1、 外文翻译 原文 Managerial Overoptimism and the Choice Between Debt and Equity Financing Material Source: The Journal of Behavioral Finance 2007,Vol.8,No.4,225235 Author: Michael Gombola and Dalia Marciukaityte Evidence of poor stock and operating performance fo llowing equity issues has led to the hypothe
2、sis that managers take advantage of periods of high stock prices and investor overoptimism in order to sell overpriced equity. Ritter(1991):This “windows of opportunity” hypothesis suggests that managers time equity issues when their firms shares are overpriced. This hypothesis, however, cannot be u
3、sed to explain poor stock performance following debt issues documented by Spiess and Affleck-Graves(1999)and Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman(2000).Underperformance following debt financing indicates a need for an alternative hypothesis that can explain these findings. We suggest that managerial over
4、optimism is a factor that can explain poor long-term stock performance following stock and, especially, bond issuance. Recent studies show that managerial overoptimism affects corporate decisions, e.g., Heaton(2002),Gervais, Heaton and Odean(2003)Malmendier and Tate(2003 and 2005).As managers are mo
5、re affected by the performance of their firm than are well-diversified shareholders, moderate managerial overoptimism can help to ensure that managers behave in the best interest of shareholders by counteracting the effect of managerial risk aversion; however, strong managerial overoptimism can resu
6、lt in the undertaking of negative net present value projects and destruction of a firms value Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2003).An excessively favorable estimate of future outcomes for investments is the crux of this managerial overoptimism hypothesis. When managers have optimistic predictions of inv
7、estment outcomes, they are more inclined to finance with debt rather than equity. Confidence about the size of future outcomes makes managers unwilling to share future profits with new equity investors and make them more willing to issue debt rather than equity. This study tests the managerial overo
8、ptimism hypothesis by examining post-financing stock performance for both debt and equity financing. If managerial overoptimism has a more significant effect on the choice between debt and equity financing and post financing performance than manager attempts to time the market and take advantage of
9、windows of opportunity for issuing equity, we expect worse stock performance following debt financing than following equity financing. We focus on a sample of firms with rapid growth in assets and a corresponding need to finance those assets. By focusing on firms that require asset financing, securi
10、ty issuance for other purposes can be largely eliminated. Furthermore, since studying long-term performance does not require identifying a particular issuance date, our study is not limited to firms with explicit announcements of security issuance. Rather than limiting the study to firms that announ
11、ce new issues of debt or equity, we include all forms of financing and measure financing by the change in debt or change in equity. In this manner, implicit security issuance such as stock-for-stock mergers can be incorporated in the sample. Another reason for focusing on high-growth firms is our ex
12、pectation of stronger managerial overoptimism among these firms. All else being equal, overoptimistic managers perceive that they have more good projects available than other managers. As managers should take all projects they believe to have positive net present value, overoptimistic managers would
13、 undertake more projects resulting in the faster growthof their firms. There are two reasons why it is important to focus on a sample affected by strong managerial overoptimism in a study examining whether managerial overoptimism affects the choice between debt and equity financing and poor post-fin
14、ancing performance. First, the windows of opportunity hypothesis and the managerial overoptimism hypothesis are not mutually exclusive. It is possible that while some managers choose between debt and equity financing to take advantage of windows of opportunity, other managers are significantly affec
15、ted by overoptimism when making security choice decisions. Even the same manager can be affected by both factors at the same time: an overoptimistic manager may attempt to take advantage of share mispricings. Because of market timing to sell overpriced shares, equity financing will be followed by wo
16、rse post-financing stock performance than debt financing. Because of the managerial overoptimism effect on the choice between debt and equity financing, debt financing will be followed by worse stock performance. As these factors work in opposite directions, the effect of market timing can cancel th
17、e effect of managerial overoptimism in a sample of all debt and equity issues. The second reason for focusing on a sample affected by strong managerial overoptimism is related to the market overoptimism. Poor post-financing stock performance indicates that the market is overoptimistic about the firm
