1、1外文文献翻译译文原文EARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDFIRMFINANCIALMOTIVEAFINANCIALINVESTIGATIONOFUKLISTEDFIRMSABSTRACTTHISSTUDYFOCUSESONTHEINVESTIGATIONOFMOTIVESFORANDCHARACTERISTICSOFUKFIRMSTHATENGAGEINEARNINGSMANAGEMENTACTIVITIESITCONCENTRATESPARTICULARLYONTHEPROVISIONOFVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURES,THEVIOLATIONOFDEB
2、TCOVENANTS,MANAGEMENTCOMPENSATION,ANDONTHEEQUITYANDDEBTCAPITALNEEDSOFFIRMSANDTHEIRRELATIONWITHTHEUSEOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTTHESTUDYEXAMINESALSOTHEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINCLINATIONOFFIRMSTHATSEEKTOMEETOREXCEEDFINANCIALANALYSTSFORECASTSTHEFINDINGSGENERALLYINDICATETHATFIRMSWITHLOWPROFITABILITYANDHIGHLEVERAGEM
3、EASURESARELIKELYTOUSEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTALSO,FIRMSTHATAREINEQUITYANDDEBTCAPITALNEEDANDARECLOSETODEBTCOVENANTVIOLATIONALSOAPPEARTOBEINCLINEDTOEMPLOYEARNINGSMANAGEMENTPRACTICESLIKEWISE,FIRMSTENDTOUSEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTTOIMPROVETHEIRFINANCIALNUMBERSANDSUBSEQUENTLYREINFORCETHEIRCOMPENSATIONANDMEETANDEXCEE
4、DFINANCIALANALYSTSEARNINGSFORECASTSINCONTRAST,THESTUDYSHOWSTHATFIRMSTHATPROVIDEVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESAPPEARTOBELESSINCLINEDTOMAKEUSEOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENT1INTRODUCTIONINTHEIRSTRUGGLETOMAXIMIZEFIRMSPROFITSANDSTOCKVALUE,MANAGERSMAYSOMETIMESBEINCLINEDTOMAKEUSEOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTPRACTICESTHISSTUD
5、YEXAMINESWHETHERFIRMSEMPLOYEARNINGSMANAGEMENTPROCEDURESINORDERTOIMPROVETHEIRFINANCIALPICTUREANDIMPRESSSTOCKMARKETPARTICIPANTSTHESTUDYSEEKSTOIDENTIFYMOTIVESFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTHERE,THESTUDYFOCUSESONTHERELATIONBETWEENTHEPROVISIONOFVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURES,DEBTCOVENANTVIOLATION,EXECUTIVECOMPENSA
6、TION,EQUITYANDDEBTCAPITAL,ANDFINANCIALANALYSTSFORECASTS,WITHEARNINGSMANAGEMENT2EARNINGSMANAGEMENTRELATESTOTHEUSEOFDISCRETIONARYACCOUNTINGACCRUALSTOINFLUENCEREPORTEDEARNINGSTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFSUCHPRACTICESMAYBEINSPIREDBYTHEAPPRECIATIONTHATTHESTOCKMARKETSHOWSWHENFAVORABLEACCOUNTINGNUMBERSAREREPORTEDSO
