1、外文翻译 原文 Non-Tradable Share Reform and Corporate Governance in the Chinese Stock Market Material Source: Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2009, 17（ 4） : 457475 Author:Yin-Hua Ye, Pei-Gi Shu, Yu-Hui Su 1. Abstract Research Question/Issue: Prior to Chinas split-share structure reform, dom
2、estic shares were divided into non-tradable and tradable shares. Non-tradable shareholders represent the government, hold roughly a two-thirds majority, and manage the firms, while tradable shareholders have little power to affect the decisions made by non-tradable shareholders. This is a typical st
3、ructure to exhibit agency problems. The 2005 structure reform program stipulates that non-tradable shareholders have to bargain with tradable shareholders in order to gain liquidity. The price that non-tradable shareholders pay to tradable shareholders for gaining liquidity is defined as “compensati
4、on ”.We explore the issue of why corporate governance might play an important role in affecting the level of compensation. Research Findings/Insights: Firms with a weak governance structure or severe agency problems are required to have a higher level of compensation. The level of compensation is po
5、sitively correlated with the non-tradable shareholding, the pledge ratio, and related-party transactions, and is negatively correlated with foreign shareholdings. The same set of variables dictates the ex-post wealth effect of tradable shareholders, but in the reverse direction. Theoretical/Academic
6、 Implications: The share reform provides a natural setting that allows tradable shareholders to reflect their concerns with agency problems. The mechanism could ameliorate the agency problems. Corporate governance, in a broad sense, is related to compensation and the ex-post wealth effect of tradabl
7、e shares. Practitioner/Policy Implications: A successful mechanism should be designed to have minority shareholders involved in the process and have the final compensation reflect the quality of corporate governance. 2. Introduction In the past few decades, most emerging markets have attempted to bu
8、ild a 2 strong securities market. However, it is hard to do at all, and impossible to do quickly. The central reason why building a strong securities market is so hard is that the securities market depends on a complex network of supporting institutions, including government regulations, enforcement
9、 agencies, private market institutions, and a culture of disclosure and honest dealing with minority shareholders. Some countries have tried to make the leap from a centrally planned economy to a strong public stock market. However, they failed. For example, the most aggressive efforts, in Russia ha
10、ve crashed and burned. 3. The background issues of the reform In the 1980s, the Chinese government launched a decentralizing program that partially relinquished the managerial decision rights of its state-owned enterprises from the central government to the local firm level. The aim was to promote m
11、arkets and gradually phase out the central control of government. In the 1990s, the government partially privatized some of its SOEs by issuing a minority of shares to individual investors who could trade their shares freely in the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges, which were opened in 1990 and
12、 1991, respectively. However, the majority of shares, which were held by different levels of government, were prohibited from being sold. Therefore, a firms ownership structure was a split-share structure in which a large portion of non-tradable shares were mainly held by the government and a small
