1、 外文翻译 原文 The hidden ethics of corporate governance and the practical uses of corporate governance codes: a commentary on Bhimani Material Source: Published online: 25 June 2008 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2008 Author: Thomas Ahrens Professor Bhimani suggests that corporate governance codes
2、 have adopted a particular ethics associated with economic rationalism. I discuss why those ethics may discourage managers from acting in the spirit of those codes by comparing the organisational consequences of the external requirements of financial reporting with those of corporate governance repo
3、rting. Bhimani takes issue with the ways in which highly particular codes of moral behaviour have been slipped into corporate governance rules. He shows how the reliance of corporate governance rules on certain economic rationales, as articulated, for example, by agency theory, transaction cost econ
4、omics, stakeholder theory and stewardship theory, gives rise to a highly specific ethics. Despite the differences between those theories all of them are rooted in economic rationalism because they share certain assumptions. For example, enterprises seek wealth maximisation, human motivation is acqui
5、sitive, and managers are self-interested. The codification of corporate behaviour which drives the corporate governance project affords the opportunity to standardise a particular ethics through the reliance on economic rationalism in ways not seen before. One problem with this is that rules of corp
6、orate governance exhort companies to follow those ethics without ever offering a clear justification. The ethics are simply adopted wholesale from economic rationalism. Those ethics may thus come to appear natural and be taken for granted. But can an ethics ever aspire to universality and objectivit
7、y in the way that the scientific postulates of economic rationalism have? Bhimani cites many views who would suggest not. If so, should corporate governance codes be careful to separate rational assertion from moral exhortation? Bhimani shows that economic rationalism is already imbued with moral pr
8、ecepts, such as non-satiety, preference ranking, and consistency of preferences. Rules of corporate governance such as the Combined Code in the UK can make far-reaching demands on companies based on specific moral expectations. In the case of the Combined Code these extend, for instance, to the conc
9、entration of power on the board, directors remuneration, internal control systems, and company communication with shareholders. Overall, the Code emphasises the avoidance of conflicts of interest between principal (shareholders) and agents (managers and particularly board members) by seeking transpa
10、rency of the power and privileges of management and by avoiding concentration of power. Bhimanis essay thus identifies an important resource of the corporate governance project which has enabled the spread of corporate governance ideas and practices through public and private sector organisations ac
11、ross the globe: their ability to address supposedly universal problems of corporate governance irrespective of variations of economic institutions and the specific socio-cultural context. The ubiquity of corporate governance scandals has helped legitimate the use of economic rationalism in the conce
12、ption of corporate governance rules. It seems that potentially everyone, no matter in which country or company,is susceptible to the temptations of office. The conflicts of interest between shareholder and manager pervade the global corporate landscape. If such is the support that economic rationali
13、sm has given to the spread of the institutions of, essentially, Anglo-Saxon style corporate governance around the world, the question remains as to the practical efficacy of corporate governance thus conceived. To put the issue differently, the uniformity of corporate governance rules gives the impr
14、ession of a ubiquitous ethics. But this is only to look at the provision of rules. What happens in the sphere of the practical application of rules? How are the rules and their ethics taken up by companies and how can they influence their management and governance? Here I would briefly like to explo
15、re some of the implications of a corporate governance ethics that lays claim to universality and objectivity without ever clearly articulating the ethical case. In company practice, what aids the spread of relatively uniform rules across contexts can act as an obstacle to an actual reform of the pra
16、ctices of corporate governance. Rooted in the particular ethics described by Bhimani, the rules of corporate governance emphasise the creation of transparency to counteract conflicts of interest. They start from an assumption of mistrust. This is meant to guard against abuse of managerial power. But
17、 practically, how far does one want to curtail such power without impinging on what managers are hired to do, running a successful business? Moreover, the presumption of mistrust does not sit easily with a common managerial perspective on managers priorities as the agents of capital. The overriding
