1、外文翻译 原文 A New World of Crises and Disasters Material Source: Louisiana State University Author: Arjen Boin The world of crises and disasters is shifting. The frequency, nature, and consequences of these adverse events are changing (Missiroli, 2006; OECD, 2003; Posner,2004; Quarantelli, Lagadec, Robb
2、, 2007). This shift in possible adversity poses new challenges to political-administrative elites. It also spurs a new research agenda for students of the public sector. This opening statement should not be taken as an apodictic overstatement. Crises and disasters may be getting worse in some ways,
3、but the capacity to deal with some of these adverse events is growing. It is, for instance, easily forgotten that some “traditional” disasters rarely occur in modern societies, where they used to be ubiquitous not so long ago (think of cholera, bridge collapses, and theater fires). In fact, there is
4、 ample evidence to suggest we are safer today than we have ever been before (Wildavsky, 1988). Yet, the shape and dynamics of crises and disasters is changing. They have different causes, play out differently, draw different reactions, and affect societies in different ways. This special issue takes
5、 stock of this development. The contributors assess the changing nature of crises and disasters, explore existing and emerging challenges, and formulate research questions that demand our attention. In this introduction, I sketch a theoretical ideal type of the modern crisis, which I will refer to a
6、s the transboundary crisis. The contributions in this special issue strongly suggest that the crises of the future will be increasingly transboundary in nature. These events are likely to last much longer than contemporary crises, as they infect other sectors and functions, changing continuously. Th
7、ey are likely to cause more damage, but in a different way. Much more than before, they pose a critical challenge to the legitimacy base of public and private organizations. The key to understanding the shifting nature of crises and disasters is deceptively simple: threat agents will look familiar (
8、e.g., natural forces, violence, and technological failure), but the consequences play out very differently. To understand why Review of Policy Research, Volume 26, Number 4 (2009) this is the case, I begin by outlining the characteristics of these transboundary crises (section 2). Section 3 identifi
9、es the political-administrative challenges posed by these crises and disasters. The article concludes by formulating a set of key research questions and introducing the contributions to this special issue. We speak of a transboundary crisis when the functioning of multiple, life-sustaining systems,
10、functions, or infrastructures is acutely threatened and the causes of failure or courses of redress remain unclear. This definition builds on the traditional notion of crisis with its core conceptual elements of threat, urgency, and uncertainty (Rosenthal, Boin, Rosenthal, Charles, & t Hart, 1989).
11、What sets it apart from the more traditional definition is its emphasis on the tightly woven web of critical infrastructures that characterizes modern society (see also the contributions of Wachtendorf and Santella et al. in this special issue). The potential for crossing boundaries sets this new cl
12、ass of adversity apart from its traditional brethren. A transboundary crisis can easily cross geographical borders, threatening multiple cities, regions, countries, and continents. A snow storm in the southern and central provinces of China left hundreds of thousands stranded during the New Year hol
13、idays (February 2008), severely exposing the countrys inadequate crisis management structures. The current financial implosion does not respect national borders, as it wreaks havoc across the world. Task 1: Preparing in the Face of Indifference Public leaders need to prepare themselves and their org
14、anizations for the occurrence of a crisis or disaster, which will require rapid, coordinated, and often improvised action to ensure an effective response. There are many ways to prepare for crises, including training, simulations, and wholesale cultural change (Weick &Sutcliffe, 2001). Such preparat
15、ions generally run into three obstacles.First, crisis preparation is relatively expensive. The allocation of permanent staff and resources, in combination with continuous training, planning, and exercise efforts, in preparation for an event that may happen, takes away scarce resources from problems
