1、本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文RISKMANAGEMENTINBOTPROJECTSRISKMANAGEMENTINBOTPROJECTSISSTUDIED,FOLLOWINGTHERISKMANAGEMENTFRAMEWORK,IERISKIDENTIFICATION,RISKCLASSIFICATION,RISKANALYSIS,RISKATTITUDEANDRISKRESPONSEORRISKALLOCATION1RISKIDENTIFICATIONINBOTPROJECTSTHERISKSOFBOTPROJECTSCANBEIDENTIFIEDINTHEFOLLOWINGCATEGO
2、RIESBAKER,1986CITEDINNADEEM,1998POLITICALRISKSCONSTRUCTIONCOMPLETIONRISKSOPERATINGRISKSFINANCERISKSANDLEGALRISKS2RISKCLASSIFICATIONINBOTPROJECTSTHEREHAVEBEENSEVERALTYPESOFRISKCLASSIFICATIONTHEFOLLOWINGARESOMEEXAMPLESOFTHEMCONSTRUCTIONPHASECOMPLETIONDELAY,COSTOVERRUN,FORCEMAJEURE,POLITICALRISK,INFRAS
3、TRUCTURERISKREFERRINGTOOTHERFACILITIESINDIRECTCOMPETITIONWITHTHEBOTPROJECTINQUESTIONOPERATIONALPHASERAWMATERIALSUPPLY,MARKET,PERFORMANCE/TECHNICAL,OPERATION/MAINTENANCE,FOREIGNEXCHANGE,OTHERCONTINGENCIESTIONG,1990BDEVELOPMENTPHASETECHNOLOGYRISK,CREDITRISK,BIDRISKCONSTRUCTIONPHASECOMPLETIONRISK,COSTO
4、VERRUNRISK,PERFORMANCERISK,POLITICALRISKOPERATINGPHASEPERFORMANCERISK,COSTOVERRUNRISK,LIABILITYRISK,EQUITYRESALERISK,OFFTAKERISKBEIDLEMANETAL,1990GLOBALRISKSPOLITICALGOVERNMENT,TECHNOLOGYLEGALFRAMEWORK,TYPEOFAGREEMENTCOMMERCIALMARKET,INPUT,CURRENCYENVIRONMENTIMPACT,ECOLOGICALCONSTRUCTION,DESIGN,ELEM
5、ENTALRISKSTECHNICALPHYSICALCONDITIONS,TRAININGFINANCIALFORMOFTECHNOLOGYOPERATIONALOPERATION,MAINTENANCE,OWNERSHIP,RETURN,CURRENCYREVENUEDEMAND,FINANCING,EVALUATION,DEVELOPMENTTOLL/TARIFF,WOODWARDETAL,1992THEREARESOMEOTHERCLASSIFICATIONS,SOMEOFWHICHARESTATICORDYNAMICFUNDAMENTALORPARTICULARGOVERNMENTS
6、OURCEORPRIVATESOURCESPECULATIVEORPUREFINANCIALORNONFINANCIALANDMEASURABLEORIMMEASURABLECHAROENPORNPATIANA,1998THESECLASSIFICATIONSFACILITATEALLTHEFOLLOWINGSTEPSOFTHERISKMANAGEMENTFRAMEWORK3RISKANALYSISINBOTPROJECTSTHEREASONSOFRISKANALYSISINBOTPROJECTSARESUMMARIZEDBYWALKERANDSMITH1995ASFOLLOWSARIGORO
