投资，融资和股利决策在解释公司股权结构中的作用：来自西班牙的经验数据【外文翻译】.doc

1、本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文THEROLEOFINVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONSINEXPLAININGCORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREEMPIRICALEVIDENCEFROMSPAIN1、INTRODUCTIONTHEREISEXTENSIVETHEORETICALANDEMPIRICALRESEARCHONHOWCORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREINFLUENCESFINANCING,DIVIDENDANDINVESTMENTDECISIONSHOWEVER,THEREISLITTLEEVIDEN

2、CEONTHEDETERMINANTSOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE,ESPECIALLYONTHEEFFECTOFTHESEINVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONSONAFIRMSINSIDEANDOUTSIDESHAREHOLDINGSTHECLEARREVERSALOFTHEEFFECTOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREONINVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONS,ANDTHERESULTINGENDOGENEITY,DISCOURAGESRESEARCHERSFROMADDRESSINGSU

3、CHANANALYSISWEOVERCOMETHISDRAWBACKTHANKSTOTHEUSEOFTHEGENERALISEDMETHODOFMOMENTSGMMTHISESTIMATIONMETHODCONTROLSFORTHEENDOGENEITYPROBLEMAND,CONSEQUENTLY,ITALLOWSUSTOSTUDYTHEROLEPLAYEDBYINVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONSINEXPLAININGCORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREINORDERTOPROVIDENEWEVIDENCEONONEOFTHEM

4、OSTINTERESTINGTOPICSINCORPORATEGOVERNANCEOURPAPERMAKESASIGNIFICANTCONTRIBUTIONTOTHECORPORATEGOVERNANCELITERATUREINATLEASTTHREEWAYSFIRST,WEOFFERNEWEVIDENCEONTHEDETERMINANTSOFCORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE,MAINLYFOCUSINGONTHEEFFECTSOFINVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONSONINSIDERSTAKESANDOWNERSHIPCONC

5、ENTRATIONLEVELSSECOND,WEANALYSETHEINTERACTIONBETWEENINSIDEROWNERSHIPANDOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATION,BOTHOFWHICHARECONSIDEREDASAGENCYCOSTCONTROLMECHANISMS,BYTAKINGINTOACCOUNTTHECONVERGENCEOFINTERESTSANDENTRENCHMENTEFFECTSINTHECASEOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONTHIRD,WECONTRIBUTENEWEVIDENCETOCORPORATEGOVERNANCEBYF

6、OCUSINGONTHESPANISHCASEINFACT,THESPANISHCASEISINTERESTINGINITSELFBECAUSESPAINISACIVILLAWCOUNTRYAND,ACCORDINGTOLAPORTAETAL1998,PROTECTIONOFSPANISHINVESTORSISWEAKERTHANTHATOFTHEIRUKANDUSCOUNTERPARTSASACONSEQUENCE,THEREISLIKELYTOBEOPPORTUNISTICBEHAVIORONTHEPARTOFENTRENCHEDMANAGERSANDEXPROPRIATIONACTIVI

7、TIESONTHEPARTOFMAJORITYOWNERS,ASDOCUMENTEDINMIGUELETAL2004CONSEQUENTLY,THEAIMOFTHISPAPERISTOANALYSETHEROLEPLAYEDBYINVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONSINEXPLAININGCORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREUSINGSPANISHFIRMSTOACHIEVETHISAIM,WEDERIVETWOMODELSINSIDEROWNERSHIPANDOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONMODELSINACCORDA

8、NCEWITHFINANCIALTHEORYBOTHMODELSAREESTIMATEDBYUSINGPANELDATAMETHODOLOGYINORDERTOELIMINATETHEUNOBSERVABLEHETEROGENEITYSPECIFICALLY,WEUSETHEGMMTOCONTROLFORTHEENDOGENEITYPROBLEM,THEIMPORTANCEOFWHICHHASBEENDEMONSTRATEDBYTHEABOVEMENTIONEDEXTENSIVELITERATUREONHOWOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREINFLUENCESINVESTMENT,FINA

