1、 1 外文翻译 原文 Executive compensation and corporate value the relationship Material Source: Journal of Business and Psychology1992(4) Author: Mark A. Wilson and Chacko & Charles B and Shrader.Ellen Mullen A study examining longitudinal data obtained from the Disclosure database for 390 large American fi
2、rms yielded complex and unclear patterns of correlations between firm performance and executive pay. An examination of the data indicates that the relationship between firm performance and executive compensation may be nonlinear. Among performance measures, total assets was found to have the stronge
3、st association with executive pay. It was concluded that the scale of discretionary resources available to the firm better predicts executive pay than profitability or efficiency ratios. Debate over executive compensation has escalated in recent years (Ehrenberg, 1990). At the heart of this issue ar
4、e chief executive officers (CEOs) of large corporations and the perception of their rapidly increas-ing wealth. Public criticism of CEO remuneration abounds as many find their pay too high, especially in comparison to their employees. Others argue that CEOs are worth every cent they get (Murphy, 198
5、6) and that in a competitive economy top executives are entitled to be paid what they are worth (Sethi & Namiki, 1986). In 1987, the CEOs of 24 American companies earned in excess of $5 million, including bonuses and stock option profits. At least 300 CEOs earned $1 million or more. Yet only 30 chie
6、f executives of European companies, and even less in Asian companies, had seven-figure earnings that year (Tully, 1988).Perhaps American CEO salaries are a culture-specific phenomenon driven by the nations history, social norms, and government policies. While American CEOs are enjoying large financi
7、al gains, the companies they lead may be struggling or even losing ground. Sethi and Namiki (1986) contend that the prevailing compensation sys- tem in U.S. industry, particularly in large corporations, has produced executives who are failing either to better economic values for stock-holders or to
8、make American industry internationally competitive. Clearly, it is no longer a sign of this countrys 2 economic dominance in the world market place.Regrettably, executive compensation has traditionally been based on relative status rather than contribution or merit (Kanter, 1987). Critics of the cur
9、rent magnitude of executive compensation include employees further down the ranks, union officials, and stockholders, as well as the general public.According to Murthy and Salter (1975), corporate America has traditionally emphasized the bottom line per- formance (i.e., profit). In other words, chan
10、ges in a companys top-level compensation should be related to changes in its profit. At no level of the organization is pay for firm performance more justified, since at no other level does the employee have as much control over the firms per- formance. The claim that motivation will suffer if pay i
11、s attached to firm performance factors beyond the employees control is not relevant for top executives. While they certainly are faced with some uncertain- ties in the market and the environment, they unquestionably have con- trol over and responsibility for the organization. Most CEOs, when asked h
12、ow they should be paid, say their pay should be based on their performance (Crystal,1989). This belief is based on the assumption that behavior which is reinforced or rewarded tends to be repeated.Executive performance that enhances firm and stockholder wealth and interests can be expected when rewa
13、rds are at- tached to such behavior. Whether CEOs rewards are actually linked to performance is not so clear. A recent analysis of the relationship between executive pay and firm performance revealed the “madness of the system“ (Loomis,1982, p.42). Results, however, have been mixed, with some showin
14、g a positive relationship, some showing no relationship, and others suggesting that firm performance depends on various other factors, such as the type of industry or organizational strategy. In support of the current levels of executive compensation, Murphy (1986) found, in a sample of nearly 1,200
15、 large U.S.corporations over ten years, that top executives pay and performance are strongly related. He claims that performance based compensation systems are justified since they typically do motivate executives to act on behalf of stock- holders, and that the public view is wrong. Additionally, L
16、ewellen and Huntsman (1970) reported results indicating strong support for the hy- pothesis that CEO pay is heavily dependent on the generation of profit, and not on the size of the corporation as measured by sales. More recently, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) report a positive relationship betwee