7、USRISKANALYSISISNECESSARYBEFOREAPROJECTISEMBARKEDUPONINORDERTOESTABLISHITSFINANCIALANDTECHNICALFEASIBILITYITCANHELPTOSCREENOUTFINANCIALLYUNSOUNDPROJECTSANDGETMINDSWORKINGTOGETHEREARLYENOUGHTOOVERCOMEFORESEENTECHNICALDIFFICULTIESANINCREASEDUNDERSTANDINGOFTHEPROJECTRISKSLEADSTOTHEFORMULATIONOFMOREREAL
8、ISTICPLANSINTERMSOFCOSTESTIMATESANDPROGRAMMESKNOWINGTHEMAGNITUDEOFTHEPOSSIBLEIMPACTTHATMAYBECAUSEDBYTHECONTINGENTFACTORS,THEPARTIESCANSEEKFORBETTERALLOCATIONOFTHERISKSTHROUGHTHEAGREEMENTOFSUITABLECONTRACTCLAUSES,PROCUREMENTOFINSURANCEOROTHERRISKRESPONSEMEASURESAPARTFROMTHESE,AMOREPOSITIVEANDRATIONAL
9、RISKTAKINGATTITUDEWILLRESULTFROMACAREFULLYPREPAREDRISKANALYSISASTHERISKTAKERSKNOWWHERETHEYSTANDTHEREARESEVERAL,ORMANY,TOOLSANDTECHNIQUES,WHICHAREAPPLICABLETORISKANALYSISINBOTPROJECTSTHEAPPLICATIONISDEPENDENTONTHECONTENTSANDCONTEXTSOFPROJECTS4RISKATTITUDEINBOTPROJECTSTHEGOVERNMENTISMOVINGAWAYFROMTAKI
10、NGONPROJECTRISKSASIAMONEY,1996GOVERNMENTSEEBOTSCHEMESASAMETHODWITHALLTHETECHNICALANDFINANCIALRISKSBEINGBORNEBYTHEPRIVATEPROMOTERINATRADITIONALMETHODOFCONTRACTING,RISKSHARINGMAYBEALLOWEDANDTHECONTRACTORMAYBEABLETONEGOTIATEWITHTHECLIENTASFARASCLAIMSFORCOSTOVERRUNISCONCERNEDUNDERTHEBOTMETHOD,INWHICHTHE
11、CONTRACTORISNORMALLYALSOTHEDEVELOPER,THISISNOLONGERPOSSIBLEITISVERYIMPORTANTFORPROMOTERSTODEMONSTRATETOTHEGOVERNMENTTHATTHEYAREABLETOTAKEALLTHERISKSTHATTHEGOVERNMENTISAPPREHENSIVEABOUTTIONG,1995ATHESEDESCRIPTIONSAREPARTICULARLYPOINTINGOUTTHEGOVERNMENTSATTITUDETHATITISEXPECTINGTHEPRIVATESECTORSTOTAKE
12、ASMANYRISKSASPOSSIBLESOTHATITBEFREEFROMTHEMTIONGANDALUM1997AANALYZEDTHEREQUIREMENTSINBOTPROJECTSFROMTHEVIEWPOINTOFGOVERNMENTSTHETOPICSINTHESESTUDIESARE,PROPOSALEVALUATIONCRITERIA,THEFINANCIALANDCONTRACTUALELEMENTSINFINALNEGOTIATION,REQUIREMENTINREQUESTFORPROPOSALRFPTIONG,1995A,FINANCIALCOMMITMENTTIO
