1、本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文二BOARDCOMPOSITION,EXECUTIVEREMUNERATION,ANDCORPORATEPERFORMANCETHECASEOFREITSINTRODUCTIONSTOCKHOLDERSINMODERNCORPORATIONSARETHERESIDUALRISKBEARERSASTHEYDONTHAVETHEEXPERTISETORUNTHEIRFIRMS,STOCKHOLDERSMUSTRELYONTHEFIRMSMANAGEMENTTEAMJENSENANDRUBACK1983DEFINEDTHEMANAGEMENTTEAMASTHETOPM
2、ANAGERSASWELLASTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSOFTHEFIRMTHESEPARATIONBETWEENOWNERSHIPANDCONTROLINTHEMODERNCORPORATIONCREATESTHEINCENTIVESFORMANAGERSTOPURSUETHEIRSELFINTERESTGOALSANDNOTTOMAXIMIZETHESHAREHOLDERSWEALTHINWHATISTERMEDINTHELITERATUREASTHEAGENCYCONFLICTRESEARCHERSHAVESUGGESTEDMANYMECHANISMSBYWHICHMANAG
3、ERSARECURBEDFROMMAXIMIZINGSOLELYTHEIROWNUTILITIESTHESEMECHANISMSSEEAGARWALANDKNOEBER1996CANBEEITHEREXTERNALONES,SUCHASMARKETFORCORPORATECONTROLORINTERNALONES,SUCHASTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSISABASICELEMENTOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCETHEMAINFUNCTIONSOFCORPORATEBOARDSAREEVALUATINGANDAPPROVINGSTRA
4、TEGIESFORMULATEDBYMANAGERS,PROVIDINGANAPPROPRIATEVEHICLEFORSTOCKHOLDERSDESIRINGREPRESENTATIONINCOMPANYBOARDS,ANDPERFORMINGVIGOROUSMONITORINGOFMANAGERSACTIONSTOMAKESURETHATDECISIONSBYTOPMANAGERSCOMEINLINEWITHSHAREHOLDERSINTERESTSTHELITERATUREISRICHWITHSTUDIESTHATHAVESHOWNTHEPOSITIVEEFFECTOFTHEOUTSIDE
5、BOARDMEMBERSONFIRMVALUETHETHEORYSAYSTHATTHEWAYABOARDOFDIRECTORSISFORMEDISINTENDEDTOMINIMIZETHEAGENCYCONFLICTCOSTSALSO,SOMESTUDIESHAVESHOWNHOWTHESIZEOFTHEBOARDAFFECTSCORPORATEVALUEYERMACK1996ZAHRAETAL1989EISENBERGETAL1998CONSEQUENTLY,THEBOARDOFDIRECTORSISANIMPORTANTGOVERNANCEMECHANISMTHATENSURESTHATT
6、HEINTERESTSOFSHAREHOLDERSANDMANAGEMENTARECLOSELYALIGNED,WHICHWOULDHAVEITSEFFECTSONCORPORATEPERFORMANCEINADDITIONTOTHEINTERNALMECHANISMSTHATMITIGATEAGENCYCONFLICTS,MANAGERIALREMUNERATIONISANIMPORTANTDEVICETHATCANBEUSEDEFFECTIVELYTOALIGNTHEINTERESTSOFSTOCKHOLDERSANDMANAGERSTHEEXTENTTOWHICHTHEREMUNERAT
7、IONPACKAGECANACHIEVETHATALIGNMENTOFINTERESTSISANEMPIRICALQUESTIONFROMATHEORETICALPOINTOFVIEW,MANAGERIALREMUNERATIONSHOULDCORRELATEWEAKLYWITHCORPORATEPERFORMANCETHEANNUALBONUSUSUALLYISGIVENINGOODASWELLASBADPERFORMANCETIMESGOODPERFORMANCEPUSHESTHEBONUSUPWHILEBADPERFORMANCEDOESNOTDEPRESSTHEBONUSHOWEVER