7、METIMES,FIRMSAREINCLINEDTODISCLOSEINFORMATIONTHATISINEXCESSOFWHATISREQUIREDBYTHELAWTHESEVOLUNTARYDISCLOSURESAIMMAINLYATIMPROVINGFIRMSIMAGEANDMAKINGITMOREAPPEALINGTOINVESTORSHENCE,ITFOLLOWSTHATTHEPROVISIONOFVOLUNTARYDISCLOSURESWOULDPROBABLYREDUCETHESCOPEFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENT,SINCETHEPROVISIONOFADDITI
8、ONALINFORMATIONWOULDALLOWACCOUNTINGUSERSTODETECTPHENOMENAOFFRAUD,IRREGULARITYANDSHAREHOLDERMISGUIDANCEINORDERTOAVOIDBREACHINGDEBTCOVENANTS,WHICHWOULDNEGATIVELYAFFECTTHECOMPANYMARKETPICTUREANDWEAKENTHECREDITABILITYANDTERMSOFBORROWING,FIRMSMIGHTRESORTTOEARNINGSMANAGEMENTMANAGERSMIGHTALSOUSEEARNINGSMAN
9、AGEMENTTECHNIQUESINORDERTOENHANCETHEIRCOMPENSATIONARRANGEMENTSANDWEALTHINORDERTOACQUIRETHECAPITALNEEDED,AFIRMADDRESSESTHECAPITALANDMONEYMARKETSBYISSUINGEQUITYORDEBTCAPITALFIRMSMIGHT,THEREFORE,ENGAGEINEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINORDERTOIMPRESSCAPITALPROVIDERSANDMAKETHEISSUESOFSTOCKANDDEBTCAPITALATTRACTIVEAND
10、SUCCESSFULMEETINGOREXCEEDINGFINANCIALANALYSTSEARNINGSFORECASTSISANABSOLUTENECESSITY,IFAFIRMISTORETAINITSSTATUSANDPROSPERITYINDEED,SCHONFELD1998,PP256257STATESTHATIFTHECOMPANYSACTUALEARNINGSMEETORJUSTBEATTHECONSENSUS,BOTHTHECOMPANYANDTHEANALYSTSWINTHESTOCKGOESUP,ANDEVERYONELOOKSSMARTCOMPANIESAREUNDER
11、ENORMOUSPRESSURETOACHIEVETHECONSENSUSESTIMATES,THEREFORE,FIRMSSEEMTOHAVEASIGNIFICANTINCENTIVETOSURMOUNTORREACHANALYSTSEARNINGSEXPECTATIONS,AGOALWHICHMIGHTBEACHIEVEDBYEMPLOYINGEARNINGSMANAGEMENTPRACTICESTHESTUDYFOCUSESONUKLISTEDFIRMSANDEXAMINESWHETHERTHEREISARELATIONBETWEENEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDVOLUNT
12、ARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURES,DEBTCOVENANTVIOLATION,MANAGERSCOMPENSATION,EQUITYANDDEBTCAPITALACCESSIBILITYANDMEETINGFINANCIALANALYSTSFORECASTSTHESTUDYALSOSEEKSTOIDENTIFYTHEFINANCIALCHARACTERISTICSOFFIRMSTHATUSEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDTHEMOTIVESTHATURGETHEM3TORESORTTOEARNINGSMANAGEMENTPRACTICESTHERESEARCHQUE
13、STIONISWHETHERFIRMSTHATAREINNEEDOFCAPITALORINANUNFAVORABLEFINANCIALSITUATIONWOULDEMPLOYEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINORDERTOIMPROVETHEIRFINANCIALNUMBERS,ANDSUBSEQUENTLYIMPRESSCAPITALPROVIDERSANDOTHERMARKETPARTICIPANTS21VOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESMANAGERSAREINCLINEDTOPROVIDEVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESINO
