1、原文EARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDCORPORATEGOVERNANCEINASIASEMERGINGMARKETSTHISPAPERSTUDIESTHEIMPACTSOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEONEARNINGSMANAGEMENTWEUSEFIRMLEVELGOVERNANCEDATA,TAKENFROMCREDITLYONNAISSECURITYASIACLSA,OFNINEASIANCOUNTRIES,INADDITIONTOTHECOUNTRYLEVELGOVERNANCEDATAUSEDINPASTSTUDIESOURCONCLUSIONISASFOLL
2、OWSFIRST,FIRMSWITHGOODCORPORATEGOVERNANCETENDTOCONDUCTLESSEARNINGSMANAGEMENTSECOND,THEREISASIZEEFFECTFOREARNINGSSMOOTHING,THATIS,LARGESIZEFIRMSAREPRONETOCONDUCTEARNINGSSMOOTHING,BUTGOODCORPORATEGOVERNANCECANMITIGATETHEEFFECTONAVERAGETHIRD,THEREISATURNINGPOINTFORLEVERAGEEFFECT,IEWHENTHEGOVERNANCEINDE
3、XISLARGE,LEVERAGEEFFECTEXISTS,OTHERWISEREVERSELEVERAGEEFFECTEXISTSITSHOWSTHATAHIGHLYLEVERAGEDFIRMWITHPOORGOVERNANCEISPRONETOBESCRUTINISEDCLOSELYANDTHUSFINDSITHARDERTOFOOLTHEMARKETBYMANIPULATINGEARNINGSFOURTH,FIRMSWITHHIGHERGROWTHLOWEREARNINGSYIELDAREPRONETOENGAGEINEARNINGSSMOOTHINGANDEARNINGSAGGRESS
4、IVENESS,BUTGOODCORPORATEGOVERNANCECANMITIGATETHEEFFECTFINALLY,FIRMSINSTRONGERANTIDIRECTORRIGHTSCOUNTRIESTENDTOEXHIBITSTRONGEREARNINGSSMOOTHINGTHISCOUNTERINTUITIVERESULTISDIFFERENTFROMLEUZETAL20031、INTRODUCTIONSTUDIESOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTHEREAFTER,EMHAVERECENTLYATTRACTEDALOTOFATTENTIONBECAUSEOFTHEACCO
5、UNTINGFRAUDATENRON,WORLDCOM,XEROX,ROYALAHOLD,HEALTHSOUTH,ANDSOONTHEINCREASINGATTENTIONTOTHEQUALITYOFREPORTEDEARNINGSMAKESTHESTUDYOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTIMPORTANTAGAINLEVITT,2000SCHIPPER1989ANDHEALYANDWAHLEN1999STATETHATEARNINGSMANAGEMENTISTHEALTERNATIONOFFIRMSREPORTEDECONOMICPERFORMANCEBYINSIDERSTOEITH
6、ER“MISLEADSOMESTAKEHOLDERS”ORTO“INFLUENCECONTRACTUALOUTCOMES”ITISPREMISEDTHATINSIDERSENGAGEINEMTODILUTETHEIRRENTSEEKINGACTIVITIESFROMOUTSIDERSTHATIS,EMISUSEDTOREDUCEOUTSIDERINTERFERENCEANDPROTECTINSIDERSPRIVATECONTROLBENEFITSFORINSTANCE,INSIDERSCANUSETHEIRDISCRETIONINFINANCIALREPORTINGTOINACCURATELY
7、REFLECTFIRMPERFORMANCEANDCONSEQUENTLYWEAKENOUTSIDERSABILITYTOGOVERNTHEFIRMFURTHERMORE,INVESTORSWHOARECONCERNEDWITHTHESTOCKRETURNSEXAMINETHEEARNINGSFREQUENTLYTHISHEIGHTENSCAPITALMARKETPRESSUREANDCREATESANADDITIONALINCENTIVEFORFIRMSTOENGAGEINEARNINGSMANIPULATIONTHEREGULARSCRUTINYOFFIRMSFINANCIALPERFOR