8、,EMPIRICALLY,THERELATIONSHIPBETWEENMANAGEMENTREMUNERATIONANDCORPORATEPERFORMANCEWASDETECTEDANDSHOWNTOEXISTGENERALLY,STUDIESHAVEFOUNDTHATTHEREISAPOSITIVERELATIONBETWEENMANAGERIALREMUNERATIONANDCORPORATEPERFORMANCEHAMID1995DAVISETAL1994FINNERTYETAL1993MANAGERIALREMUNERATIONANDCORPORATEPERFORMANCETHEIS
9、SUEOFMANAGERIALINCENTIVESHASBEENHEAVILYRESEARCHEDINFINANCIALECONOMICSMANAGERIALINCENTIVES,ATLEASTFROMATHEORETICALPOINTOFVIEW,HAVEANENERGETICEFFECTONMITIGATINGTHEMORALHAZARDPROBLEMINHERITEDININDIVIDUALCONTRACTSTHISWOULDHAVEAMAJORIMPACTUPONFIRMSFINANCIALPERFORMANCEHAMID1995EXAMINEDTHERELATIONSHIPBETWE
10、ENCEOCOMPENSATIONSTRUCTURE,OWNERSHIP,ANDFIRMPERFORMANCEHEMAINLYFOCUSEDUPONTHEEQUITYTYPEOFCOMPENSATIONNOTTHECASHCOMPENSATIONHISRESULTSCONFIRMEDASIGNIFICANTPOSITIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENCEOEQUITYCOMPENSATIONANDFIRMPERFORMANCEOTHERTYPESOFCOMPENSATIONALSOHAVEAPOSITIVEEFFECTONCORPORATEPERFORMANCEEVENAFTERCO
11、NSIDERINGSOMECONTROLVARIABLESDAVISANDSHELOR1995ALSODOCUMENTEDASIGNIFICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENEXECUTIVETOTALCOMPENSATION,FIRMSIZE,ANDFIRMPERFORMANCECANNONANDVOGT1995USEDJENSENSMEASURETOPROXYFORREITSFINANCIALPERFORMANCEANDEXAMINEDHOWSEVERETHEAGENCYCOSTSINREITSARETHEYFINDTHATADVISORREITSWITHLOWDIRECTORO
12、WNERSHIPTENDTOUNDERPERFORMANDPAYHIGHERADVISORPAYMENTSTHANDOTHEIRCOUNTERPARTSWITHHIGHOWNERSHIPTHEYFINDNOSUCHRELATIONSHIPFORSELFADMINISTEREDREITSTHESERESULTSSHOWTHATSELFADMINISTEREDREITSMAKEBETTERUSEOFMARKETBASEDPERFORMANCECOMPENSATIONTHANDOADVISORREITSLEWELLEN,LODERER,MARTIN,ANDBLUM1992FOUNDTHATTHERE
13、ISASIGNIFICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENMANAGERIALCOMPENSATIONANDFIRMECONOMICPERFORMANCETHEIRRESULTSCONFIRMEDTHATCOMPENSATIONPACKAGESAREDESIGNEDTOMITIGATETHEAGENCYCONFLICTCOSTSINMOSTPREVIOUSSTUDIES,THERELATIONBETWEENMANAGERIALREMUNERATIONANDCORPORATEPERFORMANCEWASEXAMINEDANDSHOWNTOBEPOSITIVEWHENUSINGTOTALR
14、EMUNERATIONPACKAGE,WHICHINCLUDESUSUALLY1BASECASHREMUNERATION,2INCENTIVECASHREMUNERATION,3STOCKOPTIONS,AND4RELATIVEPERFORMANCEREMUNERATIONTHISSTUDY,HOWEVER,ISCONCERNEDONLYWITHCASHREMUNERATIONSINCEITREPRESENTSABOUT80OFTOTALREMUNERATIONPACKAGEBOARDCOMPOSITIONANDFINANCIALPERFORMANCETHEISSUEOFBOARDCOMPOS