17、n pay and performance as well. Their results suggest that CEO compensation is influenced by a complex set of 3 factors, including firm performance, size, and complexity, and CEO experience. A number of studies, using a variety of measures of CEO performance, have, on the other hand, found little or
18、no relationship between executive pay and firm performance. Murthy and Salter (1975) claim that in many firms the compensation of executives changes without regard to changes in profits, return on equity, or earnings per share. Platt and McCarthy (1985) found that, rather than being related to the f
19、irms past or anticipated financial performance, pay is a function of the CEOs tenure in that position, age, and business background. If top executives are indeed worth what they get, and assuming executive performance is reflected in stock price (Coughlan & Schmidt,1984) then the highest paid execut
20、ives should be found in companies providing the largest returns to stockholders. Executives acting responsibly (i.e.,as agent of the stockholders) should treat those stockholders money as if it were their own and avoid compensation excesses (Loomis, 1982). Unfortunately, (e.g., Sethi & Namiki, 1986)
21、 most studies indicate that executive salaries are poorly related to stockholders returns. In fact, many cases reveal a negative relationship. It is often argued that CEOs appear to act only in their own self-interest (Rappaport, 1978). Proponents of agency theory suggest that executive behavior may
22、 not always be in the interest of the stockholders. Not only is there disagreement over the pay/performance linkage for executives, but many researchers disagree on the necessary methodologies and measures used to study the issue. For instance, executive pay has been measured in numerous ways, from
23、salary, to salary and bonus (combined or separately), to salary, bonus, and all the various stock options. Though it has been argued that to omit stock options is to look at only part of the compensation picture, Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) found that using salary plus bonus alone to measure execut
24、ive pay yields more significant results than does using total compensation. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between executive pay and firm performance while taking into consideration an important measurement issue. Previous studies have typically employed linear models to e
25、xamine the impact of various measures of firm performance on executive compensation. Very recently research has indicated that the relationship between executive pay and firm performance may be nonlinear(Leonard,1990). In the current study,nonlinear models of firm performance were tested for both th
26、e chairman of the board and the chief executive officer over a three year period. 4 METHOD:The data for this study was obtained from the Disclosure Database of Fortune 500 Companies.The Disclosure Database is a standardized compilation of company information obtained from documents filed with the U.
27、S.Securities and Exchange Commission.The firms were from a wide variety of industries nationwide(i.e.,food and beverages, textiles and apparel, household goods, publishing, electronic equipment, pre-cious metals, and television).The database included 250 fields of information, including resume infor
28、mation, textual information, and financial information. Of primary importance to this study were data on executive compensation and company financial performance. The salaries, including base pay and bonuses, for the top two executives from 487 of the Fortune 500 companies in 1987 were used as a mea
29、sure of executive compensation. The executive salaries examined were the corporations chairman of the board and chief executive officer. For many firms, the same individual held both titles. In the absence of salary information on either or both of these, data for the president was used. If none of
30、these salaries were listed, the company was excluded from the study. Three figures were used in combination as measures of each companys financial performance. The data used for statistical analysis were gross profit, current ratio, and total assets for 1985, 1986, and 1987. These variables were use
31、d as indications of firm profitability, efficiency, and size, respectively. In order to determine whether a relationship existed between executive compensation and company performance for this sample,separate stepwise regressions were computed for the chairman of the board and the CEO for each year.
