1、 外文翻译 原文 Deepening China-Taiwan Relations through the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement Material Source: Peterson Institute for International Economics 2010.6 Author: Daniel H. Rosen and Zhi Wang Daniel H. Rosen is a visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, where
2、 he was in residence from 1993 to 1998. He is also principal of Rhodium Group (RHG), a New Yorkbased research firm , and has been an adjunct professor at Columbia Universitys School of International and Public Affairs since 2001. He is the author or coauthor of The Implications of China-Taiwan Econo
3、mic Liberalization(forthcoming 2010), Prospects for a US-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement (2004), Roots of Competitiveness: Chinas Evolving Agriculture Interests(2004), and Behind the Open Door: Foreign Enterprises in the Chinese Marketplace (1998). Zhi Wang is a senior international economist at the US
4、International Trade Commission. He previously consulted to the World Bank and worked as an economist at Purdue University, the US Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Economic Analysis of US Department of Commerce, and as a senior research scientist at the School of Computational Sciences of Geo
5、rge Mason University. He is coauthor of The Implications of China-Taiwan Economic Liberalization (forthcoming2010). On Sunday, June 13, 2010 representatives from China andTaiwan1 held a third round of talks in Beijing on an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) that would liberalize import
6、ant aspects of cross-Strait economic relations. Details of what was agreed and what remains under negotiation are still trickling out, and in any case the nature of this framework is that various elements will be agreed upon on anon going basis rather than at once. But it is clear from available det
7、ails that ECFA will be an ambitious accord that fund amen tally changes the game between Taiwan and China and hence affects the regional economy and even the transpacific temp of or the United States. While the exact terms and sequencing of ECFA remain to be seen, we have prepared an analysis of its
8、 implications using the general parameters of the undertaking as described to us by senior officials in Beijing and Taipei.2 In the study, we explore the existing abnormalities in the cross-Strait economic relationship, the long-term costs of those abnormalities for both sides, the motivations in mo
9、ving to a new framework, and the projected economic implications of something like ECFA. We also examine the security concerns arising from an even deeper interdependence and compare those with the concerns arising from business as usual Motivations At first glance, some think the status quo has bee
10、n favorable to Taiwan. China mostly extends World Trade Organization (WTO)standard most-favored nation status to Taiwanmeaning trade terms equivalent to those all other WTO members receivewhile Taiwan imposes unilateral barriers to imports, investment, and visitors from China. Economically speaking,
11、 however, the more protected partyTaiwansaddles its household consumers and enterprise manufacturers with more expensive inputs where China would be most competitive, deprives the economy of productive investment, and cuts off skilled labor mobility that could benefit Taiwan. Moreover, the ambiguity
12、 of Taipeis stance and uncertainty about competitiveness likely scare away domestic investment and other Asian and Western investors. Not only is this status quo not optimal for Taiwan but also with the advent of deeper economic integration accords in the regionsuch as the free trade agreement betwe
13、en the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China， which entered into force on January 1, 2010Taiwans position in the worlds most important new market is eroding, as its peer competitors agree on preferential trade and investment terms with Beijing that go beyond the WTO standard. Therefore, t
14、he baseline situation that motivates Taiwan is not merely business as usual but rather diminishing marginal benefit from regional trends. For its part, China is frank in stating that it supports an ECFA undertaking because it believes this will maximize the prospect for eventual political integratio
15、n across the Taiwan Strait. But officials in Beijing argue that this belief is rooted not in the idea that ECFA would enhance their ability to coerce Taiwan but in the view that it would maximize mutual prosperity and Taiwans perception of common interest, there by establishing the goodwill necessar
16、y to facilitate political rapprochement in the future. Our conjecture is that the security and political consequences of marginalization for Taiwan under the current, abnormal conditions are at least as deleterious to the islands core interests as normalizing economic relations would be. Projections
