1、 外文翻译 原文 Strategic Orientations, Competitive Advantage,and Business Performance Material Source: Elsevier Author: Peter Wright, Mark Kroll, Augustine Lado Internally oriented business units, externally oriented business units, and businesses with dual emphasis (which are internally and externally or
2、iented) are analyzed with respect to their performance. The results of the empirical investigation reveal that the internally orented and the externally orented businesses have not achieved competitive advantage and are underperformers. The results also portray that the businesses with dual emphasis
3、 have achieved competitive advantage and perform well. J BUSN P, ES 1995. 33.143-151 Competitive advantage enables an enterprise or a group of businesses within an industry to achieve superior business performance. Competitive advantage and superior business performance have been sought through orga
4、nizational adaptability as well as rigidity (Wright et al., 1991). Organizational adaptability corresponds to an external, boundary spanning strategic orientation. Organizational rigidity corresponds to an internal strategic orientation, On the one hand, a business unit can maintain an external focu
5、s, with an accompanying ability to adapt to market change, but at significant cost. On the other hand, the business can focus internally and be no adaptable, but achieve a low cost, efficient profile (McKee, Varadarajan, and Pride, 1989). Alternatively, a business may maintain a dual emphasis-one on
6、 efficiency and another nonadaptability (Miles and Snow, 1978, 1986). In this study, the strategic orientations and performance of businesses forming distinct strategic groups within an industry are analyzed. More specifics on these subjects are provided next under the literature review section. The
7、se subjects are then brought together, and a set of hypotheses are offered for empirical testing. The method, results, limitations, and suggestions for future research compose the latter sections of the article. Literature Review A number of scholars have suggested that groups of businesses could pe
8、rform well on the bases of internal orientation, external orientation, or the maintenance of a dual emphasis by competing in subparts of their industry environments (Child, 1972; McGee and Thomas, 1986; Miles and Snow, 1986). The internally oriented businesses have been referred to as defenders or r
9、igid, nonadaptive business units (McDaniel and Kolari, 1987; McKee, Varadarajan, and Pride, 1989; Miles and Snow, 1978; Wright et al., 1991). These business units emphasize low costs of operations. They produce known outputs and are unwilling to experiment with new product developments. They do not
10、emphasize marketing because their main focus is on operation efficiencies. The externally oriented enterprises have been recognized as prospectors or boundary spanning, adaptive businesses. They emphasize new products for emerging market opportunities. These businesses are deliberately inefficient b
11、ecause a continuous emphasis on new products is costly. Such business units are marketing-driven. Business units with internal as well as external orientations have been referred to as analyzers or those with dual emphasis. In one sphere, they emphasize efficiencies whereas in another sphere they em
12、phasize product innovations in response to competitors and emerging market opportunities. These business units are also primarily marketing-driven. Empirical investigations relative to these strategic predispositions have often measured business performance in accounting terms, such as return on inv
13、estment. In this study, the level of return as performance is augmented by also considering risk. Risk is explored because theoretically the various strategic orientations mentioned earlier have been discussed in the context of risk. More specifically, it has been argued that the advantage of intern
14、ally oriented business units is reduced operating cost. However, a corresponding risk of internal orientation is that the nature of market demand may change, and the businesses may not be able to adapt to change (Abernathy and Wayne, 1983). The advantage of externally oriented business units is thei
15、r adaptive capability. However, a corresponding risk of external orientation is that these organizations must bear the high cost inherent in adaptability. Finally, the businesses that maintain a dual emphasis have the advantage of low costs as well as the advantage of adaptability. Consequently, the
16、y may have a lower corresponding risk. Theoretically, the level of return also has been related to risk-taking predispositions via prospect theory (Bowman, 1980; Bromiley, 1991). In prospect theory, it has been argued that personnel or top managers are risk-averse in their decisions when their recen
17、t experience and prospects (or business returns) have been satisfactory-at or above their own aspiration or target levels (Bowman, 1980; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). However, when decision-makers recent experience and prospects have been unsatisfactory-below their own aspiration or target levels- th
18、en they become risk-seeking (Bowman, 1980; Jemison, 1987). Prospect theory is based on the premise that people are psychologically risk-averse in satisfactory situations and risk-prone in unsatisfactory situations. Empirical results of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) have substantiated
19、this premise. When identical problems are framed in gains and subsequently changed to losses, individual choices shift from risk- aversion to risk-taking, In a strategy context, the implication of prospect theory is that top managers are expected to be risk-averse when faced with high levels of retu
20、rn. The managers are expected to be risk-seeking when faced with low levels of return or losses. These considerations suggest that, in the context of prospect theory, negative risk/return relationships may be expected. This is contrary to traditional financial theory in which positive risk/return re
21、lationships are generally expected. Because in financial theory it is assumed that people and organizations are ordinarily risk- averse, it is proposed that they must be compensated more for higher risk options.(没问题 ) Risk/return has been primarily investigated at the corporate level .The few studie