14、RDERTOINFORMSTAKEHOLDERSOFTHEIRABILITYTOMEETBUSINESSASWELLASFINANCIALTARGETSHOWEVER,THEINFORMATIVENESSANDTHESIZEOFDISCLOSEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONVARIESFROMFIRMTOFIRMRELATIVETOITSINFORMATIVENESS,FIRMSUSUALLYTENDTODISCLOSEMOREWILLINGLYGOODINFORMATIONTHANBADINFORMATIONABOODYANDKAZNIK,2000MANAGERSTENDTOP
15、ROVIDEINFORMATIONINORDERTOREDUCEVARIABILITYINORINFLUENCETHEPRICINGOFTHECOMPANYSSTOCKSANDCONSEQUENTLYMAXIMIZETHEIRCOMPENSATIONRECEIPTSFURTHERMORE,VOLUNTARYDISCLOSURESCANREDUCEPOTENTIALPOLITICALANDCONTRACTINGASWELLASLITIGATIONCOSTSTHROUGHVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURES,MANAGERSCOULDDEMONSTRATETOPRESENT
16、ANDPROSPECTIVESTAKEHOLDERSTHECOMPANYSSUPERIORFINANCIALPOSITIONANDALSOPROVIDEEXPLANATIONSWHENCOMPLICATEDAND/ORAGGRESSIVEACCOUNTINGMETHODSAREEMPLOYEDEVIDENTLY,THEPROVISIONOFVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESCANREDUCEINFORMATIONASYMMETRYANDIMPROVETHECOMMUNICATIONBETWEENMANAGERS,SHAREHOLDERSANDLENDERSFINANC
17、IALANALYSTSVALUEFIRMSTHATPROVIDEVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESHIGHERTHANFIRMSTHATDISCLOSEINFORMATIONBASEDONTHEMINIMUMREQUIREMENTSOFTHELAW,ORFIRMSTHATPROVIDEPOORDISCLOSURESGELBANDZAROWIN,2002GOODNEWSFORECASTSMAYRESULTINMODERATEINCREASESINSTOCKPRICES,WHILEBADNEWSFORECASTSMAYLEADTOLARGENEGATIVESTOCKPRI
18、CECHANGESHUTTON,MILLER,SWEENEY,1994ITALSOPROVIDESANEGATIVESIGNALOFCORPORATEPERFORMANCEWITHUNFAVORABLEIMPLICATIONSFORTHECOMPANYSSTOCKBEHAVIORANDCREDITABILITYASWELLASFORMANAGERSREPUTATIONHOLTHAUSEN,LARCKER,SHUTO,2007MANAGERSWITHEARNINGSBASEDCOMPENSATIONCONTRACTSTENDTOADOPTINCOMEINCREASINGACCOUNTINGMET
19、HODSTOMAXIMISETHEIREMOLUMENTSWHENEARNINGSDROPBELOWTHELOWERBOUNDORRISEABOVETHEUPPERBOUNDDESIGNATEDBYTHEBONUSPLAN,MANAGERSMAYBEINCLINEDTOSELECTINCOMEDECREASINGACCOUNTINGMETHODSDEGEORGE,PATEL,ASHBAUGHSKAIFE,COLLINS,LAUXANDLAUX,200831EARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESINTHEIREFFORTTOINFO
20、RMSTAKEHOLDERSANDSOOTHETHEIRCONCERNSREGARDINGTHEFIRMSFUTUREPLANSANDVIABILITY,MANAGERSMIGHTVOLUNTARILYDISCLOSEPIECESOFQUALITATIVEANDQUANTITATIVEINFORMATIONBEYONDTHEMINIMUMREQUIREMENTSOFTHELAWTHEMAINOBJECTIVEOFPROVIDINGVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESWOULDBETOGIVECLARIFICATIONSANDEXPLANATIONSTOINTERESTE
21、DPARTIESABOUTTHEFIRMSFINANCIALPICTURE5ANDPERFORMANCEANDTOVANISHANYDOUBTSTHATMIGHTIMPEDETHEFIRMSFUTUREFINANCIALGROWTHANDPROGRESSTHEPROVISIONOFINFORMATIVEACCOUNTINGREPORTSANDTHEDISSEMINATIONOFGOODQUALITYACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONWOULDARMSTOCKMARKETPARTICIPANTSWITHINSIGHTANDKNOWLEDGEABOUTTHEFIRMSFINANCIALPE
