1、本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文INSURANCE,BONDCOVENANTS,ANDUNDEROROVERINVESTMENTWITHRISKYASSETRECONSTITUTIONABSTRACTTRADITIONALTHEORYPREDICTSTHATTHESHAREHOLDERSOFALIMITEDLIABILITYCOMPANYFINANCEDPARTLYBYBONDSMAYUNDERINVESTBYNOTREPLACINGDAMAGEDCOMPANYASSETSITALSOPRECLUDESTHEPOSSIBILITYOFOVERINVESTMENTBYRELAXINGTHERES
2、TRICTIVEASSUMPTIONMAINTAINEDUNDERTRADITIONALTHEORY,NAMELY,THATTHEEFFECTSOFRECONSTITUTINGDAMAGEDASSETSARENONSTOCHASTIC,THISARTICLESHOWSTHATBOTHOVERANDUNDERINVESTMENTAREPOSSIBLEITISSHOWNTHATTHESEMORALHAZARDPROBLEMSCANBEMITIGATEDBYINCORPORATINGAPPROPRIATEINSURANCEREQUIREMENTSINTOBONDCOVENANTSMOREOVER,I
3、TISSHOWNTHATTHEINSURANCEREQUIREMENTSFORALLEVIATINGUNDERINVESTMENTANDOVERINVESTMENTAREQUITEDIFFERENTPARTICULARLY,FORUNDERINVESTMENT,THEREQUIREDINSURANCEONLYNEEDSTOMAKETHEBONDSRISKLESSINTHEBESTASSETRECONSTITUTIONSTATESOFTHELOSSSTATESINWHICHTHECOMPANYVALUEFALLSSHORTOFTHEPROMISEDBONDREPAYMENTHOWEVER,FOR
4、OVERINVESTMENT,THEREQUIREDINSURANCESHOULDMAKETHEBONDSTOTALLYRISKLESSTHEDIFFERENCEININSURANCEREQUIREMENTSISESPECIALLYIMPORTANTWHENINSURANCEISACTUARIALLYUNFAVORABLESUCHTHATMORETHANREQUIREDINSURANCEISALWAYSUNDESIRABLEINTRODUCTIONITISWELLKNOWNINTHEFINANCEANDECONOMICSLITERATURETHATTHEPRESENCEOFASYMMETRIC
5、INFORMATIONBETWEENSTOCKHOLDERSANDBONDHOLDERSMAYLEADTOSUBOPTIMALCORPORATEINVESTMENTDECISIONSTWOCOMMONEXAMPLESARETHEASSETSUBSTITUTIONPROBLEMANDTHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMINTRODUCEDBYJENSENANDMECKLING1976ANDMYERS1977THESEMINALARTICLEOFMAYERSANDSMITH1987SHOWSTHATTHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMMAYALSOOCCURINTHEC
6、ASEOFRECONSTITUTIONOFDAMAGEDCORPORATEASSETSRISKNEUTRALSHAREHOLDERS,WHOHAVENOPRECOMMITMENTTORECONSTITUTINGDAMAGEDCORPORATEASSETS,MAYCHOOSENOTTOREPLACELOSTASSETSINTHESTATESOFNATUREINWHICHTHEVALUEOFTHECOMPANYAFTERASSETRECONSTITUTIONISRAISEDBUTFALLSSHORTOFTHEBONDREPAYMENTAMOUNTTOILLUSTRATETHEUNDERINVEST
7、MENTPROBLEM,MAYERSANDSMITH1987ASSUMETHATASSETRECONSTITUTIONRAISESCOMPANYVALUEANDISRISKLESSMAYERSANDSMITH1987,SCHNABELANDROUMI1989,ANDGARVENANDMACMINN1993PROPOSETHATTOMITIGATETHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEM,ABONDCOVENANTSHOULDBEIMPOSED,SPECIFYINGTHATSUFFICIENTPROPERTYINSURANCEISPURCHASEDTOMAKETHEBONDSRISKL
