1、 外文翻译 原文 The green barrier to free trade Material Source: Financial Daily from THE HINDU group of publications Author: C. P. Chandrasekhar， Jayati Ghosh AT the and of the latest round of meetings of the agricultural negotiations committee of the WTO, the optimism that negotiators would meet the Marc
2、h 31 deadline for working out numerical targets, formulas and other “modalities” through which countries can frame their liberalization commitments in a new full-fledged round of trade negotiations has almost disappeared. That target was important for two reasons： First， it is now becoming clear, th
3、at even more than was true during the Uruguay Round, forging an agreement in the agricultural area is bound to prove extremely difficult. Progress in the agricultural negotiations was key to persuading the unconvinced that a new “Doha Round” of trade negotiations is useful and feasible. Second, the
4、Doha declaration made agricultural negotiations one part of a single undertaking to be completed by January 1, 2005. That is, in a take all-or-nothing scheme, countries had to arrive at, and be bound by, agreements in all areas in which negotiations were to be initiated in the new round. This means
5、that if agreement is not worked out with regard to agriculture, there would be no change in the multilateral trade regime governing industry, services or related areas and no progress in new areas, such as competition policy, foreign investment and public procurement, all of which are crucial to the
6、 economic agenda of the developed countries. The factors making agriculture the sticking point on this occasion are numerous. As in the last Round, there is little agreement among the developed countries themselves on the appropriate shape of the global agricultural trade regime. There are substanti
7、al differences in the agenda of the US, the EU and the developed countries within the Cairns group of agricultural exporters. When the rich and the powerful disagree, a global consensus is not easy to come by. But that is not all. Even if an agreement is stitched up between the rich nations, This is
8、 because the outcomes in the agricultural trade area since the implementation of the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) began have fallen far short of expectations. In the course of Round, advocates of the UR regime had promised global production adjustments that would increase the va
9、lue of world agricultural trade and an increase in developing country share of such trade. That is, the US proposals are clearly not in the direction of reducing state support for agriculture, but of manipulating the agricultural support regime in the direction of what was defined to be non-trade di
10、storting in the course of the Uruguay Round. Seen in this background, the new stand on agricultural support still being discussed among EU members is by no means bizarre. The European Commissions recently released proposals for reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) do not promise any cut in
