成集群的方式是不同的。后者关注与贸易关系的成本最小化，而前者则更广泛地指向非市场或者非合同交易更广泛的优化过程。 最后，值得一提的，非贸易相互依赖性虽然可以加强有效的集体学习和行动，但同时也会造成阻碍。特别是 当熟悉的传统建立之后，组织僵化就有可能乘虚而入。区域就有陷入过时，并且低效的技术和机构困境中。