32、 Each variable, as well as the square of each variable, was entered into the regression to examine possible non-linear effects (Leonard, 1990). Three stepwise regressions were computed for both the chairman of the board and the CEO data (i.e., one for each year in the study) where both the measures
33、of firm performance (gross profit, total assets, current ratio) and the square of each variable were included for possible entry into the stepwise regression model. Table 1 presents the regression results for chairmen and CEO compensation. What could explain the relationship between total assets and
34、 executive pay found in this study? These findings square with much of the organizational theory literature which suggests that managerial practice is often related to the size or complexity of the firms being governed. For example, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) identified the major challenge to large
35、firms as integration and coordination of differentiated units. Correspondingly, Mahoney, Frost, Crandall, and Weitzel (1972) 5 found that managers of large units were compelled to develop broader perspectives toward goal setting, delegation, and control. Simply put, managers of large units experienc
36、e many more contingencies than do managers of smaller ones, and it appears from the results of this study that firms are willing to compensate managers for this difference. Given the large number of studies that have examined executive pay and performance, it may be appropriate to conduct a meta ana
37、lysis in this area of research. However, prior to any further research a greater understanding must be obtained of important measures of firm performance along with consistent definitions of executive pay. It would also be interesting to combine data on executive perceptions of the relationship betw
38、een their pay and the performance of the firm with actual firm performance and executive pay variables. Finally, little attention has been directed towards the composition of the board of directors and the role it may play in determining the link between executive pay and firm performance (Hoskisson
39、 & Turk, 1990). Managerial Implications: For the executive seeking the implications of our results for their own firm, several points need to be stressed. First, any firm should have a clear and complete definition of how “performance“ will be measured. Second, clear goals of what constitutes good p
40、erformance should be set. Third, records of exceptions to goals that are the inevitable result of operating in a turbulent environment should be maintained. Finally, the contingencies of the pay for performance system should be made clear to all participating executives. Nothing in our research indi
