1、 1 外文翻译 原文 Subjectivity and the Weighting of Performance Measures: Evidence from a Balanced Scorecard Material Source: http:/faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/larcker/PDF/48%20Weighting%20Performance%20Measures.pdf Author:Christopher D. Ittner David F. Larcker Marshall W. Meyer This study investigates the us
2、e of subjectivity in reward systems containing multiple performance measures. Bonuses based solely on profits and other financial accounting numbers have been criticized for encouraging managers to sacrifice long-run performance to increase short-term financial results, and thereby maximize their bo
3、nuses.To overcome the short-run orientation of accounting-based reward systems, many firms are implementing compensation plans that supplement financial metrics with additional measures in order to assess performance dimensions that are not captured in short-term financial results. These additional
4、measures can take a variety of forms, ranging from quantitative,nonfinancial metrics, such as employee and customer survey results, to qualitative assessments of performance by the managers superior. One critical implementation issue that arises when incorporating multiple performance measures in re
5、ward systems is determining the relative weights to place on the various measures when determining bonuses. One option is to use a formula that explicitly weights each measure. Potential difficulties with this option include determining the appropriate weights to place on each measure, the game-play
6、ing associated with any formula-based plan, the possibility that bonuses will be paid even when performance is unbalanced(i.e., overachievement on some objectives and underachievement on others), and the likelihood that all relevant dimensions of managerial performance are not captured by the select
7、ed performance measures (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Baker et al. 1994;Kaplan and Norton 1996). A second option is to introduce subjectivity into the bonus award process. This subjectivity can take the form of flexibility in weighting quantitative performance 2 measures when computing a manage
8、rs bonus, the use of qualitative performance evaluations, and/or the discretion to adjust bonus awards based on factors other than the measures specified in the bonus contract. Some theoretical work indicates that greater subjectivity can improve incentive contracting because it allows the firm to e
9、xploit noncontractible information that might otherwise be ignored in formula-based contracts, and to mitigate distortions in managerial effort by backing out dysfunctional behavior induced by incomplete objective performance measures (Baker et al. 1994; Baiman and Rajan 1995). However, other resear
10、ch suggests that subjectivity in reward systems can lower managers motivation by allowing evaluators to ignore certain types of performance measures that are included in the bonus plan, permitting bonus payout criteria to change each period, and introducing favoritism and bias into the reward system
11、 (e.g., Prendergast and Topel 1993). As a result,managers will be less able to distinguish what constitutes good performance, less likely to believe that rewards are contingent on performance, and less convinced that performance criteria are being applied consistently across the organization. Drawin
12、g upon economic and psychological studies on the choice of performance measures for performance evaluation and compensation purposes, we develop exploratory hypotheses regarding the weights placed on different types of performance measures (e.g.,financial versus nonfinancial, quantitative versus qua