9、NCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONSACCORDINGTOOURRESULTS,THEFOLLOWINGCONCLUSIONSAREREACHEDFIRST,INSIDERSTENDTOREDUCETHEIRHOLDINGSWHENDEBTINCREASES,ASACONSEQUENCEOFTHEIRRISKAVERSIONSECOND,THEMONITORINGBYLARGEOUTSIDEOWNERSSUBSTITUTESFORTHEDISCIPLINARYROLEOFDEBTTHIRD,HIGHERDIVIDENDSENCOURAGEINSIDERSTOINCREASETHE

10、IRSTAKESINTHEFIRMSOTHATTHEYOFFSETTHEIRLOWERPOTENTIALOFSHIRKINGBYAPPROPRIATINGALARGERFRACTIONOFTHEDIVIDENDSPAIDOUTSIDEOWNERSAREALSOENCOURAGEDTOINCREASETHEIRHOLDINGSINVIEWOFHIGHERDIVIDENDS,SINCEDIVIDENDSARETAXDEDUCTIBLEFOURTH,THELEVELSOFINSIDEROWNERSHIPANDOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONAREALSOHIGHERWHENNEWINVE

11、STMENTSAREUNDERTAKEN,ASAWAYTOCONTROLFORTHEGREATEROPPORTUNITIESFORMANAGERIALDISCRETIONFINALLY,MANAGERIALHOLDINGSDEPENDONTHEFIRMSFREECASHFLOWANDINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIES,WHEREASOUTSIDEOWNERSDONOTSEEMTOHAVESUCHINFORMATIONWHENCHOOSINGTHEIRSTAKESOURSTUDYINVOLVESTWOIMPORTANTMETHODOLOGICALADVANCESINTHECORPOR

12、ATEGOVERNANCELITERATUREFIRST,WECONSIDERAWAYOFCONTROLLINGFORTHEENDOGENEITYPROBLEMBYUSINGTHEGMMSECOND,WECONTROLFORTHEWIDELYDOCUMENTEDNONLINEARITIESBETWEENOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDPERFORMANCEBYUSINGTHEMETHODPROPOSEDBYMIGUELETAL2004TOCATEGORISETHECONVERGENCEOFINTERESTS,ENTRENCHMENT,MONITORINGANDEXPROPRIATIO

13、NPHENOMENA,ANDBYENTERINGTHISINFORMATIONINTOTHEMODELTHROUGHTHEUSEOFDUMMYVARIABLESINTERACTEDWITHTHEEXPLANATORYOWNERSHIPVARIABLESTHISNEWAPPROACHISAPPLIEDTOEXPLAINTHEDIVERSITYOFOWNERSHIPPATTERNSACROSSFIRMSBYHIGHLIGHTINGTHEEFFECTOFINVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONSONCORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURESPECI

14、FICALLY,OUREVIDENCEAGREESWITHTHEGROWINGINTERESTSHOWNBYCORPORATEGOVERNANCELITERATUREINTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDBOTHDEBTANDDIVIDENDS,SINCETHESETWOCORPORATEDECISIONSARESHOWNTOBEMAJORDETERMINANTSOFAFIRMSINSIDEANDOUTSIDESHAREHOLDINGSTHEPAPERISORGANIZEDASFOLLOWSSECTION2PRESENTSOURMODELSA

15、NDDISCUSSESTHEMAINTHEORETICALARGUMENTSSUPPORTINGTHEPROPOSEDRELATIONSTHEDATASETANDTHEMETHODOLOGYUSEDINTHEESTIMATIONOFTHESPECIFIEDMODELSAREDESCRIBEDINSECTION3THEEMPIRICALRESULTSAREDISCUSSEDINTHEFOLLOWINGSECTION,ANDTHEPAPERFINISHESWITHOURMAINCONCLUSIONS2THEORYANDECONOMETRICSPECIFICATION21BASICMODELSOFC

