1、外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文EARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDFIRMFINANCIALMOTIVEAFINANCIALINVESTIGATIONOFUKLISTEDFIRMSABSTRACTTHISSTUDYFOCUSESONTHEINVESTIGATIONOFMOTIVESFORANDCHARACTERISTICSOFUKFIRMSTHATENGAGEINEARNINGSMANAGEMENTACTIVITIESITCONCENTRATESPARTICULARLYONTHEPROVISIONOFVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURES,THEVIOLATION
2、OFDEBTCOVENANTS,MANAGEMENTCOMPENSATION,ANDONTHEEQUITYANDDEBTCAPITALNEEDSOFFIRMSANDTHEIRRELATIONWITHTHEUSEOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTTHESTUDYEXAMINESALSOTHEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINCLINATIONOFFIRMSTHATSEEKTOMEETOREXCEEDFINANCIALANALYSTSFORECASTSTHEFINDINGSGENERALLYINDICATETHATFIRMSWITHLOWPROFITABILITYANDHIGHLEVE
3、RAGEMEASURESARELIKELYTOUSEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTALSO,FIRMSTHATAREINEQUITYANDDEBTCAPITALNEEDANDARECLOSETODEBTCOVENANTVIOLATIONALSOAPPEARTOBEINCLINEDTOEMPLOYEARNINGSMANAGEMENTPRACTICESLIKEWISE,FIRMSTENDTOUSEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTTOIMPROVETHEIRFINANCIALNUMBERSANDSUBSEQUENTLYREINFORCETHEIRCOMPENSATIONANDMEETAND
4、EXCEEDFINANCIALANALYSTSEARNINGSFORECASTSINCONTRAST,THESTUDYSHOWSTHATFIRMSTHATPROVIDEVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESAPPEARTOBELESSINCLINEDTOMAKEUSEOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENT1INTRODUCTIONINTHEIRSTRUGGLETOMAXIMIZEFIRMSPROFITSANDSTOCKVALUE,MANAGERSMAYSOMETIMESBEINCLINEDTOMAKEUSEOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTPRACTICESTHI
5、SSTUDYEXAMINESWHETHERFIRMSEMPLOYEARNINGSMANAGEMENTPROCEDURESINORDERTOIMPROVETHEIRFINANCIALPICTUREANDIMPRESSSTOCKMARKETPARTICIPANTSTHESTUDYSEEKSTOIDENTIFYMOTIVESFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTHERE,THESTUDYFOCUSESONTHERELATIONBETWEENTHEPROVISIONOFVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURES,DEBTCOVENANTVIOLATION,EXECUTIVECOM
6、PENSATION,EQUITYANDDEBTCAPITAL,ANDFINANCIALANALYSTSFORECASTS,WITHEARNINGSMANAGEMENTEARNINGSMANAGEMENTRELATESTOTHEUSEOFDISCRETIONARYACCOUNTINGACCRUALSTOINFLUENCEREPORTEDEARNINGSTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFSUCHPRACTICESMAYBEINSPIREDBYTHEAPPRECIATIONTHATTHESTOCKMARKETSHOWSWHENFAVORABLEACCOUNTINGNUMBERSAREREPORT
7、EDSOMETIMES,FIRMSAREINCLINEDTODISCLOSEINFORMATIONTHATISINEXCESSOFWHATISREQUIREDBYTHELAWTHESEVOLUNTARYDISCLOSURESAIMMAINLYATIMPROVINGFIRMSIMAGEANDMAKINGITMOREAPPEALINGTOINVESTORSHENCE,ITFOLLOWSTHATTHEPROVISIONOFVOLUNTARYDISCLOSURESWOULDPROBABLYREDUCETHESCOPEFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENT,SINCETHEPROVISIONOFAD
8、DITIONALINFORMATIONWOULDALLOWACCOUNTINGUSERSTODETECTPHENOMENAOFFRAUD,IRREGULARITYANDSHAREHOLDERMISGUIDANCEINORDERTOAVOIDBREACHINGDEBTCOVENANTS,WHICHWOULDNEGATIVELYAFFECTTHECOMPANYMARKETPICTUREANDWEAKENTHECREDITABILITYANDTERMSOFBORROWING,FIRMSMIGHTRESORTTOEARNINGSMANAGEMENTMANAGERSMIGHTALSOUSEEARNING
