1、 外文翻译 原文 Trade Finance in a Liquidity Crisis Material Source: Policy Research Working Paper of The World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network International Trade Department Author: Tore Ellingsen and Jonas Vlachos 1 Introduction The current economic crisis is characterized by a sev
2、ere contraction of credit. Although reliable statistics are scarce, several observers note that this contraction also appears to have hit the trade finance sector hard (Auboin, 2009). As trade finance plays a critical role in supporting international trade (80-90 percent of world trade relies on tra
3、de finance), the shortage of trade finance potentially has severe consequences for the world economy. Indeed, the onset of the financial crisis during the fall of 2008 was accompanied by a dramatic drop in international trade. By themselves, the declines in trade and trade finance do not necessarily
4、 provide reasons for targeted government interventions. First of all, demand is falling and exports along with it. Further, risk levels have gone up which motivates an increase in the cost of all types of credit. Any resources spent on trade finance provision could be used to relieve other constrain
5、ts in the economy so it is not obvious that targeting trade finance is warranted. In this note, we discuss the consequences from the dryingup of trade finance and address the question if targeted trade credit policies are motivated. Our main argument in favor of trade finance targeting in times of a
6、 financial crisisis that firms are then likely to have an incentive to hoard cash. When hoarding occurs, funding for inter-firm transactions has greater social value than other funding, because trade finance cannot be hoarded by borrowers. Thus, the reasons for promoting trade finance are stronger t
7、han for promoting credit in general. While these arguments pertain both to domestic and international trade finance, we argue that they are stronger in the international context. Because international loan enforcement is weaker than domestic enforcement, sellers are less willing to keep internationa
8、l loans on their books, and it is the sellers insistence on immediate payment that creates the demand for liquidity in the first place. The crisis also means that uncertainty has increased, probably magnifying problems of asymmetric information in the credit market. We discuss the effects that asymm
9、etric information about financial constraints can have on inter-firm trade.While we find that such financial uncertainty is harmful, our conclusion is that general financial easing may be as effective as specific easing of trade finance for dealing with this problem. The paper is organized as follow
10、s. The next two sections provide some brief definitions and some background. Section 2 focuses on the details of trade finance, whereas Section 3 gives a brief overview of the role of financial frictions in international trade. Section 4 outlines our main argument for trade finance support. A formal
11、 model buttressing our argument is presented in Section 5. Sections 6 and 7 discuss, in a similarly formal way, some of the issues that our basic model neglects. The Sections 5-7 may thus be skipped by readers without an interest in checking the fine details of our arguments. 2 Definitions and basic
12、 theory A broad definition of trade finance is any financial arrangements connected to inter-firm commercial transactions. By this definition, extension of ordinary trade credit is an example of trade finance. A narrow definition of trade finance is the funding of individual international commercial
13、 transactions by financial intermediaries. Even the broadly defined trade finance phenomenon is puzzling at first glance. Why do firms that are not specializing in financial intermediation extend credit to other firms? A common explanation for this is that firms in a business relationship acquire in
14、formation about each other that it would be expensive (or even impossible) for banks to obtain. While plausible, the basic monitoring story does not explain why trade finance is almost exclusively provided in-kind; if the monitoring advantage is so great, who dont firms also lend cash to each other?