13、NGANDALUM,1997B,ANDIMPORTANCEOFEQUITYINTHEFINANCIALPACKAGETIONG,1995BPARTICULARLYINHISONESTUDYTIONG,1995A,HETESTIFIEDAHYPOTHESISTHEABILITYTOBEAWARDEDTHECONCESSIONINABOTTENDERISSTRONGLYRELATEDTOTHEABILITYOFTHEPROJECTPROMOTERTORETAINANDREALLOCATERISKSANDOFFERGUARANTEESAGAINSTRISKSANDUNCERTAINTIESFROMA
14、NANALYSISOFTHESTUDY,HECONCLUDEDTHEREISAPOSITIVEAGREEMENTINTHEVIEWSOFTHEPROMOTERANDGOVERNMENTRESPONDENTSWITHREGARDTOTHEHYPOTHESISONETHINGGOVERNMENTSSHOULDRECOGNIZEISTHEADDITIONALCOSTOFRISKTRANSFERTHEGOVERNMENTPROVIDESFUNDSFORPUBLICSECTORPROJECTSATCOSTANDWITHOUTCHARGESFORTHEPROJECTRISKSTHEPRIVATESECTO
15、RPRICESRISKSANDCHARGESMOREFORPROJECTSWITHHIGHESTRISKSAUNDERS,1998JOSHUAANDGERBER1992POINTEDOUTTHEPOTENTIALPROBLEMTHATTHEPUBLICHAVETOBEARAHIGHERTOLLPRICECAUSEDBYUNREASONABLERISKTRANSFERINAPRIVATIZEDTOLLWAYITISCALLEDVALUEFORMONEYVFMPARADOX,WHICHMAYOCCURINPFIPROJECTSINTRYINGTOACHIEVEVFMTHROUGHTHETRANSF
16、ERENCEOFRISKSTOPRIVATECONSORTIAOWENANDMERNA,1997ONTHEOTHERHAND,WHATISACONTRACTORSVIEWISSURVEYEDINTHEUK,ANDWALKERANDSMITH1995SUMMARIZEDTHEREPORTSASFOLLOWS“MAJORCONTRACTORSINTHEUKWOULDHAVETOACHIEVEHIGHERLEVELSOFRETURN,AQUICKPAYBACKORACHIEVEOTHERSPINOFFBENEFITSSUCHASDEVELOPMENTGAINSORBUSINESSFOROTHERCO
17、MPANIESWITHINTHEIRORGANIZATION”,ACCORDINGTOTHEREPORTIN1989“THE1993REPORTSUGGESTEDTHATAMARKETFORPRIVATEINVESTMENTCOULDBECREATEDBYTHETRANSFEROFANETWORKOFROADSTOTOLLEDSTATUSWITHINTHEPUBLICSECTOR,THECREATIONOFANUMBEROFCOMPANIESOWNINGSIGNIFICANTSHARESINTHENETWORKANDTHESUBSEQUENTPRIVATIZATIONOFTHOSECOMPAN
18、IES”THISREPORTINDICATESTHATAMARKETFORPRIVATEINVESTMENTCOULDNOTBECREATEDIFTHEROADNETWORKSWERENOTTRANSFERREDTOPARTICULARINDEPENDENTBODIESCONTRACTORSSTATEDTHATTHEYWOULDONLYBEPREPAREDTOTAKETHEPERCEIVEDINCREASEDRISKINPRIVATIZEDPROJECTSIFTHEGOVERNMENTTAKESAPOSITIVESTANCEONTHESUBJECTRATHERTHANPLAYINGWITHTH
19、EISSUEONAPIECEMEALBASISTHE1989SURVEYREVEALEDTHATTHEPRIVATESECTORWASEXPECTEDTOTAKETHEWHOLEBURDENOFRISK,ANDTHISMADEMANYOFTHEMWARYABOUTTHEIRINVOLVEMENTHOWABOUTBANKERSINTHEUKTHE1989REPORT“GAVETHECONSENSUSVIEWTHATTHEBANKSDIDNOTADOPTAPROACTIVEROLELEAVINGTHECONTRACTORSTOBETHEPRIMEMOVERSONEOFTHEREASONSCITED