22、RFORMANCEANDSITUATION,ANDWOULDSUBSEQUENTLYTENDTOREDUCETHESCOPEFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTITFOLLOWS,THEREFORE,THATFIRMSTHATPROVIDEVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESWOULDBELESSINCLINEDTOMANAGETHEIREARNINGSFIGURESTHEHYPOTHESISTHATISTESTEDISASFOLLOWSFIRMSTHATPROVIDEVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESARELESSLIKELYTOUSE
23、EARNINGSMANAGEMENTTHECATEGORIZATIONOFFIRMSINTOVOLUNTARYANDNONVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSERSISBASEDUPONTHEQUALITYANDQUANTITYOFREPORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONINPUBLISHEDACCOUNTINGREPORTSFIRMSTHATCONFORMTOTHEMINIMUMREQUIREMENTSOFTHELAWANDPRESENTBASICACCOUNTINGINFORMATION,SUCHASTHEBASICFINANCIALSTATEMENTSA
24、NDMANAGEMENTREPORTSASWELLASBRIEFNOTESTOTHEACCOUNTSWITHQUESTIONABLEINFORMATIONALVALUEARELABELLEDASNONVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSERSFIRMSPROVIDINGINFORMATIONMORETHANREQUIRED,INCLUDINGENLIGHTENINGNOTESTOTHEACCOUNTS,SENSITIVEINFORMATIONREGARDINGMANAGERSREMUNERATION,CORPORATEGOVERNANCE,RISKPROFILE,DEBTCOV
25、ENANTS,USEOFFINANCIALDERIVATIVESASWELLASDETAILSABOUTCHANGESINACCOUNTINGPOLICIESANDTHEIRIMPACTONACCOUNTINGNUMBERS,ARELABELLEDASVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSERS32EARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDDEBTCOVENANTVIOLATIONWHENCONTRACTINGALOANAGREEMENT,LENDERSSETCONDITIONSTOBORROWERS,OFTENREGARDINGNETWORTHAND/ORWORKINGCAPI
26、TALTHEVIOLATIONOFDEBTCOVENANTSWOULDREFLECTTHELIQUIDITYAND/ORPROFITABILITYDIFFICULTIESOFTHEFIRM,ANDWOULDUNFAVOURABLYAFFECTITSREPUTATIONANDCREDITABILITYHENCE,MANAGERSMIGHTBEINCLINEDTOENGAGEINEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINORDERTOCOMPLYWITHDEBTCOVENANTSSETBYLENDERSANDREDUCETHEPOSSIBILITYOFVIOLATIONANDFINANCIALDIS
27、TRESS33EARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDEQUITYANDDEBTCAPITALFORAFIRMTOREINFORCEITSVIABILITYANDFULFILITSINVESTMENTANDGROWTHPLANS,ITHASTOMAKESURETHATITCANOBTAINSMOOTHACCESSTOEQUITYANDDEBTCAPITALMARKETS6TOOBTAINUNHINDEREDACCESSTOCAPITALMARKETSANDATTRACTINVESTORS,AFIRMWOULDNEEDTODISPLAYSOUNDFINANCIALNUMBERSANDFAVOR
