1、原文REGULATIONFAIRDISCLOSUREANDTHECOSTOFADVERSESELECTIONABSTRACTREGULATIONFAIRDISCLOSUREFD,IMPOSEDBYTHESECURITIESANDEXCHANGECOMMISSIONINOCTOBER2000,WASDESIGNEDTOPROHIBITDISCLOSUREOFMATERIALPRIVATEINFORMATIONTOSELECTEDMARKETPARTICIPANTSTHEINFORMATIONALADVANTAGESUCHSELECTPARTICIPANTSGAINISUNCLEARIFMULTI
2、PLEINSIDERSRECEIVEIDENTICALINFORMATION,PRIVATEINFORMATIONISIMMEDIATELYINCORPORATEDINPRICEANDEACHINSIDERHASZEROEXPECTEDPROFITIF,ONTHEOTHERHAND,REGULATIONFDHASCURTAILEDTHEFLOWOFINFORMATIONFROMFIRMS,PRIVATEINFORMATIONBECOMESLONGERLIVEDANDMOREVALUABLEHENCE,MARKETMAKERSWILLDEMANDINCREASEDCOMPENSATIONBYWI
3、DENINGTHEADVERSESELECTIONCOMPONENTOFTHEBIDASKSPREADWEIDENTIFYTHECOSTCOMPONENTSOFTHEBIDASKSPREADFORASAMPLEOFNASDAQSTOCKSSURROUNDINGTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFREGULATIONFDCONTROLLINGFOROTHERFACTORSAFFECTINGTHESPREAD,WEFINDTHATADVERSESELECTIONCOSTSINCREASEAPPROXIMATELY36AFTERREGULATIONFDWEINTERPRETOURFINDINGAS
4、REGULATIONFDFAILINGTOACHIEVEONEOFITSDESIREDOBJECTIVES1INTRODUCTIONWEESTIMATETHEPROBABILITYOFINFORMEDTRADINGANDTHECOSTOFADVERSESELECTIONINTHEPERIODSURROUNDINGTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFREGULATIONFAIRDISCLOSUREFDBYEXAMININGTHECOSTCOMPONENTSOFMARKETMAKERBIDASKSPREADSINTHENASDAQMARKET1WEFOCUSONNASDAQSTOCKSTOAVO
5、IDTHECONFOUNDINGEFFECTSOFDECIMALIZATIONFORNEWYORKSTOCKEXCHANGENYSESTOCKS,WHICHOCCURREDINPROXIMITYTOTHEEFFECTIVEDATEOFREGULATIONFDINCONTRASTTOPRIORRESEARCHINVESTIGATINGTHISISSUEFORNYSELISTEDSECURITIESELESWARAPU,THOMPSON,ANDVENKATARAMAN2004,OUREVIDENCEINDICATES,AFTERCONTROLLINGFOROTHERFACTORSAFFECTING
6、THEMARKETMAKERSSPREAD,REGULATIONFDHASLEDTOANINCREASEINADVERSESELECTIONCOSTSTHESECURITIESANDEXCHANGECOMMISSIONSSECSELECTIVEDISCLOSUREANDINSIDERTRADINGREGULATIONBECAMEEFFECTIVEONOCTOBER23,20002INASECTIONPOPULARLYREFERREDTOASREGULATIONFAIRDISCLOSUREREGULATIONFD,THESECEXPRESSEDITSINTENTIONTOCREATEALEVEL
7、PLAYINGFIELDFORALLINVESTORSINACCESSINGPRICESENSITIVEINFORMATIONREGULATIONFDPROHIBITSTHEDISCLOSUREOFMATERIALNONPUBLICINFORMATIONTOSELECTIVEGROUPSORINDIVIDUALSSUCHASFINANCIALANALYSTSORINSTITUTIONALINVESTORSIFMATERIALDISCLOSURESAREINTENDEDTHROUGHSUCHBRIEFINGS,THESAMEINFORMATIONMUSTBEDISCLOSEDSIMULTANEO