20、FORTHISRATHERPASSIVEAPPROACHISTHELONGGESTATIONPERIODOFTHESEPROJECTSINDEED,BANKERSBELIEVEDTHATTHEIRRISKPOSITIONWASFARWORSETHANTHATFACINGCONTRACTORSITISALSOREPORTEDTHATBANKSWOULDNOTMAKELOANSTOFINANCEPUBLICSECTORPROJECTSWITHOUTRISKCAPITALALSOBEINGAVAILABLESAUNDERS,19985RISKRESPONSEANDRISKALLOCATIONINBO
21、TPROJECTSTHEPFIGUIDELINESINTHEUKRECOGNIZETHATTHEMINIMIZATIONOFRISKANDTHECOSTOFACCEPTINGITISGENERALLYACHIEVEDBYALLOCATINGRISKTOTHOSEBESTPLACEDTOACCEPTITSAUNDERS,1998INCASESOFDEVELOPINGCOUNTRIES,SOMEGOVERNMENTGUARANTEESAREGENERALLYREQUIREDFORFUNDINGMCCARTHYANDTIONG1991DESCRIBEDTHECOMMONRISKSANDSECURIT
22、IESCONSIDERINGTHEPROPERRISKTHISSECTIONDISCUSSESTHERISKANALYSISFROMTHESTANDPOINTSOFMAJORPROJECTPARTICIPANTS,IEHOSTGOVERNMENT,FUNDERSHOSTGOVERNMENTTHEGOVERNMENTSPRINCIPALRESPONSIBILITYISTOACHIEVEVFMORCOSTEFFICIENCYCEBYIMPLEMENTINGAPROJECTINTHISREGARD,THEBESTALTERNATIVEFORINFRASTRUCTUREARRANGEMENTMUSTB
23、ESELECTEDHOWEVER,VFMANDCEOFAPROJECTCONTAINUNCERTAINTYANDRISK,BECAUSETHEYAREVALUESOFTHEPROJECTINTHEFUTURETHEREFORE,EVALUATIONOFVFMANDCESHOULDBECONDUCTEDINTERMSOFRISKANALYSIS,TOOGENERALLY,VFMINCLUDESNOTONLYMONEYTERMS,BUTALSONONMONETARYTERMS,SUCHASSOCIALWELFAREANDTIMESAVINGINTRANSPORTATIONIFALLOFTHESEN
24、ONMONETARYTERMSARECONVERTIBLEINTOMONETARYTERMS,ADECISIONMAKERCANANALYZERISKBYTHEMONEYTERMASASINGLECRITERIONMONTECARLOSIMULATIONANDSENSITIVITYANALYSISAREAPPLICABLEINTHISCASEONTHEOTHERHAND,IFITISNOTTHECASE,MCDM,WHICHCANINCORPORATEPLURALCRITERIAINASYSTEMATICWAY,ISAPPLICABLETOTHEANALYSISSELECTIONOFTHEMO
25、STCOSTEFFICIENTCONCESSIONAIREISALSOANIMPORTANTRESPONSIBILITYOFGOVERNMENTCONCESSIONAIRESELECTIONUNDERRISKSHOULDBECONSIDEREDINTHISREGARD,HATUSHANDSKITMORE1997PRESENTEDAPOTENTIALUSEOFPROBABILISTICRISKANALYSISTOBIDEVALUATIONANDPREQUALIFICATIONOFCONCESSIONAIRESINADDITION,INORDERTORECOGNIZETHECOSTEFFICIEN