17、 To assess the economic impact of ECFA, we employ an economic model similar to the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) platform, which can capture the economic liberalization already happening and likely to happen in Asia in the near future, in order to simulate the dynamic context around the choic
18、es confronting Taipei and Beijing. Our first important projection is that by implementing an ECFA along the lines of the ASEAN+ China agreement, Taiwan would increase its 2020 GDP by about 4.5 percent, or $21 billion, from the current trend line. But we also conclude that the trend line will not sta
19、nd still, and other agreements in the region will be negotiated (ASEAN+3), which will impose costs on Taiwan, if it does not do an ECFA, to the tune of almost 0.8 percent of GDP. So the net effect of ECFA for Taiwan would be some 5.3 percent improvement in GDP by 2020. We can think of few (if any) o
20、ther policy reforms available to Taipei that could deliver such gains. While some of these gains arise from Taiwan dismantling its non-WTO compliant import prohibitions on China, the gains also rely on China reducing tariffs on key Taiwan goods to free trade agreement levels. Other aspects of the re
21、lationship necessary to realize the benefits of tariff reductionslike normal government-to government regulatory communicationrely on negotiated, not just unilateral, outcomes. This alone is an important result and is greater than in most other studies because (among other things) we recognize that
22、the bulk of economic benefits from ECFA accrue only in the medium term, so we set the end year to 2020. We also argue that this is a conservative projection: Our model falls short of projecting a slew of economic benefits, especially service-sector gains and cross-border investment flows. Since an i
23、nsight of the study is that the regional economy around China and Taiwan is not standing still but is extraordinarily dynamic, we do not stop with this ECFA-only scenario. One of the most heated questions in Taiwan (though it is largely left out of formal discussions such as those that took place on
24、 June 13) is whether Taiwan could follow ECFA with similar liberalization agreements with other economiesat least the ones that already have free trade agreements with China itself, like ASEANwithout interference from China. This is a delicate political consideration from Beijings perspective, thoug
25、h we would argue that it is time for China to set aside these anxieties. While we cant model the correct way forward on the politics of this question, we did model the projected benefits for Taiwan from being able to do so. If after ECFA Taiwan joined the ASEAN+ China regime, for instance, its 2020
26、GDP would rise 4.9 percent instead of 4.5 percent, or roughly 5.7 percent if measured from the reduced GDP outcome that eventuates should Taiwan eschew cross-Strait normalization. This additional benefit is positive, clearly, but the more important point is that it is very modest compared with the g
27、ains from ECFA itself. The reason is simple: Taiwan already has normal trade relations with the rest of Asia; it is with China that it maintains welfare-diminishing barriers, and so it is with China that liberalization would bring the greatest gains. The corollary insightwhich is just as importantis
28、 that once ECFA is achieved, the bulk of gains available to Taiwan from regional trade liberalization would be locked in regardless of whether it resolves the impediments to doing free trade agreements with other economies. This is not to say those other arrangements would not benefit Taiwan, they w
29、ould; but the cross-Strait gains are disproportionately large given the sheer magnitude of Chinas economic growth and the unique abnormalities between Taiwan and China. Finally, our modeling offers insights for other economies from the ECFA and ECFA+ scenarios.3 For China, the ne results of ECFA are
30、 positive, though far less so than for Taiwan in value terms and of course as a share of GDP. For other economies in the region, including those that have enjoyed an intermediary role in lieu of direct China-Taiwan economic links, the impact of ECFA is modest (in some cases positive); in no case do
31、we foresee economic grounds for concern among the other players in the region. Even Hong Kong, which has been the main entrep between China and Taiwan, has little to be concerned about from China-Taiwan normalization. In the case of the United States, our model shows a very modest positive result fr
32、om ECFA (though statistically marginal), but a more negative impact as the scenarios incorporating further Asian integration (ASEAN+3) unfold. Several insights arise from this component of our analysis. First, if the US objective is to maximize Taiwans economic prospects and hence its freedom of ind
33、ependent action, then ECFA is highly desirable, and Taiwans involvement in further Asian deepening is to be supported. Second, however, we should be mindful of what the models are telling us: US economic interests per se erode as Asia draws tighter together without US inclusion. That is an econometr