15、ITIONHASDEEPROOTSINFINANCIALECONOMICSLITERATUREWHETHERTHEWAYBOARDOFDIRECTORSISFORMEDCANAFFECTTHEECONOMICVALUEANDPERFORMANCEOFAFIRMHASBEENINVESTIGATEDBYALOTOFRESEARCHERSTHEEMPIRICALEVIDENCENOTSOLIDLYCONVINCINGREGARDINGTHISISSUEWHENCONSIDERINGTHEENTIRELITERATURE,ALTHOUGHMANYEMPIRICALSTUDIESSUPPORTAPOS
16、ITIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENBOARDSDOMINATEDBYOUTSIDEDIRECTORSANDCORPORATEPERFORMANCECOTTER,SHIVDASANI,ANDZENNER1997DOCUMENTEDEVIDENCESHOWINGTHEPOSITIVEEFFECTOFTHEOUTSIDEDIRECTORSONCORPORATEPERFORMANCEASTHEYFOUNDTHATSHAREHOLDERSGAINSFROMTENDEROFFERSWOULDBEGREATERFORTARGETSWITHINDEPENDENTBOARDMEMBERSTHANF
17、OROTHERTARGETSROSENSTEINANDWYATT1994EXAMINEDTHEWEALTHEFFECTSWHENANOFFICEROFONEPUBLICCORPORATIONJOINSTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSOFANOTHERCORPORATIONTHEYFINDTHATTHENONFINANCIALSENDINGFIRMSEXPERIENCENEGATIVERETURNSWHILETHERECEIVINGFIRMSDONOTGAINFROMTHESEAPPOINTMENTSTHISSUGGESTSTHATWHENEXECUTIVESJOINBOARDSOFOTH
18、ERCORPORATIONS,THEYBECOMEDISTRACTEDFROMSHAREHOLDERSWEALTHMAXIMIZATIONOBJECTIVETHEFINANCIALSENDINGFIRMSEXPERIENCEPOSITIVERETURNSWHENSENDINGTHEIROFFICERSTOOTHERFIRMSBARNHARTETAL1994INVESTIGATEDTHEEFFECTOFBOARDCOMPOSITIONONCOMPANYPERFORMANCEWHENTHEYDONOTCONTROLFORVARIABLESTHATHAVEEFFECTSONCOMPANYPERFOR
19、MANCE,THERELATIONSHIPBETWEENCORPORATEPERFORMANCE,PROXIEDBYMARKETTOBOOKRATIOOFEQUITY,ANDBOARDCOMPOSITIONISSIGNIFICANTWHENTHEYACCOUNTFORMANAGERIALOWNERSHIPANDVARIATIONACROSSINDUSTRIES,BOARDCOMPOSITIONISFOUNDTOBERELATEDTOMARKETTOBOOKRATIOINANONLINEARFASHIONLEE,ROSENSTEIN,RANGAN,ANDDAVIDSON1992REVEALEDT
20、HEEFFECTIVENESSOFTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSINENHANCINGFIRMPERFORMANCEBYSHOWINGTHATSTOCKPRICESOFFIRMSWHOSEBOARDSAREDOMINATEDBYINDEPENDENTDIRECTORSAREASSOCIATEDWITHLARGERABNORMALRETURNSTHANTHOSEOFCOMPANIESWHOSEBOARDSAREDOMINATEDBYLESSINDEPENDENTDIRECTORSBYRDANDHICKMAN1992REVIEWEDTHELITERATUREANDSUPPORTEDTHEC
21、ONJECTUREOFTHEPOSITIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENCORPORATEPROFITABILITYANDBOARDSDOMINATEDBYOUTSIDEINDEPENDENTDIRECTORSGILSON1990ALSOCONFIRMEDTHEIDEATHATBOARDCOMPOSITIONISRELATEDTOFINANCIALPERFORMANCEOFFIRMSASHEDOCUMENTEDANEVIDENSETHATAFTERCOMPANYDEFAULT,BOARDCOMPOSITIONISALTEREDSIGNIFICANTLYBYCREDITORSWHOTE