11、 total spending. But they do not point to any substantial increase either, since the EU leaders agreed last year to a 1 per cent ceiling on annual increases in the farm budget. In addition, the proposals currently being discussed make an effort to link subsidies less directly with production, thereb
12、y rendering them non-trade distorting. The difficulty the EU faces is that of mooting and then winning agreement among its members on doing away with export subsidies and on making a complete transition to Green Box measures. Since the support afforded to agriculture in EU countries is large and mul
13、tifarious, a complete transition is not easy to achieve. France, for example, which receives more money from the CAP than any other country is vehemently opposed to that transition, with vocal support from President Chirac. As a result, the EU in its proposals submitted in December to the agricultur
14、al negotiations committee, has called for retaining the Blue Box and for continuing with the Peace Clause, which protected Blue Box measures from being challenged during the implementation period of the Uruguay Round. That is, the EU wants the right to openly and transparently support and protect it
15、s farmers, and wants adequate elbowroom within the agreement to do so. But the fact that it is unwilling to go the US way, by opting for less transparent support measures that have been defined as acceptable helps those who paint it as the stumbling block on the road to free trade. The reason for th
16、e peculiar situation is that through the manoeuvres made during the Uruguay Round, especially the famous Blair House accord, the rich nations managed to obtain Cairns group concurrence and developing country support for an agreement that provided inadequate market access and little reduction in prot
17、ection in the developed countries in the agricultural area. This they did by holding out the threat of trade chaos if no agreement was reached and by promising that: This was an interim arrangement which would be assessed starting a year before the completion of the implementation period; The worst
18、form of domestic support such as the blue box measures would be dropped at that point; and liberalization would be further intensified starting in 2000. Unfortunately, not only has the experience with the implementation of the not-so-liberal Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture been wanting on man
19、y counts, but there is strong pressure to continue with the manoeuvring by dressing up all support measures in Green, as is the case with the US, or by just refusing to meet the Uruguay Round commitments, as is true of the EU. This makes it extremely difficult to once more win Cairns group concurren
20、ce and developing country support for a new Agreement on Agriculture, which offers merely a small advance along an older protectionist route. Unfortunately for the developed countries, they had gone for the “single undertaking“, all-or-nothing strategy with the hope that they can use small concessio
21、ns in areas such as agriculture, drug patents and special and differential treatment to win major battles in the areas of competition policy, foreign investment and public procurement. But with no agreement among them even on those concessions and an agreement on agriculture proving a stumbling bloc