16、ORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURESINCETHEMAINPURPOSEOFTHISPAPERISTOSTUDYTHEROLEPLAYEDBYINVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONSINEXPLAININGCORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE,THESTARTINGPOINTFOROURANALYSISISABASICMODELACCOUNTINGFORTHEEFFECTOFDEBT,DIVIDENDSANDINVESTMENTDECISIONSONAFIRMSOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREFINANCIALTH

17、EORYSUGGESTSTHATOWNERSHIPPATTERNSDIFFERBETWEENINSIDEANDOUTSIDESHAREHOLDERS,ANDWEHAVETHUSSPECIFIEDTWOSEPARATEMODELSONEEXPLAININGTHEFIRMSINSIDEROWNERSHIP,THEOTHEREXPLAININGTHELEVELOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONLETUSNOWEXPLAINHOWFINANCIALTHEORYSUPPORTSOURECONOMETRICSPECIFICATIONBYDISCUSSINGTHEEXPECTEDRELATIO

18、NSHIPSINBOTHMODELSSTULZ1988ARGUESTHATHIGHERLEVERAGEALLOWSMANAGERSTOCONTROLMOREVOTINGRIGHTSFORAGIVENSTAKEINTHEFIRM,SOTHATINCREMENTSINTHEDEBTTOCAPITALRATIOBEYONDACERTAINPOINTLEADMANAGERSTOREDUCETHEIRSHAREHOLDINGSMOREOVER,SINCETHEFIRMSSHARESBECOMERISKIERASMOREDEBTISISSUED,MANAGERSARELIKELYTOOWNSMALLERS

19、HAREHOLDINGSWHENTHEIRFIRMSDEBTRISES,BECAUSEOFTHEIRRISKAVERSIONANDLIMITEDWEALTHITISALSOWIDELYACCEPTEDINFINANCIALLITERATURETHATDEBTCONSTRAINSMANAGERSSINCETHEYMUSTMEETINTERESTPAYMENTSORFACETHELIKELIHOODOFLOSINGTHEIRJOBSINCASEOFBANKRUPTCYJENSEN,1986DEBTFINANCINGTHUSLIMITSTHEPRIVATEBENEFITSTHATMANAGERSCA

20、NOBTAINTHROUGHTHEMISUSEOFTHEIRDOMINANTPOSITIONAND,CONSEQUENTLY,THEINCENTIVESTOENTRENCHTHROUGHSHAREOWNERSHIPDIMINISHTHESEARGUMENTSLEADUSTOPOSEOURFIRSTHYPOTHESIS,ACCORDINGTOWHICHHYPOTHESIS1HIGHERDEBTLEVELSLEADTOLOWERLEVELSOFINSIDEROWNERSHIPTHEEVIDENCEINDENISANDSARIN1999ANDHOLDERNESSETAL1999SUPPORTSTHE

21、EXISTENCEOFANEGATIVEEFFECTOFLEVERAGEONTHEFIRMSLEVELOFINSIDEROWNERSHIPONTHEOTHERHAND,THESUBSTITUTIONHYPOTHESISHASOFTENBEENBROUGHTINTOPLAYTOJUSTIFYTHENEGATIVEASSOCIATIONBETWEENOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONANDDEBTTHUS,IFTHEFIRMSDEBTPROVIDESSOMEOFTHEMONITORINGOFMANAGERSTHATOTHERWISEWOULDHAVECOMEFROMCONCENTRATE

22、DOWNERSHIP,THENHIGHERLEVERAGECOULDBEASSOCIATEDWITHLOWERLEVELSOFCONCENTRATIONACCORDINGTOTHISSUBSTITUTABILITY,OURSECONDHYPOTHESISSTATESTHATHYPOTHESIS2HIGHERDEBTLEVELSTOLOWERLEVELSOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONTHERESULTSINGRIERANDZYCHOWICZ1994ANDDEMSETZANDVILLALONGA2001SUPPORTTHEEXISTENCEOFASUBSTITUTIONEFFEC