22、NDTOAPPOINTTHEIRREPRESENTATIVESTOTHEBOARDBYRDANDHICKMAN1990SHOWEDTHATTHESTOCKSOFFIRMSWHOSEATLEAST50OFTHEIRBOARDMEMBERSAREINDEPENDENTAREASSOCIATEDWITHHIGHERRETURNSFORSTOCKHOLDERSINCASEOFACQUISITIONSTHEYNOTED,HOWEVER,THATTHESERESULTSARESENSITIVETOTHEMETHODUSEDTOCLASSIFYDIRECTORSROSENSTEINANDWYATT1990A
23、LSOSHOWEDTHATTHEADDITIONOFANOUTSIDEDIRECTORINCREASEDCORPORATEVALUEINATHEORETICALPAPER,ZAHRAANDPEARCE1989DEVELOPEDATHEORETICALINTEGRATIVEMODELWHICHSPECIFIESIMPORTANTRELATIONSHIPSBETWEENBOARDVARIABLESANDCOMPANYPERFORMANCETHEYNOTEDTHATTHESERELATIONSHIPSDEPENDONSEVERALINTERNALINDUSTRYFACTORS,LEGALASPECT
24、S,ETCANDEXTERNALOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE,COMPANYLIFECYCLE,COMPLEXITYOFOPERATION,ETCCONTINGENCIESIDENTIFIEDINTHEIRMODELALLTHESEATTRIBUTESPLAYANIMPORTANTROLEINDETERMININGDIRECTORSSUCCESSINEXECUTINGTHEIRCONTROLANDMONITORINGROLES,WHICHISAPREREQUISITEFORAGLAMOUROUSCOMPANYPERFORMANCEMOLZS1988FINDINGSDONOTSUPPOR
25、TTHEASSOCIATIONBETWEENFIRMPERFORMANCEANDTHEMANAGERIALDOMINATEDBOARDSWEISBACH1988SHOWSTHATCOMPANIESWITHOUTSIDEDOMINATEDBOARDSAREMORELIKELYTOREPLACEACEOBASEDONPERFORMANCETHANCOMPANIESWITHINSIDERDOMINATEDBOARDSTHEBULKOFTHEPREVIOUSLITERATURESHOWSAPOSITIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENOUTSIDEDIRECTORSANDCORPORATEPE
26、RFORMANCETHEPREMISETHATISBROUGHTUPBYTHISSTUDYISTHATEFFECTIVEMONITORINGDOESNOTCOMEFROMALLOUTSIDEDIRECTORSASHYPOTHESIZEDBYSOMEPREVIOUSSTUDIESINTHELITERATURE,BUTITCOMESONLYFROMTHATGROUPOFDIRECTORSTHATISABLETOASKTHEHARDQUESTIONSPREVIOUSLITERATUREINCORPORATEGOVERNANCECLASSIFIESOUTSIDEDIRECTORSINTOTWOCATE
27、GORIESGRAYOUTSIDERSANDPUREINDEPENDENTOUTSIDERSTHEGRAYOUTSIDERSHAVESOMETYPEOFAFFILIATIONWITHTHECOMPANYONWHOSEBOARDTHEYSIT,WHICHCOULDLIMITTHEIRCAPABILITYTOEXERCISEEFFECTIVEMONITORINGONMANAGEMENTTHESEAFFILIATIONSINCLUDELEGAL,BANKING,CONSULTANCY,ANDOTHERRELATIONSHIPSPUREOUTSIDEDIRECTORS,ONTHEOTHERHAND,H
28、AVENORELATIONSHIPWITHTHECOMPANYOTHERTHANTHEIRDIRECTORSHIPAND,HENCE,BEARNOCOSTSFROMCHALLENGINGMANAGERSBYRDANDHICHMAN1990SHOWEDTHATTHEMETHODOFCLASSIFYINGBOARDOFDIRECTORSCAUSESTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENBOARDCOMPOSITIONANDCORPORATEPERFORMANCETOCHANGEBOARDSIZEANDCORPORATEPERFORMANCETHEORETICALLY,ITISEXPECTED