8、MANCESBYFINANCIALANALYSTSINTHEPASTDECADESPUTSFURTHERPRESSUREONFIRMSTOMAINTAINEARNINGSMOMENTUMTOFULFILTHEEXPECTATIONOFTHEMARKETEGBARTHETAL,1999MYERSANDSKINNER,2002THUS,KNOWINGTHEFACTORSTHATAFFECTEARNINGSMANAGEMENTISHELPFULFORINVESTORSTOFORESEETHEVARIATIONOFEARNINGSINPARTICULAR,WILLACOMPANYWITHGOODGOV
9、ERNANCEHAVELESSINCENTIVETOCONDUCTEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINAPPENDIXAWEHAVEREPRODUCEDEXAMPLESOFDISCLOSURESBYINCLUDEDANDEXCLUDEDFIRMSJUDGMENTWASINVOLVEDINMAKINGTHESECHOICESANDPERHAPSNOTWOPEOPLEBEGINNINGWITHTHE305FIRMSCOMPRISINGOURORIGINALSAMPLEWOULDHAVEDELETEDTHESAME65FIRMSHOWEVER,WEIDENTICALLYCLASSIFIEDOVE
10、R95OFTHEFIRMSACCORDINGTOTHECRITERIADISCUSSEDABOVEANDREACHEDAGREEMENTONTHEREMAINDEROURPROCEDUREYIELDED240FIRMSTHATREPORTEDRESTRUCTURINGCHARGESORIMPAIRMENTSOFTHECARRYINGVALUEOFRETAINEDASSETSDURINGTHEPERIOD198285THESECHARGESAREREPORTEDBEFORETAXANDAREGENERALLYASEPARATELINEITEMALTHOUGHDISCLOSUREISSOMETIM
11、ESBYFOOTNOTEFIFTYSIXOFTHESE240FIRMSREPORTEDWRITEOFFSINEXCESSOF1OFASSETSINTHEPRIORYEARASWELLFIRMSREPORTINGWRITEOFFSINMULTIPLEYEARSENTERTHESAMPLEMULTIPLETIMESBUTTHEREPEATWRITEOFFSAREEXAMINEDSEPARATELYINSEVERALINSTANCESMANYPROVISIONSOFINVESTORPROTECTIONINACOUNTRYMAYNOTBEBINDINGFORALLFIRMSSINCEFIRMSHAVE
12、THEFLEXIBILITYINTHEIRCORPORATECHARTERSANDBYLAWSTOEITHERCHOOSETO“OPTOUT”ANDDECLINESPECIFICPROVISIONSORADOPTADDITIONALPROVISIONSNOTLISTEDINTHEIRLEGALCODEKLAPPERANDLOVE2004CLAIMEDTHATFIRMSCOULDIMPROVEINVESTORPROTECTIONRIGHTSBYINCREASINGDISCLOSURE,SELECTINGWELLFUNCTIONINGANDINDEPENDENTBOARDS,IMPOSINGDIS
13、CIPLINARYMECHANISMTOPREVENTMANAGEMENTANDCONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSFROMENGAGINGINEXPROPRIATIONOFMINORITYSHAREHOLDERS,ANDSOFORTHHENCE,TWOFIRMSFROMTHESAMECOUNTRYMAYPERFORMVARYINGDEGREESOFPROTECTIONTOTHEIRINVESTORSNAMELY,THERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHECOUNTRYLEVELLEGALINFRASTRUCTUREANDTHEFIRMLEVELCORPORATEGOVERN
14、ANCEMECHANISMSISNOTAONETOONECORRESPONDENCETHOUGHRICHARDSONETAL2002HAVEUSEDTHEFIRMLEVELFINANCIALRATIOSTOPREDICTEARNINGSMANAGEMENT,THEYDIDNOTCONSIDERTHEROLEOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCETHEAIMOFTHISPAPERISTOSTUDYHOWCORPORATEGOVERNANCEAFFECTSEMOFASIANCOUNTRIESBYUSINGFIRMLEVELDATAINARECENTREPORT,CREDITLYONNAISSE
15、CURITIESASIAHEREAFTERCLSACALCULATEDANINDEXWITHCORPORATEGOVERNANCERANKINGSFOR495FIRMSACROSS25EMERGINGMARKETSAND18SECTORSTHEDESCRIPTIVESTATISTICSPRESENTEDINTHECLSAREPORTSHOWTHATCOMPANIESTHATRANKEDHIGHONTHEGOVERNANCEINDEXHAVEBETTEROPERATINGPERFORMANCEANDHIGHERSTOCKRETURNSKLAPPERANDLOVE2004APPLIEDTHESEG