26、CYINACONCESSIONAIRESBID,GOVERNMENTNEEDSTOKNOWHOWRISKISANTICIPATEDANDINVOLVEDINTHEBIDFOREXAMPLE,LETUSSUPPOSECONCESSIONAIREAOFFEREDAHIGHERBIDPRICEORHIGHERTARIFFRATE,LONGERCONCESSIONPERIODBECAUSEHEANTICIPATESRISKSUFFICIENTLYANDASARESULTINCLUDEDTHERISKPREMIUMINTHEBIDPRICECONCESSIONAIREB,INTURN,OFFEREDAL
27、OWERPRICESIMPLYBECAUSEHEDOESNOTANALYZERISKSUFFICIENTLYINSUCHACASE,AWARDINGTHECONCESSIONTOCONCESSIONAIREBMAYCAUSEADISASTERBECAUSEBOTPROJECTSCONTAINMUCHMORERISKTHANTRADITIONALONES,GOVERNMENTSMUSTUNDERSTANDHOWRISKISANALYZEDANDANTICIPATEDBYCONCESSIONAIRESSOASTOAVOIDTHEDISASTERASSHOWNINTHEEXAMPLEANOTHERI
28、MPORTANTPOINTISRISKTRANSFERINBOTPROJECTS,GOVERNMENTSEXPECTPRIVATECOMPANIESTOASSUMEASMUCHRISKASPOSSIBLEHOWEVER,RISKTRANSFERISALWAYSACCOMPANIEDBYRISKPREMIUMASANADDITIONALCOSTBYANALYZINGRISKINTERMSOFLIKELIHOOD,SEVERITY,ANDRISKPREMIUM,AGOVERNMENTMUSTCONSIDERTHEBESTRISKTRANSFERLIKELIHOODANDSEVERITYOFRISK
29、CANBEASSESSEDSUBJECTIVELYBUTINASYSTEMATICMANNERBYAHPANDSOMEOTHERMCDMMETHODSRISKMAPPINGTECHNIQUEISASIMPLEANDEASILYUNDERSTOODTECHNIQUEFORTHISPURPOSEONCETHESETWOATTRIBUTESOFRISK,IELIKELIHOODANDSEVERITY,AREWELLASSESSED,RISKPREMIUMCANBECONSIDEREDINSODOING,THEUTILITYTHEORYWOULDBEWORKINGTHESUITABLERISKPREM
30、IUMCANBESETTLEDINANEGOTIATIONWITHCONCESSIONAIRESFINALLY,THEMOSTESSENTIALTHINGGOVERNMENTSHAVETODOISTOSETUPCLEAROBJECTIVES,EITHERSINGLEORPLURALWITHOUTDOINGIT,RISKANALYSISCANNOTBECONDUCTEDSUFFICIENTLYFUNDERSTHEREARETWOMAJORCATEGORIESASFUNDERSINBOTPROJECTSONEISLENDERANDTHEOTHERISINVESTOR“LENDERSTENDTOFO
31、CUSONTHEDOWNSIDERISKSWHILEINVESTORSTENDTOLOOKATTHEUPSIDEOPPORTUNITY”WALKERANDSMITH,1995LENDERSAREMAINLYCONCERNEDWITHTHECASHFLOWOFAPROJECTCASHFLOWOFAPROJECTISANALYZEDANDMEASUREDBYTHEFOLLOWINGTERMS,ASEXAMPLESRETURNONINVESTMENTROIRETURNONEQUITYROENETPRESENTVALUENPVPAYBACKPERIODPBPANDINTERNALRATEOFRETUR