8、USLYTOTHEINVESTINGPUBLICTHEMOTIVATIONFORIMPOSINGREGULATIONFDWASTHESECSVIEWTHATCERTAINMEMBERSOFTHEINVESTMENTCOMMUNITYWITHACCESSTOPRIVATEINFORMATIONHADATRADINGADVANTAGERELATIVETOTHEWIDERINVESTINGPUBLICECONOMICTHEORYOFFERSLITTLESUPPORTFORTHESECSPOSITIONHOLDENANDSUBRAHMANYAM1992ANDFOSTERANDVISWANATHAN19
9、96,FOREXAMPLE,SHOWTHATIFTHEREAREMULTIPLEINFORMEDTRADERSWITHIDENTICALINFORMATIONTHENTHATNEWSISIMMEDIATELYINCORPORATEDINTOSHAREPRICEANDINSIDERSEXPECTEDPROFITSAREZEROTHUS,ANALYSTSANDTHEIRCLIENTSRECEIVENOBENEFITFROMTHEPRIVATEBRIEFING4NONETHELESS,FORMERSECCHAIRMANLEVITTARGUEDTHATSUCHSELECTIVEDISCLOSUREDE
10、LAYEDTHEPRICEDISCOVERYPROCESS,GIVINGUNDUETRADINGADVANTAGETOAFAVOREDFEWANDTHEIRCLIENTSSEESEC2000AHEALSOCOMMENTED,THESECARGUESTHATREGULATIONFDWILLIMPROVEINVESTORCONFIDENCEINTHEINTEGRITYOFTHECAPITALMARKETSBYREDUCINGTHEPOTENTIALFORCORPORATEMANAGEMENTTOGAINORMAINTAINFAVORWITHPARTICULARANALYSTSORINVESTORS
11、SEESEC2000ATHUS,THEREGULATIONWILLIMPROVEINFORMATIONFLOWTOTHEENTIREMARKETANDREMOVETHEOPPORTUNITYFORSELECTRECIPIENTSTOTRADEONTHEPRIVATEINFORMATION5MOREOVER,WHEREASRELIANCEONPRIVATEBRIEFINGSMAYCOMPROMISEANALYSTSINTOISSUINGFAVORABLEREPORTSTOMAINTAINACCESSTOCORPORATEMANAGEMENT,THENEWREGULATIONFORCESANALY
12、STSTODOMOREINDEPENDENTRESEARCH6MOHANRAMANDSUNDERS2006FINDINGSARECONSISTENTWITHTHISMOTIVATIONTHEYFINDTHATANALYSTSINVESTMOREINIDIOSYNCRATICINFORMATIONSEARCHPOSTREGULATIONFDANDALSOREDUCETHENUMBEROFFIRMSTHEYFOLLOWPRESUMABLYTOCOMPENSATEFORTHEADDITIONALEFFORTTHEYMUSTEXERTININFORMATIONGATHERINGANDANALYSISI
13、NAPOSTREGULATIONFDWORLD7CRITICSOFREGULATIONFD,ONTHEOTHERHAND,ARGUETHATITWILLHAVEACHILLINGEFFECT,WITHFIRMSREDUCINGTHEQUALITYANDQUANTITYOFINFORMATIONFLOWINGTOTHEMARKETFOREXAMPLE,FIRMSMAYPREFERTORELEASEINFORMATIONTOASELECTEDAUDIENCERATHERTHANBROADLYTOREDUCETHEPROPRIETARYCOSTSOFDISCLOSUREANDLIMITTHELITI
14、GATIONRISKTHATMAYARISEFROMMISINTERPRETATIONOFINFORMATIONRELEASESBYLESSSKILLEDUSERSINTHISVEIN,THEASSOCIATIONSUCHARESPONSECOULDLEADTOLONGERLIVED,ANDHENCEMOREVALUABLE,MANAGEMENTINSIDEINFORMATIONMOREOVER,THEINFORMATIONTHATISRELEASEDWOULDTENDTOBEDISSEMINATEDINSTANDARDORRAWFORMWITHLITTLEVALUEADDEDINTERMSO