16、OVERNANCEVARIABLESANDFOUNDTHATBETTERCORPORATEGOVERNANCEISHIGHLYCORRELATEDWITHBETTEROPERATINGPERFORMANCEANDMARKETVALUATIONALSOAPPLYINGCLSAGOVERNANCEMEASURES,CHENETAL2003FOUNDTHATBOTHDISCLOSUREANDNONDISCLOSURECORPORATEGOVERNANCEMECHANISMSHAVEASIGNIFICANTLYNEGATIVEEFFECTONTHECOSTOFEQUITYCAPITALDOIDGEET
17、AL2004ALSOUSEDCLSADATAANDFOUNDTHATFIRMSINLESSDEVELOPEDCOUNTRIESHAVELESSINCENTIVETOIMPROVEFIRMLEVELGOVERNANCEBECAUSEOUTSIDEFINANCEISEXPENSIVEANDTHEADOPTIONOFBETTERGOVERNANCEMECHANISMSISEXPENSIVEEXCEPTFORTHESETHREEPAPERS,TOTHEBESTKNOWLEDGEOFAUTHORS,NONEHAVEAPPLIEDTHECORPORATEGOVERNANCEDATADIRECTLYTOIN
18、VESTIGATETHERELEVANTISSUESTHISPAPERUSESTHESAMEGOVERNANCERANKINGPRODUCEDBYCLSATOFURTHERINVESTIGATETHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENFIRMLEVELGOVERNANCEANDFIRMLEVELEARNINGSMANAGEMENTTHEN,WESTUDIEDHOWTHECORPORATEGOVERNANCEAFFECTSTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENFIRMSFINANCIALRATIOSANDEARNINGSMANAGEMENTTHISPAPERISORGANISEDASF
19、OLLOWSTHENEXTSECTIONDESCRIBESTHECONSTRUCTIONOFTHEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTMEASURESWEDESCRIBETHEDATAOFCLSA,FOLLOWEDBYASECTIONDESCRIBINGTHEECONOMETRICMODELSEMPIRICALTESTSRESULTS,ANDTHEROBUSTNESSCHECKAREPRESENTEDTHEFINALSECTIONPRESENTSTHECONCLUSIONS2、DATAOFCLSATHECLSAREPORTINCLUDESCORPORATEGOVERNANCECGRANKING
20、SON495COMPANIESIN25EMERGINGCOUNTRIESINAPRIL2001ANDFEBRUARY20022INTHESEREPORTS,FIRMSCORPORATEGOVERNANCEWASASSESSEDBASEDONSEVENKEYCRITERIATHEREPORTSSHOWTHATGOODCORPORATEGOVERNANCEISASSOCIATEDWITHSTRONGPERFORMANCEINSEVERALDIMENSIONS,INCLUDINGSHAREPRICELEVEL,STOCKRETURNSANDACCOUNTINGPROFITABILITYTHEQUES
21、TIONSINTHECLSAREPORTCOVERSEVENBROADCATEGORIESMANAGEMENTDISCIPLINEDISC,TRANSPARENCYTRAN,INDEPENDENCEINDP,ACCOUNTABILITYACCT,RESPONSIBILITYRESP,FAIRNESSFAIRANDSOCIALAWARENESSSOCITHEMEANINGSOFTHESECATEGORIESAREASFOLLOWS“TRANSPARENCY”REFERSTOTHEABILITYOFOUTSIDERSTOASSESSTHETRUEPOSITIONOFACOMPANY“DISCIPL
22、INE”REFERSTOMANAGEMENTSCOMMITMENTTOEMPHASISESHAREHOLDERVALUEANDFINANCIALDISCIPLINE“INDEPENDENCE”REFERSTOTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSINDEPENDENCEOFCONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSANDSENIORMANAGEMENT“ACCOUNTABILITY”REFERSTOTHEACCOUNTABILITYOFMANAGEMENTTOTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORS“RESPONSIBILITY”REFERSTOTHEEFFECTIVENESSOFTHEBO
