1、 1 外文翻译 原文 Before and After Enron: CPAs Views on Auditor Independence Material Source: The CPA Journal Online Author: Deborah L. Lindberg and Frank D. Beck Auditor independence is often referred to as the cornerstone of the auditing profession because it is the foundation for the publics trust in th
2、e attest function. Although many have stated that the collapse of Enron has negatively affected the perception of auditor independence, we do not need to rely on anecdotal evidence alone. In October 2001, approximately two months prior to Enron declaring bankruptcy, an extensive survey instrument on
3、 auditor independence had been sent to 1,500 CPAs. After Enron declared bankruptcy in December 2001, the survey was sent to another 1,500 CPAs drawn from the same database. The results indicated that CPAs perceptions of the effects of nonaudit services on auditor independence are more negative after
4、 the Enron bankruptcy. In addition, after Enron declared bankruptcy, CPAs held a more conservative view of whether a material transaction or event detrimentally affects auditor independence. Furthermore, the findings suggest that auditors perceive that nonaudit services and other issues that threate
5、n auditor independence detrimentally affect the publics perception of independence to a greater extent than they adversely influence actual independence. A Discussion of Auditor Independence Auditor independence helps to ensure quality audits and contributes to financial statement users reliance on
6、the financial reporting process. Several major instances of misstated earnings prompted the SEC in 2000 to adopt rules prohibiting nonaudit services inconsistent with auditor independence. 2 Auditor independence has long been couched in terms of independence “in fact” and independence “in appearance
7、.” An auditor who is independent in fact has the ability to make independent audit decisions even if there is a perceived lack of independence or if the auditor is placed in a potentially compromising position. Nonetheless, even when the auditor is in fact independent, one or more factors may lead t
8、he public to believe the auditor does not appear independent. This may cause users of financial statements to believe they cannot rely on financial information. Because auditor independence in fact is a mental state, investors and other users of financial statements cannot accurately assess actual a
9、uditor objectivity; they can only evaluate an auditors appearance of objectivity. Thus, even when an auditor acts independently in fact and issues an unbiased audit opinion, investor confidence is eroded if investors and other users of the financial statement information do not perceive that the aud
10、itor was independent in appearance. Arthur Andersen, Enrons former auditor, was perceived as lacking independence, because the accounting firm earned more revenue from nonaudit services than from audit services. While independence in fact and in appearance are both required in order to achieve the g
11、oal of independence, the Enron debacle, and the negative publicity that the auditing profession received, may have altered the publics expectations. Policy Issues Economic bonding. In 2000, the SEC adopted amendments to its rules governing relationships between independent auditors and their SEC cli
12、ents. These rules identified nine nonaudit services inconsistent with auditor independence (Exhibit 1). The rules regarding management functions and human resources were consolidated into a single rule, resulting in eight rules that were subsequently made into law by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
13、While the independence rules allow audit firms to offer consulting services such as information technology (IT) and internal auditing, those services are subject to certain restrictions. Among other things, the rules now require annual disclosure of audit firms fees received for auditing, IT consult
14、ing, and all other services. Many commentators have stated that the Enron bankruptcy has forever altered the publics view of auditor independence, because Enrons auditors had previously issued unqualified opinions on Enrons financial statements. Regulators and critics 3 of the accounting profession
15、view an audit firms provision of consulting services to an audit client as a conflict of interest. There is also a stream of critical literature, dating from the early 1980s, which argues that the provision of most nonaudit services threatens auditor independence, because an economic bond, which the
16、 auditor does not want to lose, develops between the client and the accounting firm. The authors expected that CPAs would perceive the provision of nonaudit (consulting) services to auditing clients as weakening auditor independence, more so after the bankruptcy of Enron than before. Survey In Octob
17、er 2001, before Enron declared bankruptcy, the authors had developed an extensive survey instrument on auditor independence and sent it to 1,500 CPAs. After Enron declared bankruptcy, the survey was sent to another 1,500 CPAs drawn from the same database, asking their views on auditor independence.