28、ABLEFUTUREFINANCIALPROSPECTSITAPPEARSTHEREFORETHAT,PRIORTOANEQUITYORDEBTISSUE,MANAGERSMIGHTUSEDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSINORDERTOIMPROVETHEIRFIRMFINANCIALPERFORMANCEANDIMPRESSSTOCKMARKETPARTICIPANTS,ANDTHUSMAKETHEISSUEATTRACTIVEANDSUCCESSFUL34EARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDEXECUTIVECOMPENSATIONEXECUTIVECOMPENSATIO
29、NVARIESDEPENDINGONMANAGERSFINANCIALPERFORMANCE,PRODUCTIVITYANDTARGETMEETINGHIGHERPROFITABILITYANDBETTERFINANCIALMEASURESWOULDLEADTOHIGHERCOMPENSATIONINCONTRAST,AFAILURETOIMPROVETHEFIRMSFINANCIALPICTUREORATTAINTHEPRESETMANAGERIALGOALSWOULDHARMMANAGERSREPUTATIONANDADVERSELYAFFECTTHEIRREMUNERATIONITFOL
30、LOWS,THEREFORE,THATMANAGERSMIGHTBEINCLINEDTOINFLUENCETHEIREARNINGSFIGURESBYUSINGDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSINORDERTOFAVORABLYAFFECTANDMAXIMISETHEIRCOMPENSATION35DISCRETIONARYACCRUALSANDFIRMFINANCIALATTRIBUTESTHISSECTIONCONCLUDESTHESTUDYBYPROVIDINGAGENERALOVERVIEWOFTHEFINANCIALCHARACTERISTICSOFFIRMSWITHDIS
31、CRETIONARYACCRUALSFIRMSWITHEQUITYAND/ORDEBTCAPITALNEEDS,ORFIRMSTHATNEEDTOIMPROVETHEIRACCOUNTINGNUMBERSANDMEASURES,SUCHASPROFITABILITY,LIQUIDITYANDINVESTMENT,ASWELLASTOREINFORCETHEIRMARKETFINANCIALPICTUREMIGHTBEINCLINEDTOUSEEARNINGSMANAGEMENT4CONCLUSIONSCAPITALMARKETSSIMILARCONSIDERATIONSAPPLYWHENFIR
32、MSSEEKTOMEETANDEXCEEDFINANCIALANALYSTSEARNINGSFORECASTSTHESTUDYCONCLUDESTHATFIRMSTHATENGAGEINEARNINGSMANAGEMENTGENERALLYTENDTODISPLAYLARGERSIZE,HIGHERLEVERAGE,LOWERGROWTHANDINFERIORPROFITABILITYANDLIQUIDITYFIGURESALTHOUGHEARNINGSMANAGEMENTMAYINSOMECASESSUPPORTSHORTTERMMANAGERIALOBJECTIVES,ITMAYALSOJ
33、EOPARDISEFIRMSLONGTERMINTEGRITYANDCREDIBILITYBARSKY2002ARGUESTHATEARNINGSMANAGEMENTSHOULDBEELIMINATEDINORDERTOACHIEVEHIGHLEVELMARKETQUALITYANDTRANSPARENCYALTHOUGHSEVERALMEASURESHAVEBEENRECOMMENDEDTOREDUCEEARNINGSMANAGEMENT,SUCHASREGULATIONENACTMENTS,TAXATIONTHREATS,INCREASEDMONITORING,EXTERNALBOARDP
34、ARTICIPATION,REINFORCINGAUDIT7COMMITTEEROLEANDINTERNALCONTROLSYSTEMS,ETC,FIRMSAPPEARINCERTAINCASESTOBEINCLINEDTORESORTTOEARNINGSMANAGEMENTPRACTICESFIRMSSHOULDSEEKTOIDENTIFYALTERNATIVEMEANSTOACHIEVETHEIRMANAGERIALGOALS,EVENIFTHEYRESULTINLOWERPROFITABILITYFIGURESTHEDISCLOSUREOFINFORMATIONTHATREFLECTST
35、HEIRREALFINANCIALPICTUREWOULDREINFORCEFIRMSCREDIBILITYANDACCESSTOCAPITALMARKETSANDWOULDALSOENHANCETHEIRFUTUREFINANCIALPROSPECTSANDPROSPERITYTHEFINDINGSOFTHESTUDYAREUSEFULFORCAPITALPROVIDERS,SUCHASINVESTORSANDLENDERS,WHENTHEYREVIEWFIRMSFINANCIALNUMBERSANDACCOUNTSANDCONSIDERTHEAPPROVALORTHEREJECTIONOF