22、k, those visions born of greed are threatening to blur. The threat to the forces of corporate globalisation comes not just from the anti-globalisation movement outside. An important enemy seems to lie within, as well. 译文 绿色贸易壁垒对自由贸易的影响 资料来源 :印度金融日报 2003 年 1 月 28 日 作者： 钱德拉塞卡 戈什 在结束对农业谈判世贸组织，乐观委员会的会议，
23、谈判将符合 3 月 31 日为制定一个数值目标，公式等 “模式 ”的框架，各国可以通过其最新一轮的开放承诺的最后期限新的全面的贸易谈判回合已经几乎消失。 这一目标是重要的两个原因 ： 首先，现在是越来越清楚，这甚至超过了在乌拉圭回合的真实，锻造在农业领域的协议必将证明是极为困难的。 在农业谈判取得进展的关键是说服不相信一个新的 多哈回合贸易谈判 是有用的，可行的。 其次， 多哈宣言中所作的一个 单一承诺 是由 2005 年 1 月 1 日完成农业谈判的一部分。 也就是说，在采取 全有或没有什么计划，国家已经到达，并通过在所有领域中，谈判的协议，在新一轮启动的约束。 这意味着，如果协议没有使用过
24、了关于农业，就没有在多边贸易体制的管理行业，服务或相关的领域，也没有在新的领域，如竞争政策，外国投资和公共采购，进度变化，所有这些都是至关重要的发达国家经济议程 的因素，使农业在这次的症结是多方面的。 由于在上一轮，他们之间有没有协议，发达国家对全球农产品贸易制度的适当形状。 有在美国，欧盟和发达国家在农产品出口国凯恩斯集团议程的重大分歧。 当富人 强大的反对 下 ，一个全球性的共识是不容易得到。 但这还不是全部。 即使协议是 联合 富国之间，通过诸如布莱尔宫协议演习，得到了世界其他国家一起去会比较困难， 这是因为自乌拉圭回合谈判（乌拉圭回合）农业协定（ AOA）的实施在农业贸易领域的成果已开
25、始远远低于预期。 在 谈判 过程中，乌拉圭回合政权主张答应全球生产调整，将增加世界农产品贸易的价值和在发展中国家的这种贸易份额的增加。 在任何情况下，与欧盟的共同农业政策改革的讨论预计将持续到夏季， 欧盟 共体还没有完全能够通过制定在谈判过程中。 因此， 3 月 31 日最后期限不能得到满足。 直到因为这些问题的时间将被清除它是在完全肯定不是一个农业协定，这对 多哈回合贸易谈判的完成的先决条件，可以在 2005 年保证。 在匆忙的想为这一目标在令人失望的。 但这一前景并不新鲜。 世贸组织成员已经错过了一个关于专利协议和基本商品的供应十二月的最后期限，因为美国的顽固态度。 他们还错过了最后期限，
26、制订特殊和差别待遇的发展中国家的方式。 在媒体的指责游戏试图找出元凶举起迈向农业协议的进展情况，再次领先的竞争者是欧洲联盟。 这对欧盟的理由是焦点，但是，摇摇欲坠 的 美国也提供了大力支持本国农民，并大幅上调本文通过农场安全和农村投资法支持。 在美国，主要的收入和价格支持计划农业项目，经费平均超过 150 亿美元 1996 年至 2002 年一年，并已触及 2000 年的三百二十三点亿美元高。 2002 年法令在纸上的承诺保持这种高支持将通过授权的支出总额超过六年度结束 2007 年期间11850000 万美元。 预计实际数字要高得多。 众所周知，这一支持偏重在少数大型商业农场，这是一对美国和
27、国际市场的供应占多数的赞成 。 作为这种支持，即使在直接收入支付的形式提供的 “脱钩 ”，从实际生产中，间接影响农民的生产和定价决策时，他们的影响力在世界市场上供应和价格。 也就是说，他们扭曲了世界贸易即使乌拉圭回合回合协议声称他们不知道。 2002 年农业法 指示是，美国没有削减这种支持背面的意图，不可能加入任何协议，认股权证等晋级。 之所以出现这种隐含的立场，美国不会导致其在当前的农业谈判瓶颈识别的是，几乎所有的这种支持的绿箱措施，或支持措施的形式是可以接受的，是根据乌拉圭回合协议，因为它们表面上是 “ 非贸易扭曲 ” 。 毫不奇怪，美国的建议先进的工作方案的课程， 2002 年 3 月开
28、始 结合： 为出口补贴取消答辩 ； 通过配额取消， 关税削减和加强关税配额的市场准入增加（或各商品需要降低关税与进 口 ，确保最低水平）的建议 ； 要么做一个与国内支持，不属于绿箱范畴或与新绿箱支出等措施，支持替代挖角的例子。 也就是说，美国的建议显然不是在减少对农业的国家的支持方向，但操作中的定义是什么非贸易在乌拉圭回合中的农业支持制度扭曲的方向。 从这个背景下，对欧盟成员国仍在讨论中的农业支持的新立场是绝不奇怪。 欧盟委员会最近发表的共同农业政策（ CAP）的改革方案不能保证任何总支出的削减。 但他们并不指向任何要么大幅增加，因为欧盟领导人去年商定的最高限额为百分之 1 场中的预算逐年增加
29、。 此外，目前正在讨论的提议作出努力，少环节，直接与生产的补贴，从而使它们的非贸易扭曲。 由于在欧盟国家给予农业的支持大，五花八门，一个完整的过渡是不容易实现。 法国为例，它接收从 CAP 的钱比其他任何国家对此表示强烈反对， 总统希拉克与声援。 作为一个结果是，在 12 月提交给委员会的欧盟农业谈判的建议，呼吁保留蓝箱和与和平条款，而被保护在乌拉圭回合的执行期蓝箱措施的持续挑战。 也就是说，欧盟希望的权利 ，公开和透明地支持和保护本国农民，并希望在协定范围内这样做足够的必需的时机。 但事实上，它是 不愿意去欠透明支持已接受所规定的措施作为选择和美国一样，帮助那些谁油漆上的自由贸易之路的绊脚石
30、了。 对于特殊情况的原因是，通过在乌拉圭回合期间，特别是著名的布莱尔宫协议的演习，富国设法获得同意和凯恩斯集团达成一项协议，规定在保护不足，市场准入和减少发展中国家的支持小在农 业领域的发达国家。 他们这样做，举行了贸易混乱的威胁，如果没有达成任何协议和承诺是： 这是一项临时安排，这将是评估启动实施前的一年内完成 ; 最坏的国内支持，如蓝箱措施的方式将被丢弃在这一点 ;及 自由化将进一步加剧 2000 年开 始。 不幸的是，不仅具有 与该不那么自由乌拉圭回合农业协定的执行情况被许多时候想的经验， 还 有强大的压力与操纵的打扮，继续在绿色所有支持措施，是与美国，或只是拒绝以满足乌拉圭回合承诺的情况下，由于是欧盟如此。 这使得它很难再次赢得对农业，它提供了一个较旧的保护主义沿路线只是一个很小的提前同意新协议凯恩斯集团和发展中国家的支持。 不幸的是发达国家，他们走后的 “单一承诺 ”，全或无的策略，希望他们可以使用在诸如农业，药品专利以及特殊和差别待遇地区小的让步，在重大战役获胜地区的竞争政策，外国投资和公共采购。 但是，即使在没有它们之间的优惠协议，并证明对农业协定的绊脚石，贪婪出生的愿景正在威胁着模糊。 对企业全球化的力量的威胁不仅来自反全球化运动之外。 一个重要的敌人似乎在于内 。