23、TBETWEENTHESETWOCONTROLMECHANISMSJENSEN1986POINTSTODIVIDENDPAYMENTSASANALTERNATIVETODEBTASAWAYOFELIMINATINGAFIRMSFREECASHFLOWAND,CONSEQUENTLY,ASAPOTENTIALDETERRENTTOMANAGERSCONSUMPTIONOFPERQUISITESONTHEBASISOFTHEIDEATHATINSIDERSMAYOFFSETTHEIRLOWERPOTENTIALOFSHIRKINGBYINCREASINGTHEAMOUNTOFDIVIDENDSTH

24、EYRECEIVETHROUGHSHAREOWNERSHIP,OURTHIRDHYPOTHESISSTATESTHATHYPOTHESIS3HIGHERDIVIDENDSLEADTOHIGHERINSIDEROWNERSHIPLEVELSONTHEOTHERHAND,SHLEIFERANDVISHNY1986JUSTIFYTHEEXISTENCEOFAPOSITIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONANDDIVIDENDSBASEDONTAXCONCERNS,SINCELARGESHAREHOLDERSAREUSUALLYOTHERCOMPAN

25、IESFORWHICHTHERECEIVEDDIVIDENDSARETAXDEDUCTIBLEINTHISWAY,DIVIDENDPAYMENTSCANBESEENASAWAYOFENCOURAGINGTHEPOSSESSIONOFHIGHERSTAKESINTHEFIRM,ASSHOWNINALLENETAL2000THESPANISHTAXSYSTEMISSIMILARTOTHATOFTHEUSAINTHATSPANISHSHAREHOLDERSTHATARECOMPANIESTHEMSELVESAREALLOWEDTODEDUCTAPERCENTAGEOFTHEDIVIDENDSRECE

26、IVEDFROMTHEIRINCOMESOTHATTHEYFACEANEFFECTIVEDIVIDENDTAXRATEMUCHLOWERTHANTHECAPITALGAINSTAXRATETAKINGINTOACCOUNTTHATLARGESPANISHSHAREHOLDERSAREUSUALLYOTHERCOMPANIES,WECANPURSUETHEABOVEMENTIONEDUSBASEDTAXARGUMENTANDPOSEOURFOURTHHYPOTHESISHYPOTHESIS4HIGHERDIVIDENDSLEADTOHIGHERLEVELSOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRA

27、TIONTHEEFFECTOFINVESTMENTDECISIONSONCORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREISNOTSOSTRAIGHTFORWARDTHEREVERSECAUSALITY,HOWEVER,HASBEENWIDELYACCEPTEDINFINANCIALLITERATURE,SINCEINVESTMENTISONEOFTHEMAJORWAYSTHROUGHWHICHOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREAFFECTSAFIRMSVALUEASJENSENANDMECKLING1976ASSERT,MANAGERSNATURALTENDENCYISTOALLOC

28、ATETHEFIRMSRESOURCESINTHEIROWNBESTINTERESTS,WHICHMAYCONFLICTWITHVALUEMAXIMISATIONTHEREFORE,THEHIGHERTHEINSIDEREQUITYOWNERSHIP,THEMORELIKELYITISTHATTHECONFLICTSBETWEENMANAGERSANDSHAREHOLDERSWILLBERESOLVED,ANDTHEMOREEFFICIENTTHEIRINVESTMENTDECISIONSWILLBEACCORDINGLY,HIMMELBERGETAL1999PROPOSETHATINVEST

29、MENTSHOULDPOSITIVELYAFFECTINSIDEROWNERSHIP,SINCEHIGHERINVESTMENTLEADSTOGREATEROPPORTUNITIESFORMANAGERIALDISCRETION,WHICHCANBECONTROLLEDFORBYMEANSOFINCREASESININSIDEROWNERSHIPCONSISTENTWITHTHISARGUMENT,OURFIFTHHYPOTHESISISASFOLLOWSHYPOTHESIS5HIGHERINVESTMENTLEADSTOHIGHERLEVELSOFINSIDEROWNERSHIPFOLLOW