13、litative, and input versus outcome) insubjective bonus computations. We test these hypotheses using quantitative and qualitative data gathered during an extensive, multiyear field investigation of a balanced scorecard bonus plan in the U.S. retail banking operations of Global Financial Services (GFS
14、), a leading international financial services provider. In 1993, GFS replaced a profit-based bonus plan for branch managers with a formulabased system that rewarded multiple accounting and growth measures once customer satisfaction and operational audit hurdles were achieved. This system changed rap
15、idly during the nine quarters it was in use as the bank sought to eliminate gaming and promote performance across a broader set of measures. The formula-based plan was replaced in the second quarter of 1995 by a balanced scorecard bonus plan containing six categories of financial and nonfinancial pe
16、rformance measures, some of which were based on qualitative evaluations by the managers supervisors. Unlike the earlier formula-based plan, subjective weightings were used to aggregate the various scorecard measures when determining overall 3 performance evaluations and bonuses. Although Kaplan and
17、Norton (2001) cite the GFS bonus plan as an example of a scorecard-based reward system that prevented managers from underperforming on any of the scorecard dimensions, we find that the use of subjectivity in weighting the scorecard measures allowed supervisors to ignore many performance measures, ev
18、en though some of these measures were leading indicators of the banks two strategic objectives (financial performance and growth in customers). Instead, short-term financial performance measures become the primary determinant of bonuses. In addition, a large proportion of branch managers performance
19、 evaluations was based on factors other than the scorecard measures, even though discretion to consider other factors was not a component of the bonus plan.The move from the formula-based system to the more subjective scorecard led many branch managers to complain about favoritism in bonus awards an
20、d uncertainty in the criteria being used to determine rewards, and caused corporate executives and human resource managers to question the scorecards use for compensation purposes. Ultimately, the company abandoned the scorecard plan at the end of 1998 in favor of a commission-style system based on
21、revenues. Our study makes four contributions to the performance evaluation and compensation literatures. First, we extend cross-sectional studies on the use of subjectivity and discretion in bonus plans (e.g., Murphy and Oyer 2001; Gibbs et al. 2002). Whereas these studies ocus on the factors explai
22、ning who includes subjectivity in compensation contracts, our study emphasizes how subjectivity is incorporated into performance evaluations and bonus awards. Second, we provide further evidence on the influence of informativeness on performance measure weighting. Prior studies on the relative weigh
23、ts placed on financial and nonfinancial performance measures (e.g., Bushman et al. 1996; Ittner et al. 1997) generally include proxies for the noise in financial measures, but do not include direct measures of the informativeness of nonfinancial measures due to data constraints. The detailed data in