18、 obtaining external financing. Overoptimistic managers prefer debt financing to equity financing when they perceive their shares to be underpriced, which happens when managers are more overoptimistic about their firms future than is the market. As the market is overoptimistic about financing firms,
19、overoptimistic manager preference for debt financing will be observed only for the most overoptimistic managers whose overoptimism exceeds the overoptimism of the market. Consequently, if we would examine the whole population of firms obtaining external financing, it is likely that we would find no
20、evidence of worse stock performance following debt financing than equity financing, even if managerial overoptimism significantly affects the choice between debt and equity financing and post-financing stock performance. This expectation is consistent with the Jung, Kim and Stulz(1996) study that co
21、mpares stock performance after new bond issues and primary stock offerings and, when controlling for the characteristics of issuing firms, find no significant difference in the post-issue performance. We examine a sample of high-growth firms that includes the top 10%of firms in the compustat databas
22、e, based on their one-year percentage total asset growth. The resulting sample contains firms with significant financing during the examined year. We study two subsets of the high-growth sample: a sample of firms that primarily use debt to finance asset growth and a sample of firms that primarily us
23、e external equity to finance asset growth. If more overly optimistic managers use debt financing, then we would find worse performance for the sample that primarily uses debt financing. Worse performance for the sample of equity-financing firms could provide support for the windows of opportunity hy
24、pothesis. We find that debt financing is associated with significantly worse post-financing one-to five-year stock performance. For example, in the first post-financing year, our debt-financing sample underperforms our equity-financing sample by 8% to 10%, depending on the methodology used to contro
25、l for risk. We control for risk using the matched-sample approach advocated by Barber and Lyon(1997)and a four-factor model, including the three Fama and French(1993)factors supplemented by a momentum factor. We also examine the effect of the choice between debt and equity financing on post-financin
26、g performance using a continuous variable to measure a firms reliance on debt financing and controlling for firm char- acteristics. Furthermore, we test the robustness of our results using restricted samples. Regardless of the test design, we find that stronger reliance on debt financing is associat
27、ed with worse post-financing stock performance. Our results support the notion that the choice between debt and equity financing and post-financing stock performance are affected by managerial overoptimis. 译文 管理过于乐观以及债务和股权融资的选择 资料来 源 :The Journal of Behavioral Finance 2007,Vol.8,No.4,225235 作者： Mich
28、ael Gombola and Dalia Marciukaityte 根据股票和股票发行后的经营业绩之差，假设为即管理者定下的高股价和投资者过于乐观时期的优势，以出售价格过高的股票。 这样的“机会之窗“假说建议， 里特 (1991)认为 当股权公司的股票价格过高时应更注意管 理人员时间上的公平问题 。 但是，这个假设，不能用来解释施皮斯 和阿弗莱克 -格雷夫斯 (1999)和达塔，依斯干达和拉曼 (2000)所认为的拙劣表现。张宗益以债务融资记录的债务问题表示了另一种假设，可以解释这些现象。 例如，希顿 (2002)，热尔韦，希顿和 Odean(2003) Malmendier (2003
29、和 2005年 )通过 最近的研究表明， 管理过于乐观是一个可以用来解释长期股价 低下表现的一个 因素 。 由于管理者相对于多元化的股东人而言 ，更受他们的公司业绩的影响。适度的管理过于乐观可以帮助确保管理人员在股东的最佳利益的行为的同时，抵消管理风险规避的影响，但是， 热尔韦，希顿和 Odean(2003)认为 强有力的管理过于乐观可能导致负净现值的项目和一个公司的价值的毁灭。公司的管理者如果对投资结果有乐观的预测，他会们更倾向于债务融资而不是股权。对未来结果的自信使管理者不愿意分享未来利润新的股票投资者，使他们更愿意发行债券而不是股票。 本研究通过检查测试债务和股权融资后的资金管理的股票表
30、现来证明过分乐观的假设。如果管理过于乐观，通过债务与股权融资和后融资市场的表现，比采取机会之窗的优势选择论具有更重要的作用。我们预期认定股权融资比债务融资以下的股票表现较差。 我们专注于一 个快速增长的公司的资产和相应的资金，需要这些资产的样本。需要以企业资产融资为重点，为其他目的而发行股票的原因可以在很大程度上忽略不计。此外，由于学习长期业绩并不需要确定一个特定的签发日期，我们的研究并不仅限于与证券发行公司的明确公告。这不是限制的研究，该公司宣布新的债务或股权的问题，我们会随着债务或股权融资的变化而变化，测量所有的融资形式。通过这种方式，如股票换股票证券发行合并隐可纳入样本。另一个集中高增长
31、的公司的原因更强烈，是对这些企业的管理过于乐观的期望。在其他条件相同的前提下，过于乐观的管理者认为他们 比其他公司的管理人员有更多的好项目可以提供。作为项目管理人员应该采取一切他们认为有正的净现值，过于乐观的管理者将进行更多的项目使他们的企业更快地产生。 有两个原因是在研究强有力的管理过于乐观的影响时重要的要素。是否过分乐观影响管理债务与股权融资和贫困后融资的性能选择研究样本。首先，机会假说和优势之窗学说都过于乐观的假设不是相互排斥的。这是可能的，虽然有些管理人员通过优势之窗学说来选择债务与股权融资，其他管理人员影响着过于乐观时安全性选择的决定。 即使是同一个管理者也可能在同一个时间受到这两个
32、因素的影响：一个 过于乐观的管理者会采取错误定价的股票。由于在市场价格过高的时机出售股票，股权融资后的股票行为比债务融资后的股票行为恶劣很多。 由于在债务与股权融资的选择中管理过分乐观的影响下，债务融资后股票表现将更差。由于这些因素的影响方向相反，市场时机的效果可以抵消在管理过分乐观的情况下债务和公平问题的影响。对于由一个强有力的管理过于乐观的影响为重点的第二个原因是样本相关的市场过分乐观。恶劣的融资后股票的表现说明，期望于从市场获得融资的公司的决定是过于乐观的。过于乐观的管理者在认为他们的股票价值被低估是，更乐意选择股权融资 ，这恰好说明过于乐观的管理者对于市场更关心公司的未来。因此，如果我
33、们把研究范围扩大到获得外部融资的公司整体， 很可能，我们没有证据来说明，债务融资后的股票表现得比股权融资后的股票表现差。这种期望与 Jung, Kim and Stulz(1996)对新债券和股票发行进行比较后的观点一致。我们研究了高增长公司的抽样调查数据，其中包括前 10%的公司的 的数据库中，根据他们为期一年的总资产的增长比例。 我们研究了两个子集的高增长范例：一部分主要适用债务融资，一部分主要使用股权融资。如果更多过于乐观的管理者使用债务融资， 我们就会发现更多使用债务融资后糟糕表现的示例。这些糟糕的股权融资公司的抽样调查表现可以为“机会之窗”说学提供支持。我们发现，债务融资关系着融资后一至五年内股票的表现。例如，在融资后的第一年，根据风险控制的方法，我们的债务融资和股权融资的比例为 8%至 10%。此外，我们也检验了我们使用受限制的样本的调查结果的可靠性。不论如何测试，我们发现债务融资都与融资后股票表现差相关联。我们的研究结果也证明了管理者过于乐观的管理影响了债务融资与股权融资的选择。