18、Survey participants were asked to provide their opinions about issues that may impair auditor independence. For one set of questions, survey participants were instructed to provide their opinions about specific nonaudit services on a scale from “definitely weakens independence in fact” (1) to “defin
19、itely strengthens independence in fact” (5). Respondents were also asked to provide their perceptions of how the same nonaudit services affected independence in appearance. In a similar vein, participants were asked to provide their perceptions, in several different formats, of how several other iss
20、ues affect auditor independence (Exhibit 2). Tests of Economic Bonding To test the economic bonding hypothesis, the authors predicted that the post-Enron respondents would be more negative toward a particular nonaudit service on independence in fact and independence in appearance than the pre-Enron
21、respondents. Differences existed between CPAs surveyed before and after the Enron bankruptcy for independence in fact on nine out of the 10 nonaudit services surveyed. The largest difference was the effect that the provision of internal audit services by an audit firm has on independence in fact. Th
22、e provision of management functions, broker-dealer services, or legal services concerned CPAs as well, both 4 before and after the Enron bankruptcy. Financial information systems design, the nonaudit service for which no significant difference existed pre- or post-Enron, was perceived as the least p
23、roblematic for the maintenance of independence in fact (Exhibit 3). CPAs opinions regarding the effect of audit firms providing nonaudit services to clients on independence in appearance grew more negative for only five of the 10 nonaudit services surveyed. The largest difference was for the provisi
24、on of internal audit services. In addition, after the Enron bankruptcy, concern about independence in appearance was greater if the audit firm also provides bookkeeping or legal services, financial information systems implementation services, or appraisal valuation. The results, summarized in Exhibi
25、t 3, also indicated that providing nonaudit services is more of a concern for independence in appearance than for independence in fact. The Role of Materiality Materiality is an issue that accountants and auditors have long grappled with. There are no pronouncements that specify a dollar amount to u
26、se as a materiality cutoff, or that help determine whether an item is material. Rather, professional standards state that the determination of materiality is a matter of professional judgment, and should be based on such factors as the size or nature of an item, the expected users of financial infor
27、mation, and the cumulative effect of items under consideration. Thus, materiality judgments are subject to much subjectivity. Since Enron, the financial press has extensively covered materiality issues. Because of reactions by CPAs to such negative publicity, the authors expected CPAs would take a m
28、ore conservative view of materiality after Enron declared bankruptcy. In other words, all other factors remaining the same, the Enron debacle has motivated CPAs to lower their materiality threshold. Tests of the Role of Materiality One survey question asked participants to indicate whether the mater