23、ARDTOTAKENECESSARYMEASURESINCASEOFMISMANAGEMENT“FAIRNESS”REFERSTOTHETREATMENTMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSRECEIVEFROMMAJORITYSHAREHOLDERSANDMANAGEMENTTHELASTCATEGORY,“SOCIALAWARENESS”,REFERSTOTHECOMPANYSEMPHASISONETHICALANDSOCIALLYRESPONSIBLEBEHAVIOURFURTHERMORE,CLSAINCLUDEDCG6,THESIMPLEAVERAGEOFTHEFIRSTSIXI
24、TEMSANDCG7,THEWEIGHTEDAVERAGEOFTHESEVENITEMS,WITHTHEWEIGHTBEINGEQUALTO15PERCENTFORTHEFIRSTSIXITEMSAND10PERCENTFORTHELASTONEINOURCASE,ONLYNINEASIANCOUNTRIESWEREADOPTED,INCLUDINGHONGKONG,INDIA,INDONESIA,KOREA,MALAYSIA,THEPHILIPPINES,SINGAPORE,TAIWANANDTHAILANDWESKIPPEDTHEREMAININGCOUNTRIESSINCETHEIDEN
25、TIFICATIONOFTHEFIRMSINCLSACOULDNOTBEPOSITIVELYCONFIRMEDEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESINTHEIREFFORTTOINFORMSTAKEHOLDERSANDSOOTHETHEIRCONCERNSREGARDINGTHEFIRMSFUTUREPLANSANDVIABILITY,MANAGERSMIGHTVOLUNTARILYDISCLOSEPIECESOFQUALITATIVEANDQUANTITATIVEINFORMATIONBEYONDTHEMINIMUMREQUI
26、REMENTSOFTHELAWTHEMAINOBJECTIVEOFPROVIDINGVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESWOULDBETOGIVECLARIFICATIONSANDEXPLANATIONSTOINTERESTEDPARTIESABOUTTHEFIRMSFINANCIALPICTUREANDPERFORMANCEANDTOVANISHANYDOUBTSTHATMIGHTIMPEDETHEFIRMSFUTUREFINANCIALGROWTHANDPROGRESSTHEPROVISIONOFINFORMATIVEACCOUNTINGREPORTSANDTHED
27、ISSEMINATIONOFGOODQUALITYACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONWOULDARMSTOCKMARKETPARTICIPANTSWITHINSIGHTANDKNOWLEDGEABOUTTHEFIRMSFINANCIALPERFORMANCEANDSITUATION,ANDWOULDSUBSEQUENTLYTENDTOREDUCETHESCOPEFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTITFOLLOWS,THEREFORE,THATFIRMSTHATPROVIDEVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESWOULDBELESSINCLINEDTOMA
28、NAGETHEIREARNINGSFIGURESTHEHYPOTHESISTHATISTESTEDISASFOLLOWSFIRMSTHATPROVIDEVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURESARELESSLIKELYTOUSEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTTHECATEGORIZATIONOFFIRMSINTOVOLUNTARYANDNONVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSERSISBASEDUPONTHEQUALITYANDQUANTITYOFREPORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONINPUBLISHEDACCOUNTINGRE
29、PORTSFIRMSTHATCONFORMTOTHEMINIMUMREQUIREMENTSOFTHELAWANDPRESENTBASICACCOUNTINGINFORMATION,SUCHASTHEBASICFINANCIALSTATEMENTSANDMANAGEMENTREPORTSASWELLASBRIEFNOTESTOTHEACCOUNTSWITHQUESTIONABLEINFORMATIONALVALUEARELABELLEDASNONVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSERSFIRMSPROVIDINGINFORMATIONMORETHANREQUIRED,INCLU
30、DINGENLIGHTENINGNOTESTOTHEACCOUNTS,SENSITIVEINFORMATIONREGARDINGMANAGERSREMUNERATION,CORPORATEGOVERNANCE,RISKPROFILE,DEBTCOVENANTS,USEOFFINANCIALDERIVATIVESASWELLASDETAILSABOUTCHANGESINACCOUNTINGPOLICIESANDTHEIRIMPACTONACCOUNTINGNUMBERS,ARELABELLEDASVOLUNTARYACCOUNTINGDISCLOSERSEARNINGSMANAGEMENTAND
31、DEBTCOVENANTVIOLATIONWHENCONTRACTINGALOANAGREEMENT,LENDERSSETCONDITIONSTOBORROWERS,OFTENREGARDINGNETWORTHAND/ORWORKINGCAPITALTHEVIOLATIONOFDEBTCOVENANTSWOULDREFLECTTHELIQUIDITYAND/ORPROFITABILITYDIFFICULTIESOFTHEFIRM,ANDWOULDUNFAVOURABLYAFFECTITSREPUTATIONANDCREDITABILITYHENCE,MANAGERSMIGHTBEINCLINE
32、DTOENGAGEINEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINORDERTOCOMPLYWITHDEBTCOVENANTSSETBYLENDERSANDREDUCETHEPOSSIBILITYOFVIOLATIONANDFINANCIALDISTRESSEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDEQUITYANDDEBTCAPITALFORAFIRMTOREINFORCEITSVIABILITYANDFULFILITSINVESTMENTANDGROWTHPLANS,ITHASTOMAKESURETHATITCANOBTAINSMOOTHACCESSTOEQUITYANDDEBTCAPITAL
33、MARKETSTOOBTAINUNHINDEREDACCESSTOCAPITALMARKETSANDATTRACTINVESTORS,AFIRMWOULDNEEDTODISPLAYSOUNDFINANCIALNUMBERSANDFAVORABLEFUTUREFINANCIALPROSPECTSITAPPEARSTHEREFORETHAT,PRIORTOANEQUITYORDEBTISSUE,MANAGERSMIGHTUSEDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSINORDERTOIMPROVETHEIRFIRMFINANCIALPERFORMANCEANDIMPRESSSTOCKMARKET
34、PARTICIPANTS,ANDTHUSMAKETHEISSUEATTRACTIVEANDSUCCESSFULEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDEXECUTIVECOMPENSATIONEXECUTIVECOMPENSATIONVARIESDEPENDINGONMANAGERSFINANCIALPERFORMANCE,PRODUCTIVITYANDTARGETMEETINGHIGHERPROFITABILITYANDBETTERFINANCIALMEASURESWOULDLEADTOHIGHERCOMPENSATIONINCONTRAST,AFAILURETOIMPROVETHEFIR
35、MSFINANCIALPICTUREORATTAINTHEPRESETMANAGERIALGOALSWOULDHARMMANAGERSREPUTATIONANDADVERSELYAFFECTTHEIRREMUNERATIONITFOLLOWS,THEREFORE,THATMANAGERSMIGHTBEINCLINEDTOINFLUENCETHEIREARNINGSFIGURESBYUSINGDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSINORDERTOFAVORABLYAFFECTANDMAXIMISETHEIRCOMPENSATIONDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSANDFIRMFI
36、NANCIALATTRIBUTESTHISSECTIONCONCLUDESTHESTUDYBYPROVIDINGAGENERALOVERVIEWOFTHEFINANCIALCHARACTERISTICSOFFIRMSWITHDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSFIRMSWITHEQUITYAND/ORDEBTCAPITALNEEDS,ORFIRMSTHATNEEDTOIMPROVETHEIRACCOUNTINGNUMBERSANDMEASURES,SUCHASPROFITABILITY,LIQUIDITYANDINVESTMENT,ASWELLASTOREINFORCETHEIRMARK
37、ETFINANCIALPICTUREMIGHTBEINCLINEDTOUSEEARNINGSMANAGEMENT3、EARNINGSMANAGEMENTMEASURESBECAUSEINSIDERSCANEXERCISEDISCRETIONALONGANUMBEROFDIFFERENTDIMENSIONS,ANDTHEPREFERREDEARNINGSMANAGEMENTMETHODCANDIFFERACROSSCOUNTRIES,ASINGLEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTMEASUREMAYNOTYIELDACOMPLETEPICTUREACCORDINGLY,WEANALYSEDF
38、OURDIFFERENTMEASURESOFEMSOUREARNINGSMEASURESARETHESAMEASLEUZETAL2003,WHOCLASSIFIEDTHEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINTOTWOKINDSOFMANIPULATIONSEARNINGSSMOOTHINGANDEARNINGSDISCRETIONBHATTACHARYAETAL2003FURTHERCLASSIFIEDTHEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINTOTHREECATEGORIESLOSSAVOIDANCE,EARNINGSSMOOTHINGANDEARNINGSAGGRESSIVENES
39、SINTHISPAPER,WEFOLLOWEDLEUZETALS2003APPROACHINCLASSIFYINGEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINTOEARNINGSSMOOTHINGEM1ANDEM2INOURNOTATIONBELOWANDEARNINGSAGGRESSIVENESSEM3BELOW1THEFOURTHEMMEASUREISSIMPLYTHEAVERAGEOFTHEIRRANKINGSAEMWHERESPEARMANISTHESPEARMANCORRELATIONCOEFFICIENTTHECONCEPTOFTHISMEASUREISTHATTHEINSIDERSM
40、AYALSOUSETHEIRDISCRETIONTOREPORTACCOUNTINGACCRUALSTHATOFFSETECONOMICSHOCKSTOTHEFIRMSOPERATINGCASHFLOWTHATWOULDOTHERWISEAFFECTREPORTEDEARNINGSANEGATIVECORRELATIONIMPLIESTHEUSEOFDISCRETIONARYACCOUNTINGACCRUALSTOOFFSETUNDESIRABLECASHFLOWSHOCKS,HENCE,ALARGEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTTHEREFORE,THEHIGHERTHEEM2,THE
41、LESSISTHETENDENCYTOMANAGEEARNINGSSOURCEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDCORPORATEGOVERNANCEINASIASEMERGINGMARKETSRCHUNGHUASHENANDHSIANGLINCHIH,2007,9译文在亚洲新兴市场的盈余管理与企业管治本文研究了公司治理对盈余管理的影响。我们使用公司一级的管理数据，采取由里昂信贷银行亚洲安全（里昂证券）的亚洲国家中，除国家一级的管理在过去的研究使用的数据。我们的结论如下第一，良好的企业管治公司往往不盈利进行管理。第二，有一个平滑的收益规模效应，也就是大型公司都容易进行盈余平衡，良好的企
42、业管治可缓解平均作用。第三，有一个杠杆效应，即转折点治理指数大，同时杠杆效应和其它的反向杠杆效应一起存在。这表明，一个高度杠杆效应与公司治理不善，是很容易被密切审议，因此被认为更难操纵盈利的市场。第四，企业具有较高的增长（收益减少收益率）很容易增加平滑收入和盈利的攻击性，但良好的企业管治可发挥缓解作用。最后，企业在较强的抗董事权利国家里往往表现出较强的收益平滑。一、简介最近，研究盈余管理（以下简称电磁）吸引了众多的目光。因为出现了安然财务欺诈、世通、施乐、皇家阿霍德、南方保健等等事件，使得大众日益关注报告的收益质量，再次开始研究盈余管理的重要性（莱维特，2000）。席佩尔（1989年）、希利和
