1、本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文OPTIMALCAPITALSTRUCTUREREFLECTIONSONECONOMICANDOTHERVALUESOVERTHELASTFEWDECADESSTUDIESHAVEBEENPRODUCEDONTHEEFFECTOFOTHERSTAKEHOLDERSINTERESTSONCAPITALSTRUCTUREWELLKNOWNEXAMPLESARETHEINTERESTSOFCUSTOMERSWHORECEIVEPRODUCTORSERVICEGUARANTEESFROMTHECOMPANYANOTHERAREATHATHASRECEIVEDCONSID
2、ERABLEATTENTIONISTHERELATIONBETWEENMANAGERIALINCENTIVESANDCAPITALSTRUCTUREIBIDFURTHERMORE,THEISSUEOFCORPORATECONTROL1AND,RELATED,THEISSUEOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCE,RECEIVEALIONSPARTOFTHEMORERECENTACADEMICATTENTIONFORCAPITALSTRUCTUREDECISIONSFROMALLTHESESTUDIES,ONETHINGISCLEARTHECAPITALSTRUCTUREDECISIONOR
3、RATHER,THEMANAGEMENTOFTHECAPITALSTRUCTUREOVERTIMEINVOLVESMOREISSUESTHANTHEMAXIMIZATIONOFTHERMSMARKETVALUEALONEINTHISPAPER,WEGIVEANOVERVIEWOFTHEDIFFERENTOBJECTIVESANDCONSIDERATIONSTHATHAVEBEENPROPOSEDINTHELITERATUREWEMAKEADISTINCTIONBETWEENTWOBROADLYDENEDSITUATIONSTHERSTISTHETRADITIONALCASEOFTHERMTHA
4、TSTRIVESFORTHEMAXIMIZATIONOFTHEVALUEOFTHESHARESFORTHECURRENTSHAREHOLDERSWHENEVEROTHERCONSIDERATIONSTHANVALUEMAXIMIZATIONENTERCAPITALSTRUCTUREDECISIONS,THESECONSIDERATIONSHAVETOBEINSTRUMENTALTOTHEGOALOFVALUEMAXIMIZATIONTHESECONDCASECONCERNSTHERMTHATEXPLICITLYCHOOSESFORMOREOBJECTIVESTHANVALUEMAXIMIZAT
5、IONALONETHISMAYBEBECAUSETHESHAREHOLDERSADOPTAMULTIPLESTAKEHOLDERSAPPROACHORBECAUSEOFADIFFERENTOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURETHANTHEUSUALCORPORATESTRUCTUREDOMINATINGNANCELITERATUREANEXAMPLEOFTHELATTERISTHECOOPERATION,ALEGALENTITYWHICHCANBEFOUND,INAMONGOTHERS,MANYEUROPEANCOUNTRIESFORADISCUSSIONONWHYRMSAREFACINGMU
6、LTIPLEGOALS,WEREFERTOHALLERBACHANDSPRONK。ACCORDINGTOTHENEOCLASSICALVIEWONTHEROLEOFTHERM,THERMHASONESINGLEOBJECTIVEMAXIMIZATIONOFSHAREHOLDERVALUESHAREHOLDERSPOSSESSTHEPROPERTYRIGHTSOFTHERMANDARETHUSENTITLEDTODECIDEWHATTHERMSHOULDAIMFORSINCESHAREHOLDERSONLYHAVEONEOBJECTIVEINMINDWEALTHMAXIMIZATIONTHEGO