32、NIRRBYCONSTRUCTINGCASHFLOWMODELS,LENDERSTAKEALOOKATSOMEOFTHESETERMSOFAPROJECTONEOFTHEVERYIMPORTANTANDDIFFICULTTHINGSINCASHFLOWMODELINGISHOWTOPREDICTANINTERESTRATEANDANINFLATIONRATE,OR,INOTHERWORDS,ADISCOUNTRATE,WHICHMUSTBEINVOLVEDINTHEMODELING,OVERTHECONCESSIONPERIODOFAPROJECTASLONGAS2030YEARSASMALL
33、CHANGEINTHESERATESRESULTSINAVERYBIGCHANGEINTHEPROJECTCASHFLOWTHECASHFLOWANALYSISISOFTENCONDUCTEDBYMEANSOFMONTECARLOSIMULATIONANDSENSITIVITYANALYSISSINCELENDERS,SUCHASBANKERS,CANNOTASSUMESOMUCHRISK,THEIRCONCERNISDIRECTEDTOTHEDOWNSIDE,IETHEWORSECASESINSENSITIVITYANALYSISINMANYCASESOFBOTPROJECTS,THELOA
34、NSAREMADEONTHELIMITEDORNONRECOURSEBASIS,LENDERSNEEDTOBEVERYAWAREOFRISKTHEREFORE,ANYWORSTCASESCENARIOISNECESSARYANDNEEDSTOBEEXAMINEDBYSENSITIVITYANALYSIS,ANDOTHERANALYSESASWELLTHEIMPACTSOFCHANGEINTHEINTERESTRATEANDTHEINFLATIONRATESHOULDBETESTEDBYSENSITIVITYTESTING,TOOHOWEVER,CASHFLOWANALYSISISDIFFICU
35、LTTOINCORPORATEQUALITATIVERISKFACTORSTHESEFACTORSINCLUDEPOLITICALRISKS,RISKSINMANAGEMENTBYACONCESSIONAIREANDSOONSINCETHESEFACTORSAREVERYIMPORTANTINBOTPROJECTS,THEYSHOULDBEANALYZEDSEPARATELYFROMCASHFLOWANALYSISTHINGSAREMORECOMPLICATEDANDSERIOUSINBOTTRANSPORTPROJECTSTHANINBOTPOWERPROJECTS,BECAUSELENDE
36、RSAREMOREEXPOSEDTOTHEDEMANDRISKINTHEFORMERTHANINTHELATTERGENERALLY,THEREAREMANYFACTORSINFLUENTIALTOTHEDEMAND,ANDTHEYINTERACTINCOMPLEXMANNERSINTHISCASE,RISKFACTORSANDTHEIRRELATIONSHIPSHOULDBEFULLYIDENTIFIEDBECAUSEINCOMEOFAPROJECTSOLELYDEPENDSONTHEDEMAND,THELENDERSHOULDRECOGNIZETHEIMPACTOFVARIOUSRISKF
37、ACTORSTOTHEDEMANDBYSENSITIVITYANALYSISSENSITIVITYANALYSISISAPPLICABLEWHENFUNCTIONSBETWEENINPUTVARIABLESANDOUTPUTVARIABLESAREEXPLICITONTHEOTHERHAND,NEURALNETWORKAPPROACHHASGREATPOTENTIALFORSENSITIVITYTESTINGINBOTPROJECTSINCASETHEFUNCTIONSAREIMPLICITHOWEVER,THISAPPROACHREQUIRESASUFFICIENTAMOUNTOFRECOR