36、FIRMSEXTERNALFINANCINGREQUESTSITFOLLOWSTHATCAPITALPROVIDERSWOULDBERELUCTANTTOPROVIDEFINANCINGTOFIRMS,WHOSEFINANCIALCHARACTERISTICSANDBEHAVIOURGIVERISETOEARNINGSMANAGEMENTSUSPICIONS,SUCHASDISCLOSINGPOORFINANCIALINFORMATIONORINFORMATIONTHATSIMPLYABIDESBYTHEMINIMUMREQUIREMENTSOFTHELAW,BEINGINORCLOSETOF
37、INANCIALDISTRESS,REPORTINGPOORFINANCIALPERFORMANCE,ETCTHESTUDYISALSOUSEFULFORREGULATORYANDOTHERMARKETAUTHORITIES,ESPECIALLYWHENTHEYPREPAREORREVIEWACCOUNTINGANDFINANCIALREGULATIONONREPORTINGFIRMFINANCIALPERFORMANCE,ANDCANGIVESOMEINSIGHTINTHEIREFFORTTOREDUCETHESCOPEFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDENHANCETHEQU
38、ALITYOFTHEREPORTEDFINANCIALINFORMATIONITISIMPLIEDTHATTHEFLEXIBILITYINFINANCIALREPORTINGMAYINCERTAINCASESENHANCETHESCOPEFORJUDGEMENT,SUBJECTIVITYANDEARNINGSMANIPULATIONITISAMATTERASTOWHETHERTHESTOCKMARKETISSOPHISTICATEDANDINSIGHTFULORNOTITFOLLOWSTHATTHEQUALITYOFACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONISESSENTIALFORENHA
39、NCINGTHEEFFICIENCYOFTHESTOCKMARKETHENCE,THEQUESTIONSTHATARISEAREHOWFLEXIBLEFINANCIALREPORTINGSHOULDBE,ANDHOWACCOUNTINGREGULATIONSHOULDBEIMPROVEDTOPREVENTANDELIMINATEPHENOMENAOFEARNINGSANDINVESTORMANIPULATIONITSTEMSTHATTHEINFORMATIONASYMMETRYMAYLEADTOOPPORTUNISTICMANAGERIALBEHAVIOURS,LEADINGTOAGREATE
40、RNEEDTOESTABLISHDEVICESOFMONITORINGMANAGERIALACTIONSANDDECISIONSTHESTRENGTHENINGOFACCOUNTINGREGULATION,THEREFORE,WOULDLEADTOLOWERAGENCYANDMONITORINGCOSTSANDWOULDIMPROVETHECOMMUNICATIONBETWEENMANAGERSANDSTAKEHOLDERSTHEREINFORCEMENTOFTHEAUDITINGANDSUPERVISORYSTRUCTUREWOULDALSO8ENABLEINVESTORSTOMAKEUNB
41、IASEDFINANCIALPREDICTIONSABOUTFIRMSFUTUREPERFORMANCEANDMAKECORPORATEREPORTSCREDIBLEANDVALUERELEVANTTHUS,THEREMEDYFORREDUCINGEARNINGSMANAGEMENTWOULDBETHEPROVISIONOFHIGHERQUALITYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURES,WHICHWOULDALLOWFIRMSTOAVOIDPOLITICALATTENTIONANDSCRUTINY,ORMAKINGSTAKEHOLDERSSCEPTICALABOUTTHEVALIDITY
42、OFTHEIRMANAGERIALACTIONSSOURCESOURCEGEORGEKADRINISEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDFIRMFINANCIALMOTIVESAFINANCIALINVESTIGATIONOFUKLISTEDFIRMSJINTERNATIONALREVIEWOFFINANCIALANALYSIS，200941641739译文盈余管理与公司财务动机英国上市公司的财务调查摘要本研究的重点是为英国上市公司的盈余管理动机，对其公司盈余管理活动的特点进行调查。它集中表现在对自愿性会计信息披露的债务契约，管理人员的报酬违反规定，也表现在股票和债券资金需求的公司中与盈