15、 One explanation for this pattern is that firms with access to funding for the purchase of illiquid assets are less tempted to engage in activities that are undesirable from the investors point of view, as discussed by Burkart and Ellingsen (2004). Since in-kind credit is expensive to divert to othe
16、r usages, potential moral hazard problems on the borrowers side are reduced when trade credit is extended. This has the important implication that trade credit and other types of credit are complements rather than substitutes, a prediction that is supported by evidence in Giannetti et al (2009). Suc
17、h complementarities suggest that alternative sources of funding cannot fill the gap when trade credit dries up. Instead, reduced trade credit will worsen the access to other types of credit as well. While this would seem to be a general argument in favor of targeting trade finance over other types o
18、f interventions, such a conclusion cannot necessarily be drawn. The reason is that the value of this additional bank credit in principle could be extracted by the seller who provides the trade credit. Thus, it is not clear that the trade credit multiplier effect justifies specific trade credit subsi
19、dies. Rather, it is an argument for relaxing the sellers access to finance by improving the workings of the financial sector in general. The narrow definition of trade finance restricts attention to international transactions that are directly funded by intermediaries. Of course, not all internation
20、al transactions are intermediated; sometimes the seller keeps the receivable on the own books as is common for domestic trade credit. However, the more significant role of intermediaries in international trade is interesting, because it informs us that there could be greater obstacles to the extensi
21、on of international trade credit. Our interpretation is that sellers are more worried about strategic default in the case of foreign buyers. Thus, sellers tend to insist on upfront payment from foreigners.2 Since the foreign buyer frequently needs the credit, the natural arrangement is to borrow fro
22、m a bank in the own country. That bank in turn, for the reasons discussed above, is more willing to provide specific loans for input purchases than to provide general cash loans. Hence, one natural arrangement is for the buyers bank to verify the shipment, and pay upon delivery to the sellers bank,
23、while providing a loan to the buyer. According to our analysis, the need for immediate payments due to fears of strategic default is the deep reason why trade finance is so vulnerable to liquidity crises. The importance of strategic default fears is demonstrated by the numerous studies documenting t
24、hat international contract enforment is a serious concern for firms involved in international trade (Rauch, 2001).3 Similarly, cross-border trust has also been shown to be an important determinant of international trade and investment (Guiso et al, 2008). 3 Finance, trade, and FDI Financial markets
25、and intermediaries play an important role in the modern economy by reducing frictions between borrowers and lenders. To a large extent such frictions are caused by informational asymmetries between the transacting parties. There is by now a substantial body of theoretical and empirical work showing
26、that financial frictions have a substantial impact on international trade.For example, Chaney (2005) shows that if there are fixed costs for entering the export market, liquidity constraints can prevent some firms from exporting even when it would otherwise be profitable to do so.4 Svaleryd and Vlac