8、ESSANDTOPREVENTTHESHAREHOLDERSFROMTAKINGADVANTAGEOFTHELIMITEDLIABILITYPROVISIONBYUNDERINVESTINGINTHESTATESWITHLARGEPROPERTYLOSSESRECENTLY,SOMEAUTHORSEG,DEMEZAANDWEBB,1987BERKOVITCHANDKIM,1990STULZ,1990HARRISANDRAVIV,1996CHUNG,1998NOEETAL,2002SIGOUIN,2003SUGGESTVARIOUSREASONSTHATOVERINVESTMENTMAYALSO
9、OCCURFOREXAMPLE,BERKOVICHANDKIM1990SUGGESTTHATIFSHAREHOLDERSAREALLOWEDTOISSUENONSUBORDINATEDDEBT,THENTHERELATIVELYLOWCOSTOFBORROWINGMAYCREATEINCENTIVEFOREXCESSIVEINVESTMENTNOEETAL2002SHOWTHATININTERNATIONALCOOPERATIVEVENTURES,OVERINVESTMENTOCCURSWHENTHEMULTINATIONALSBARGAININGADVANTAGEISREINFORCEDBY
10、ANINFORMATIONALADVANTAGEANATURALQUESTIONTHATONEMAYASKISWHETHERITISPOSSIBLETHATSHAREHOLDERSMAYOVERINVESTWHENDECIDINGIFDAMAGEDASSETSSHOULDBEREPLACEDUNDERMAYERSANDSMITHS1987RISKLESSASSETRECONSTITUTIONASSUMPTION,OVERINVESTMENTWILLNEVEROCCUR,BECAUSEANYASSETRECONSTITUTIONTHATREDUCESCOMPANYVALUEBELOWTHEPRO
11、MISEDBONDREPAYMENTAMOUNTALSOREDUCESSHAREHOLDERSWEALTHWITHCERTAINTYWHATIFASSETRECONSTITUTIONISRISKYINREALITY,THEREAREREASONSWHYRECONSTITUTINGDAMAGEDASSETSMAYNOTALWAYSRAISETHEVALUEOFACOMPANYANDMAYEVENBERISKYFORINSTANCE,THECOSTOFRAISINGIMMEDIATELIQUIDITYTOFINANCEASSETRECONSTITUTIONMAYEXCEEDITSBENEFITGI
12、VENIMPERFECTSHORTTERMCAPITALMARKETSUNLESSTHEREAREPREARRANGEDCONTINGENCYLOANSWHICHARELIKELYTOBEINSUFFICIENTINTHECASEOFLARGEPROPERTYDAMAGE,THELIQUIDITYNEEDEDFORASSETRECONSTITUTIONOFTENHASTOBEEXTRACTEDFROMOTHERIMPORTANTOPERATIONSORPRODUCTIONACTIVITIESWITHLARGEPROPERTYDAMAGE,ASSETRECONSTITUTIONMAYUSEUPA
13、SIGNIFICANTPORTIONOFPREARRANGEDCREDITORBUFFERCASHINITIALLYPLANNEDFORCOPINGWITHOTHERPRODUCTIONANDMARKETSHOCKS,INTRODUCINGADDITIONALRISKTOTHEVALUEOFACOMPANYPOSSIBLELIQUIDITYPROBLEMSMAYHAVESIGNIFICANTLYNEGATIVEIMPACTONCOMPANYVALUETHEREFORE,ASSETRECONSTITUTIONCANBERISKY,POSSIBLYRESULTINGINPOSITIVEORNEGA
14、TIVENETPRESENTVALUESINDIFFERENTSTATESOFNATUREMOREOVER,THEEXPECTEDNETPRESENTVALUEOFASSETRECONSTITUTIONCANBEPOSITIVEORNEGATIVETHISARTICLESHOWSTHATBOTHOVERANDUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMSMAYARISEWHENASSETRECONSTITUTIONISRISKYWITHRISKYASSETRECONSTITUTION,GIVENACERTAINLEVELOFASSETDAMAGE,SHAREHOLDERSMAYNOTCHOOS