15、FMANAGEMENTGUIDANCEWITHOUTGUIDANCEFROMMANAGEMENTTHROUGHTHEFINANCIALANALYSTCOMMUNITY,USERSMUSTMAKETHEIROWNINFERENCESSEEWEBER20009DIRECTMEASURESOFTHECOSTOFINFORMATIONASYMMETRYAREFEWONEPOSSIBILITYISTOINFERITFROMTHEMARKETMAKERSBIDASKSPREADTHEMARKETMAKERSBIDASKSPREADISAFUNCTIONOFORDERPROCESSINGCOSTS,INVE
16、NTORYHOLDINGCOSTS,COMPETITION,ANDADVERSESELECTIONCOSTSIFTHEFIRSTTHREECOMPONENTSAREUNAFFECTEDBYREGULATIONFD,ACHANGEINSPREADSURROUNDINGTHEREGULATIONMUSTBEDRIVENBYACHANGEINADVERSESELECTIONCOSTSSUNDER2002USESTHERELATIVEBIDASKSPREADASAPROXYFORTHELEVELOFINFORMATIONASYMMETRYBETWEENINFORMEDANDUNINFORMEDTRAD
17、ERSOFFIRMSHOSTINGCONFERENCECALLSINTHEPREREGULATIONFDPERIOD,HEFINDSFIRMSDISCLOSINGINFORMATIONTHROUGHRESTRICTEDCONFERENCECALLSHAVEHIGHERBIDASKSPREADSHIGHERINFORMATIONASYMMETRYTHANFIRMSTHATUSEOPENCONFERENCECALLS10THESEDIFFERENCESDONOTPERSISTINTHEPOSTREGULATIONFDPERIOD,LEADINGHIMTOCONCLUDETHATTHEPLAYING
18、FIELDHASBEENLEVELEDSUNDERS2002REGRESSIONMODEL,HOWEVER,DOESNOTEXPLICITLYISOLATETHEADVERSESELECTIONCOSTCOMPONENTOFTHEBIDASKSPREADTHUS,HISRESULTSCANALSOBEDRIVENBYCROSSSECTIONALVARIATIONINANYOFTHEOTHERCOMPONENTSOFTHEBIDASKSPREADINCLUDINGORDERPROCESSINGCOSTS,INVENTORYHOLDINGCOSTS,ANDCOMPETITION11ELESWARA
19、PU,THOMPSON,ANDVENKATARAMAN2004PROXYFORINFORMATIONASYMMETRYUSINGNOTONLYTHERELATIVEBIDASKSPREADBUTALSOAMEASUREOFTHEORDERFLOWIMBALANCE12USINGDATAONTRADINGDAYSSURROUNDINGEARNINGSRELATEDANNOUNCEMENTS,THEYFINDAREDUCTIONININFORMATIONASYMMETRYAFTERTHEINTRODUCTIONOFREGULATIONFD,WITHTHEREDUCTIONBEINGMOSTNOTI
20、CEABLEFORLESSLIQUIDFIRMSSTRASER2002ATTEMPTSTOFOCUSMOREDIRECTLYONINFORMATIONASYMMETRYBYMEASURING1THEPROBABILITYOFINFORMEDTRADINGBASEDONEASLEYETAL1996,AND2THEADVERSESELECTIONCOMPONENTOFTHESPREADDERIVEDFROMAMODIFIEDVERSIONOFHUANGANDSTOLL1997HEFINDSTHATBOTHAPPROACHESSHOWTHATTHEPROBABILITYOFINFORMEDTRADI
21、NGDOESNOTCHANGESIGNIFICANTLYBETWEENTHEPREANDPOSTREGULATIONFDPERIODSASLAN2002ALSOUSESTHEEASLEYETAL1996MODELANDCONCLUDESTHATTHEPROBABILITYOFINFORMEDTRADINGDECREASESFORMEDIUMANDLARGEFIRMSBUTINCREASESFORSMALLFIRMSINSUMMARY,PRIORWORKPRESENTSCONFLICTINGEVIDENCEREGARDINGCHANGESININFORMATIONASYMMETRYSURROUN