30、INGTHISARGUMENT,ANDEXTENDINGITTOTHELEVELOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONBYWAYOFTHEMONITORINGHYPOTHESIS,WEPOSEOURSIXTHHYPOTHESISACCORDINGTOWHICHHYPOTHESIS6HIGHERINVESTMENTLEADSTOHIGHERLEVELSOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONASSUGGESTEDBYJENSEN1986,THEHIGHERTHEFIRMSFREECASHFLOW,THEGREATERTHEMANAGERSINCENTIVESTOMAKETHEI

31、RFIRMSGROWBEYONDTHEIROPTIMALSIZEIFCONCENTRATEDOWNERSHIPSOLVESFREECASHFLOWPROBLEMS,THENTHEDESIREDLEVELOFINSIDEROWNERSHIPANDOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONINORDERTOAVOIDOVERINVESTMENTISEXPECTEDTOINCREASEWITHTHEAMOUNTOFFREECASHFLOWONTHEBASISOFJENSENS1986ARGUMENTS,OURSEVENTHHYPOTHESISSTATESTHATHYPOTHESIS7HIGHERF

32、REECASHFLOWLEVELSLEADTOHIGHERLEVELSOFINSIDEANDOUTSIDEOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONTHEAVAILABLEEMPIRICALEVIDENCE,HOWEVER,ISCONTRADICTORYFORINSTANCE,THERESULTSINBERGSTROMANDRYDQVIST1990SHOWTHATTHEREISNOSIGNIFICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENEQUITYCONCENTRATIONANDFREECASHFLOWWHEREASLANGEANDSHARPE1995ANDHIMMELBERGETAL1

33、999FINDTHATFREECASHFLOWPOSITIVELYINFLUENCESTHEFIRMSOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONANDINSIDEROWNERSHIP,RESPECTIVELYINSIDERTRADINGLITERATURESUPPORTSTHEIDEATHATINSIDERSTRADEBECAUSETHEYHAVEPRIVATEINFORMATIONABOUTFUTUREPROSPECTSOFFIRMS,WHICHGRANTSTHEMTHEOPPORTUNITYTOEXPLOITTHEPOTENTIALDIVERGENCEBETWEENINSIDEANDMA

34、RKETEXPECTATIONSANDADJUSTTHEIRHOLDINGSTOTHEIRFIRMSFUTUREPERFORMANCEFORPERSONALGAINACCORDINGLY,TOBINSQSHOULDTHUSBEANIMPORTANTDETERMINANTOFINSIDEROWNERSHIP,INSUCHAWAYTHATMANAGERSINFIRMSWITHBETTERINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESAREEXPECTEDTOHOLDALARGERFRACTIONOFTHEIRFIRMSSHARESINORDERTOTAKEADVANTAGEOFPOTENTIALP

35、RIVILEGEDINFORMATIONONTHEFIRMSFUTUREPERFORMANCEANDASIMILARREACTIONWOULDBEEXPECTEDFROMOUTSIDEOWNERSWHENEVERTHEYHAVEACCESSTOSUCHINFORMATIONACCORDINGTOTHISARGUMENT,WEPOSEOUREIGHTHHYPOTHESISHYPOTHESIS8HIGHERTOBINSQLEADSTOHIGHERLEVELSOFINSIDEANDOUTSIDEOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONUSINGDIFFERENTPROXIESFORTOBINSQ

36、,THERESULTSINCHO1998ANDDENISANDSARIN1999CORROBORATETHEEXPECTEDPOSITIVEEFFECTOFAFIRMSINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESONITSMANAGERSOWNERSHIP,WHEREASLANGEANDSHARPE1995ANDMAKEANDLI2001FINDNOSIGNIFICANTEFFECTONTHELEVELOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONINCONTRAST,DEMSETZANDVILLALONGA2001REPORTANEGATIVECOEFFICIENTFORTOBINSQI