15、ETORECONSTITUTEDAMAGEDASSETSEVENTHOUGHDOINGSOGENERATESAPOSITIVEEXPECTEDNETPRESENTVALUE,GIVINGRISETOTHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMTHISHAPPENSWHENTHEVALUEOFACOMPANYFALLSSHORTOFTHEPROMISEDBONDREPAYMENTAMOUNTEVENINTHEBESTASSETRECONSTITUTIONSTATESINTHISCASE,ASSETRECONSTITUTIONWILLONLYBENEFITBONDHOLDERS,BUTNOT
16、SHAREHOLDERSWHOAREALREADYPROTECTEDBYTHELIMITEDLIABILITYPROVISIONTHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMWILLNOTARISEINTHEABSENCEOFLIMITEDLIABILITYBECAUSEARISEINCOMPANYVALUEDUETOASSETRECONSTITUTIONWILLRELIEVESOMESHAREHOLDERSDEBTRESPONSIBILITIESITALSOWILLNOTARISEWHENEVERCOMPANYVALUEEXCEEDSTHEPROMISEDBONDREPAYMENTAMO
17、UNTINSOMEASSETRECONSTITUTIONSTATES,BECAUSEASSETRECONSTITUTIONRAISESSHAREHOLDERSWEALTHINTHESESTATESONTHECONTRARY,GIVENACERTAINLEVELOFASSETDAMAGE,SHAREHOLDERSMAYOPTFORRISKYASSETRECONSTITUTIONWITHANEGATIVEEXPECTEDNETPRESENTVALUE,GIVINGRISETOTHEOVERINVESTMENTPROBLEMTHISHAPPENSWHENTHEVALUEOFACOMPANYISHIG
18、HERTHANTHEBONDREPAYMENTAMOUNTINSOME,BUTNOTALL,ASSETRECONSTITUTIONSTATESSHAREHOLDERS,WHOAREPROTECTEDBYTHELIMITEDLIABILITYPROVISION,WILLENGAGEINRISKYASSETRECONSTITUTIONTORAISETHEIROWNWEALTHINSOLVENTSTATES,KNOWINGTHATDOINGSOLOWERSCOMPANYVALUEANDBONDHOLDERSWEALTHININSOLVENTSTATES,GIVINGRISETOANOVERALLFA
19、LLINEXPECTEDCOMPANYVALUEANDEXPECTEDBONDHOLDERSWEALTHTHEOVERINVESTMENTPROBLEMWILLNOTARISEINTHEABSENCEOFLIMITEDLIABILITYBECAUSEANYFALLINCOMPANYVALUEWILLEVENTUALLYRAISESHAREHOLDERSOWNDEBTRESPONSIBILITIESITALSOWILLNOTARISEWHENEVERACOMPANYSVALUEISLOWERTHANTHEPROMISEDBONDREPAYMENTAMOUNTINALLASSETRECONSTIT
20、UTIONSTATES,BECAUSEASSETRECONSTITUTIONWILLBENEFITNOONESIMILARTOMAYERSANDSMITHS1987UNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMUNDERRISKLESSASSETRECONSTITUTION,BONDCOVENANTSREQUIRINGTHESHAREHOLDERSTOPURCHASEAPPROPRIATEPROPERTYINSURANCECANBEUSEDTOMITIGATEBOTHUNDERINVESTMENTANDOVERINVESTMENTUNDERRISKYASSETRECONSTITUTIONPART
21、ICULARLY,TOAVOIDUNDERINVESTMENT,ITSUFFICESTOSPECIFYANINDEMNITYSCHEDULETORAISETHEVALUEOFTHECOMPANYSUFFICIENTLYSOTHATTHEBONDSAREMADERISKLESSINTHOSEINSOLVENTSTATESINWHICHRECONSTITUTINGDAMAGEDASSETSRAISESCOMPANYVALUEINORDERTOPROVIDEANINCENTIVEFORTHESHAREHOLDERSTOREPLACEDAMAGEDASSETSTOKEEPTHECOMPANYFROMG