29、iality of the amount of nonaudit fees impairs independence in fact and in appearance. The results show that CPAs did lower their materiality threshold for nonaudit fees 5 impairing independence after Enron. This is another indication of the validity of the economic bonding hypothesis before Enron. F
30、urthermore, a factor analysis identified nine items that were related to each other, including materiality, dollar amount of waived audit adjustments, client audit revenue, estimation of a valuation allowance, outsourcing of internal audit services, low-balling of initial audit fees, potential for n
31、onaudit revenue, compensation for referrals, and contingency fees. Because these items were part of an underlying and unmeasured concern with the effect of dollars on auditor-company relations and independence, the authors performed the same test on the other eight items tested regarding the materia
32、lity of nonaudit fees (Exhibit 4). The difference between CPAs concerns over independence in fact before and after Enron was statistically significant for five of the nine items, including materiality. CPAs surveyed after Enron were also more concerned that the size of audit clients affected indepen
33、dence in fact, as well as about the outsourcing of internal audit services, the potential for nonaudit revenue, and compensation for consulting referrals of nonaudit services. There was no difference in views of independence in fact pre- and post-Enron, (once experience, firm size, and gender were h
34、eld constant), regarding the effect of the size of waived adjustments, the estimation of valuation allowance, or low-balling of fees. Regarding independence in appearance, CPAs had a more conservative view of whether a material transaction or event detrimentally affects auditor independence in appea
35、rance after Enron. The differences were statistically significant for eight of the nine items, all expressing more concern after Enron. The strongest differences were for the materiality of nonaudit fees, the outsourcing of internal audit services, the potential for nonaudit revenue, and compensatio
36、n for consulting referrals of nonaudit services. Interestingly, the differences between pre- and post-Enron CPAs were greater when asked about independence in appearance than independence in fact. Perception and Reality As discussed, an auditor is considered independent in fact if she has the abilit
37、y to make independent audit decisions even if there is a perceived lack of independence or if the auditor is placed in a potentially compromising position. 6 Even when the auditor is in fact independent, however, one or more factors may lead the public to conclude the auditor is not independent. Man
38、y commentators on the Enron debacle note that perception becomes reality where auditor independence is concerned. If perception becomes reality for CPAs, too, there would be no statistically significant difference between their perceptions of independence in fact and in appearance before and after E
39、nron. Tests of Independence Perceptions A series of paired difference t-tests demonstrates that respondents were more concerned about many nonaudit services and audit practices affecting independence in appearance than they were about those same issues affecting independence in fact. Of the 31 tests