38、DEDDATAINMANYCASESOFBOTENVIRONMENTS,ARISKOFCURRENCYEXCHANGERATEISONEOFTHEMOSTCONCERNSFORPROJECTPARTICIPANTSTHISRISKFACTORISINHERENTINBOTPROJECTS,PARTICULARLYINDEVELOPINGCOUNTRIESITMUSTBEFULLYUNDERSTOODTHROUGHATHOROUGHRISKANALYSISPROCESSFROMIDENTIFICATIONTOSENSITIVITYTESTINGLENDERSINGENERALARESUPPOSE
39、DTOBEWELLKNOWLEDGEDINFINANCIALTECHNIQUESACCORDINGLY,TECHNIQUESFORFINANCIALRISKHEDGING,SUCHASEXCHANGERATESWAP,CANBEEMPLOYEDASLONGASTHERISKISFULLYANALYZEDONTHEOTHERHAND,FOREXTERNALINVESTORS,THEIREQUITYINVESTMENTTOABOTPROJECTNORMALLYFORMSONEPORTIONOFTHEIRPORTFOLIORISKANALYSISFORINVESTORSISDIRECTEDTODIV
40、ERSIFICATIONOFRISKINTHEIRPORTFOLIOBECAUSEBOTPROJECTSAREHIGHLYRISKYBYNATURE,MUCHHIGHERRETURNISEXPECTEDANDREQUIREDBYINVESTORSSOURCEPRASANTAKDEY,STEPHENOOGUNLANASELECTIONANDAPPLICATIONOFRISKMANAGEMENTTOOLSANDTECHNIQUESFORBUILDOPERATETRANSFERPROJECTSINDUSTRIALMANAGEMENT引用NADEEM,1998）政治风险、完工风险、经营风险、财务风险和
41、法律风险。2BOT项目的风险分类现有很多种风险分类，以下按不同的角度分类施工阶段的风险完工延迟风险、成本超支风险、不可抗力风险、政治风险、基础设施风险（是指其他设施建设与正在筹划中的BOT项目有直接竞争的风险）。运营阶段的风险原料供应风险、市场风险、性能/技术风险、设备运营/维修风险、外汇风险、其他可能发生的意外（TIONG,1990B）。发展阶段的风险技术风险、信用风险、投标风险。施工阶段的风险完工风险、成本超支风险、性能风险、政治风险。运营阶段的风险性能风险、成本超支风险、责任风险、公平转售风险、上升风险（BEIDLEMAN等,1990）。全球风险政治方面包括政府和科技风险。法律方面包括框
42、架和合同类型风险。商业方面包括市场、输入和货币风险。环境方面包括影响和生态风险。建设、设计、元素风险技术方面包括物理状态和训练风险。金融方面包括科技形式风险。操作方面包括运行风险、维护风险、所有权风险、回报和货币风险。收益方面包括需求风险、融资风险、评估风险和发展风险（人数/关税,WOODWARD等,1992）。还有一些其他的风险分类像静态或动态分类；理论或特定分类；政府消息来源或私人来源分类；投机或投资分类；金融或非金融分类；以及可衡量或不可估量的风险分类（CHAROENPORNPATIANA,1998）。这些分类将有助于形成下列所有风险管理框架。3BOT项目的风险分析WALKERANDSM
43、ITH（1995）总结BOT项目风险分析的原因如下为了建立财务和技术的可行性，在实施项目之前进行严谨的可行性分析是很有必要的。它有助于筛选经济上不健全的项目，并且同时事先工作以克服可预见的技术困难。对项目风险认识的不断增加，可以推动制定基于成本估计和项目的更实际的计划。另外，了解由意外因素所可能引起的影响程度，从而当事人就可以通过合适的合同条款、保险采购或其他风险的应对措施寻求更好的风险分配办法。除此之外，完善的风险分析可以使冒险者知道他们的立场，从而采取更积极和理性的冒险态度。还有几个或更多的工具和技术可适用于BOT项目的风险分析，这是一个依赖于内容和环境项目的应用程序。4BOT项目中的风险
44、态度政府正在远离承担项目的风险（ASIAMONEY,1996）。政府把BOT方案看作一种方法它所有的技术和金融风险均由私人发起者承担在订立合同的传统方法中允许风险分担，而且承包商还可与客户就与费用超支有关的要求进行谈判。而在BOT的方法下,由于承包商通常也是开发者，上述情况就不可能实现了。发起人向政府证明他们能承担所有政府所担忧的一切风险是很重要的（TIONG1995A）。以上的描述中特别指出政府的态度是期望私人部门尽可能多的承担风险，这样政府就可以远离风险了。TIONG和ALUM（1997）从政府的角度分析了BOT项目的要求。在这些研究中有以下几个主题建议的评价标准、最后谈判中的财政和契约因