22、OINGBANKRUPTTOAVOIDOVERINVESTMENT,ITSUFFICESTOSPECIFYANINDEMNITYSCHEDULETORAISECOMPANYVALUEINPOTENTIALINSOLVENTSTATESANDHENCESHAREHOLDERSOPPORTUNITYCOSTOFASSETRECONSTITUTION,SOTHATITISNOLONGERPOSSIBLEFORSHAREHOLDERSTOTAKEADVANTAGEOFTHELIMITEDLIABILITYPROVISIONTOINCREASETHEIROWNWEALTHATTHEEXPENSEOFBO
23、NDHOLDERSTHERESTOFTHEARTICLEISORGANIZEDASFOLLOWSSECTIONCOMPANYVALUEWITHRISKLESSORRISKYASSETRECONSTITUTIONCOMPARESTHECASEOFRISKYASSETRECONSTITUTIONTOTHETRADITIONALCASEOFRISKLESSASSETRECONSTITUTIONSECTIONUNDERINVESTMENTWITHRISKLESSORRISKYASSETRECONSTITUTIONDISTINGUISHESTHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMSWITHRI
24、SKLESSANDWITHRISKYASSETRECONSTITUTIONSECTIONBONDCOVENANTFORMITIGATINGUNDERINVESTMENTDERIVESTHEREQUIREDPROPERTYINSURANCEINDEMNITYSCHEDULETHATSHOULDBESPECIFIEDINABONDCOVENANTTOMITIGATETHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMWITHRISKYASSETRECONSTITUTIONSECTIONOVERINVESTMENTWITHRISKYASSETRECONSTITUTIONIDENTIFIESTHEOVE
25、RINVESTMENTPROBLEMWITHRISKYASSETRECONSTITUTIONSECTIONBONDCOVENANTFORMITIGATINGOVERINVESTMENTDERIVESTHEINSURANCEINDEMNITYSCHEDULEREQUIREDFORMITIGATINGTHEOVERINVESTMENTPROBLEMSECTIONACTUARIALLYUNFAVORABLEINSURANCECONSIDERSTHEEFFECTSOFINSURANCELOADINGFINALSECTIONCONCLUDES1COMPANYVALUEWITHRISKLESSORRISK
26、YASSETRECONSTITUTIONTHEMODELTOBEANALYZEDISANEXTENSIONOFTHOSEOFMAYERSANDSMITH1987,SCHNABELANDROUMI1989,ANDGARVENANDMACMINN1993MAYERSANDSMITH1987ASSUMETHATTHESHAREHOLDERSOFALIMITEDLIABILITYCOMPANYHAVETHECHOICEOFREPLACINGDAMAGEDASSETSFULLYANDTHATTHEEFFECTOFASSETRECONSTITUTIONONTHECOMPANYSVALUEISCERTAIN
27、,DEPENDINGONLYONREALIZATIONSOFSTHEYCONCLUDETHATTHEREMAYBEUNDERINVESTMENT,ASTHESHAREHOLDERSMAYNOTREPLACEDAMAGEDASSETSEVENWHENASSETRECONSTITUTIONRESULTSINANINCREASEINTHEVALUEOFTHECOMPANYTHEREASONISTHATINTHESTATESWITHLARGEPROPERTYLOSSES,THEVALUEOFTHECOMPANYISLOWERTHANTHEAMOUNTNEEDEDFORFULLYREPAYINGTHEB
28、ONDHOLDERS,EVENAFTERASSETRECONSTITUTIONSINCETHESHAREHOLDERSAREPROTECTEDBYTHELIMITEDLIABILITYPROVISION,ANYINCREASEINTHEVALUEOFTHECOMPANYINTHESELOSSSTATESWILLBENEFITONLYTHEBONDHOLDERSNOTICETHATWITHRISKLESSASSETRECONSTITUTION,OVERINVESTMENTISIMPOSSIBLEBECAUSETHESHAREHOLDERSWILLNOTBENEFITFROMANYRISKLESS