27、hos (2002, 2005) provide evidence for such a link by finding that countries with well developed financial markets tend to trade more and to export relatively more in sectors highly dependent on external financing. Relatedly, Manova (2008) finds that equity market liberalizations tend to boost export
28、s and particularly so in industries were firms are likely to face liquidity constraints. Not only trade, but also the behavior of multinational firms (MNCs) and their suppliers are affected by financial constraints. Consistent with an explanation based on fixed costs for liquidity constrained local
29、firms to enter production, Chor et al (2008) find that MNCs are more likely to undertake vertical investments in countries with well developed financial markets. In other words, local firms are more likely to become part of an international supply chain when they are less liquidity constrained. Theo
30、retically, it is plausible that interacting with a MNC can reduce such liquidity constraints: First of all, less credit constrained MNCs extend credit to constrained local suppliers. Second, contracting with a MNC can increase the credit worthiness of a local supplier thereby alleviating constraints
31、. However, evidence in Javorcik and Spatareanu (2009) suggest that less constrained local firms are the ones that select into becoming suppliers to MNCs, rather than suppliers benefiting from the financial links to the MNC. Such evidence indicate that the decline in exports since the onset of the cu
32、rrent crisis is not solely due to a drop in demand, but that financial constraints are an important part of the story. To quantify the relative impact of a decline in trade finance is substantially more difficult, not the least because of the lack of data. On the one hand, the above evidence tell us
33、 that trade finance cannot remove all financial frictions in international trade. If that were the case, local financial development would not have such a strong impact on exports. The evidence that the investment strategies of MNCs and their local suppliers depend on local financial conditions furt
34、her indicate that international trade finance has its limits; after all, a MNC is better positioned to extend credit across international borders than firms interacting at arms length. On the other hand, the sheer amount of trade that relies on trade finance indicates that increased financial distre
35、ss in one country is likely to spill over to other countries through this channel. Further, it is known from previous crises episodes that domestic trade finance falls relative to sales in times of financial crises(Love et al, 2007). Some aspects of the current crisis suggest that international trad
36、e finance will be particularly badly hit. As opposed to domestic trade credit, international trade finance frequently relies on financial intermediaries; banks issue letters of credit and guarantees that are reinsured by other financial firms. Unlike most previous crisis episodes, todays crisis is t
37、ruly global and affecting all types of financial intermediaries. Thus, uncertainty about the credit worthiness of the issuing and receiving banks has added to the general increase in business risk brought about by the recession. Indicative of such effects is that the costs of trade finace have incre
38、ased sharply (Dorsey, 2009). 4 Conclusions To summarize, sponsoring trade finance is desirable during a liquidity squeeze primarily because the extension of credit is tied to actual current transactions. Thus, the additional credit cannot be hoarded. In the above discussion we show that these proble