22、s that have considered risk/return at the business unit level have analyzed risk as the variability in the level of return or the standard deviation of return on investment The limitation of measuring risk by standard deviation in accounting ROI is that it ignores the two aspects of risk prominent i
23、n financial theory. The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) separates risk into systematic and unsystematic components .Unsystematic risk is firm-and industry-specific. Systematic risk portrays the sensitivity of a companys returns to macro environmental trends. Competitive advantage enables the firm
24、 to lower its unsystematic risk through the attainment of stable, progressively higher earnings. Competitive advantage also allows the enterprise to lower its systematic risk. That is, the enterprise can better defend its chosen market position and its overall economic position by “ forcing its weak
25、er competitors into economic decline”. In the literature, problems involved in applying the CAPM to strategy at the corporate level have been pointed out. The problems of strictly applying the CAPM to strategy at the business level have also been pointed out. At the business level, a major problem r
26、elates to the fact that shares of business units that are privately held or those belonging to corporations are not traded in the market.(没问题 ) In spite of these problems, because of the desirability of analyzing both unsystematic and systematic risk components, in this investigation risk is measure
27、d by its two components at the strategic group level. In this way, the strategic orientations of business units can be examined in the context of their risk/return associations. Strategic group theory recognizes that select businesses in each industry compete similarly with each other and differentl
28、y from other businesses. The theoretical roots of the strategic group concept may be traced to Chamberlin Ian economics (1933). According to Chamberlin, competition in industries consists of rivalry of businesses with different, although over- lapping competencies. The premise of strategic group the
29、ory is not only that various strategic groups are present in each industry, but that they have different performance prospects. What has been discussed in the previous pages and what will be presented next serve as bases for the statement of hypotheses. Hypotheses For the purpose of this study, thre
30、e broad, viable strategic orientations are presumed: internal-oriented businesses, external-oriented businesses, and businesses with dual emphasis. Miles and Snow (1986) suggest that each strategic orientation can perform equally well, which is consistent with the concept of equifinality. The hypoth
31、eses in this study test whether each group of businesses has returns higher than the industry average. This raises the question of which businesses will have returns below the industry average. Performance below industry norms could occur among other types of firms (for example, those that lack a st
32、rategic orientation), an issue which is outside of the scope of this study. Based on related literature and the elaborations made in the following paragraphs, several hypotheses are made. Internal Orientation and Risk/Return Businesses that successfully compete with an internal strategic orientation
33、 attempt to lower their cost through process R Miles and Snow, 1978, 1986). The successful internally oriented businesses may have levels of return higher then their industry average. A corresponding risk of being internally oriented is that such businesses may not be able to change as their industr
34、ies or markets change. In this context, the financial premise of positive correlation between return and risk may be appropriate for these businesses as opposed to prospect theorys negative presumption of risk and return (Jemison, 1987). Therefore, the following hypothesis is offered: HI: The intern
35、ally oriented businesses will have levels of return higher than their industry average, high systematic business risk, and high unsystematic risk. External Orientation and Risk/Return Businesses that successfully compete with this strategic orientation value product R Potter, 1985). Nor are they lik
36、ely to be significantly concerned with capacity utilization, manufacturing expenses, or relative direct costs. Brand loyalty and high quality outputs may allow them to charge high prices or to at least avoid profit damaging competition on the basis of price. Such businesses may have levels of return
37、 higher than their industry average. High returns of these businesses may be due to their commitment to improved or innovative outputs. A corresponding risk of being continuously innovative is that these businesses are high-cost enterprises. In this circumstance, the financial premise that assumes a
38、 positive relationship between risk and return is also proper for these businesses, which is against the negative presumption of risk and return in prospect theory. Consequently, the next hypothesis is submitted: H2: The externally oriented businesses will have levels of return higher than their ind
39、ustry average, high systematic business risk, and high unsystematic risk. Dual Emphasis and Risk/Return Businesses that successfully compete with this strategic orientation attempt to lower costs through process R Miles and Snow, 1978, 1986; Utter- back and Abernathy, 1975). They also emphasize effi
40、ciencies through high-capacity utilization, low manufacturing costs, and low relative direct costs (Buzzell and Gale, 1987). Such businesses emphasize output improvements and differentiation through product R罗米立， 1991） 。从前景理论上看，如果他们最近的经历和前景（或营业收益）已令人满意，达到或超过自己的愿望和目标水平，会认为人员或高级经理在他们的做出决策时是厌恶风险的，（鲍曼，
41、1980;卡尼曼 和 Tversky， 1979）。但是，当决策者最近的经历和前景并不令人满意，比自己的愿望或目标水平低，那么他们会成为风险的追求者（鲍曼， 1980;杰米森， 1987）。 前景理论是基于一个前提，即在人的心理风险满意情况和风险规避中的不理想的情况下容易发生。前景理论（ Kahneman 和 Tversky， 1979）的实证结果证实了这一前提。当相同的问题发生在从收益转变为损失时，个人会选择从厌恶风险转变为热爱冒险。 在实施战略方面，前景理论的含义是，高层管理人员在面对高回报的水平时，会期望规避风险。当管理者面对低水平回 报或损失时会期望热爱风险。这些因素表明 ,前景理论的
42、背景下 ,消极的风险和回报关系可以被预期。这是违背传统金融理论预期普遍采取积极的风险和回报关系的。因为在金融理论里假定人和组织通常会规避风险，反对选择更适合的高风险项目的补偿。 风险和回报一直主要在企业层面考察。少数研究已经考虑到风险和回报，在几个层次上分析了在风险退货水平的标准上偏差的投资回报率（ ROI）。 在会计标准差里，衡量投资回报率的限制是忽略了金融理论中的风险突出的两个方面。资本资产定价模型（ CAPM）把风险分为系统风险和非系统风险。非系统风险必然存 在于特定行业。系统性风险描绘了在敏感性宏观环境的趋势下的公司回报。竞争优势能使公司通过稳定的业绩，逐步提高收入来降低非系统风险。竞争优势也使企业降低系统风险。也就是说，企业可以通过迫使较弱的竞争者进入了衰退的经济”，保护自己选择的市场，更好地捍卫总体的经济地