29、ASSETRECONSTITUTIONTHATREDUCESTHEVALUEOFTHECOMPANYTWOQUESTIONSARISEFIRST,ISTHERISKLESSASSETRECONSTITUTIONASSUMPTIONALWAYSREASONABLESECOND,IFTHERISKLESSASSETRECONSTITUTIONASSUMPTIONISRELAXED,HOWWILLTHECONCLUSIONONUNDERINVESTMENTANDOVERINVESTMENTBEAFFECTEDITISPOSSIBLETHATASSETRECONSTITUTIONMAYREDUCE,I
30、NSTEADOFRAISE,THEVALUEOFTHECOMPANYAND,ATTHESAMETIME,MAYINTRODUCEASPREADORADDITIONALRISKTHEREARESEVERALREASONSFORSUCHSTOCHASTICDETERIORATIONOFCOMPANYVALUEFIRST,EVENIFTHEREINSTALLATIONORREPRODUCTIONOFDAMAGEDASSETSPOSSIBLYPRODUCTIVEINPUTSORFINISHEDOUTPUTSISSUCCESSFULWITHCERTAINTY,THECOSTANDTHETIMINGOFT
31、HEREINSTALLATIONORREPRODUCTIONMAYBESTOCHASTIC,RESULTINGINADDITIONALCOSTORPRODUCTIONUNCERTAINTYSECOND,THEREPLENISHINGOFDAMAGEDOUTPUTMAYREQUIRETHECOMPANYTOACQUIREADDITIONALRAWMATERIALSANDOTHERINPUTSWHOSEPRICESMAYBERISKYASTHESIZEOFASSETDAMAGEISUNKNOWNAPRIORI,NOHEDGINGAGAINSTTHEFLUCTUATIONININPUTPRICESC
32、ANBEPREARRANGEDTHIRD,EVENIFTHEDAMAGEDASSETSAREFULLYREPLACED,THEREMAYBECONTRACTORPRODUCTIONDELAYTHATCREATESADDITIONALRISKASARESULTOFUNCERTAINCONTRACTPENALTYORFLUCTUATIONINOUTPUTPRICESTHATHASNOTBEENCOMPLETELYHEDGEDAGAINSTFINALLY,ASSETRECONSTITUTIONMAYUTILIZEINTERNALFUNDS,CAUSINGSOMEUNCERTAINLIQUIDITYP
33、ROBLEMS,DEPENDINGONTHEREALIZEDLOSSSIZETOMODELTHEADDITIONALRISKINTRODUCEDBYASSETRECONSTITUTION,DENOTETHECONTINUUMOFSTATESOFNATURERESULTINGFROMASSETRECONSTITUTIONBYRANDOMVARIABLEATT0,PRIORTOTHEBONDISSUE,ANDSHAVEJOINTDISTRIBUTIONFUNCTIONFASSUMETHATISREALIZEDRIGHTAFTERSHASBEENREALIZEDANDTHESHAREHOLDERSH
34、AVETAKENACTIONTORECONSTITUTEANYDAMAGEDASSETSCONCLUSIONSMAYERSANDSMITH1987ANDSUBSEQUENTRESEARCHERSHAVEANALYZEDTHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMOFTHESHAREHOLDERSOFALIMITEDLIABILITYCOMPANYFINANCEDPARTLYBYBONDSWHENTHENETEFFECTOFREPLACINGDAMAGEDPROPERTYISCERTAINTHEYSUGGESTTHATABONDCOVENANTSPECIFYINGANAPPROPRIATE
35、INSURANCEREQUIREMENTMITIGATESTHEPROBLEMRECENTLY,ASYMMETRICINFORMATIONOVERINVESTMENTPROBLEMSHAVEBEENSTUDIEDEXTENSIVELYINTHEECONOMICSANDFINANCELITERATUREBUTHAVERECEIVEDLITTLEATTENTIONINTHEINSURANCELITERATURETHISARTICLESUGGESTSTHATBOTHOVERINVESTMENTANDUNDERINVESTMENTARECOMMONPOTENTIALASYMMETRICINFORMAT