39、ms are particularly severe in international transactions as it is more difficult to make credible pledges across borders than within borders. A second reason why multilateral organizations ought to support trade finance specifically, rather than providing funding more broadly, is that domestic polic
40、y initiatives are likely to place a relatively low weight on foreigners gains (see Economist, 2009). Since the support of trade finance typically involves supplying funds to the buyers bank, while primarily benefiting the seller, it is easy to see how these transactions will suffer under purely dome
41、stic policies. Sponsoring trade finance may also in general help to alleviate insufficient trade due to incomplete information among non-financial firms, but we think that unless there is a liquidity squeeze trade finance subsidies have no obvious advantage over general financial measures. 译文 在流动性危机
42、下的贸易融资 资料来源 :世界银行 扶贫 、 经济管理网国际贸易部 门的政策研究工作 报告 作者： 特勒 .埃林森和 乔纳斯 .范拉契 1 引言 当前经济危机的特点是信用的严重收缩。尽管缺乏一些可靠的统计，一些观察者指出这一收缩出现并严重冲击了贸易融资部门。因为贸易融资在支持国际贸易中承担了主要的作用（ 80 90%的国际贸易依赖贸易融资），所以缺少贸易融资给全球经济带来了潜在的严重后果。事实上，在 2008 年秋天的经济危机伴随着国际贸易 戏剧性的下降。 对他们来说，贸易的减少和贸易融资不为目标政府的介入提供了必要的原因。首先，需求量在下降，而出口也随之下降。其次，风险水平的上升促进了所有信
43、用成本的增加。任何在贸易融资供应上的资源的花费都是习惯被用来缓解其他的经济约束，所以被保证的目标贸易融资不是显然的。在本文中，我们将讨论贸易融资衰弱的结果和说明如果目标贸易信用政策被刺激这个问题。 我们的主要论点支持或赞同在经济危机时贸易融资的目标是公司们倾向于储藏现金的动机。当储存发生时，用于公司间交易的资金比其他资金具有更大的社会价值，因为贸易融资不能 被借款人所储存。因此，总的来说促进贸易融资的原因比促进信用更强烈。 当这些论点用于国内以及国际的贸易融资，我们认为在国际关系上他们更强。因为国际贷款比国内贷款执法弱，所以卖家相对不愿意保持国际贷款在他们的账户中，卖方坚持的即时付款促使了对流
44、动性的首要要求。 危机同时也意味着不确定性提高了，也许会放大在信贷市场的信息不对称问题。我们讨论在财政约束的企业间交易下的信息不对称的影响。当我们发现这样的财务部确定是有害的时候，我们的结论是贸易融资的一般财务缓解和特定缓解在处理问题时是一样有效的。 这篇文章和是如下组织 的：下面两段是提供一些简要的定义和一些背景。第二部分重点在贸易融资的细节上，第三部分简要概括贸易摩擦在国际贸易中的作用。第四部分概括我们的主要论点即对贸易融资的支持。支持我们论点的一个正式模型将在第五段被建立起来。第六段和第七段讨论，在一个同样正式的方式中一些我们基本模型忽略的问题。因此第 5-7 段可能被读者忽略因为没有兴
45、趣去检查我们论点中的一些难以描述的细节。 2 定义和基础理论 广义的贸易融资的定义是任何和公司间的商业交易相关联的财务安排。在这个定义下，普通贸易信用的延期是一个贸易融资的例子。一个狭义的 贸易融资是金融中介机构的单独的国际商业交易的资金。 即使广义的贸易融资现象的定义咋一看很难理解。为什么没有专门化的金融中介公司会扩展信贷到其他公司？一个普遍接受的解释是银行在商业关系中的公司里去的相互间的信息是非常贵的。似是而非的，基本控制情况没有解释为什么贸易融资只提供以货代款；如果控制优势如此强大，为什么公司不借现金给其他公司。 由波卡特和艾林森（ 2004）的讨论得出这个模式的一种解释是公司更愿意把资
46、金投入活动中而不愿意购买非流动资产，这个观点是不被投资者接受的。自从一带贷款信用转为其他并变得昂贵时，借 款方的潜在的道德风险问题随着贸易信用的加强而减弱。这是一个重要的补充，即贸易信贷和其他种类的信用工具不光是替代品而且还是补充，这是歌安妮特和其他一些人（ 2009）以证据支持的预测。 这样的互补性说明了代替的资金反感不能填补贸易信贷衰弱的空缺。相反的，减少贸易信贷会使其他方式的信贷更加恶化。当这个变成一种普遍观点来支持目标贸易融资以上的其他干预类型，那么这个结论不一定会得出。这是因为原则上这个附加的银行信用价值原则上可以被提供贸易 信用的卖方所获得。因此，贸易信贷乘数效应能不能说明具体的行
47、业信贷补贴是不清晰的。换句话说，这个论点总的来说说明改善财务部门的工作可以放松卖家取得融资的条件。 狭义的贸易融资限制注重于那些中介机构直接提供资金的国际交易。当然，不是所有的国际贸易都是有媒介的；有些时候，卖家在其自身账户中保持一定的应收账款作为普遍的国内贸易信贷。然而，中介在国际贸易中的重要作用是很有意思的，因为它提示我们国际贸易信贷的发展会遇到更大的阻碍。我们的解释是相对于国外的买家卖家会更加担心战略性的债务拖欠。因此，卖家倾向于坚持国外购买的 事先付款。因为国外的买家通常需要信贷，所以自然普遍的安排是向自己国家的银行借钱。反过来，那个银行，因为上面提及的原因，更加愿意提供为内销购进的特
48、别贷款而不是普通的现金贷款。因此，一种普遍的方式是当买家装船和支付运费到卖家银行时为买家提供一定的贷款。 根据我们的分析，因为害怕战略性的拖欠货款所对即时付款的需求是一个为什么贸易融资在流动性危机下这么脆弱的重要原因。被大量研究资料证实，考虑到战略性拖欠货款的重要性是从事国际贸易的公司对国际合约的实施的一系列需要关心的事项（劳赫， 2001）。同样地，跨国的信任也被展 示为一种国际贸易和投资的重要因素。（桂索等人， 2008） 3 金融，贸易和外国直接投资 金融市场和中介机构现代的经济中扮演了一个很重要的角色因为其减少了借款人和贷款人之间的冲突。在很大程度上这种摩擦是由不同交易团体间的信息不对
49、称所造成的。在坚实的理论主体下和工作经验显示经济摩擦对国际贸易会产生大量的影响。打个比方，钱尼（ 2005）指出如果有进入出口市场的固定成本，流动性约束能防止一些公司在能够获取利益的情况下出口。萨瓦拉里和范拉契 （ 2002,2005）提供证据表明拥有良好发展的经济市场的国家倾向于更多的贸 易和运用外部资金出口相对多的高度独立的部门这样的资金联系。相关地，马努瓦（ 2008）发现股票市场自由倾向于促进出口，特别是在更愿意面对流动性限制的行业的公司。 不仅贸易，还有跨国公司的行为（跨国公司）和他们的供给都受财务限制的影响。于一个流动性限制的地方公司进入生产基于固定成本的的解释是一致的。 焦尔 和其他人（ 2008）发现跨国公司更喜欢去尝试在一些国家的发达的金融市场垂直投资。换句话说，当他们减少流动性限制时本地的公司更可能成为一个国际供应链的部分。理论上，这些和跨国公司的互动可能减少这种流动性的限制：首先 ，较少的跨国公司的信贷限制扩展到地方供应商的信贷限制。其次，与跨国公司的合约可以会增加对地方供应商信贷的可靠性从而缓和限制。然而，加沃斯科（ 2009）建议减少地方公司即那些将要成为跨国公司供应商的公司的限制，而不是那些能够从跨国公司