13、portion of tradable shares were mainly held by individual investors. The non-tradable share reform program was launched on May 9, 2005, with four companies. Three of the four companies successfully accomplished the transfer program in 35 days, on average. The second phase of the program involved 42
14、companies that took, on average, 47 days to finalize the process. By the end of 2006, more than 80 per cent of the listed firms in China had successfully participated in the reform program. We mainly focus on internal corporate governance and divide it into ownership structure, board structure, and
15、related-party transactions. Based on the framework, we develop the following hypotheses that relate corporate governance and compensation. If rational expectations hold, the compensation made to tradable shareholders will be commensurate to the subsequent loss of tradable shareholders wealth. The sa
16、me values are predicted to apply to the relation between corporate governance and the ex-post wealth effect but in the reverse direction. 4. Summary Statistics 3 Table 1 summarizes the statistics of the variables. On average, non-tradable shareholders gave 0.3454 additional shares per share held by
17、tradable shareholders. The median compensation is 0.32 shares per tradable share. It is interesting to find that the compensation is distributed within a narrow range between 30 per cent (first quartile) and 35 percent (third quartile). This implies that tradable shareholders in general reached a co
18、nsensus on one-third of wealth losses from the reform. The standard deviation of the compensation is 13.82 per cent, implying that the level of compensation depends on the scenario. We note that the majority of the reform firms (88 per cent) used bonus shares to compensate tradable shareholders, and
19、 that 86 per cent of the reform firms were associated with non-tradable shareholders who made commitments additional to those established by the CSRC guidelines. The additional commitments made by non-tradable shareholders took different forms: lockup commitment impose further restrictions on tradin
20、g; dividend commitment promise to pay a fraction of future profit as dividends; incentive commitment promise to introduce stock- and option-based pay to corporate executives; performance commitment promise to distribute additional shares or cash to tradable shareholders if performance or stock price
21、 in particular falls below the target in the next two years; and holding commitment promise to buy the companys shares in the secondary market to stabilize the stock price and retain the increased holdings for a period of six months. Independent members comprise 34.27 per cent of the board membershi
22、p. We note that board independence is distributed in a narrow range between 33.33 per cent (first quartile) and 36.36 per cent (third quartile). This indicates that most listed firms in China merely meet the minimum legal requirement by composing a board of one-third independent directors. Moreover,
23、 even though there is an official definition for independent directors, some of the independent directors are actually friends of management or people that management can ultimately control and therefore provide little monitoring. According to a survey conducted by China Securities Daily in 2005, 52
24、.5 per cent of the independent directors said that their remuneration was determined by the companys senior managers, while 37.5 percent revealed that it was the controlling shareholders who decided their remuneration. Clearly, for a significant portion of the independent directors, their constituen