41、cates that executive pay cannot be more closely linked to firm performance. However, little in our study would indicate that past attempts at linking pay to firm performance have been successful. 译文 公司高管薪酬与公司价值关系 资料来源 :德国 Springer 公司期刊 数据库 作者 ： 马克威尔逊 、 查尔斯 B 施雷德、艾伦马伦 一项对 390 家大型美国公司披露数据库的研究，从中获得纵向数据
42、产生的复杂和不明确的公司之间的业绩和高管薪酬的相关性模式。对有关数据的审查表明，公司业绩之间及行政赔偿的关系可能是非线性的。在业绩计量中，发现6 总资产与行政人员的薪酬有最强的关联。得出的结论是相对于盈利能力或效率，现有的公司要更好地预测高管薪酬的比例酌情资源规模。 近几年对行政赔偿的争论已经升级。这个问题的核心是行政的大公司和他们的财富迅速增加的情况下，行政人员的看法。公众对 CEO 薪酬的批评主要是因为许多人发现他们的薪金过高，特别是和员工相比。而其他一部分人则认为一分一毫的 CEO 他们的获得是合理的，尤其是竞争性的经济高层管理人员。 1987 年， 24 个美国公司的 CEO 的薪酬在
43、 500 万美元，包括奖金和股票期权的利润额。至少有 300 个 CEO 的薪酬是 100 万美元或更多。然而，只有 30家行政总裁的欧洲公司，很少是亚洲公司，有 7 位数的获利年度（ Tully， 1988）。也许美国的 CEO 薪酬是一种含有具体国家的历史，社会规范推动和政府的政策的文化现象。虽然美国的 CEO 们正享受着大量的财政收益，但是他 们的公司领导可能会挣扎，甚至节节败退。 Sethi and Namiki（ 1986）声称，在美国工业界普遍补偿制度下，特别是在大公司，制作人员也没有谁是更好的经济价值的股票持有人，或使美国工业国际竞争力增强。显然，它不再是这个国家在世界市场上的经
44、济主导地位的迹象。令人遗憾的是，行政赔偿，治癌，传统的基础上的相对地位，而不是贡献或价值（ Kanter， 1987）。 对行政补偿电流幅度的反对者包括进一步降低员工队伍，工会官员和股东，以及一般市民。据 Murthy and Salter（ 1975），美国公司历来强调每底 线表现性（即利润）。换句话说，在公司高层薪酬的变化应与在其盈利的变化。在没有其他的水平下，任何组织水平是企业的业绩更加合理，并作为该雇员在公司中工作表现方面的控制。动机的说法，如果将遭受支付附加雇员无法控制的因素，是公司业绩不相关的高层管理人员。虽然他们肯定是一些市场的不确定性和环境所面临的，但也的确有超过和组织责任的控
45、制。 大多数 CEO 当被问及应如何注意的时，他们回答是他们的工资应以其性能为基础（ Crystal， 1989 年）。这种信念是建立在增强或奖励的行为重复出现的假设上。执行性能是指提高公司和股东财富 、利益时，可以预期的回报附加到这样的行为。 CEO 的奖励，实际上与业绩挂钩不是很清楚明晰。但是结果有好有坏，有些呈现良好的关系，有些表现出没有关系，以及其他表明企业业绩的各种其它因素而定，如行业或组织战略的类型 鉴于目前的高管薪酬水平的支持下， Murphy（ 1986）发现，在近 1200 名美国大公司的样本超过 10 年，即高层管理者的薪酬和性能密切相关。他声称，表现为基础的赔偿制度是合理
46、的，因为它们通常不鼓励行政人员的行为代表股票持有人，以及公众的看法是错误的。此外， Lewellen and Huntsman（ 1970）报告的结果表明了坚决支持 CEO 薪酬是严重依赖利润而产生的，而不是作为衡量公司的销售规模的假设。最近， Finkelstein and Hambrick（ 1989 年）报告的7 薪酬和绩效之间也是积极的关系。他们的研究结果表明， CEO 薪酬是由一系列复杂的因素，包括公司业绩，大小的影响，和复杂性，和首席执行官的经验。 一些研究，使用了高性能的 CEO 多种措施，对另一方面，很少或根本没有发现与行政人员的薪酬和公司绩效的关系。 Murthy and S
47、alter（ 1975）声称，声称，许多公司行政赔偿的变化，不考虑改变利 润，股权回报率，或每股收益。Platt and McCarthy（ 1985）发现，它不是与对公司过去的或预期的财务业绩相关，而是付出的代价是 CEO 在这个位置上的任期年龄功能和商业背景。 如果高层管理人员确实值得得到他们应有的，假如高管的表现反映在股票价格（ Coughlan & Schmidt， 1984）上，那么薪酬最高的管理人员应当找到公司能提供最大的回报给股东。管理人员负责任的行为（即，作为股东代理人）应该视这些股东的钱就好像是他们自己，同时避免过度补偿（ Loomis， 1982）。不幸的是，（例如， Se
48、thi & Namiki， 1986）大多数研究表明，管理人员的工资与不善股东回报相关。事实上，很多案例表明负相关关系。人们常常认为，首席执行官们似乎只能担任在其自身利益的职位（ Rappaport， 1978）。代理理论的支持者表明，高管人员的行为可能并不总是在股东的利益上。 不仅存在有关薪酬 /绩效对管理人员联系的分歧，而且许多研究人员不同意有关必要的方法和用于研究这个问题的措施。比如，从许多方面对高管薪酬进行测量，从工资，薪金和奖金（联合或单独），到薪金，奖金，和各种股票期权。虽然有人认为，省略股票期权是看图片 的补偿， Lewellen and Huntsman（ 1970年）发现，只
49、有部分使用单独的工资加奖金来衡量高管薪酬水平产生的效果比不使用补偿总额更明显。 本研究的目的是探讨其与行政人员的薪酬和公司业绩的关系，同时考虑到一个重要的衡量问题。以前的研究通常采用线性模型，研究了坚定的行政补偿性能的各种措施的影响。最近的研究表明，与行政人员的薪酬与企业绩效的关系可能是非线性（ Leonard， 1990）。在最新的研究中，对企业业绩的非线性模型对董事长和首席执行官 3 年多时间进行了测试。 这项研究获得的数据来自于数据库披露 的财富 500 强企业。披露资料库是从美国证券和交易委员会提交的文件中获得的公司信息标准化的汇编。该公司是从事全国各行各业（即食品和饮料，纺织品和服装，家居用品，出版，电子设备，前大翼橙的金属，和电视）。该数据库包括 250 领域的资料，包括履历表资料，文字资料，业务和资金转账信息。首要的这项研究是关于行政赔偿的数据和公司的财务表现。 薪金，包括基本工资和奖金，对于两位高层从 1987 年财富 500 强公司 487人作为行政补偿的措施。管理人员的工资的研究是公司的董事会和董事长兼首席执行官。对于许多公司而言，同一个人持有许 多头衔。在工资信息其中之一8 或