7、ALOFTHERMISMAXIMIZATIONOFTHERMSCONTRIBUTIONTOTHENANCIALWEALTHOFITSSHAREHOLDERSTHERMCANACCOMPLISHTHISBYINVESTINGINPROJECTSWITHAPOSITIVENETPRESENTVALUEPARTOFSHAREHOLDERVALUEISDETERMINEDBYTHECORPORATENANCINGDECISIONTWOTHEORIESABOUTTHECAPITALSTRUCTUREOFTHERMTHETRADEOFFTHEORYANDTHEPECKINGORDERTHEORYASSUM
8、ESHAREHOLDERWEALTHMAXIMIZATIONASTHEONEANDONLYCORPORATEOBJECTIVEWEWILLDISCUSSBOTHTHEORIESINCLUDINGSEVERALMARKETVALUERELATEDEXTENSIONSBASEDONTHISDISCUSSIONWEFORMULATEALISTOFCRITERIATHATISRELEVANTFORTHECORPORATENANCINGDECISIONINTHISESSENTIALLYNEOCLASSICALVIEWTHEORIGINALPROPOSITIONIOFMODIGLIANIANDMILLER
9、TATESTHATINAPERFECTCAPITALMARKETTHEEQUILIBRIUMMARKETVALUEOFARMISINDEPENDENTOFITSCAPITALSTRUCTURE,IETHEDEBTEQUITYRATIOIFPROPOSITIONIDOESNOTHOLDTHENARBITRAGEWILLTAKEPLACEINVESTORSWILLBUYSHARESOFTHEUNDERVALUEDRMANDSELLSHARESOFTHEOVERVALUEDRMINSUCHAWAYTHATIDENTICALINCOMESTREAMSAREOBTAINEDASINVESTORSEXPL
10、OITTHESEARBITRAGEOPPORTUNITIES,THEPRICEOFTHEOVERVALUEDSHARESWILLFALLANDTHATOFTHEUNDERVALUEDSHARESWILLRISE,UNTILBOTHPRICESAREEQUALWHENCORPORATETAXESAREINTRODUCED,PROPOSITIONICHANGESDRAMATICALLYMODIGLIANIANDMILLERSHOWTHATINAWORLDWITHCORPORATETAXTHEVALUEOFRMSISAMONGOTHERSAFUNCTIONOFLEVERAGEWHENINTEREST
11、PAYMENTSBECOMETAXDEDUCTIBLEANDPAYMENTSTOSHAREHOLDERSARENOT,THECAPITALSTRUCTURETHATMAXIMIZESRMVALUEINVOLVESAHUNDREDPERCENTDEBTNANCINGBYINCREASINGLEVERAGE,THEPAYMENTSTOTHEGOVERNMENTAREREDUCEDWITHAHIGHERCASHOWFORTHEPROVIDERSOFCAPITALASARESULTTHEDIFFERENCEBETWEENTHEPRESENTVALUEOFTHETAXESPAIDBYANUNLEVERE
12、DRMANDANIDENTICALLEVEREDRMISTHEPRESENTVALUEOFTAXSHIELDSINTHETRADITIONALTRADEOFFMODELSOFOPTIMALCAPITALSTRUCTUREITISASSUMEDTHATRMSBALANCETHEMARGINALPRESENTVALUEOFINTERESTTAXSHIELDSAGAINSTTHEMARGINALDIRECTCOSTSOFNANCIALDISTRESSORDIRECTBANKRUPTCYCOSTSADDITIONALFACTORSCANBEINCLUDEDINTHISTRADEOFFFRAMEWORK