16、that are already happening. Only in the immediate wake of a time-defining disaster (think of 9/11 or Katrina) is it politically feasible to divert money away from such perennial concerns as crime, education, unemployment,defense, and critical infrastructures (compare with Birkland, this issue).Secon
17、d, planning and preparing for unknown events is intrinsically hard. It is hard enough to plan for disasters that are likely to happen (think of hurricanes in Louisiana and earthquakes in California). Yet, even known disasters always play out differently than previous or seemingly similar events in o
18、ther locations. It is muchharder to plan for “inconceivable” events. Planning for the unimaginable easily becomes generic to the extent that it is merely symbolic (Clarke, 1999). Third, crisis preparation is fraught with political tension. It cuts to the essence of politics, evoking the question: Wh
19、o will be protected against what, when, and where? The inevitable follow-up question is: Who will pay for it? Should U.S. taxpayers assist house owners who want to live on the Gulf Coast and find their house damaged after a hurricane?Louisiana provides a case in point. After being heavily criticized
20、 for its performance before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana has recently stepped up its preparations for the hurricane season. Five days before Hurricane Gustav was predicted to come ashore, Governor Jindal declared a state of emergency. The population of New Orleans was evacuated we
21、ll before the storm came ashore.Louisiana had learned its lesson, or so it seemed.Hurricane Gustav revealed that the aforementioned obstacles had not been fully circumvented. The shelters proved woefully inadequate, prompting the resignation of Ann Williamson, the secretary of social services. The s
22、tate had prepared for massive flooding, but Gustav caused a very different disaster: the paralysis of Baton Rouge (where the state has its crisis-management center). The evacuation of New Orleans may have been politically expedient, but it turned out to be unnecessary,which, in turn, may well hinder
23、 future efforts to evacuate a population notoriously unwilling and unable to leave. 译文 危机和灾害 资料来源：美国路易斯安那州立大学 作者：布安罗本 在日常 报道和 各类专业研究 ， 企业家和企业报纸 中 经常可以 看到 有关自然灾害 以及 各种冲突 的报道。不管是大公司还是小企业都会遇到经营困难 ， 特别 行业甚至 一个国家 在这种或那种方式 发生 危机 。 危机 通常是指 困难危险 未来决定情况下一个极其辽阔的自然、社会、经济的过程 （极其广泛地区的自然，经济社会例如政治危机，经济危机，金融危机，石油危机
24、，环境危机，道德危机，艺术品，价值危机，健康危机，中年危机）的危机。在口语中，最常见的主要是负面的含义，因为它是连接到不同的不快和困难。 然而，一场危机可能有 很多 不同的 规模 。从经济的角度来看， 因而 可以说对世界经济危机，一个国家的经济危机，行业危机和企业危机 。最近几年 ，我们目睹了一些危机的规模化，例如，亚洲和俄罗斯金融危机，海湾危机，中东危机，巴尔干危机等，其中有共同的特征是不利的和令人震惊的事态 发展 ，这会影响商业和生活，需要尽快 渡过。一个危机在更大范围的社会和经济环境直接和间接影响的位置对一个特定的公司，或其他实体，它可能会或多或少与一 个范围更大的区域危机。一个产业的危
25、机 (如 :汽车工业、建筑业 )就会严重不利于公司从完全不同的分支机构。我们讨论感兴趣的公司危机 (即公司或组织的危机 )是有商业或注册非牟 制造或服务机构而设的 。 危机与公司或组织是紧密联系的。随着日趋复杂的公司 ,交互地连接到各种社会可能出现危机的发生而范围的原因能引发危机也会有所增长。 如果所有其他的危机 都 被添加到这一领域 ， 我们可能会同意企业危机是不可避免的 发生 （芬克，1986 年，第 67 页）在 现今的商业社会。当谈论公司危机，一场危机可以被定义为一个短期、清淡，和临界状态不利来自公司 ，该公司的内部和外部直接危害继续存在和发展的公司。 从企业管理的观点，商业决定制造商
26、 ,一场危机带来的紧急状态，因为它的剧烈要求及时决策必须尽可能地，因为修正通常不可能。 在作出决定的时间和压力 ， 反对的原因和危机时期形成的过程中，通常是在一个较长 的时间。在公司管理的必然直接面向以下特点的紧急状态，这就需要一种不同的方法相比 ,公司管理层的正常经营。 导致结果的功能特点与行为公司在危机的状态不同于当时的计划 ,经过一段时间的发展。因此 ,技术和方法进行管理要有所不同。也就是在这些表明管理的紧急情况下会发 现本身，这种想法管理公司的特质在危机不同于的经典的战略管理。危机管理是一种短期性质：生存的公司必须放在首位与发展的目标。因此，危机管理的一个特定部分现代战略管理。由于日益
27、动荡的内部外部环境、的经典的管理其实获得越来越多的特点危机管理。一些知名的实例比较，一个人可以学到的印象是一个危机可以持续一个长时间 (甚至永远的并不是自然的短暂的。持续的危机取决于它的强度，方法的复杂性的大小和链接，包围公司与外部因素，其中一个人注意状态 (或相关专业 )补贴，由于各种 (但通常非经济的 )原因 (如社会、政治 )的人工的延长危机。因为 这些案子是不是关于系统和计划解决危机，但纯粹的延长痛苦 (争取生活、致死 )，这场危机实际上可以更长久，只不过是像我说过，人工长的时间危机的一段时间。国家公司通常称为急性危机，能持续一段时间，因为它要求尽快解决 (有利或不利的 )。危机是一种
28、的引发重建公司的力量。在大多数情况下，解决方案的急性危机而这将领导公司不仅向后但即使成是前题的衰败，实现更新的一个公司。一家成功的公司经常更新而造成的后果，因为以前的严重危机重构企业客户过程和结构，使有效、成功运作就不会吃公司没有地方被迫改变 (不太成功 )操作方式和战略方向。 这 里指的是提供的定义并表示危机，一场危机通常由于出现交织的影响的内部和外部原因，指出这些和他们的连接是十分重要的指导为愈合，即为克服这种危机。比较管理的错误可以显示股东，主管经验事会或政府机构管理能力者优先考虑特定的开发或危机阶段公司。很 明显 在这一阶段的严重危机，不同的竞争力的经理将比的情况下需要加速发展。允许管
29、理的错误的比较发展计划的组织如何采用如何制订最佳的施工惯例和提高企业绩效根据现有的业务情况。即使在正常经营公司，自然的矛盾，利益表达 (例如员工和业主、保险和没有保险的债权人 )存在并有平衡。在正常情况下 。因此，公司所有人的利益 a 参与者。以一种敏锐的危机，平衡是失去了，因为每个参与者试图保护他们的自己的利益，这只能通过了对违反兴趣领域的另一种形式参与者。矛盾也大大加强了在急性危机和利益的分歧加剧。对他们的角色和定位 ,所有的参与者一个公司都不得有相同的兴趣也同样的权利或影响。因为个人参加者努力实现不同的利益 ,他们的兴趣的行为是不同 ,在里面到公司 以及外，也 可以概括在这方面。它必须交代每个利益集团都有自己的时间框架、标准和指标作为判断成功。 新奥尔良的疏散可能是政治上的权宜之计 ， 但它被证明是不必要的 ， 这反过来 ， 可能 会阻碍今后的努力疏散人口，不能出了名的不愿离开。