40、 performed on the responses before the Enron bankruptcy, 29 were statistically significant and indicated more concern about independence in appearance. Twenty-eight of the 31 tests were statistically significant after Enron and more concerned about independence in fact. Among respondents, concern ov
41、er a certain issue affecting independence in appearance increases directly with concern over the same issue affecting independence in fact. The average concern for each issue was higher for those surveyed after Enron declared bankruptcy than it was for CPAs surveyed before. 译文 安然事件前后：对注册会计师审计独立性的意见
42、资料来源 : The CPA Journal Online 作者： Deborah L. Lindberg and Frank D. Beck 审计独立性常被称为审计职业的基础 ,因为它是公众信任的证明。尽管许多人曾经说过 ,安然的倒闭对审计独立性的看法有负面的影响 ,我们不只需要依靠证据。 2001 年 10 月 ,大约宣布破产的两个月前 ,对安然审计独立性的调查已经被送往 1500会计师事务所。在 2001年 12 月，安然公司宣布破产后 ,被送往 1500会计师事务所的调查来自同 一个会计师事务所的数据库。 结果表明，对非审计服务的审计独立性影响注册会计师的看法更消极后，安然破产。另外
43、,在安然公司宣布破产 ,举行了一次会计师事务所是否保守主义7 观点的交易或者事项产生其造成损坏性影响材料审计的独立性。此外 ,该发现表明 ,审计人员察觉到非审计服务和其他问题 ,威胁其造成损坏性影响审计独立性的独立公众的感知程度大于他们产生不良影响实际独立。 审计独立性的探讨 审计独立性有助于确保审计质量，并有助于财务报表使用者的过于依赖财务报告。几个主要的事例 ,促使美国证券交易委员会 (SEC)申报收入在 2000 年 就开始采用条文规定禁止非审计服务与审计师的独立性不一致。 审计独立性一直抱着术语“事实上”的独立与独立”在出现。“独立审计师事实上是有能力独立作出独立审计的决定的，即使有一
44、个明显缺乏独立性或者如果让一个审计师处于一个潜在的妥协的立场。尽管如此 ,即使审计师是事实上的独立 ,一个或多个因素可能导致公众相信审计师并不会出现独立。这可能会导致财务报表的使用者相信 ,他们不能依赖财务信息。 因为审计的独立性其实是一种精神状态 ,投资者及其他财务报表的使用者不能准确评价实际审计客观性 ;他们只能评估审计外表上的客观性。因此 ,即 使当审计师的行为事实上独立并做出无偏见的审计意见 ,投资者的信心被侵蚀，如果投资者和其他用户的财务报表资讯不能被感知 ,而审计人员在外表上是独立的。亚瑟安德森 ,安然的前任审计师、被认为是缺乏独立的会计师事务所 ,因为非审计服务的收入比从审计业务
45、服务。而事实上 ,在外观上的独立都需要为了实现目标的独立性 ,安然的破产 ,这些负面的宣传 ,从审计职业来看 ,也许已经改变了公众的期望。 政策问题 经济的结合。 2000 年，美国证券交易委员会通过的修正案，其规则与美国证券交易委员会的独立核数师及其客户的关系。这些规则确定了 9 个与核 数师的独立性（图表 1）不一致非审计服务。关于管理的职能和人力资源规则被合并为一个单一的规则，随后成为法律的 2002 年萨班斯 -奥克斯利法案的规则造成的。 虽然规则允许的独立审计公司提供诸如信息技术（ IT）和内部审计咨询服务，这些服务受到一定的限制。除其他事项外，现在的规则要求审计公司的年度披露的审计
46、费用， IT 咨询，而所有其他服务接收。 许多评论家指出，安然破产案已经永远改变了公众对审计师的独立性认为，8 由于安然公司的审计师曾发出有关安然公司的财务报表无保留意见。监管机构和会计专业评论家查看审计事务所的咨询服务， 以作为一个审计客户的利益冲突的规定。还有一个重要的文学流，从 80 年代初，它认为，大部分非审计服务的审计师的独立性构成威胁，这是因为经济上的纽带，而核数师不希望失去之间，客户端和会计师事务所发展的约会。 笔者预计，将注册会计师审计独立性看成是削弱了非审计规定（咨询）服务，审计客户，更使安然公司后，比以前破产。 调查 调查 2001 年 10 月，安然公司宣布破产之前，作者
47、制定了一项广泛的调查对审计师的独立性仪器，送去 1500 注册会计师。安然公司宣布破产后，该调查是从1500 发送到另一个相同的数据库制定注册会计师，审 计师的独立性，要求对他们的看法。 调查对象被要求提供有关的问题，可能损害审计独立性的意见。对于一组问题，调查参与者被指示提供关于特定的非审计服务的规模从他们的意见，“肯定会削弱事实上的独立”（ 1）“绝对加强了事实上的独立”（ 5）。受访者还要求提供非审计服务的同时如何在外观上的独立性受到影响的看法。与此类似，参与者被要求提供多种不同格式的其他几个问题如何影响审计师的独立性（图表2），他们的看法。 经济结合试验 为了检验这一假设经济结合，作者
48、预测，后安然的受访者更倾向于将是一个独立的事实和独立性比前安然非审计 服务的受访者尤其是外观阴性。之间存在的差异前后 独立安然破产其实对 9种被调查的 10个非审计服务的会计师事务所进行调查。最大的不同是结果，内部审计服务的会计师事务所提供一个在事实上已经独立。管理职能，经纪交易商服务，或提供法律服务有关的注册会计师以及之前和之后的安然公司破产。财务信息系统的设计，非审计服务，这些地区没有显着差异前或后安然，被认为是最不独立的，实际上（图表 3）维护问题。 注册会计师审计意见，关于非审计服务，以提供在外观上独立的公司客户更多的负面影响仅增长在接受调查的 10 个非审计服务五年。最大 的差异为内
49、部审计服务。此外，安然公司破产后，约在外观上更关注的是，如果独立审计公9 司还提供簿记或法律服务，金融信息系统实施服务，或鉴定估价。结果总结在（表 3）还表明，提供非审计服务是一个独立的外观比实际上更值得关注的独立性。 实质性的作用 实质性是一个问题，会计师和审计师有长期努力处理。没有指定一个声明的金额，作为一个实质性截止，或帮助确定是否使用一个项目是重大的。相反，专业标准规定，对物质的界定是一个专业判断的问题，并应在尽可能的大小或一个项目，财务信息使用者的预期，以及根据审议的项目性质等因素的累积效应为 基础。因此，实质性的判断可能会有很大的主观性。由于安然公司，金融新闻界广泛报道实质性问题。由于受这些负面宣传注册会计师的反应，笔者预计注册会计师的重要性将采取较保守的观点后，安然公司宣布破产。换句话说，所有其他因素保持不变，安然的崩溃，激励注册会 计师的重要性，以降低门槛。测试实质性的重要性 一个调查问题请与会者指出是否对非审计费数额实质性损害的事实和在外观上的独立性。结果表明，注册会计师没有降低他们对损害非审计费用后，安然公司独立实质性的门槛。这是另一种经济的安然公司前粘接假说的迹象。 此外，因子分析 确定了 9 个项目，涉及到对方，包括重要性，放弃美元的审计调整，客