36、IONPROBLEMSINHERENTINTHERECONSTITUTIONOFDAMAGEDASSETSWHOSEEFFECTSARESTOCHASTICTHESEPROBLEMSCANNOTBEPREVENTEDBYCONVENTIONALINVESTMENTRESTRICTIONSINBONDCOVENANTSTHATREQUIRENEWPROJECTSTOBEUNDERTAKENIFANDONLYIFTHEYHAVEPOSITIVENETPRESENTVALUESTHEREASONISTHATREPLACINGDAMAGEDASSETSISNOTRECORDEDASANEWINVEST
37、MENTINGENERALSIMILARTOTHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMWITHRISKLESSASSETRECONSTITUTION,THEUNDERINVESTMENTANDOVERINVESTMENTPROBLEMSWITHRISKYASSETRECONSTITUTIONCANBEMITIGATEDBYIMPOSINGBONDCOVENANTSCONTAININGAPPROPRIATEINSURANCEREQUIREMENTSASTANDARDINSURANCEREQUIREMENTINABONDCOVENANTISOFTENSIMPLEBECAUSEOFCOSTC
38、ONSIDERATIONANDTHEDIFFICULTIESINMONITORINGANDENFORCINGITOFTENSTATESTHATTHEBORROWINGCOMPANYSHOULDPURCHASEINSURANCE“TOSUBSTANTIALLYTHESAMEEXTENTASITSCOMPETITORS”SEEEG,SMITHANDWARNER,1979ACCORDINGTOTHERESULTSDERIVEDINTHISARTICLE,HOWEVER,SUCHAREQUIREMENTISGENERALLYNOTVERYEFFECTIVEINADDITION,THISARTICLES
39、HOWSTHATTHEINDEMNITYSCHEDULESREQUIREDFORMITIGATINGTYPICALUNDERINVESTMENTANDOVERINVESTMENTPROBLEMSAREVERYDIFFERENTINGENERALOFCOURSE,THEDIFFERENCEISUNIMPORTANTWHENINSURANCEISACTUARIALLYFAIR,INWHICHCASETHESHAREHOLDERSCANSIMPLYBEREQUIREDTOBUYFULLINSURANCE,WHICHISALWAYSSUFFICIENTBUTNOTNECESSARYFORSOLVING
40、BOTHPROBLEMSTHEDIFFERENCEBECOMESCRITICALWHENINSURANCEISACTUARIALLYUNFAVORABLEANDMORETHANREQUIREDINSURANCEISALWAYSUNDESIRABLESOURCEARTHURHAU,2007“INVESTMENT,BONDCOVENANTS,ANDUNDEROROVERINVESTMENTWITHRISKYASSETRECONSTITUTION”THEJOURNALOFRISKANDINSURANCEVOL74,NO1,PP322译文风险资产重组下的保险，债券合约，以及投资不足或过度投资摘要传统理
41、论预测部分债权责任有限公司的股东可能因替代被损害的公司资产而投资不足。它同时也排除了过度投资的可能性。包含在传统理论指导下，放宽限制的臆想，名义上说，重组被损害的资产的影响是非随机性的。本文论证了过度投资及投资不足均有可能。它显示出道德危机问题可能会因把适当的保险需求合并入债务投资而缓和，此外，看上去缓解投资不足及投资过度的保障要求是十分不同的。特别的，对于投资不足而言，保障要求仅仅需要在当公司处于亏损状况，承诺的债券收益减少，于最佳的资产重组的状况中将债务风险减小。但是，对于过度投资而言，保障要求则要使债务风险完全无风险。当保险在精算上不顺利时，就如更多的不必要的保证总是很需要存在一样，这一
42、在保险事务上的不同就会显得特别的重要。引言众所周知，在财经类文献中股东与债权人之间存在非对称信息可能会导致不是最理想的合作投资决定。两个共同的例子是杰森、麦克林和迈尔斯阐述的关于资产替换问题和投资不足问题。这一迈尔斯和史密斯的对今后发展有巨大影响的文章指出投资不足问题可能也会发生在受损合作资产的整合中。那些没有预先承诺重组合作资本的中性风险股东可能会再公司资产重组使整个公司资产提高但债券分红总金额较短减少的自然情况下选择不去替补那些失去的资产。为了说明投资不足的问题，迈尔斯和史密斯假定资产重组提高公司价值并且无风险。迈尔斯、史密斯、思科南拜耳、罗米、葛文和麦克明提议为缓解投资不足的问题，应被强
43、制实行的一种债务合约明确提出应该购买足够的财产保险来是债务无风险，并阻止股东在大量资金流失时通过投资不足来利用有限的债务供给。最近，一些作者指出了多种原因过度投资也会发生。例如，贝尔科维奇和金姆指出假如股东也被允许发出附属债务，之后借贷的低花费关系，则会刺激产生过度投资。诺尔等显示出在国际合作风险中，过度投资会在多国交易优势因信息优势而加强时发生。一个人们会问的自然的问题是是否有这种可能股东会在决定受损害的资产是否应被替换时投资过度。在迈尔斯和史密斯无风险资产重组假说下，过度投资永不会发生，因为任何减少在承诺的债券收益总金额的情况下的公司价值的同时肯定也会减少股东的财富。那假如资产重组使有风险