13、OTHERCOSTSTHANDIRECTCOSTSOFNANCIALDISTRESSAREAGENCYCOSTSOFDEBTOFTENCITEDEXAMPLESOFAGENCYCOSTSOFDEBTARETHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEM,THEASSETSUBSTITUTIONPROBLEM，THE“PLAYFORTIME”GAMEBYMANAGERS,THE“UNEXPECTEDINCREASEOFLEVERAGECOMBINEDWITHANEQUIVALENTPAYOUTTOSTOCKHOLDERSTOMAKETOINCREASETHEIMPACT,”THE“REFUSA
14、LTOCONTRIBUTEEQUITYCAPITAL”ANDTHE“CASHINANDRUN”GAMETHESEPROBLEMSARECAUSEDBYTHEDIFFERENCEOFINTERESTBETWEENEQUITYANDDEBTHOLDERSANDCOULDBESEENASPARTOFTHEINDIRECTCOSTSOFNANCIALDISTRESSANOTHERBENETOFDEBTBESIDESTHEPVTSISTHEREDUCTIONOFAGENCYCOSTSBETWEENMANAGERSANDEXTERNALHOLDERSOFEQUITYJENSENANDMECKLINGARG
15、UETHATDEBT,BYALLOWINGLARGERMANAGERIALRESIDUALCLAIMSBECAUSETHENEEDFOREXTERNALEQUITYISREDUCEDBYTHEUSEOFDEBT,INCREASESMANAGERIALEFFORTTOWORKINADDITION,JENSEN23ARGUESTHATHIGHLEVERAGEREDUCESFREECASHOWWITHLESSRESOURCESTOWASTEONUNPROTABLEINVESTMENTSASARESULTTHEAGENCYCOSTSBETWEENMANAGEMENTANDEXTERNALEQUITYA
16、REOFTENLEFTOUTTHETRADEOFFTHEORYSINCEITASSUMESMANAGERSNOTACTINGONBEHALFOFTHESHAREHOLDERSONLYWHICHISANASSUMPTIONOFTHETRADITIONALTRADEOFFTHEORYINMYERSANDMYERSANDMAJLUFSPECKINGORDERMODELTHEREISNOOPTIMALCAPITALSTRUCTUREINSTEAD,BECAUSEOFASYMMETRICINFORMATIONANDSIGNALINGPROBLEMSASSOCIATEDWITHEXTERNALNANCIN
17、G,RMSNANCINGPOLICIESFOLLOWAHIERARCHY,WITHAPREFERENCEFORINTERNALOVEREXTERNALNANCE,ANDFORDEBTOVEREQUITYASTRICTINTERPRETATIONOFTHISMODELSUGGESTSTHATRMSDONOTAIMATATARGETDEBTRATIOINSTEAD,THEDEBTRATIOISJUSTTHECUMULATIVERESULTOFHIERARCHICALNANCINGOVERTIMEORIGINALEXAMPLESOFSIGNALINGMODELSARETHEMODELSOFROSSA
18、NDLELANDANDPYLEROSSSUGGESTSTHATHIGHERNANCIALLEVERAGECANBEUSEDBYMANAGERSTOSIGNALANOPTIMISTICFUTUREFORTHERMANDTHATTHESESIGNALSCANNOTBEMIMICKEDBYUNSUCCESSFULRMSLELANDANDPYLE30FOCUSONOWNERSINSTEADOFMANAGERSTHEYASSUMETHATENTREPRENEURSHAVEBETTERINFORMATIONONTHEEXPECTEDCASHOWSTHANOUTSIDERSHAVETHEINSIDEINFO