18、concern for senior managers tends to be financial performance because it offers a summary perspective on their organisations period performance. Depending on the organisations financial performance, questions of trust can be more of less significant. In successful organisations they often become sec
19、ondary. Success tends to breed trust especially if sustained over consecutive periods. This is not to say that successful organisations do not use illegitimate means to enhance performance. They may just not be found out. Equally, successful organisations might be even more successful if they had be
20、en led by more trustworthy managers. However, corporate governance scandals often take place in organisations withweak performance where managers tried to use illegitimate means of enhancing reported performance but were found out. Anecdotally, therefore, managers distinguish between external commun
21、ication to report performance and to increase trust. Performance reporting is mandatory. It relies on a financial accounting framework and serves to establish the competency of management. Trust reporting relies on corporate governance rules. Unlike performance reporting, which can be broken down in
22、to reports on sub-tasks, say, for divisional managers, trust reporting does not tend to occupy a prominent place for organising the activities of managers. Its one-size-fits-all ethics of distrust makes it appear to managers as simply another bureaucratic reporting burden, not something that can hel
23、p them in the process of managing and achieving objectives. An ethics of distrust discourages practical engagement with the rules. It encourages a search for the most efficient way of formally discharging the reporting obligations. Unsurprisingly, therefore, firms have resorted to boilerplate statem
24、ents of corporate governance in order to signal to capital markets that they follow best practices. The problem with such corporate governance reporting is that it disconnects corporate practices from the more complex rationales of corporate governance rules. Companies can comply with the requiremen
25、ts of the rules without receiving the benefits that they are supposed to generate for them. Therefore investors can check that companies adhere to the rules but they cannot know if they have improved the stewardship of their investment. We know that the mechanistic application of corporate governanc
26、e rules is a concern among regulators, investors and managers. It is often called box-ticking (e.g., Hampel report 1998). Box-ticking ignores the deliberations that accompanied for example the publication of the UK corporate governance codes and that were often published as the reports of the commit
27、tees on corporate governance. Those deliberations often emphasised that the codes usefulness for different organisa-tional circumstances need careful judgement and that users of codes should follow the spirit of the codes and not just their formal prescriptions. Roberts (2001) associated the mechani
28、stic application of corporate governance rules in a context pervaded by mistrust with individualising accountability. He suggested that certain forms of corporate governance makes directors act in the manner of the individualised agents familiar from agency theory. If board directors are treated as
29、individual agents with a propensity for shirking effort and abusing their positions they may act just so. Socialising accountability, by contrast, is characterised by deep interrelatedness among managers. Managers are seen to work and flourish through interacting and interrelating with others and th
30、eir achievements are regarded as the results of group activities. In a context of socialising accountability it is more likely that one can observe constructive uses of corporate governance requirements, analogous to Adler and Borys (1996) notion of enabling uses of bureaucracy or Ahrens and Chapman
31、s (2004) derived notion of enabling uses of management control systems. The key lies in the ways in which formal systems help organisational members understand the tasks and relate them to the activities of other organisational members to enhance organisational performance. The problem of corporate
32、governance from this point of view is that it does not appear particularly useful. There are however examples to the contrary. Corporate governance codes prescribe audit committees and communication of the board with shareholders. One element of good practice of audit committees would be to subtly d
33、iffuse cases of internal fraud or misuse of resources before they lead to a political confrontation at board level (Turley and Zaman 2007). A different example concerning the companys communication illustrates how the chief executives meetings with shareholders and investors can strengthen the board
34、s strategic thinking and also help in further communicating and implementing strategic initiatives in a company (Roberts et al. 2006). Examples such as these appeal to corporate governance practitioners to use formal corporate governance requirements in ways which enhance the management of the firm.