22、DINGREGULATIONFDSOMESTUDIESNOTEADECREASEEG,ASLAN2002FORMEDIUMANDLARGEFIRMS,ELESWARAPU,THOMPSON,ANDVENKATARAMAN2004,SUNDER2002,SOMEWORKFINDSANINCREASEEG,ASLAN2002FORSMALLFIRMS,ANDSOMERESEARCHDOCUMENTSNOCHANGEEG,STRASER2002FURTHERMORE,THESEAPPROACHESDEPENDONTHEORETICALOREMPIRICALMODELSTHATASSUMETHATTH
23、EONLYTIMESERIESVARIATIONINSPREADISDRIVENBYINFORMATIONALASYMMETRYTEMPORALMOVEMENTSINORDERPROCESSINGCOSTS,INVENTORYHOLDINGCOSTS,ANDCOMPETITIONAREASSUMEDCONSTANTWITHOUTEXPLICITLYMODELINGTHEEFFECTSOFTHESEVARIABLES,THERESULTSMUSTBEINTERPRETEDCAUTIOUSLYTOOVERCOMETHESELIMITATIONS,WEADOPTTHEBIDASKSPREADREGR
24、ESSIONMODELDEVELOPEDINBOLLEN,SMITH,ANDWHALEY2004HEREAFTER,BSWTHISMODEL,SUMMARIZEDINTHEAPPENDIX,DECOMPOSESTHEMARKETMAKERSSPREADINTOCOSTSATTRIBUTABLETOORDERPROCESSING,INVENTORYHOLDING,ADVERSESELECTION,ANDMARKETMAKERCOMPETITIONINCONTRASTTOELESWARAPU,THOMPSON,ANDVENKATARAMAN2004,OUREVIDENCEINDICATESTHAT
25、,AFTERCONTROLLINGFOROTHERFACTORSAFFECTINGTHEMARKETMAKERSSPREAD,REGULATIONFDHASLEDTOANINCREASEINADVERSESELECTIONCOSTSOURRESULTSAREROBUSTTOANUMBEROFSENSITIVITYCHECKSWEINTERPRETOURFINDINGASMARKETMAKERSRESPONDINGINAMANNERINCONSISTENTWITHTHESECSLEVELPLAYINGFIELDANDIMPROVEDINVESTORCONFIDENCEOBJECTIVESINIM
26、POSINGREGULATIONFDTHATIS,MARKETMAKERSRESPONDASIFINFORMATIONASYMMETRYISINCREASED,NOTDIMINISHED,AFTERTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFREGULATIONFDTHEPAPERPROCEEDSASFOLLOWSINSECTION2,WESUMMARIZEPRIORRESEARCHWEDESCRIBETHESAMPLEINSECTION3,ANDSECTION4CONTAINSTHEEMPIRICALWORKINSECTION5,WEASSESSTHEROBUSTNESSOFOURFINDING,
27、THENCONCLUDEINSECTION6ABRIEFDESCRIPTIONOFTHEBSWMODELISCONTAINEDINTHEAPPENDIX2PRIORRESEARCHOURSTUDYISRELATEDTOPRIORRESEARCHEXAMININGCHANGESSURROUNDINGREGULATIONFDINFIRMSINFORMATIONENVIRONMENTSANDINVESTORSTRADINGBEHAVIOR21CHANGESINFIRMSINFORMATIONENVIRONMENTSSEVERALSTUDIESASSESSTHEIMPACTONFIRMSINFORMA
28、TIONENVIRONMENTSBYINVESTIGATINGCHANGESSURROUNDINGREGULATIONFDINTHEACCURACYANDDISPERSIONOFANALYSTSEARNINGSFORECASTSANDTHEMARKETRESPONSETOANALYSTSREPORTSIFANALYSTSACCESSTOMANAGEMENTIS1ANIMPORTANTSOURCEOFINFORMATIONAND2CURTAILEDBYREGULATIONFD,WEWOULDEXPECTAREDUCTIONINCREASEINTHEACCURACYDISPERSIONOFTHEI