19、RMATIONHELDBYANENTREPRENEURCANBETRANSFERREDTOSUPPLIERSOFCAPITALBECAUSEITISINTHEOWNERSINTERESTTOINVESTAGREATERFRACTIONOFHISWEALTHINSUCCESSFULPROJECTSTHUSTHEOWNERSWILLINGNESSTOINVESTINHISOWNPROJECTSCANSERVEASASIGNALOFPROJECTQUALITYTHEVALUEOFTHERMINCREASESWITHTHEPERCENTAGEOFEQUITYHELDBYTHEENTREPRENEURR
20、ELATIVETOTHEPERCENTAGEHEWOULDHAVEHELDINCASEOFALOWERQUALITYPROJECTTHESTAKEHOLDERTHEORYFORMULATEDBYGRINBLATTANDTITMAN19SUGGESTSTHATTHEWAYINWHICHARMANDITSNONNANCIALSTAKEHOLDERSINTERACTISANIMPORTANTDETERMINANTOFTHERMSOPTIMALCAPITALSTRUCTURENONNANCIALSTAKEHOLDERSARETHOSEPARTIESOTHERTHANTHEDEBTANDEQUITYHO
21、LDERSNONNANCIALSTAKEHOLDERSINCLUDERMSCUSTOMERS,EMPLOYEES,SUPPLIERSANDTHEOVERALLCOMMUNITYINWHICHTHERMOPERATESTHESESTAKEHOLDERSCANBEHURTBYARMSNANCIALDIFFICULTIESFOREXAMPLECUSTOMERSMAYRECEIVEINFERIORPRODUCTSTHATAREDIFFICULTTOSERVICE,SUPPLIERSMAYLOSEBUSINESS,EMPLOYEESMAYLOSEJOBSANDTHEECONOMYCANBEDISRUPT
22、EDBECAUSEOFTHECOSTSTHEYPOTENTIALLYBEARINTHEEVENTOFARMSNANCIALDISTRESS,NONNANCIALSTAKEHOLDERSWILLBELESSINTERESTEDCETERISPARIBUSINDOINGBUSINESSWITHARMHAVINGAHIGHERPOTENTIALFORNANCIALDIFFICULTIESTHISUNDERSTANDABLERELUCTANCETODOBUSINESSWITHADISTRESSEDRMCREATESACOSTTHATCANDETERARMFROMUNDERTAKINGEXCESSIVE
23、DEBTNANCINGEVENWHENLENDERSAREWILLINGTOPROVIDEITONFAVORABLETERMSTHESECONSIDERATIONSBYNONNANCIALSTAKEHOLDERSARETHECAUSEOFTHEIRIMPORTANCEASDETERMINANTFORTHECAPITALSTRUCTURETHISSTAKEHOLDERTHEORYCOULDBESEENASPARTOFTHETRADEOFFTHEORY，SINCETHESESTAKEHOLDERSINUENCETHEINDIRECTCOSTSOFNANCIALDISTRESSASTHETRADEO
24、FFTHEORYEXCLUDINGAGENCYCOSTSBETWEENMANAGERSANDSHAREHOLDERSANDTHEPECKINGORDERTHEORY,THESTAKEHOLDERTHEORYOFGRINBLATTANDTITMANASSUMESSHAREHOLDERWEALTHMAXIMIZATIONASTHESINGLECORPORATEOBJECTIVEBASEDONTHESETHEORIES,AHUGENUMBEROFEMPIRICALSTUDIESHAVEBEENPRODUCEDSEEEGHARRISANDRAVIVORASYSTEMATICOVERVIEWOFTHIS
25、LITERATUREMORERECENTSTUDIESAREEGSUNDERANDMYERS,TESTINGTHETRADEOFFTHEORYAGAINSTTHEPECKINGORDERTHEORY,KEMSLEYANDNISSIMESTIMATINGTHEPRESENTVALUEOFTAXSHIELDS,ANDRADEANDKAPLANESTIMATINGTHECOSTSOFNANCIALDISTRESSANDRAJANANDZINGALESINVESTIGATINGTHEDETERMINANTSOFCAPITALSTRUCTUREINTHEG7COUNTRIESRAJANANDZINGAL