29、THATCOORDINATIONANDCOMMUNICATIONWILLBEMOREEFFECTIVEANDDECISIONMAKINGPROBLEMSWILLBELESSINRELATIVELYSMALLBOARDS,WHICHMIGHTPOSITIVELYAFFECTBOARDPERFORMANCEONTHEOTHERHAND,LARGEBOARDSHAVETHETENDENCYTOINCLUDEDIRECTORSWITHDIVERSEEXPERTISEANDSKILLSTHESETWOCONTRADICTEDPREMISESDESERVEMOREINSPECTIONINTHEREITSI
30、NDUSTRYDUETOTHEIRDIFFERENTCONTROLSYSTEMONTOPOFTHAT,THEREISASCARCITYINTHELITERATUREREGARDINGSTUDIESOFTHERELATIONBETWEENBOARDSIZEANDCORPORATEPERFORMANCETHISSTUDYCONJECTURESTHAT,INGENERAL,THEIDEALBOARDSIZEVARIESWITHFIRMSIZEEISENBERG,SUNDGREN,ANDWELLS1998USEDACCOUNTINGFIGURESTOMEASUREFIRMPERFORMANCETHEY
31、FOUNDEVIDENCETHATSMALLBOARDSHADPOSITIVEEFFECTSONCORPORATEPERFORMANCEYERMACK1996ADOPTEDTHEPOINTOFVIEWOFANEGATIVEASSOCIATIONBETWEENBOARDSIZEANDPERFORMANCEHEFOUNDSANINVERSERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHETWOVARIABLESTHISSUGGESTSTHATTHESMALLSIZEOFABOARDOFDIRECTORSHELPSTOIMPROVETHEEFFICIENCYOFTHEDECISIONMAKINGPROC
32、ESSAND,HENCE,PROMOTESSHAREHOLDERS,INTERESTSBROWNANDMALONEY1992ALSOFOUNDTHATSMALLERBOARDSOFDIRECTORSAREASSOCIATEDWITHBETTERFIRMPERFORMANCEGIVENTHATTHEPREVIOUSSTUDIESHAVECROSSSECTIONALLYEXAMINEDMANYINDUSTRIES,THEDOCUMENTEDRELATIONSHIPMIGHTBEALTEREDWHENSTUDYINGONEINDUSTRYWITHUNIQUEFEATURESREGARDINGTHEC
33、ONTROLSYSTEMPERFORMANCEMEASURETHELITERATUREISFILLEDWITHDIFFERENTTYPESOFFINANCIALPERFORMANCEMEASURESALLTHESEMEASURESCANBECATEGORIZEDASEITHERACCOUNTINGBASEDMEASURESORMARKETORIENTEDMEASURESUSUALLY,ACCOUNTINGMEASURESTHATARECONSTRUCTEDFROMFINANCIALSTATEMENTSDATAAREHIGHLYCRITICIZEDINTHEFINANCECOMMUNITYALS
34、O,THESEMEASURESUSUALLYDONOTACCOUNTFORDIFFERENCESINSYSTEMATICRISKHENCE,THEYDIVERGEFROMTHEECONOMICMARKETVALUEOFFIRMSSEEBENSTON1985THATISWHYFINANCIALANALYSTSSOMETIMESRECLASSIFYSOMEBALANCESHEETITEMSINORDERTOJUDGETHEPRECISELIQUIDITYOFAFIRMONTHEOTHERHAND,THEMARKETBASEDPERFORMANCEMEASURESAREDETERMINEDSOLEL
35、YANDCOLLECTIVELYBYTHEMARKETPARTICIPANTSWHOINTERPRETMANAGERSSIGNALSCORRECTLY,ASSUMINGEFFICIENTFINANCIALMARKETS,ANDUSUALLYFIRMMANAGERSHAVENODISCRETIONOVERTHESEMEASURESBASEDUPONTHAT,ANDBECAUSETHESAMPLEFIRMSAREPUBLICLYOWNEDCOMPANIESANDHENCETHEIRSECURITIESAREPRICEDINFINANCIALMARKETS,THISSTUDYWILLUSEAMARK