35、 One way in which practices of corporate governance can become appreciated by managers is by making them instrumental for management. In analogy to enabling internal uses of external performance reporting, external trust reporting can also become an internal enabler if it can help organisational mem
36、bers understand better their organisational tasks and roles and how these are to relate to those of other organisational members. Such thinking privileges the specificity of organisational context and the specific uses of corporate governance that such contexts afford. It suggests that an ethics wit
37、h universal and objective ambition might be counterpro-ductive to efforts at making corporate governance practical. 译文 公司治理和公司治理守则使用 的内在理论 ： 对 Bhimani 的 评论 资料来源 :施普林格科学商业媒体公司 作者： 托马斯阿伦斯 教授 Bhimani 表明，公司治理守则 已经 通过了 与 经济理性主义 相关的特定理论 。我将讨论为什么 财务报告的外部使用者在通过将组织结构的重要性与那些公司治理报告相比较后，会在这些规则的鼓舞下采取行动。 Bhimani
38、从 道德行为规范已被纳入公司治理规则 这一问题着手 。他演示了公司治理规则 如何 依赖 某些经济原理， 与这有关联的， 例如 ， 代理理论，交易成本经济学，利益相关者理论和管理理论 ，产生一个非常 有效 的 规矩 。尽管这些理论之间 有 差异， 但 它们都植根于经济理性，因为他们有着某些共同的假设。例如，企业追求 的是 财富的最大化，人的动机是贪婪， 管理者也都是自私的 。企业行为的 编纂 （能够掌控公司治理项目）通过与经济理性 相 结合，为规范一些 特定 规矩 提供了机会，这是之前从未见过的方法 。 这里面存在一个问题，就是公司的企业管治 力劝公司 要遵从 这些 规则 却 没有 要求 提供
39、任何 明确 的公司辩解 。 这些规矩只是简单的从 经济理性主义 大量采纳 。 这些 规矩 可能 因此 显得自然 而被大范围使用 。 但 是一项规矩是立志于 经济理性主义的科学假设 的普 遍性和客观性的吗 ？ Bhimani 谁引用了很多意见建议 ，他们都认为 并 不是 。 如果是这样，公司治理守则 是否应该谨慎地 将合理性与道德性 区分 开呢 ？ Bhimani 表明，经济理性 已经充满了 道德 规律 ， 例如无充分供应，优先的权利 和 优先权的一致性 。公司治理规则 （ 如 英国 的 综合守则 ）可以 根据特定 的道德预期 对 公司产生 很多的 要求。 案例中的综合守则在 对权力集中在董事会
40、，董事酬金，内部控制制度，公司与股东的沟通 方面都有扩展。总体而言， 该法强调了主体之间的利益冲突（股东）和代理人（经理，特别是董事会成员）寻求避税的权力和特权的管理透明度 ，并避免权力的集中。 Bhimani 的文章从而 被 定 为了公司治理项目的重要资源，他使 企业管治的观念和做法 在公共和 私营机构 的 全球范围内 的蔓延成为可能 ：他 们有能力解决公司治理 中 的普遍问题，无论经济制度的变化 或 特定社会文化背景 的差异。 公司治理失败案例的扩散， 帮助 了合 法的经济理性主义的公司治理规则 概念 的使用 。 看来 ， 可能每个人，无论在哪个国家或公司，很容易受到办公室 吸引力的影响
41、。股东和经理之间的利益冲突 在全球范围具有普遍性 。 如果这种经济理性主义已 经 考虑到 如 盎格鲁撒克逊式的世界各地的企业管治 机构的蔓延 ，公司治理的实 际效果 的问题会因此产生 。 从另一方面考虑这个问题，公司治理规则的一致性 就产生了 一个 潜在规矩 的 概念 。但是，这只是为了看看规则的规定。 在 实际的规则 应 用 中会发生什么呢 ？ 这些 规则 和规矩如何被公司 采取 ？以及 他们如何影响他们的管理和治理？ 在这里，我 想 简要地 探索 一 些 公司治理 规则，他们都是 没有明确阐述的 但具有普遍性和客观性的潜在的规则 。在公司实践中，在什么情况下相对统一的规则 的蔓延 可以作为