26、ESEXPLAINDIFFERENCESINLEVERAGEOFINDIVIDUALRMSWITHRMCHARACTERISTICSINTHEIRSTUDYLEVERAGEISAFUNCTIONOFTANGIBILITYOFASSETS,MARKETTOBOOKRATIO,RMSIZEANDPROTABILITYBARCLAYANDSMITHPROVIDEANEMPIRICALEXAMINATIONOFTHEDETERMINANTSOFCORPORATEDEBTMATURITYCROSSSECTIONALSTUDIESASBYTITMANANDWESSELS,RAJANANDZINGALES,
27、BARCLAYANDSMITHANDWALDMODELCAPITALSTRUCTUREMAINLYINTERMSOFLEVERAGEANDTHENLEVERAGEASAFUNCTIONOFDIFFERENTRMANDMARKETCHARACTERISTICSASSUGGESTEDBYCAPITALSTRUCTURETHEORYWEDOTHEOPPOSITEWEDONOTANALYZETHEEFFECTOFSEVERALRMCHARACTERISTICSONCAPITALSTRUCTURE,BUTWEANALYZETHEEFFECTOFCAPITALSTRUCTUREONVARIABLESTHA
28、TCODETERMINESHAREHOLDERVALUEINSEVERALDECISIONS,INCLUDINGCAPITALSTRUCTUREDECISIONS,THESEVARIABLESMAYGETTHEROLEOFDECISIONCRITERIA143OTHEROBJECTIVESANDCONSIDERATIONSALOTOFEVIDENCESUGGESTSTHATMANAGERSACTNOTONLYINTHEINTERESTOFTHESHAREHOLDERSNEITHERTHESTATICTRADEOFFTHEORYNORTHEPECKINGORDERTHEORYCANFULLYEX
29、PLAINDIFFERENCESINCAPITALSTRUCTUREMYERS41P82STATESTHAT“YETEVEN40YEARSAFTERTHEMODIGLIANIANDMILLERRESEARCH,OURUNDERSTANDINGOFTHESERMSNANCINGCHOICESISLIMITED”RESULTSOFSEVERALSURVEYSREVEALTHATCFOSDONOTPAYALOTOFATTENTIONTOVARIABLESRELEVANTINTHESESHAREHOLDERWEALTHMAXIMIZINGTHEORIESGIVENTHERESULTSOFEMPIRIC
30、ALRESEARCH,THISDOESNOTCOMEASASURPRISETHESURVEYBYGRAHAMANDHARVEYNDSONLYMODERATEEVIDENCEFORTHETRADEOFFTHEORYAROUND70HAVEAEXIBLETARGETORASOMEWHATTIGHTTARGETORRANGEONLY10HAVEASTRICTTARGETRATIOAROUND20OFTHERMSDECLARENOTTOHAVEANOPTIMALORTARGETDEBTEQUITYRATIOATALLINGENERAL,THECORPORATETAXADVANTAGESEEMSONLY
31、MODERATELYIMPORTANTINCAPITALSTRUCTUREDECISIONSTHETAXADVANTAGEOFDEBTISMOSTIMPORTANTFORLARGEREGULATEDANDDIVIDENDPAYINGRMSFURTHER,FAVORABLEFOREIGNTAXTREATMENTRELATIVETOTHEUSISFAIRLYIMPORTANTINISSUINGFOREIGNDEBTDECISIONSLITTLEEVIDENCEISFOUNDTHATPERSONALTAXESINUENCETHECAPITALSTRUCTUREINGENERALPOTENTIALCO