43、余管理的关系。这项研究还考察了企业，其结果超过了金融分析师预测的盈余管理倾向。研究结果表明，与一般低利润和高杠杆措施相比，英国公司很可能利用盈余管理的相对措施。此外，公司是在股票和债务资本的需求上，接受违反债务契约，似乎也是倾向于进行盈余管理的做法。同样，企业倾向于使用盈余管理，以改善其财务数字，随后增加他们的补偿，达到并超过了金融分析师的盈利预测。但与此相反，企业提供的会计信息披露义务似乎不太愿意使用盈余管理。1、绪论他们的斗争，在于最大限度地提高企业的利润和股票价值，管理人员有时在实践中可能倾向于利用盈余管理。本研究探讨公司是否聘用盈余管理程序，以改善他们的财政状况以给股市参与者留下深刻的
44、印象。这项研究旨在确定盈余管理的动机。在这里，研究的重点在于自愿性会计信息披露、违反债务契约、行政赔偿权益、债务资本和金融分析师预测与盈余管理之间的关系。盈余管理涉及到自由裁量会计计量来影响报告收益。这种做法的实施可能会有利于财务报告的数字。有时，公司倾向于披露的信息，在法律要求的基础上。这些自愿披露的目的主要是改善公司的形象，使之更吸引投资者。因此，它遵循自愿披露的规定，因为更多的会计信息的提供可以让用户来检测欺诈，这将可能减少违规和误导现象的发生。为了避免违反债务协议将产生的负面影响，从而削弱了企业市场的公信力和借款条件，公司可能采取盈余管理。经理还可以、以盈余管理技术，增强他们的赔偿手段
45、和财富。为了获得所需的资本，企业通过发行股票或债务资本进入货币市场。公司因此从事盈余管理，给资本提供者留下深刻的印象，使股票和债务资本的吸引力增大。如果一个企业要维持其地位和繁荣，达到或超过了金融分析师盈余预测是绝对必要的。事实上，SCHONFELD（1998年，页256257）指出，“如果公司的实10际盈利达到共识，无论是公司与分析师谁赢，股票都上涨，大家看上去很聪明，但公司面临着巨大的压力，因此，企业似乎有一个重大的驱动力去达到分析师的盈利预期，这可能是一个用盈余管理行为来实现的目标。这项研究着重于英国上市公司，并探讨是否有盈余管理与会计信息披露义务、违反债务契约、经理人的报酬、股票及债务
46、资本和满足金融分析师预测的关系。这项研究还旨在确定公司盈余管理与使用者的动机从而敦促他们采取盈余管理行为的财务特征。研究问题的关键是企业是否在需要资金或在财务不利的状况下使用盈余管理措施，以提高他们的财务数字，用来吸引资本提供者及其他市场参与者。21、自愿性会计信息披露经理们倾向于提供自愿性会计信息披露以了解他们的能力，从而满足业务和财务目标利益相关者。相对于其在培训，企业通常倾向于愿意披露更多良好的信息。管理者倾向于提供信息，以避免影响本公司的股票价格，从而最大限度地发挥他们的赔偿金收据。此外，自愿性信息披露可以降低潜在的政治和合同的诉讼成本。通过自愿会计信息披露，管理人员可以提出证明，该公
47、司的财务状况优于预期的利益相关者，并提供复杂的证据或积极采用会计方法来解释。很明显，自愿性会计信息披露的规定可以减少信息不对称，提高管理者，股东和债权人的沟通。金融分析师提供价值的公司自愿性会计信息披露高于公司进行信息披露的法律基础上的最低要求。好消息预测，可能会导致股票价格温和增长，而坏消息，预测可能导致股票价格较大的负变动（赫顿，米勒，和斯金纳，2003）。22、盈余管理违反公约的债务意味着有波动，其主要后果会影响会计收益和流动性，从而使破产的风险可能性很高（德丰，加密把佛，1994）。它还提供了该公司的股票的行为和公信力，以及管理人员的声誉（霍尔索森，拉克尔，与斯隆管理学院，1995）对
48、企业业绩的不利影响，。因此，为了努力避免这些不良影响，并遵守其债务契约，管理人员可能会积极地管理其会计数字（兰伯特，2001）。现存的文献表明，经理倾向于从事盈余管理，以减轻债务违反公约行为的可能性。为此，管理人员可能使用增加收入的酌情会计方法（斯威尼，1994）。11其原因是，行政赔偿的合同往往是基于事实的报道，管理者可能会影响报告内容，努力改善他们的声誉和补偿福利收入的会计数字。以盈利为基础的补偿合同管理人员往往采取收入增加的会计方法，以最大限度地提高他们的酬金。当盈余低于下限或上升下降超过了指定的奖金计划上限，管理者可能会倾向于选择收入减少的会计方法（第古格，帕特尔，泽克豪泽，1999）
49、。据报道，管理者有时会聘请人员操纵应计利润，以加强公司的价值，而不是增加其管理的赔偿。在某些情况下，会计基础执行合同可能导致管理者的机会主义方式行事，即他们采取收入增长的政策，以减少他们的补偿，即使这对股东的财富有不利影响。针对管理机会主义采取的措施包括对员工董事比例较高，具有强大的审计委员会密切合作，检查总裁，会计和审计法规，将确保符合审计程序的独立性，并加强对投资者的保障机制（南大，威索基，2003；阿什博斯凯夫，科林斯，与拉方德，2006；劳克斯和劳克斯，2008）。31盈余管理和自愿会计披露他们的努力通知利益相关者，关切公司未来的计划和可行性，经理可能自愿披露信息的定性和定量的超越了法律的最低要求。自愿提供会计信息披露的主要目标将是要澄清和解释有关公司的财政状况和业绩方面消除任何的怀疑，以免妨碍公司未来的财务发展和进步。会计报告的信息提供和质量良好的会计信息的传播，有利于股市参与者的洞察力对公司的财务表现和状况有所认识，并随后将趋于减少盈余管理的范围。企业提供的会计信息披露信息不太可能使用盈余管理。该公司将自愿和非自愿性会计披露的分类是建立在报告的质量和会计报告中公布的会计信息质量的基础上。企业行为符合现行的法律和基本的会计信息，如基本的财务报表和管理报告以及简要说明，信息的价值与可疑帐户被视为非自愿性会计