29、REARNINGSFORECASTSANDAREDUCTIONINTHESHAREPRICERESPONSETOTHEIRREPORTSPRIORRESEARCHGENERALLYCONFIRMSTHESECONJECTURESANEARLYSTUDYBYHEFLIN,SUBRAMANYAM,ANDZHANG2003AFINDSNOSIGNIFICANTCHANGEINFORECASTACCURACYANDDISPERSIONLATERWORK,HOWEVER,SUGGESTSTHATANALYSTSFORECASTSHAVEBECOMELESSACCURATEANDMOREDISPERSED
30、13INTHEPOSTREGULATIONFDPERIODAGRAWAL,CHADHA,ANDCHEN2005FURTHERMORE,THEDETERIORATIONINFORECASTACCURACYTENDSTO1BEASSOCIATEDWITHFORECASTSISSUEDEARLIERINTHEQUARTERSHANE,SODERSTROM,ANDYOON2001,AGRAWAL,CHADHA,ANDCHEN2005,2BEMOREPRONOUNCEDFORSMALLERCOMPANIESAGRAWAL,CHADHA,ANDCHEN2005,GOMES,GORTON,ANDMADURE
31、IRA2006,3INCREASEWITHTHEPASSAGEOFTIMESINCEREGULATIONFDSENACTMENTAGRAWAL,CHADHA,ANDCHEN2005,AND4OCCURFORTHOSEANALYSTSTHOUGHTTOHAVEHADPREFERENTIALACCESSTOFIRMSMOHANRAMANDSUNDER2006AGAIN,CONSISTENTWITHREGULATIONFDREDUCINGINFORMATIONPROVIDEDBYMANAGERSTOANALYSTS,GINTSCHELANDMARKOV2004FINDTHATTHEABSOLUTEP
32、RICERESPONSETOINFORMATIONDISSEMINATEDBYFINANCIALANALYSTSIS28LOWERINTHEPOSTREGULATIONFDPERIODSEEALSOTEHRANIANANDYALCIN2004MOREOVER,THEDROPISSYSTEMATICALLYHIGHERFOR1THOSECONSTITUENCIESTHOUGHTTOHAVEMOSTBENEFITEDFROMPREFERENTIALACCESSTOMANAGEMENTPRIORTOREGULATIONFD,2HIGHLYRANKEDBYINSTITUTIONALINVESTORBR
33、OKERAGEHOUSESANDOPTIMISTICANALYSTS,AND3FIRMSMOREDIFFICULTTOVALUEWITHPUBLICLYAVAILABLEINFORMATION,THOSEWITHLARGERIDIOSYNCRATICRISKFURTHERMORE,CREDITANALYSTS,AGROUPEXEMPTFROMTHEPROVISIONSOFREGULATIONFD,APPEARTOHAVEBECOMEPRIVILEGEDCONDUITSOFSELECTIVEDISCLOSURETOTHEPUBLICJORION,LIU,ANDSHI2005,P329JORION
34、ETAL2005FINDTHAT,AFTERREGULATIONFD,BOTHRATINGDOWNGRADESANDUPGRADESHAVEALARGESTOCKPRICEIMPACTTHEYCONCLUDETHATREGULATIONFDCONFERSASTRATEGICADVANTAGETOCREDITRATINGSAGENCIESRESEARCHINVESTIGATINGSHAREPRICERESPONSESTOEARNINGSANNOUNCEMENTSSURROUNDINGREGULATIONFDHASYIELDEDMIXEDCONCLUSIONSHEFLIN,SUBRAMANYAM,
35、ANDZHANG2003AMEASURETHEINFORMATIONGAP,THEABSOLUTEDEVIATIONINSTOCKPRICEBETWEENVARIOUSPREEARNINGSANNOUNCEMENTDAYSANDTHEPOSTEARNINGSANNOUNCEMENTDAYAFTERCONTROLLINGFORMARKETWIDEMOVEMENTS,14BEFOREANDAFTERREGULATIONFDTHEIREVIDENCESUGGESTSTHATTHEPOSTREGULATIONFDINFORMATIONAVAILABLETOTHEMARKETPRIORTOEARNING