32、STSOFNANCIALDISTRESSSEEMNOTVERYIMPORTANTALTHOUGHCREDITRATINGSAREACCORDINGTOGRAHAMANDHARVEYTHISLASTNDINGCOULDBEVIEWEDASANINDIRECTINDICATIONOFCONCERNWITHDISTRESSEARNINGSVOLATILITYALSOSEEMSTOBEADETERMINANTOFLEVERAGE,WHICHISCONSISTENTWITHTHEPREDICTIONTHATRMSREDUCELEVERAGEWHENTHEPROBABILITYOFBANKRUPTCYIS
33、HIGHFIRMSDONOTDECLAREDIRECTLYTHATTHEPRESENTVALUEOFTHEEXPECTEDCOSTSOFNANCIALDISTRESSAREANIMPORTANTDETERMINANTOFCAPITALSTRUCTURE,ALTHOUGHINDIRECTEVIDENCESEEMSTOEXISTGRAHAMANDHARVEYNDLITTLEEVIDENCETHATRMSDISCIPLINEMANAGERSBYINCREASINGLEVERAGEGRAHAMANDHARVEYEXPLICITLYNOTETHAT“1MANAGERSMIGHTBEUNWILLINGTO
34、ADMITTOUSINGDEBTINTHISMANNER,OR2PERHAPSALOWRATINGONTHISQUESTIONREECTSANUNWILLINGNESSOFRMSTOADOPTJENSENSSOLUTIONMORETHANAWEAKNESSINJENSENSARGUMENTTHEMOSTIMPORTANTISSUEAFFECTINGCORPORATEDEBTDECISIONSISMANAGEMENTSDESIREFORNANCIALEXIBILITYEXCESSCASHORPRESERVATIONOFDEBTCAPACITYFURTHERMORE,MANAGERSARERELU
35、CTANTTOISSUECOMMONSTOCKWHENTHEYPERCEIVETHEMARKETISUNDERVALUEDMOSTCFOSTHINKTHEIRSHARESAREUNDERVALUEDBECAUSEASYMMETRICINFORMATIONVARIABLESHAVENOPOWERTOPREDICTTHEISSUEOFNEWDEBTOREQUITY,HARVEYANDGRAHAMCONCLUDETHATTHEPECKINGORDERMODELISNOTTHETRUEMODELOFTHESECURITYCHOICETHEFACTTHATNEOCLASSICALMODELSDONOTF
36、ULLYEXPLAINNANCIALBEHAVIORCOULDBEEXPLAINEDINSEVERALWAYSFIRST,ITCOULDBETHATMANAGERSDOSTRIVEFORCREATINGSHAREHOLDERVALUEBUTATTHESAMETIMEALSOPAYATTENTIONTOVARIABLESOTHERTHANTHEVARIABLESVARIABLESOFWHICHMANAGERSTHINK,THATTHEYAREJUSTIABLYORNOTRELEVANTFORCREATINGSHAREHOLDERVALUESECOND,ITCOULDBETHATMANAGERSD
37、ONOTONLYSERVETHEINTERESTOFTHESHAREHOLDERSBUTOFOTHERSTAKEHOLDERSASWELLASARESULT,MANAGERSINTEGRATEVARIABLESTHATARERELEVANTFORTHEMANDOROTHERSTAKEHOLDERSINTHEPROCESSOFMANAGINGTHERMSCAPITALSTRUCTURETHEIMPACTOFTHESEVARIABLESONTHENANCINGDECISIONISNOTPERDENITIONNEGATIVEFORSHAREHOLDERVALUEFOREXAMPLEIF“VALUEO