34、ic reality. More significant still is the geoeconomic, qualitative implication of even long-standing nemeses China and Taiwan drawing together in a free trade pact while the United States watches, unable to ratify already negotiated Asian trade agreements like the US-Korea free trade agreement. Poli
35、cy Conclusion Our economic projections of the effects of a China-Taiwan economic liberalization agreement point to the significant benefits of cross-Strait economic reform, especially for Taiwan. Modeling the impacts on other economies helps illuminate the importance of US engagement in Asian econom
36、ic integration. Washington and Taipei can add to the balance in geoeconomic momentum centered on China by reinvigorating their ongoing Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) talks and by considering other opportunities for transpacific bridge building that includes the United States. In tha
37、t context, theTrans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which the United States is pursuing with others in the region, may present an attractive test of Taiwans ability to engage in additional economic liberalization, once ECFA is agreed (and assuming TPP moves ahead in a meaningful way). Taiwan has more lim
38、ited experience in negotiating serious trade liberalization than most other Asian economies, and in ECFA talks Beijings underlying political motives may cause it to restrain its trade negotiators from pushing for maximum benefits. Going beyond ECFA, if Taiwan wants to capitalize on the opportunity t
39、o build more economic links, it will need to catch up quickly in terms of the skills to negotiate and then ratify and implement at home its external commitments. That Taiwan should encounter some missteps in implementation given its relative isolation in the past is understandable; but if Taipei is
40、to make use of any greater opportunity to conclude agreements externally in the future it will have to do better. Whether the challenge is executing a product specific import agreement, implementing ECFA itself, or convincing the populace that going through WTO dispute resolution procedures is a mar
41、k of maturity, not an indication of weakness, Taiwans leaders have political challenges at home that Beijings officials are not constrained by.4 This should be good newsan aspect of commonality with more advanced democracies, not a source of misgiving about Taiwans ability to deliver on its trade co
42、mmitments. As with any preferential trade agreement, the ECFA now moving closer to conclusion between Beijing and Taipei will take time to complete and then to enact. Its ultimate worth will depend on the fidelity with which it is enforced and the competence with which the private sectors and bureau
43、cracies on both sides facilitate the commerce that should be empowered by it. While the details, including myriad sectoral and industrial codicils, remain to be seen, our modeling makes clear that the aggregate implications of ECFA are very important economically and thus will likely have an impact
44、on the larger relationship between China and Taiwan, between those two and the region, and between that region and the United States. While modest in its global economic effects, we believe the geoeconomic implications are significant enough to demand strategic attention from the United States and u
45、nderscore as well as anything the importance of securing US economic engagement of the first order in Asia. 译文 通过经济合作协议框架来加深中国大陆与台湾的联系 资料来源 : 彼得森国际经济研究 所 2010.6 作者： Daniel H. Rosen和 Zhi wang 丹 尼尔 H. Rosen是一个从 1993 年到 1998 年在相互的全国经济 Peterson学院参观 的人 。他也是 RHG 一家纽约的研究企业的校长 ，也 是自 2001 年以来在国际和公共事务哥伦比亚大学的附
46、属教授。他 还 是中国台湾经济自由化 （ 即将到来 ， 2010） 、 我们台湾自由贸易协议远景 （ 2004） 、 中国农业兴趣的演变（ 2004） 和在门户开放主义之后：外国企业在中国 Marketplace （ 1998） 的作者或共同执笔者。 Zhi Wang 是一位在美国国际贸易委员会 的 资深国际经济学家 。 他以前到世界银行咨询并且作为经济学家在 Purdue 大学 、 美国农业部 、 对美商务部的经济分析局工作 ； 作为一位资深研究科学家 ，他 在乔治泥工大学计算科学学校 工作 。他是中国台湾经济自由化的涵义的共同执笔者 （ 即将到来 ，2010） 。 2010 年 6 月 1
47、3 日 是 星期天，从中国和 台湾 来 的代表在北京 开始 会谈 经济合作协议框架 （ ECFA） ， 自由化 是 两岸经济关系的重要方面。细节同意和保持交涉仍然 低 下 ，但 无论如何这个框架的本质是各种各样的元素将 被 同意而不是立即 被同意 。但是可利用的细节是 ECFA 将是 从 根本 上 改变台湾和中国 之间的 贸易， 并且 是 一份影响地方经济和美国 ， 甚 至是 横跨太平洋的雄心勃勃的协议 。 当确切 的 期限和程序化 的 ECFA 依然存在将被看见时，我们准备使用事业的一般参量如我们对在北京和台北 的 高级官员所描述 的方法 对它 的 涵义 进行 分析。在研究中，我们在两岸经济
48、的现有的反常性关系、那些双方的反常性的长期费用 中 探索，刺激 它 向一个新的框架移动和 像 ECFA 计划经济 的 涵义 。 我们也审查出现 的 更加深刻的相互依赖的安全问题并且像往常一样比较从这些业务中 产生的忧虑 。 1 动机 乍一看，有些人认为的现状已对台湾有利。中国主要扩展世界贸易组织（世贸组 织）标准的最惠国地位，台湾的贸易条件的意义等同于 接受 所有其他 WTO成员，而台湾单方面施加进口壁垒 、 投资以及中国游客。然而从经济上说，更多的 “ 保护 ” 党台更昂贵的投入在中国将是最有竞争力 的 ，其家庭消费者 、 企业的制成品 和 再培训计划剥夺了生产性投资的经济，技术和劳动力的流
49、动性降低了， 这 可能受益台湾。此外，台北的立场和关于竞争力的模糊不确定性可能吓走国内投资和其他亚洲和西方投资者 。 这不仅是现状不够理想，台湾也与经济一体化协定中的区域东南亚国家联盟和中国 （ 东盟 +中国 ） 出现深化，其中生效的 是 自由贸易协议 。 但 2010 年 1月 1 日，台湾在世界上最重要的新兴市场的地位正在削弱，作为同行竞争者同意以优惠的贸易和与北京超越世贸组织标准去投资 的 条 件 。因此，基本情况 是不只是像往常一样激励台湾，而是从区域递减边际效益的业务 。 就其本身而言，中国指出它支持 ECFA 的承诺，因为它认为这将最大限度地为最终两岸政治一体化的前景坦诚。但在北京官员认为，这种信念是植根于观念 ， 不是签 ECFA 将提高他们的能力迫使台湾，但认为这将最大限度地共同繁荣与台湾的共同利益的看法，从而建立的商誉要促进政治和解的未来。我们的猜想是，台湾的安全和边缘化在目前的政治后果， 非正常条件至少有害的经济关系正常化将是岛上的核心利益 。 2 预测 为了评估 ECFA 的经济影响，我们采用的经济模式类似于全球贸易分析项目（ GTAP）平台，它 能 捕捉经济自由化已经发生并可能在不久的将来