25、cy is the controlling shareholders. Not surprisingly, 65 per cent of the independent directors under the survey of the China Securities Daily indicated that they never said “no” in the meetings of the board of directors. The aforementioned factors 4 could explain why tradable shareholders do not tak
26、e board independence seriously into the compensation negotiation and therefore the empirical result exhibits an insignificant relation between board independence and compensation. 5. Empirical results: The results indicate that corporate governance not only dictates the compensation but also the pos
27、t-reform wealth effect. This could provide an auxiliary explanation for why tradable shareholders are so concerned about the issue of corporate governance and factor it into their negotiation for compensation. We find those 20 days after the reform, compensation is significantly and positively corre
28、lated with the Wealth effect and non-tradable shareholders ownership has a negative impact on the wealth effect. The negative impact of related party transactions on tradable shareholders wealth continues up to 60 days after reform. Finally, the result from the wealth effect 90 days after the reform
29、 is insignificant. 译文 中国股票市场上的股权分置改革和公司治理 资料来源 ：公司治理：国际评论， 2009， 17（ 4） 作者：伊华叶，舒培基，余辉舒 1、 摘要： 研究股票市场， 在股权分置改革之前 ，国内 A 股被划分为非流通股和流通股。非流通股东代表着政府，拥有大约三分之二的股份，并经营着公司，而流通股东只有很小的权利 对于 影响非流通股持有者作出的决策 ， 这是公司的一个典型股权结构，表现出代理 的 问题。 2005 年的 股权 结构改革方案规定，非流通股股东与流通股股东要 通过议价 ，以获得流动 性 。这个价格，非流通股股东支付给流通股股东为 获得流动性被定义为
30、 “ 补偿 ” 。我们探讨 研究 为什么公司治理在补偿水平的发挥问题上具有重要作用。 研究成果 或 见解：治理结构或代理问题严重的公司都要求有较高的补偿水平。 使用报酬率与非流通股股权，质押率和关联方交易成正相关的关系，而外资持股是负相关。同一组的变量决定了流通股股东事后 的 财富效应，但方向相反。 理论 或 学术意义：股权分置改革提供了一个自然的环境 ，允许 流通股股东去反映他们对于 代理问题 的焦虑 ，以引起他们的关注。该机制可以改善机构的问题。公司治理，从广义上讲，是有关补偿和流通股事后的财富效应。 5 政策影响： 一个成功的机制设计应涉及少数的股东，拥有最后赔偿，这反映了公司治理的质量
31、。 2、 引言 在过去的几十年中，大多数新兴市场都试图建立一个 强大的证券 市场 。但是，它是很难做到，也不可能迅速做到。 那 为什么建立一个强大的证券 市场是这么辛苦 ？ 核心原因是因为证券市场依靠复杂的网络机构 ，法律法规，执法机构，私人市场机构， 以及一种与少数股东处理问题的良好 职业道德 文化 来支持 。有些国家试图 实现 从计划经济 到 一个强大的公共股票市场的飞跃。 但是，失败了。 例如， 做出 最积极 努力的 俄罗斯和捷克共和国 已经 坠毁和毁灭。 3、改革的背景问题 在 20 世纪 80 年代，中国政府启动了一项下放程序，从中央政府到地方企业，政府部分放弃了对国有企业经营决策权
32、。其目的是促进市场和逐步脱离政府集中控制，在 20 世纪 90 年代，政府部分私有化的股票允许少数个人投资，也就是一部分人 可以在深圳和上海证券交易所买卖他们的国有部分，这 是 在1990 年和 1991 年开始的。然而，绝大部分股票被各级政府禁止出售。 因此，公司的股权结构为分体式结构，其中股份的非流通股的大部分主要是由政府，流通股的一小部分，主要由个人投资者持有。 非流通股改革方案的 推出， 2005 年 5 月 9 日，有三四家公司在 35 天里 完成了换乘方案。 该计划的第二阶段涉及了 42 家公司，平均在 47 天 里 完成这一过程。 2006 年底，超过 80%的国内上市公司也成功
33、参与了改革。 我们主要专注于企业内部治理和股权结构，董事会结构，关联方交易 。 根据该框架，我们提出有关公司治理和补偿的以下假设 ： 如果持理性预期，补偿流通股股东 ， 相称的流通股股东财富的后续损失。相同的值预计将适用于企业之间的治理和事后的财富效应，但关系是方向相反的关系。 4、统计摘要 表 1 对变量 的统计数据进行了总结。平均非流通股股东给了流通股 股东0.3454 每股的额 外份额。补偿流通股股东每股 0.32 的中位数。有趣的是，发现该赔偿在 30%-35%这个狭小的区间范围内发放。这意味着，流通股股东大体上达成了一个共识 在这场改革中三分之一的财富流失。 补偿标准偏差为13.82
34、%，暗示着该级别的补偿应该是情况而定。我们注意到，大部分的改革企业（ 88%），用红股，以补偿流通股股股东。而 86%的改革企业的非流通股股东承诺谁来对所做的承诺选证监会制定的相关准则。非流通股股东作出的额外承诺，采不同的形式：锁定的承诺 对贸易施加进一步的限制； 承诺支付股息的未来盈利作为股息率 ； 激励承诺 承 诺推出股票和期权为基础的薪酬与公司管理人员 ； 表现的承诺 承诺发行额外股份或现金流通股股东如果性能或股票，6 特别是价格低于在未来两年的目标 ； 及控股承诺 答应购买在二级市场的公司的股票以稳定股市价格和保留六个月期间增持。 独立成员占董事会成员的 34.27%。我们注意到，董事
35、会的独立性是分布在33.33%及 36.36%区 间 内的 狭窄范围。这表明在中国，大多数上市公司只是满足三分之一的独立董事的最低法定要求。此外，即使有一个官方定义为独立董事，独立董事实际上是一些人的管理或管理层能够最终控制，很少提供监测朋友。据中国证 券报在 2005 年的一项调查显示，占 52.5%的独立董事表示，他们 的 薪酬是由公司高级管理人员决定的，同时显示， 37.5%的是由其控股股东决定的。显然，对独立董事的重要部分，就是他们的控股股东而已。毫不奇怪，每次的中国证券报调查， 65%的独立董事表示，他们从来不说“不”，在董事会议上。上述因素可以解释，为什么流通股股东对补偿不进行认真，独立的谈判，因此，实证结果展示独立董事和补偿微不足道的关系。 5、 结论： 结果表明，公司治理不仅决定了赔偿， 也是改革后的财富效应。 这可以对“ 流通股股东为什么这么对公司法人治理的 问题 ” 提供一个辅助解释 。 我们发现，改革后的 20 日内，赔偿与财富效应是显著正相关，以及非流通股份持有人的所有权已经对财富有负面影响效果。相关的负面影响，关于流通股股东财富健康 交易，统一电力公司改革后最多 60 天。最后，从改革后的 90 天财富效应的结果是微不足道。