44、的那会如何呢实际上，关于重组受损资产可能不总是会提高公司的价值并会具有风险这一问题，有许多原因。例如，金融资产重组的直接流动的提高的花费可能超过在尚未完善的短期资本流动市场上所提供的利润。除非有提前安排的意外的借贷（就如在很大的资产损失的情况下出现不足），需要在资金重组的前提下进行的资金流动通常要在其他重要的运行或生产活动中提取。在大量资产被损害时资产重组可能会用尽提前准备的信贷或为应对产品及市场冲击的缓冲资金中的很重要的一部分，对公司的资产带来更多的风险。可能的资金流动问题也许会对公司的资产产生负面冲击。因此，资金重组可能是有风险的，在不同的环境情况下导致最终的资金正面或负面的影响。甚至资产
45、重组所期望的最终结果也可能是正面或负面的。这篇文章指出在资产重组具有风险性的情况下，过度投资及投资不足问题均会升高。在有风险的资金重组时加入给予一个确切的资金损害等级，股东们当面对投资不足问题时甚至假如能够产生一个预期的积极地最终利润，也不会选择去重组受损害的资产。这种情况即使在最好的资本重组环境下，当公司在缺乏承诺的债券收益总额时也会发生。在这种情况下，资金重组只会有利于债券持有人，而对于已经在有限责任赋予的保护下的股东则无任何利益。投资不足问题不会再有限的权利缺失的情况下提高，因为根据资金重组产生的公司价值的提升将减少股东的借贷责任。有些资金重组在公司价值超过了允诺的债券收益总额的情况下它
46、也不会提高，因为在这种情况下资金重组提高的是股东的财富。另一方面，给出某一水平的资产损坏，股东可能选择以负的预期净现值进行风险资产重组，这增强了过度投资问题。这发生在当公司价值比债券偿还总额高时，但只是一些资产重组情形，并不是全部。被限制性债务条款保护的股东会渴望通过风险资产重组来提高解决方案中他们自己的财富，要知道这么做会降低公司价值以及债权人的财富，导致了预期公司价值以及预期债权人收益的总体下降。过度投资问题在缺少限制性负债时不会提高，因为任何公司价值的下降最终都会提高股东自身的债务责任。无论何时当公司价值比全部资产重组情形下的期望债券偿还总额还低时，它也不会提高，因为资产重组不会是任何人
47、获益。与梅耶斯和史密斯（1987）无风险资产重组下的投资不足问题类似，债权契约需要股东购买适当比例的可以用于缓解风险资产重组下的投资不足以及过度投资的保险。特别地，为了避免投资不足，它有能力制定一个补偿表来充分地提高公司的价值，以便债券可以使那些重组中的受损资产增加公司价值的破产情形无风险，为了给股东提供刺激代替受损资产来维持公司免于破产。为了避免过度投资，它有能力制定一个补偿表在潜在的破产声明中提高公司价值并巩固股东资产重组的机会成本，以便使股东不可能利用受限制债务条款来用债权人的费用来增加他们自己的财富。文章的剩余部分安排如下无风险或风险资产重组下的公司价值一章将风险资产重组案例与传统的无
48、风险资产重组案例进行了比较。无风险或风险资产重组下的投资不足一章辨别了无风险资产重组下的投资不足问题以及风险资产重组下的投资不足问题。缓解投资不足的债券契约一章阐述了必须的财产保险赔偿一览表应当在债券契约中详细说明，来缓解风险资产重组下的投资不足的问题。风险资产重组下的过度投资一章阐述了风险资产重组下的过度投资问题。缓解过度投资的债券契约一章阐述了必须的财产保险赔偿一览表缓解过度投资的问题。不利的保险统计一章阐述了保险的作用。最后一章总结。1无风险或风险资产重组下的公司价值将被分析的模型是对梅耶斯和史密斯（1987），施纳贝尔和罗米（1989），以及加文和麦克民（1993）的扩展。梅耶斯和史密
49、斯（1987）假设有限责任公司的股东可以选择全部替换受损资产，并且资产重组对于公司价值的的效果是确定的，只依赖于变量S。他们得出可能会出现投资不足的结论，由于即使资产重组会使公司价值增加股东可能也不会替换受损资产。原因在于在较大的财产损失中，公司价值比支付给债权人的总额要低，资产重组后更甚。由于股东受有限责任条款保护，在这些损失的情形中任何公司价值的增加只会使债权人受益。注意由于无风险资产重组，过度投资是不可能的，因为股东将不会从任何使公司价值增加的无风险资产重组中获益。这就产生了两个问题。第一个，无风险资产重组的假定总是合理的吗第二个，如果无风险资产重组的假定是不严格的，对于投资不足和过度投资的结论将受到怎样的影响资产重组可能会减少而不是增加公司的价值也是有可能发生的，并且同时，可能产生延伸（或者额外的风险）。对于这种公司价值的随机减少有几种原因可解释。第一种，即使重新安装或者重新生产受损资产（可能是生产性的投入或者完成的产出）肯定能成功，重新安装或者重新生产的成本以及时间都可能是随机的，这导致了额外的成本或者生产不确定性。第二种，重装受损资产可能需要公司获得额外价格有风险的原材料以及其他投入。由于受损资产的尺寸事先并不知道，避免投入物价格起伏所带来损失的措施不能预先安排。第三种，即使受损资产全部被替换，作为没有完全避免的不确定合同的罚金或者产出