36、ETBASEDFINANCIALPERFORMANCEMEASURETOMEASUREREITSFINANCIALPERFORMANCETOBINSQ,ASAMARKETBASEDPERFORMANCEMEASURE,REPRESENTSASHARPMEASUREOFCORPORATEVALUESINCEITINCORPORATESTHEVALUEOFALLASSETS,ITISSUPPOSEDTOREFLECTBOTHTHEQUALITYOFMONITORINGPRACTICEDBYPUREDIRECTORSANDTHEDEGREETOWHICHSHAREHOLDERSINTERESTSAN
37、DTHOSEOFMANAGERSAREALIGNED,ASSUMINGTHATREITSSECURITIESAREPRICEDINEFFICIENTCAPITALMARKETSTOBINSQCANBEDEFINEDASTHERATIOOFTHEFIRMVALUETOITSASSETSREPLACEMENTCOSTSTHELITERATUREISFILLEDWITHDIFFERENTVERSIONSOFTOBINSQSINCENOCONSENSUSISREACHEDASTOTHEBESTTOBINSQRATIO,THREEDIFFERENTRATIOSOFTOBINSQWILLBEUSEDINT
38、HISSTUDYTHISPROCEDURESERVESTWOPURPOSESTHEFIRSTISTOTESTTHESENSITIVITYOFTHERESULTSTODIFFERENTDEFINITIONSOFCORPORATEPERFORMANCEPROXIEDBYTOBINSQSECOND,THEEFFECTOFEMPLOYINGDIFFERENTVERSIONSOFTOBINSQONTHERESULTSOFMANYDIFFERENTSTUDIESINTHELITERATUREISPARTLYRESOLVEDTHETHREEVERSIONSOFTOBINSQEMPLOYEDINTHISSTU
39、DYAREASFOLLOWSQ1MVETAEQ1/TAWHEREMVEISTHEPRODUCTOFSTOCKPRICEYEARCLOSEBYTHECOMMONSTOCKSOUTSTANDINGTAISTOTALASSET,ANDEQISTHEBOOKVALUEOFEQUITYQ2MVE/BOOKVALUEOFNETASSETS2Q3MVELTDSTEPSALV/TA3WHERELTDISTHEBOOKVALUEOFLONGTERMDEBTSTDISTHEBOOKVALUEOFTHESHORTTERMDEBT,ANDPSALVISTHEPREFERREDSTOCKATLIQUIDATIONVAL
40、UEFORTHESAKEOFILLUSTRATION,THECORRELATIONAMONGTHETHREEVERSIONSOFTOBINSQWASCALCULATEDANDWASSHOWNTOBEVERYHIGHTHEREFORE,ITISEXPECTEDTOHAVESIMILARRESULTSASFARASOURANALYSISISCONCERNEDCONCLUSIONTHISSTUDYHASINVESTIGATEDTHEEFFECTOFTHECOMPOSITIONOFTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSAMONITORINGMECHANISMANDMANAGERIALREMUNERAT
41、IONBONDINGMECHANISMONTHECORPORATEPERFORMANCEOFREITSTHERESULTSINDICATETHATTHEREISANEGATIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENCASHMANAGERIALREMUNERATIONANDFIRMPERFORMANCEALSO,UNLIKESOMEPREVIOUSSTUDIES,THISPAPERSHOWSTHATONLYPUREDIRECTORSAREABLETOPRACTICEEFFECTIVEMONITORINGANDGRAYDIRECTORSHAVENOSIGNIFICANTEFFECTONFIRMP
42、ERFORMANCETHEOUTSIDEDIRECTORS,BOTHGRAYANDPURE,HAVENOIMPACTUPONFINANCEPERFORMANCEINTHEREITSINDUSTRYMOREOVER,THISPAPERTACKLEDTHEBOARDSIZEEFFECTINVESTIGATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHELITERATURETHEFINDINGSOFTHISSTUDYCONFIRMANONLINEARRELATIONSHIPBETWEENBOARDSIZEANDFIRMPERFORMANCETHERELATIONSHIPISNEGATIVEWHENBOARDSIZ