43、沃伦（1999年）规定，盈余管理是企业经济的变更报告，无论内部人员的表现“误导一些利益相关者”或“影响合同结果”，它的前提是内部人士寻租外人从事电磁淡化活动。也就是说，EM是用来表示减少外界干扰和保护圈内人私人控制权收益的。例如，公司业内人士可以利用其在金融自由裁量权汇报的不准确性反映公司业绩因而削弱外界的执政能力。此外，研究关注谁是投资者与股票的收益回报很频繁。这加剧了资本市场的压力，并促使其创建一个额外的奖励机制为企业进行盈余操纵。该公司的财务表现在过去定期审议，金融分析师几十年来履行市场对企业提出的进一步的压力保持着盈利势头（如巴特等人的期望，1999年；迈尔斯和斯金纳，2002）。因此
44、，知道了盈余管理的影响因素有利于投资者预见变异的收益。特别是，一个具有良好治理的公司有较少的鼓励机制进行盈余管理。我们保留非经常性费用使得管理在幅度和时间的损失上有更多的自由裁量权，主要是资产减记或企业重组。虽然占同样比例，这些都是不同的经济活动。他们记录并反映管理层观念并要改变市场条件。删减或注销该资产的账面价值为代表的许多石油和天然气公司反映了储备账面值下降在碳氢化合物的市场价值。并非所有的石油和天然气公司报告减记，还有那些没有被跨越的几个分布点在我们的样本得到反映。根据公认会计准则，这些资产减记规模和时间安排预计将各不相同的功能作为一个公司收购价值的财产，提取的可能成本，偏离市场对价格下
45、降的持久信念，因此，管理人员等，对这些损失都有对时间和数额的自由裁量权，虽然审计人员可能会限制这种自由裁量权。我们的程序产生了240个企业的重组费用，报告或损伤的保留资产的账面价值在此期间19821985。这些费用是税前报道，一般披露分隔线项目有脚注。这些报告披露了240家在注销公司去年以及今年资产的1以上。一国保护的许多规定可能不对所有的企业都具有约束力，因为公司在选择公司章程和规章制度具有灵活性，要么选择衰退的具体规定要么采取不符合他们国家法律法规的其他规定。克拉伯和爱（2004）声称，公司可以通过增加信息披露，选择运作良好和独立董事会为保护投资者的权利，实行纪律处分机制，防止少数股东贿赂
46、管理层和控股股东等等。因此，两个来自同一个国家的企业可能进行不同程度的措施保护自己的投资者。也就是说，法律之间的城市水平基础设施和企业层面的公司治理机制的关系不是一对一的对应关系。尽管理查森等人（2002）所使用的企业级财务比率预测盈余管理，他们并不认为公司治理机制起作用。本文的目的是研究如何影响亚洲企业管治国家的使用企业级数据的EM。在最近的报告中，里昂证券亚洲（以下简称里昂证券）为495公司与公司治理的排名在25个新兴市场和18个行业指数计算。里昂证券在报告中提出的描述性统计资料显示，公司的治理指数上的排名高有较好的经营业绩和较高的股票的回报。克拉伯和爱（2004）应用了这些治理变数，发现
47、好的公司治理是经营业绩和市场估值高度相关。里昂证券的治理措施也适用陈等人（2003年）发现的结果。在信息不披露的公司的治理机制对股权资本成本显着负面影响。多奇等人（2004）也使用里昂证券的数据，发现在欠发达国家的公司有没有动力去改善企业层面的治理，因为外部融资是昂贵的，更好的治理机制不是通过价格昂贵的外部融资。除了这三份文件，以作者的所知，还没有应用和企业管治调查数据直接相关的问题。本文使用的排名由里昂证券提供的，以进一步探讨其与企业管理和公司盈余管理水平的关系。然后，我们研究如何在公司治理影响企业间的财务比率与盈余管理的关系。本文组织如下下一节描述了盈余管理措施的建设，我们描述了里昂证券的
48、数据，通过计量经济模型，描述部分之后，实证检验结果，并给出了鲁棒性检查。最后一节提出了结论。二、里昂证券数据里昂证券报告包括2001年2月至2002年4月排名在495新兴国家的25个公司的企业管治（CG）的报告，企业的公司治理评估标准为基础的七个关键。报告表明，良好的企业治理带来强劲的性能在几个方面，包括股价水平，股票收益和会计盈利能力里昂证券在报告中的问题包括七类管理学科，透明度，独立，问责制，责任，公平和社会意识。这些类别的含义如下。“透明度”是指外界的能力，以评估一个公司的真正立场；“纪律”是指管理的承诺，强调股东价值和财政纪律；“独立”指的是导演的控股股东和高级管理人员的独立委员会；“
49、问责制”是指管理责任制的董事会；“责任”是指董事会对效能管理不善的情况采取必要措施；“公平”指的是处理少数股东和大股东的管理接收。最后一类，“社会意识”，指的是公司对道德和社会责任行为的重视。此外，里昂证券附带的重量相等的百分之十五的前六个项目和百分之十的最后一个项目，第一至六个项目的简单平均和对七个项目的加权平均水平。在我们的情况下，只有通过了九个亚洲国家，包括香港，印度，印度尼西亚，韩国，马来西亚，菲律宾，新加坡，台湾和泰国。余下的国家我们跳过，因为对有些国家里昂证券的公司标识不能正面证实。盈余管理和自愿会计披露他们的努力通知利益相关者，关切公司未来的计划和可行性，经理可能自愿披露信息的定性和定量的超越了法律的最低要求。自愿提供会计信息披露的主要目标将是要澄清和解释有关公司的财政状况和业绩方面消除任何的怀疑，以免妨碍公司未来的财务发展和进步。会计报告的信息提供和质量良好的会计信息的传播，有利于股市参与者的洞察力对公司的财务表现和状况有所认识，并随后将趋于减少盈余管理的范围。企业提供的会计信息披露信息不太可能使用盈余管理。该公司将自愿和非自愿性会计披露的分类是建立在报告的质量和会计报告中公布的会计信息质量的基础上。企业行为符合现行的法律和基本的会计信息，如基本的财务报表和管理报告以及简要说明，信息的价值与可疑帐户被视为非自愿性会计披露标