42、一个公司治理 在 实际改革 中 的做法。根植于特定的 Bhimani描述的 规矩 ，公司治理 准则强调 透明度规则的建立 以 减少 利益冲突。他们从一个不 信任的假设 开始 。 这是为了防止管理权力的滥用。但实际上， 在录用经理没有什么限制而经营成功的情况下， 一个人 若 想 减少这种权利又能能维持多久呢 ？ 此外， 作为 股东 的代理经理 ， 不信任的推定不容易有共同的 管理重点 。 财务表现 是 高级管理人员最关心 ， 因为它提供了其组织 在 一个总结期间的表现。根据该组织的财务表现，相信问题可以不那么 难处理 了。在成功的组织 里 ，他们往往成为次要的。 如果持续下去 ， 往往 会成功的
43、产生 信任，特别是 在较长时间里 。这并不是说 ，成功的组织不使用不正当手段来提高性能。他们可能只是没有被发现。同样，成功的组织可能会更成功，如果他们已经被更值得信赖的经理领导。然而，公司治理丑闻经常 发生在脆弱的组织中 ， 那些 管理人员试图利用非法手段提高业绩报告，但被发现了。 因此， 一般 管理者区分 不同的 外部沟通 而发布 报告， 从而 增加信任。 绩效报告是强制性的。 它依赖于财务会计框架，建立管理能力。信托报告依赖于公司治理规则。不像业绩报告，它可以分解成 多种 任务报告部门经理， 也就是说 ，报告不信任往往占据组织管理人员活动 的 突出的地位。 坚持一个放之四海而皆准的不信任一
44、 切伦理让它看起来只是另一种官僚管理人员的报告负担，不是可以帮助管理和实现目标的进程。 一项规矩 的不信任阻碍规则的实际 执行 。 它鼓励 搜索 最 有效的方法去 正式履行报告义务。 不出所料，企 业纷纷以公司治理样板报表，以便他们遵循 资本市场 的 最佳做法 。 与这样的企业管治报告断开 存在的 问题是，它 成为 公司治理规则的企业行为更为复杂的理由。 公司遵守规则的要求 却 没有 得到他们应该带来的效益 。 因此，投资者可以检查企业遵守规则，但他们无法知道他们是否有改善了他们的投资管理。 我 们知道，公司治理规则 的 机械应用 在 投资者和管理者 中 是一个监管者 。它通常被称为 逐项核查
45、 （如汉佩尔报告 ， 1998 年）。 逐项核查 忽视了 审议的工作，如 英国公司治理守则 的例子中 ，经常 在 委员会发表 发表 “ 报告 ” 。 这些审议经常强调 守则 对不同 组织环境 需要细致判断 情况下 的实用性 ，应遵循守则的精神， 而 不仅是他们的正式 方法 。 罗伯茨（ 2001） 将 相关的公司治理规则中 的 不信任与个体化问 责的机械的应用 相联系 。他认 为，某些形式的公司治理行为，使董事在个 人代理 与 代理理论的方式 上 相似 。 如果董事被视为 一个 努力和滥用推卸自己的立场 的 个人代理，指责 他们可能只是这样的行为倾向。 社交功能问责制，相反， 相对 于 管理人
46、员的特点是深刻的相互关联性。经理们 观察 他们的 工作，通过 他们与别人的互动和他们自己的 成就 作为小组活动的成果。 在一个社会化的问责方面，它更可能是一个可以观察 公司治理要求 的 建设性，类似于 Adler 和鲍里斯塔拉（ 1996） 强调 使 用 官僚 制 或阿伦斯和 Chapman（ 2004） 的 有利的管理使用派生的概念使用的概念 控制系统。 关键在于如何在正式的系统帮助组织成员了解他们的任务，并涉及与其他组织成员的活动，以提高组织绩效。 从这个角度来看 公司治理 的 问题是不会 变现得 特别有用。 然而有相反的例子。 公司治理守则规定审计委 员会和董事会 的 股东 沟通。审计
47、委员会 将是 一个 很好的 因素，巧妙地 运用 内部 调解 或 利用 资源 的 情况下，才导致 股东之间 的政治对抗 （特利和扎曼 ， 2007 年） 。另一个例子涉及公司的通信 ， 演示了股东及投资者的行政长官的会议 如何 可以强化董事会的战略思维，并 有助于进一步沟通和执行公司的战略举措 （罗伯茨等人 ， 2006 年） 。 这些 实例都 呼吁 公司治理实践者 使用 能提升公司管理的公司治理准则 。 公司治理 实践能被管理者赞赏的 方式 之一就是 通过 他们的管理工具 。 与内部使用者使用外部企业的报告类似 ，外部 使用者 信任报告 同样 也能够成为一个内部推动者，如 果它能帮助组织成员更好地了解他们的组织任务和作用，以及这些都是 如何 涉及到其他组织成员的。 这些都要考虑特殊的治理环境以及特殊环境下的公司治理的特殊使用。 这表明， 一项准则具有普遍性和客观性的表现有可能 在公司治理实践中起到 适得其反的作用 。