45、素、要求计划建议书（RFP）（TIONG征求建议书,1995）、财务承诺（TIONG和ALUM,1997B）以及财务软件平等的重要性（TIONG,1995B）。特别是在他的一项研究中（TIONG1995A）,他证明了一个假说具有BOT招标特许权的能力，很大程度上与项目发起人保留和重新分配风险、提供担保规避风险和不确定性因素有密切联系。通过研究分析，他得出结论在发起者和政府之间的假设也存在积极的协议达成。政府还应该意识到额外成本的风险转移。政府为公共部门项目按原价提供资金但是没有要求承担项目风险，而私人部门的价格风险却使政府对高风险的项目收费较多（SAUNDERS,1998）。JOSHUAAND
46、GERBER（1992）指出了一个潜在的问题，即由于收费公路私有化中不合理的风险转移而造成市民必须承担较高的收费价格。它被称为现金价值（VFM）悖论，这可能发生在以实现现金价值为目的的PFI项目中，这是通过努力把风险转移给私人财团的一个项目（OWENANDMERNA,1997）。另一方面，1989年报道称英国调查了对承包商的看法，WALKER和SMITH（1995）总结的汇报如下“英国主要的承包商必须获得一个快速回报或取得其他附带利益的较高回报水平，如发展取得或与组织中的其他公司交易取得”，“1993年的报告指出，公共部门通过把一系列的公路网转为收费公路，随后使在公路网中拥有大量股份的公司私有
47、化，这样就可以创造一个私人投资市场”。该报告指出，如果公路网不转移到特定的独立机构，那么私人投资市场将无法产生。承包商阐明，只要政府在此问题上不是随便玩玩而是采取积极的态度，他们将准备承担在私有化项目中不断增加的感知风险在1989年的一项调查中表明，私营部门预期会承担所有的风险重担，这使其中许多人对他们的参与持谨慎态度。英国银行家的看法又如何呢1989年的报告指出“普遍观点也认为主要的推动力是因为银行没有采取积极主动的角色离开承包商。这种被动做法的原因之一是因为这些项目的酝酿时间长事实上，银行家认为他们所面临的风险状况相对于承包商要更糟”。另据报道，银行不会贷款给没有可用风险资金的公共部门项目
48、（SAUNDERS,1998）。5BOT项目的风险应对和风险分担英国的PFI准则认为风险最小化和成本分担通常是通过分配风险，使最有条件接受风险的人承担来实现（SAUNDERS,1998）。发展中国家要取得政府担保一般需要有资金。MCCARTHY和TIONG（1991）描述了考虑适当风险情况下的常见风险和证券。这部分从主要项目参与者即从东道国政府和资助者的立场来讨论风险分析。东道国政府政府的主要责任是要在实施项目中取得现金价值悖论（VFM）或成本效率（CE）。在此方面选定基础设施的协议是最好的选择。然而，由于一个项目的现金价值悖论和和成本效率是对项目未来的价值而言，所以他们包含不确定性和风险。因
49、此，现金价值悖论和和成本效率的评估也应在风险分析的同时进行。一般来说，现金价值悖论不仅包括货币条款，同时也包括非货币性条款，如社会福利和运输节省时间。如果这些非货币性条款都可以兑换成货币条款，那么一个决策者就可以单一分析由货币条款作为标准术语的风险。MONTECARLO认为模拟和敏感性分析在这种情况下也可适用。另一方面，如果这样不行，那么多目标决策就可以系统地纳入一个多元的标准以适用于分析。选取最具有成本效益的特许公司也是政府的重要责任。在考虑风险的情况下，特许公司的选择应加以考虑。在这方面，HATUSH和SKITMORE（1997）提出可以使用风险分析概率来评价投标资格和预先的特许经营资格。此外，为了识别特许公司投标时的成本效益，政府需要知道投标时所能预期的风险。例如，我们假设特许公司提供了一个比较高的买入价（或更高的关税税率，更长的优惠期），因为他预期的风险充分，因此价款中包括投标价格以外的风险溢价。反过来，特许公司B提供了一个较低的价格，只是因为他没有进行充分的风险分析。在这种情况下，如果把特许权授予特许公司B的话就可能会导致一场灾难。由于BOT项目比传统项目包含的风险多，政府必须了解风险分析和特许权预期，从而避免如示例所示的灾难。另外重要的一点就是风险转移。在BOT项目中，政府希望私营公司尽可能多的承担风险。然而，额外的成本风险溢价