38、FNANCIALREWARDSFORMANAGERS”ISONEOFTHEGOALSTHATISMAXIMIZEDBYMANAGERSWHICHMAYNOTBEEXCLUDEDANDIFTHEREWARDSOFMANAGERSCONSISTSOFALARGEFRACTIONOFCALLOPTIONS,MANAGERSCOULDDECIDETOINCREASELEVERAGETOLEVERTHEVOLATILITYOFTHESHARESWITHANINCREASEINTHEVALUEOFTHEOPTIONSASARESULTTHEINCREASEOFLEVERAGECOULDHAVEAPOSIT
39、IVEEFFECTONSHAREHOLDERWEALTHEGTHEAGENCYCOSTSBETWEENEQUITYANDMANAGEMENTCOULDBELOWERBUTTHECRITERION“VALUEOFNANCIALREWARDS”COULDBUTDOESNOTHAVETOBELEADINGTHIRD,SHAREHOLDERSTHEMSELVESDOPOSSIBLYHAVEOTHERGOALSTHANSHAREHOLDERWEALTHCREATIONALONEFOURTH,MANAGERSRELYONCERTAINDIFFERENTRULESOFTHUMBORHEURISTICSTHA
40、TDONOTHARMSHAREHOLDERVALUEBUTCANNOTBEEXPLAINEDBYNEOCLASSICALMODELSEITHERFIFTH,THENEOCLASSICALMODELSARENOTCOMPLETEORNOTTESTEDCORRECTLYSOURCEMARCBJSCHAUTENANDJAAPSPRONK，2010“HANDBOOKOFMULTICRITERIAANALYSIS”APPLIEDOPTIMIZATION,PART4PP405423译文最优资本结构对经济及其它价值的作用在过去几十年的研究中已经产生了其他股权持有人权益对资本结构的影响的理论研究。著名的例子是
41、那些购买本公司产品或服务并拥有担保的客户的利益。另一项受到重视的领域是管理激励机制和资本结构（同上）的关系。此外，公司控制权一问题，以及与此相关的公司治理的问题，管理者参考研究相关经济学家的较近期的关于资本结构决策的学术界部分研究结果。从这些问题的研究中，有个结论是很清楚的资本结构决策更确切地说,随时间变化的资本结构管理涉及到包括实现企业市场价值最大化在内的更多的问题。在本文中,我们将针对不同的观点以及以前相关文献中提到的理论做出不同见解和总结归纳。我们从广义上对这两方面加以区分。第一个是在传统公司价值观情况下争取现有股东权益所有者的价值最大化。当其他的考虑比价值最大化进入资本结构决策,这些参
42、考量必须用以实现企业价值最大化的目标。第二种情况是那些不仅以实现公司价值最大化为目标并且明确地选择多个实现目标的公司。这可能是因为股东采用多个利益相关者的方式，或因为相对于正常的公司控制金融结构而采取不同的所有制结构。后者的一个例子是企业合作，不难看出其具有独立法人资格，在其他情况中，许多欧洲国家的公司是这样的情况。根据海尔布奇和斯布朗克的结论，讨论为何公司正面临着多重目标。根据新古典主义的角度观察公司，公司有一个单纯经营目标实现股东价值最大化。股东拥有该公司财产权，也有权决定公司拥有怎样的经营目标。因为在股东观念中只有一个目标价值最大化公司价值最大化的目标是实现股东财富价值最大化。公司通过本
43、身具有的净现值进行积极投资以完成这个目标。部分股东价值取决于企业的融资决策。两个公司的资本结构理论平衡理论和啄食次序理论假设公司只以股东财富最大化作为目标。我们将讨论这两种理论包括几个相关市场价值延伸。在此讨论的基础上，我们从以后的的新古典主义的理论出发制定了与企业融资决策有关的标准。莫迪利亚尼和米勒的早期的观点认为，在一个完善的资本市场下的平衡稳固的市场价值和企业的资本结构是无关的，即债务权益比率。如果命题一不成立，套利观点就会取而代之。投资者将购买价值被低估公司的股票并出售价值被高估的公司股票，在这种方式下就能得到稳定的收入来源。由于投资者利用这些套利的机会以获利，高估股票的价格就会下降，