24、 our study allow us to develop stronger tests of economic theories that the relative weights placed on performance measures other than financial results are a function of their informativeness.Third, our research complements psychology-based experimental work on the importance placed on various type
25、s of performance measures by examining whether their experimental results hold in an actual performance-evaluation setting. Finally, although the ability to generalize our results is limited by the analysis of only a single firm, we provide 4 one of the first detailed studies of scorecard-based comp
26、ensation plans.1 Despite survey evidence that a growing number of firms are using balanced scorecards for compensation purposes (Kaplan and Norton 2001, Chapter 10), relatively little is known about the implementation ssues associated with scorecard-based reward systems. The remainder of the paper i
27、s organized in five sections. Section II reviews related research on subjective performance evaluation and performance measure weighting, and develops our exploratory hypotheses. The research setting for our study is described in Section III. The statistical tests for our research hypotheses are pre
28、sented in Section IV. In Section V we provide detailed qualitative analysis regarding the success of the balanced scorecard implementation. The final section summarizes our research results and discusses implications for future research. 译文 权重的主观性和业绩计量：从证据平衡计分卡 资料来源 : http:/faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/
29、larcker/PDF/48%20Weighting%20Performance%20Measures.pdf 作者：克里斯托弗四伊特纳，大卫楼拉克尔，马歇尔瓦特迈耶，宾夕法尼亚大学 本研究旨在对报酬系统使用主体性包含多个指标 的探讨 。 报酬 仅仅根据利润和其他财务会计的数字 ，它 一直被批评为 是 鼓励管理者牺牲长期性能提高短期的财务分析 ,从而最大限度地发挥各自的 报酬 。 为了克服会计为基础的奖励制度的短期方向，许多公司为了评 估业绩未捕获尺寸短期金融的结果，实施补偿计划，以补充额外措施的财务指标。这些额外的措施可以采取多种形式，从数量不等，到非财务指标，以定性评估由经理人的卓越性能，
30、如员工和客户的调查结果。 当奖励制度的措施主要是在不同地方确定相对权重，从而确定奖金，一个关键问题是如何实现多种性能相结合。一种选择是使用一个公式，明确权重的每项措施，这个选项潜在的困难包括对于每项措施确定适当的权重。然而任何基于公式的计划，都认为能支付奖金，甚至当性能是不平衡或管理业绩的所有相关方面都没有抓获的选定的性能。 5 第二种选择是主观性奖金 授予程序的介绍。这种主观性可以采取表现形式灵活的加权量化措施，如当计算一个经理的奖金，绩效评估的定性使用，相对规定在奖金合同上的奖金奖励办法可以减少酌情调整等因素。一些理论研究表明，较大的主观性可以改善，改进合同，因为它允许企业利用可能因公式为
31、基础而被忽略的不可收缩的信息，同时退出不正常的导致不完整的目标的行为而减轻管理压力，提高性能指标。然而，其它研究表明，奖励制度的主体性可以降低经营者的意志，允许评估师忽略包含奖金计划在内的某些类型的性能标准，从而允许改变每个时期的奖金支付标准，并引入偏袒和偏见进入奖励 制度。 因此 ,经理们会较不能分清什么构成了良好的性能 ,不容易相信回报很大程度上取决于性能 ,不大相信这样的表现标准一直被应用在组织 。 描绘经济和心理研究在汲取性能措施的选择性能评估和补偿的目的，我们假设发展探索关于对性能的措施（如放置不同类型的权重，金融与非金融，定量与定性，输入与成果）在主观奖金计算。我们测试这些假设采用
32、定量和定性在一项广泛收集的数据，一个多年的实地调查平衡计分卡奖金计划在美国全球金融服务公司（队），零售银行业务国际领先的金融服务提供商。 1993 年，政府飞行服务队为分行经理取代了利润为基础的 奖金计划与公式计算系统，一旦客户满意的回报多个会计和增长的措施和业务审计的障碍得以实现。该系统内迅速改变在九个季度它在使用中的银行寻求消除游戏和促进业绩在更广泛的措施。该系统内迅速改变在九个季度它在使用中的银行寻求消除游戏和促进业绩在更广泛的措施。该公式为基础的计划取代了 1995 年第二季度由平衡计分卡载有六个类别的奖金计划财务和非财务业绩计量，其中有些是基于定性评估由管理者的监事。不同于先前的公式
33、为基础的计划，主观比重分别用于汇总的各种措施，在确定整体记分卡绩效评估及奖金。 虽然卡普兰和诺顿（ 2001）举的 一个例子队奖金计划记分卡为基础的奖励制度，阻止任何表现不佳的经理人记分卡尺寸，我们发现，在使用加权计分卡的主体措施，允许监督员忽视了许多性能指标，尽管一些这些措施导致了银行的两个战略目标的指标（财经业绩和增长客户）。相反，短期财务绩效措施成为奖金主要决定因素。此外，很大的比例经理人的绩效评价是基于记分卡的措施比其他因素，即使酌情考虑其他因素是不是奖金计划的一部分。从公式为基础的系统迁移到更主观记分卡导致许多分支经理们抱怨在条件约占偏袒和不确定性的奖金奖用于确定报酬，造成企业高层管
34、理者和人力资源质疑记分卡的赔 偿用途。最终，该公司放弃在一个委员会式的制度有利于在 1998 年年底记分卡计划的基础对收入。 我们的研究贡献，使四个绩效评估及补偿文献。首先，我们扩大了主体性和自由裁量权使用横断面研究在奖励计划。鉴于这些研究对重点谁解释因素，6 包括合同的赔偿主体，我们的研究强调主体是如何将绩效评估及奖金纳入奖项。第二，我们提供的资讯性对性能影响的进一步证据测量比重。在此之前的相对权重的金融，放在研究非财务业绩计量，一般包括在金融措施噪声代理，但不包括直接措施由于数据的限制，非财务资讯性的措施。在详细资料我们的研究让我们发展经济 的理论测试，更强的相对权重对财务业绩表现比其他措
35、施安置，是其信息性功能。第三，我们的研究补充心理学为基础的实验工作重要性放置在各种性能指标通过检查其是否实验结果持有实际绩效评价的设置。最后，虽然概括能力是由我们的结果只有一个坚定的分析有限的，我们提供对计分卡为基础的补偿计划，第一个详细的研究之一。尽管调查证据表明，越来越多的公司正在使用平衡计分卡赔偿用途，相对知之甚少实施问题与计分卡为基础的奖励制度。 本文的其余部分是在五个章节，第二节审查有关研究主观绩效评估与绩效衡量的比重，并发展我们的探索性的假设。该研 究为我们的研究中描述的设置第三节。我们的研究假设的统计测试，提出在第四节。在第五节我们提供了详细的定性分析关于平衡成功记分卡的执行情况。最后一节总结我们的研究成果，并讨论未来研究的启示。