9、SMANAGEMENTTECHNIQUESINORDERTOENHANCETHEIRCOMPENSATIONARRANGEMENTSANDWEALTHINORDERTOACQUIRETHECAPITALNEEDED,AFIRMADDRESSESTHECAPITALANDMONEYMARKETSBYISSUINGEQUITYORDEBTCAPITALFIRMSMIGHT,THEREFORE,ENGAGEINEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINORDERTOIMPRESSCAPITALPROVIDERSANDMAKETHEISSUESOFSTOCKANDDEBTCAPITALATTRACTIV
10、EANDSUCCESSFULMEETINGOREXCEEDINGFINANCIALANALYSTSEARNINGSFORECASTSISANABSOLUTENECESSITY,IFAFIRMISTORETAINITSSTATUSANDPROSPERITYINDEED,SCHONFELD1998,PP256257STATESTHATIFTHECOMPANYSACTUALEARNINGSMEETORJUSTBEATTHECONSENSUS,BOTHTHECOMPANYANDTHEANALYSTSWINTHESTOCKGOESUP,ANDEVERYONELOOKSSMARTCOMPANIESAREU
11、NDERENORMOUSPRESSURETOACHIEVETHECONSENSUSESTIMATES,THEREFORE,FIRMSSEEMTOHAVEASIGNIFICANTINCENTIVETOSURMOUNTORREACHANALYSTSEARNINGSEXPECTATIONS,AGOALWHICHMIGHTBEACHIEVEDBYEMPLOYINGEARNINGSMANAGEMENTPRACTICESTHESTUDYFOCUSESONUKLISTEDFIRMSANDEXAMINESWHETHERTHEREISARELATIONBETWEENEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDVO
12、LUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURES,DEBTCOVENANTVIOLATION,MANAGERSCOMPENSATION,EQUITYANDDEBTCAPITALACCESSIBILITYANDMEETINGFINANCIALANALYSTSFORECASTSTHESTUDYALSOSEEKSTOIDENTIFYTHEFINANCIALCHARACTERISTICSOFFIRMSTHATUSEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDTHEMOTIVESTHATURGETHEMTORESORTTOEARNINGSMANAGEMENTPRACTICESTHERESEARCH
13、QUESTIONISWHETHERFIRMSTHATAREINNEEDOFCAPITALORINANUNFAVORABLEFINANCIALSITUATIONWOULDEMPLOYEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINORDERTOIMPROVETHEIRFINANCIALNUMBERS,ANDSUBSEQUENTLYIMPRESSCAPITALPROVIDERSANDOTHERMARKETPARTICIPANTS21VOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESMANAGERSAREINCLINEDTOPROVIDEVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURES
14、INORDERTOINFORMSTAKEHOLDERSOFTHEIRABILITYTOMEETBUSINESSASWELLASFINANCIALTARGETSHOWEVER,THEINFORMATIVENESSANDTHESIZEOFDISCLOSEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONVARIESFROMFIRMTOFIRMRELATIVETOITSINFORMATIVENESS,FIRMSUSUALLYTENDTODISCLOSEMOREWILLINGLYGOODINFORMATIONTHANBADINFORMATIONABOODYANDKAZNIK,2000MANAGERSTEND
15、TOPROVIDEINFORMATIONINORDERTOREDUCEVARIABILITYINORINFLUENCETHEPRICINGOFTHECOMPANYSSTOCKSANDCONSEQUENTLYMAXIMIZETHEIRCOMPENSATIONRECEIPTSFURTHERMORE,VOLUNTARYDISCLOSURESCANREDUCEPOTENTIALPOLITICALANDCONTRACTINGASWELLASLITIGATIONCOSTSTHROUGHVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURES,MANAGERSCOULDDEMONSTRATETOPRES
16、ENTANDPROSPECTIVESTAKEHOLDERSTHECOMPANYSSUPERIORFINANCIALPOSITIONANDALSOPROVIDEEXPLANATIONSWHENCOMPLICATEDAND/ORAGGRESSIVEACCOUNTINGMETHODSAREEMPLOYEDEVIDENTLY,THEPROVISIONOFVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESCANREDUCEINFORMATIONASYMMETRYANDIMPROVETHECOMMUNICATIONBETWEENMANAGERS,SHAREHOLDERSANDLENDERSFIN