43、EISSMALL,ANDITTURNSPOSITIVEWHENBOARDSIZEGROWSSOURCETURKIALSHIMMIRI,2004“BOARDCOMPOSITION,EXECUTIVEREMUNERATION,ANDCORPORATEPERFORMANCETHECASEOFREITS”CORPORATEOWNERSHIPCONTROLAUGUSTPP104112译文董事会结构，高管薪酬和公司绩效以房地产投资信托基金为例简介股东是现代公司的的剩余风险承担者。由于他们不具备专业知识，从而无法管理他们的公司，所以必须依靠公司的管理团队。詹森和罗博特（1983）把管理团队办公室界定为高层管
44、理人员以及该公司的董事会。在所有权和控制权分离的情况下，公司管理人员创造的激励机制是为了追求自身利益最大化，而不是股东财富最大化。在理论上这被称为代理冲突。研究人员已经提出了许多机制，最大限度地遏制经理们把公司看成完全属于他们个人的事业来经营管理。这些机制（见艾格瓦与可那卜1996年），可以是外部机制，如公司控制，或者是内部的机制，如董事会。董事会是公司治理的基本要素。公司董事会的主要职责是评估，审批管理人员制定的策略，给渴望成为公司董事会成员的股票持有人提供适当的条件，积极履行监管职责以确保由高层管理人员所做的决定与股东的利益相一致。很多文献研究表明，外部董事会成员对公司价值有积极的影响。该
45、理论指出，此董事会成立的目的是尽量减少机构冲突成本。此外，一些研究也指出，董事会的规模大小会影响公司价值（依玛克1996年萨拉等1989年，艾森伯格等1998年）。因此，董事会是一个确保股东和管理者的利益密切相一致的重要治理机制，也就是说它会对企业绩效产生影响。除了缓解代理冲突的内部机制，薪酬管理也是能有效地使股东和经理人的利益相一致的方法。何种程度上的薪酬包可以实现这一利益调整是一个经验性的问题。从理论角度讲，薪酬管理与企业绩效的相关性较少。年终奖金的发放通常在于你表现好坏的情况。好的业绩表现会得到更多的奖金，而不良的表现也不会导致奖金减少。然而，站在经验角度上看薪酬管理与企业绩效是存在关系
46、的。一般而言，有研究发现它们之间存在着正相关的关系。（哈米德1995；戴维斯等人1994芬纳蒂等1993年）。经营者薪酬与企业绩效经理层激励机制在金融经济学中已成为热门研究问题。激励管理，至少从理论的角度看，在减少道德风险问题上有着不小的影响。从而会对公司的财务业绩产生重大影响。哈米德（1995年）曾研究首席执行官的薪酬结构、所有权和公司业绩之间的关系。他主要着重于股份分配而不是现金股利分配。他的研究结果证实了经营者的薪酬与公司经营业绩呈正相关。其他类型的薪酬分配方式对企业业绩也有积极的影响，即使在考虑一些控制变量后。戴维斯和谢尔勒（1995年）也讲到报酬总额、企业规模与公司业绩的相关性。卡龙
47、和福格特（1995）使用杰斯的方法来研究房地产投资信托基金的财务表现及代理成本问题在房地产投资信托基金的严峻性。他们发现股权少的房地产投资信托基金董事顾问往往表现不佳，而与其同行比，他们有较高的顾问费。而自我管理的房地产信托基金公司没有这样的问题。这些结果表明，与拥有房地产投资信托基金董事顾问的公司相比较，自我管理的房地产投资信托基金能更好地利用基于市场的有偿性能。卢埃林、路德尔、马丁和布洛蒙（1992）发现企业经营者报酬与公司的经营业绩之间有重大关系。他们的研究结果证实，薪酬分配能减少代理冲突成本。在以往大多数的研究中，对经营者薪酬和企业绩效的关系进行了检验，并证明了使用薪酬包有积极的作用，
48、其中一般包括（1）基准现金薪酬（2）奖励现金薪酬（3）股票期权（4）相对表现酬金。因为现金薪酬代表约80的整体薪酬福利，所以此研究主要是涉及现金薪酬方面。董事会的组成及企业绩效金融经济学文献中有大量研究董事会的组成问题。很多研究证明无论董事会以何种方式成立都会影响企业的经济价值和绩效。虽然许多实证研究支持外部董事与公司业绩之间的正相关关系，考虑到整体问题的研究，关于这个问题的实证证据还是不够充分的。科特、斯达莎尼和真兰（1997年）研究表明外部董事与公司绩效呈正相关。因为他们发现，股东比独立董事更想从要约收购中获得收益。罗赛特和瓦亚特（1994）研究了财富方面的影响，当一个外部公司人员加入了其
49、他公司的董事会，他们发现，给非金融公司带来负回报。这表明，当其他公司高管加入董事会，他们不会专心于股东财富最大化的目标。把财务上的正回报反馈给公司，同时也反馈给其他公司。博哈特（1994年）研究董事会的组成对公司业绩的影响。当没有控制变量设定来研究公司业绩时，发现按照股票的市场价值和账面价值的比率来衡量公司绩效和董事会组成之间的关系有重大意义。当他们的所有权、管理权及行业变化后，发现董事会的组成和市场价值与账面价值的比率呈非线性的关系。李、罗赛特、沦哥和达夫赛1992指出了董事会在提高企业绩效方面的作用，通过研究得出由独立董事占主导地位的董事会相较于独立董事少的董事会，有较多异常的回报。伯德和希克曼（1992年）的文献中说到，他们支持企业盈利能力与主要由外部独立董事组成的董事会之间的关系是正相关的猜想。吉尔森（1990）也证实其想法，他的研究发现，当公司违约后，董事会的组成由债权人倾向于任命谁进入董事会而发生重大变化，即董事会组成与公司财务绩效是有关的。伯德和希克曼（1990年）表示，至少有50的董事为独立董事的公司股票在收购案件中有较高的回报。然而他们指出，通过这些结果来区分董事是比较主观的。罗森斯坦和悦（1990）也表明，外部董事的加入提高企业价值。在文献中，萨拉和皮尔斯（1989年）制定了综合性的理论模型，它指出董事会与公司绩效