36、SANNOUNCEMENTSMAYHAVEIMPROVED15INCONTRAST,AHMEDANDSCHNEIBLE2007FINDTHATTHEABSOLUTEEARNINGSANNOUNCEMENTPERIODRETURNSDIDNOTCHANGEINAPOSTREGULATIONFDPERIODRELATIVETOAPREREGULATIONFDPERIODMOREOVER,INCROSSSECTION,THEABSOLUTEANNOUNCEMENTPERIODRETURNSSIGNIFICANTLYINCREASEDAFTERREGULATIONFDFORHIGHTECHFIRMS,
37、CONSISTENTWITHADECLINEINTHEINFORMATIONENVIRONMENTFORTHESEFIRMSTHEYCONCLUDETHAT,CONTRARYTOASSERTIONSOFTHESEC,ELIMINATIONOFSELECTIVEDISCLOSUREHASWORSENEDTHEINFORMATIONENVIRONMENTFORSOMEFIRMSPARTICULARLYSMALL,HIGHTECHFIRMSWITHOUTIMPROVINGTHEINFORMATIONENVIRONMENTFOROTHERFIRMS16LAST,RESEARCHERSHAVESTUDI
38、EDFIRMSVOLUNTARYDISCLOSUREPRACTICES,MOTIVATEDBYCONCERNSTHATREGULATIONFDWOULDINDUCEMANAGERSTOWITHHOLDINFORMATIONDUETOFACTORSSUCHASINCREASEDLITIGATIONRISKINCONSISTENTWITHTHISCONCERN,HEFLIN,SUBRAMANYAM,ANDZHANG2003AFINDASIGNIFICANTINCREASEINTHEFREQUENCYOFVOLUNTARYPUBLICDISCLOSURESAFTERREGULATIONFDANDGO
39、MES,GORTON,ANDMADUREIRA2006REPORTASHARPINCREASEINTHEUSEOFEARNINGSPREANNOUNCEMENTSDRIVENBYLARGEANDMIDSIZEDFIRMSMEANWHILE,BUSHEE,MATSUMOTO,ANDMILLER2004CONCLUDETHATTHEREGULATIONDIDNOTHAVEASIGNIFICANTIMPACTONTHEDISCLOSUREPRACTICESOFFIRMSPOTENTIALLYMOSTAFFECTEDBYREGULATIONFD,THOSEHOLDINGCLOSEDCONFERENCE
40、CALLSINSUMMARY,PRIORRESEARCHGENERALLYCHARACTERIZESTHEPOSTREGULATIONFDINFORMATIONENVIRONMENTASONEWHEREANALYSTSREPORTSARELESSINFORMATIVEANDTHEIRFORECASTSLESSACCURATEANDMOREDISPERSEDEVIDENCEONTHEASSOCIATIONBETWEENMARKETRETURNSANDEARNINGSANNOUNCEMENTSISLESSCONCLUSIVECONTRARYTOEARLYCONCERNS,THEINCIDENCEO
41、FFIRMSENGAGINGINVOLUNTARYDISCLOSUREINRESPONSETOREGULATIONFDHASINCREASEDORREMAINEDUNCHANGEDSOURCEBALJITSIDHU,TOMSMITH,ROBERTEWHALEYANDRICHARDHWILLISJOURNALOFACCOUNTINGRESEARCH,2008,VOL46,ISSUE3,P697728译文公平披露规定和成本逆向选择摘要2000年10月，证券交易委员会为了禁止披露私人资料信息来选择市场参与者这一行为而强加了公平披露FD的规定。这种信息的优势比如精选的参与者获取目前尚不清楚。如果多个“
42、内部人员”收到相同的信息，私人信息则被立即注册价格，每个内线人拥有零预期利润。相反，如果规定FD削减了信息从企业流出的量，私人信息将变得更长寿和更有价值。因此，市场制造者的需求就会通过扩大逆向选择组成部分的发挥传播增加补偿。我们区分出买卖差价的成本组成比如说有利于传播实施条例FD下的纳斯达克股票。控制了其他影响这种传播的因素后，我们发现再调节FD后逆向选择成本增加大约36。结果未能达到法规FD的预期的目标。1、简介我们估计的概率的成本通知交易和逆向选择周围时期制度执行公平披露FD通过检查成本足见市场制造者在纳斯达克市场1传播发挥我们关注纳斯达克股票,以避免我们估计的概率的成本通知交易和逆向选择
43、周围时期制度执行公平披露FD通过检查成本足见市场制造者在纳斯达克MARKET1传播发挥我们关注纳斯达克股票,以避免进制的混淆影响对纽约证券交易所NYSE股票,出现在接近规定的生效日期FD1我们专注于纳斯达克股票，以避免对发生在接近规定FD生效日期下的纽约证券交易所NYSE股票造成的数字进制混杂影响。与之前的研究相反，我们调查了有价证券（ELESWARAPU,汤普森VENKATARAMAN2004）的问题，我们的证据表明,在控制其它影响做市商的蔓延的因素后，规定FD将会导致逆向选择成本的增加。美国证券交易委员会SEC的选择性披露和内线交易规则于2000年10月23日开始生效。2普遍被称为公平披露