44、而被低估的股票价格将上涨，直到两个价格都是平等的。当引入公司所得税的时候，观点一发生了显著的变化。莫迪利亚尼和米勒表明，在有税收的情况下，企业价值会随财务杠杆系数的提高而增加。当企业引入企业所得税后，负债企业的价值会超过无负债企业的价值。负债越多，这个差异越大，所以，当负债最后达到100时企业价值最大。通过增加杠杆作用，向政府支付的降低，因此，作为一种资本将会提供更高的现金流。因此可以增加企业的净收益，从而提高企业的价值。随着企业负债比例的提高，企业的价值也会提高。在传统的平衡理论模型下，最优资本结构假定公司平衡抵税收益和资本成本以及破产成本之间的收益冲突。平衡理论也包含了其他的影响因素。除了
45、资本成本外还有代理成本。常常被引用的代理成本的例子是投资不足问题以及资产替代问题，“为时间付款”的管理问题，“意想不到的增长杠杆结合等效付出来减低对股东支付增加的影响”，“拒绝贡献股份资本”和“现金流运行”问题。这些问题可以由股东权益者和债权人之间的利益不平衡引起，间接成本的一部分的金融压力可以从中显现出来。另一个债务的好处除了核查技术研究计划就是管理者和外部股权持有人代理成本的降低。杰森和麦克林认为债务,通过允许更大的管理的剩余索取权，因为需要外部资产是减少了运用内部资金量，会相应地提高管理层努力的效果。此外，杰森认为,高杠杆操作减少自由现金流动，同时在无收益的投资中将减少资源浪费。由于平衡
46、理论的一个假设是代理人不仅仅以权益所有者的价值最大化为目标，因此管理层和外部权益者的代理成本往往背离平衡理论。在斯梅尔斯和麦鲁夫的啄食顺序模型中没有最优资本结构。相反，由于信息不对称和信号传导有关的问题，与外部融资、公司的融资政策以及资金层次结构,特别是在外来资金、内部债券和股票。这个模型的严格解释表明公司并不只对准目标负债比率。相反，负债比率累积的结果就是层次融资。原始信号模型是来自罗斯派尔、利兰的模型。罗斯表明企业经理可以用高财务杠杆率为本公司的前景发出乐观的信号，而业绩不好的公司是无法模仿发出这样的乐观信号的。派尔和利兰关注的是业主而不是经理。他们认为，相对于外部信息者，内部经理人对于现
47、金流量拥有更多有效信息。持有内幕信息的企业家可以将信息转移到持有资金的供应，因为资金持有者将资产的一部分用于有效投资将获得更多利益。因此业主愿意用他们自己的资金投资到内部项目以作为一个工程质量好坏的信号。资本结构杠杆比率上升时一个积极的信号，它是向投资者表明经营者对企业未来收益的期望较高，有利于企业价值的提高。格林布拉特和蒂特慢主张的利益相关者理论认为的公司与其财务利益相关者之间的相互作用方式是决定公司最佳资本结构的重要因素之一。非财务利益相关者是那些除债权人和股权持有人的利益相关者。非财务利益相关群体包括公司的顾客、员工、供应商和整个公司运营范围涉及的社会领域。这些利益相关者会因为公司的财务
48、困境收到影响。例如客户可能买到劣质产品，恶劣的服务，供应商可能失去业务,雇员会失去工作，社会经济遭到破坏。由于在公司的财务困境中负担潜在的成本，在其他条件不变的情况下，非财务利益相关者就不会对存在更大财务风险的公司感兴趣。这种可以理解的不情愿会使公司因此避免承担过多债务融资，即使贷款者愿意向它提供优惠条款。正是由于这些考虑因素，使得非利益相关者成为企业最有资本结构的决定因素。由于这些利益相关者影响公司财务危机中的间接成本，利益相关者理论可视为平衡理论的一部分。如同权衡理论（不包括管理者和股权持有人间的代理成本）和啄食顺序理论，格林布莱特和蒂特慢的利益相关者理论假设股东财富最大化作为企业唯一的经
49、营目标。在此理论的基础上，人们进行了大量的实证研究。将哈里斯和雷维夫的理论作一个系统性理论的概述。近来有更多的研究理论，例如桑德和迈尔斯基于啄食理论的平衡理论研究，凯姆斯利和尼斯将抵税价值考虑在内，安德拉德和卡普兰将财务困境的成本计算在内，拉詹和津加莱斯调查了七大工业国公司最优资本结构的决定影响因素。根据不同企业的不同特点解释了财务杠杆在不同企业中的作用。在他们的研究显示杠杆作用是一个涉及有形资产、市价净值率、公司规模和收益的函数。巴克莱的和史密斯提供了实证以检查公司债务期限的决定因素。在蒂特曼和韦塞尔斯，拉詹和津加莱斯，巴克利和史密斯和瓦尔德的资本结构模型中主要根据资本结构理论原理研究杠杆因素以及其在不同公司（或市场）中的作用特点。我们正好相反。我们不分析几个公司资本结构特征影响，但我们分析有关变量共同确定股东价值对资本结构的影响。在几项决策中，包括资本结构决策，这些因素可能得到决策标准的作用。143其他目标和注意事项很多证据表明管理者不仅仅以股东权益最大化为目标。无论是静态权衡理论还是优序融资理论都无法完全解释资本结构的差异。迈尔斯）指出，“即使莫迪利亚尼