17、ANCIALANALYSTSVALUEFIRMSTHATPROVIDEVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESHIGHERTHANFIRMSTHATDISCLOSEINFORMATIONBASEDONTHEMINIMUMREQUIREMENTSOFTHELAW,ORFIRMSTHATPROVIDEPOORDISCLOSURESGELBANDZAROWIN,2002GOODNEWSFORECASTSMAYRESULTINMODERATEINCREASESINSTOCKPRICES,WHILEBADNEWSFORECASTSMAYLEADTOLARGENEGATIVESTOCK
18、PRICECHANGESHUTTON,MILLER,SWEENEY,1994ITALSOPROVIDESANEGATIVESIGNALOFCORPORATEPERFORMANCEWITHUNFAVORABLEIMPLICATIONSFORTHECOMPANYSSTOCKBEHAVIORANDCREDITABILITYASWELLASFORMANAGERSREPUTATIONHOLTHAUSEN,LARCKER,SHUTO,2007MANAGERSWITHEARNINGSBASEDCOMPENSATIONCONTRACTSTENDTOADOPTINCOMEINCREASINGACCOUNTING
19、METHODSTOMAXIMISETHEIREMOLUMENTSWHENEARNINGSDROPBELOWTHELOWERBOUNDORRISEABOVETHEUPPERBOUNDDESIGNATEDBYTHEBONUSPLAN,MANAGERSMAYBEINCLINEDTOSELECTINCOMEDECREASINGACCOUNTINGMETHODSDEGEORGE,PATEL,ASHBAUGHSKAIFE,COLLINS,LAUXANDLAUX,2008THELITERATURESUGGESTSTHATCOMPANIESMAYENGAGEINEARNINGSMANAGEMENTUSINGD
20、ISCRETIONARYACCRUALSPRIORTOEQUITYANDDEBTISSUESFIRMSINTENTIONISMAINLYTOREPORTBETTEREARNINGSFIGURESINTHEPERIODAROUNDTHEISSUEANDTOATTAINALOWERCOSTOFCAPITALITMAYALSOBETHATTHELARGERTHEOFFERINGTHEHIGHERTHEPOSSIBILITIESFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTFIRMSMAYBEINCLINEDTOMANAGEREPORTEDEARNINGSUPWARDBEFORETHECAPITALISS
21、UEDATE,INANEFFORTTOOBTAINFINANCINGMOREEASILYANDONBETTERTERMSBEUSELINCK,DELOOF,DOUKAS,MCKNIGHT,BERGSTRESSERSWEENEY,1994。同时它也提供了一个负面的信号。公司绩效较差的会影响公司的股价、可信度以及管理者的声誉HOLTHAUSEN,LARCKER,SHUTO,2007。以盈利为基础的补偿合同管理人员往往会采用增加收入的会计方法，最大限度地获取报酬。当收入下降或低于计划奖金的下线时，管理者可能会倾向于选择减少收入的会计处理方法DEGEORGE,PATEL,ASHBAUGHSKAIFE,
22、COLLINS,LAUXANDLAUX,2008。管理者努力地满足金融分析师的预测和投资者的预期，同时也受到自身悲观或乐观估计的影响，倾向于通过盈余管理来获取市场溢价。若未能达到分析师的预期和投资者的预测可能会对公司筹集资本、经济增长的前景、管理人员的报酬和未来发展潜力产生负面影响GRAHAM,HARVEY,BERGSTRESSERPHILIPPON,2006。这是一个拥有良好的信誉，优越的管理机制，高增长和持股率较高，且能够影响分析师的预期的大型公司。BARTOV，GIVOLY和HAYN（2002）声称，为达到金融分析师预测而进行盈余管理所花费的费用，将通过盈利报告公布前的高额股票回报得到补
23、偿。XIE（2001）认为，不对收入进行管理的公司最终将会超越长期对收入进行管理的公司。3、结论披露公司财务的决策和执行情况将缩小盈余管理的范围并引导投资者做出明智的判断。研究表明，公司提供的信息中很少将盈余管理的操作程序披露出来。此外，在可能存在违反债务契约的情况下，公司将通过盈余管理来避免财务危机和贷款困境为了提高公司业绩和最大限度的获得回报，管理层也倾向于使用盈余管理。另外，公司为了使其财务数据更好看，也倾向于使用盈余管理，从而更容易通过发行股票和债券筹集到资本。该研究的结论是经常进行盈余管理的公司倾向于显示较大的数据、发挥更高的杠杆效应、较低的增长和较差的盈利能力。尽管盈余管理在某种情
24、况下可能支持（短期）的管理目标，但从长远看会降低公司的完整性和可信度。BARSKY（2002）认为，应取消盈余管理，以提高市场信息的质量和透明度。目前已经提出了多种盈余管理的防范措施，例如，加强税务威胁，加强监测，引进外部董事，加强内部审计委员会监督作用等。尽管如此，公司在某些情况下还是倾向于运用盈余管理做法。因此，为了提高市场信息的质量和透明度，公司应寻找其他途径来实现管理目标，即使会促使盈利下降。披露的信息能够真实反映公司的财务状况，这样能增强企业的信誉和进入资本市场的能力，使其拥有更好的财务前景。这项研究的结果有利于资本提供者，如投资者和贷款人。当他们审查了公司的财务数据和账目后，能够就
25、同意还是拒绝公司的外部融资要求做出明智的判断。资本提供者不愿意向财务状况受到质疑的公司提供资本。如财务信息披露较差，或只是简单的遵守法律的最低要求，或在财务危机时报告较差的财务业绩。该项研究的结果也有利于监管当局和其他市场参与者，尤其是在他们准备审查公司账目和财务业绩报告时，能够发挥其监督作用，从而减少盈余管理的范围，并提高财务报告的质量。该项研究暗示着在某些情况下，灵活的财务报告将会增加职业判断、主观性及盈余操纵的范围。同时，股市的效率有赖于会计信息质量的提高。因而当前面临的问题是如何确定财务报告的灵活性以及如何完善会计制度，防止和消除收益被操控和投资者被欺骗的现象，并就信息不对称可能导致管理者的投机行为而言，如何建立一个有效地监督管理体系。