44、规定FD的一部分内容是，证券交易委员会表示有意创造一个平等的比赛场地，所有的投资者都将获取敏感信息。规定FD禁止披露资料非公有制的信息来选择团体或个人，比如金融分析师或机构投资者。如果物质披露打算通过比如简报这种形式，那么同样的信息必然同时披露给投资大众。强加规定FD的动机是美国证券交易委员会的观点，他们认为，投资环境的某些成员在获得私人信息上相对于投资大众有更广泛的贸易优势。经济理论给美国证券交易委员会这一地位带来了一点支持。比如，霍尔顿和SUBRAHMANYAM1992和培养和VISWANATHAN1996】表明如果多个知情交易者使用相同的信息，则这条消息立刻纳入股票价格，权威人士的预期利
45、润将是零。因此,分析师和他们的客户没有从私人简报中获得益处。4前美国证券交易委员会主席维特认为这种选择性披露会延迟价格的发现过程，给一些分析师和他们的客户带来不必要的贸易优势（见美国证券交易委员会【摘自2000】）证券交易委员会认为FD会改善投资者的信心规定在资本市场的完整性,以减少“潜力夺得或维护企业管理或投资者青睐与特定的分析师”见秒摘自。因此,该法规会提高信息流量和拆卸整个市场机会供选择的职员的私人交易。5，并且依靠私有简报可能会影响分析报告,在发行良好保持获取企业管理、新规定的力量做更多的调查6，MOHANRAMANDSUNDERS2006的发现是一致的动机,他们发现分析特质时会花费更
46、多的资金。信息搜索隐藏摘要FD,也减少了他们公司数量的特殊岗位赔偿额外的努力必须竭尽全力在信息采集和分析。相反，批评规定FD的人认为，随着公司减少关于质量和数量的信息流向市场，将会有一个“制冷效果,”，比如，公司可能更愿意发布信息给所选课的观众，而不是广泛地降低信息披露要求的竞争劣势成本和限制由缺乏技能的用户引起的误解信息可能会产生的诉讼风险。在这一点上，该协会这样一种回答可能会导致较长寿的和更有价值的、管理内部消息。此外，发布的信息会倾向于在标准规范延边或者在管理指导下，原始形式会有小的增值。从管理通过金融分析师社区上不加引导,用户必须作出自己的推论见韦伯20009，直接测量信息不对称的成本
47、也很少。一种可能性是推断出它从造市者的发挥传播。传播的造市者的发挥是一个函数的订单处理成本,库存控股成本,竞争,逆向选择成本。如果第一个三部分不受监管FD,改变周围的规定在布满必须被改变逆向选择成本破2002采用相对发挥着置换蔓延之间的信息不对称的水平知情交易者和不知情举办会议电话公司。在FD前期调控期间,他发现公司披露信息通过限制的会议电话有较高的发挥高校信息不对称息差比如公司运用“开放”电话会议）。这些差异不坚持在前期调控FD期间,让他得出这样的结论比赛场地已被夷为平地SUNDERS2002回归模型,然而,并未明确隔离逆向选择的造价组成部分发挥传播。因此,他的研究结果也可以驱动的横向变化发
48、挥的其他部份订单处理成本,包括传播成本和竞争。11，ELESWARAPU,THOMPSON,ANDVENKATARAMAN2004代表不仅使用信息不对称的相对发挥,而且传播订单流的一种量度的不平衡12，使用数据周围交易日内公告,他们发现降低信息不对称传入后,以减少FD规定以较低的价格是最值得注意的液体公司。STRASER2002试图把更多的信息不对称直接通过测量概率基于通知交易学组EASLEYETAL19961由于逆向选择组成部分来源于传播的修改版本HUANGANDSTOLL1997。他发现这两种方法都表明,概率知情交易之间的变化不明显售前和岗位规定FD时期阿斯兰2002也用EASLEY199
49、6模型,认为通知交易的可能性减少为中型和大型公司但是增加了小公司。总之,有相关工作经验提出了与之相冲突的证据对于改变在信息不对称周围的规定FD。一些研究注意减少如阿斯兰2002中、大型公司,ELESWARAPU,VENKATARAMAN,汤普森2004,破2002,一些工作发现了一个增加如阿斯兰2002因为小公司,并提出一些研究文件结论。此外,这些方法依赖理论或经验模型假定,唯一的时序变化信息不对称被传播。时间运动库存控股成本费用,订单处理假设和竞争不变。没有明确的模型对这些变量的影响,其结果必须小心谨慎的解释。要克服这些限制,我们采用了传播了回归模型发挥营运总监博伦,史密斯,和WHALEY2004以下简称英制BSW。该模型,总结了附录所述,分解造市者的扩散到订单处理,控股成本归因于成本、逆选择,市场制造者的角色的竞争。ELESWARAPU,THOMPSON,ANDVENKATARAMAN2004。我们的证据表明控制其它因素后,决定市场制造者的扩散,规定FD导致逆向选择增加成本。我们的结果是柔韧的许多灵敏度的支票。我们把我们的发现是响应市场期票出票人采取不合向证券交易委员会呈报的“公平竞争”和“改良投资者信心”目标实施条例FD也就是说,市场制造者回应,如果信息不对称是增加,不至减少,在制