37、NBOTHINSIDEROWNERSHIPANDOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONEQUATIONS,THISNEGATIVEEFFECTBEINGGREATERONINSIDEROWNERSHIPTHANONOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONFIRMSIZEISALSOCONTROLLEDFORINBOTHMODELSACCORDINGTODEMSETZANDLEHN1985,FIRMSIZEISNEGATIVELYRELATEDTOOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONBECAUSETHELARGERTHEFIRM,ANDTHELARGERITSCAPITALRE

38、SOURCES,GENERALLYTHEMOREDIFFICULTITISTOOWNAGIVENFRACTIONOFTHEFIRMBASEDONTHISIDEA,OURLASTHYPOTHESISISASFOLLOWSHYPOTHESIS9LARGERFIRMSEXHIBITLOWERLEVELSOFINSIDEANDOUTSIDEOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONTHISNEGATIVEEFFECTOFFIRMSIZEONINSIDEANDOUTSIDEOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONHASBEENWIDELYSUPPORTEDBYPREVIOUSRESEARCHSOU

39、RCEJULIOPINDADO,CHABELADELATORRE2006,“THEROLEOFINVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONSINEXPLAININGCORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREEMPIRICALEVIDENCEFROMSPAIN”EUROPEANFINANCIALMANAGEMENT,VOL12,NO5,PP661687原文一THEROLEOFINVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONSINEXPLAININGCORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREEMPIRICALE

40、VIDENCEFROMSPAIN2、INTRODUCTIONTHEREISEXTENSIVETHEORETICALANDEMPIRICALRESEARCHONHOWCORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREINFLUENCESFINANCING,DIVIDENDANDINVESTMENTDECISIONSHOWEVER,THEREISLITTLEEVIDENCEONTHEDETERMINANTSOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE,ESPECIALLYONTHEEFFECTOFTHESEINVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONSONAFIR

41、MSINSIDEANDOUTSIDESHAREHOLDINGSTHECLEARREVERSALOFTHEEFFECTOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREONINVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONS,ANDTHERESULTINGENDOGENEITY,DISCOURAGESRESEARCHERSFROMADDRESSINGSUCHANANALYSISWEOVERCOMETHISDRAWBACKTHANKSTOTHEUSEOFTHEGENERALISEDMETHODOFMOMENTSGMMTHISESTIMATIONMETHODCONTROLSFORT

42、HEENDOGENEITYPROBLEMAND,CONSEQUENTLY,ITALLOWSUSTOSTUDYTHEROLEPLAYEDBYINVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONSINEXPLAININGCORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREINORDERTOPROVIDENEWEVIDENCEONONEOFTHEMOSTINTERESTINGTOPICSINCORPORATEGOVERNANCEOURPAPERMAKESASIGNIFICANTCONTRIBUTIONTOTHECORPORATEGOVERNANCELITERATUREIN

43、ATLEASTTHREEWAYSFIRST,WEOFFERNEWEVIDENCEONTHEDETERMINANTSOFCORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE,MAINLYFOCUSINGONTHEEFFECTSOFINVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONSONINSIDERSTAKESANDOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONLEVELSSECOND,WEANALYSETHEINTERACTIONBETWEENINSIDEROWNERSHIPANDOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATION,BOTHOFWHICHARECONSID

44、EREDASAGENCYCOSTCONTROLMECHANISMS,BYTAKINGINTOACCOUNTTHECONVERGENCEOFINTERESTSANDENTRENCHMENTEFFECTSINTHECASEOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONTHIRD,WECONTRIBUTENEWEVIDENCETOCORPORATEGOVERNANCEBYFOCUSINGONTHESPANISHCASEINFACT,THESPANISHCASEISINTERESTINGINITSELFBECAUSESPAINISACIVILLAWCOUNTRYAND,ACCORDINGTOLAPO

45、RTAETAL1998,PROTECTIONOFSPANISHINVESTORSISWEAKERTHANTHATOFTHEIRUKANDUSCOUNTERPARTSASACONSEQUENCE,THEREISLIKELYTOBEOPPORTUNISTICBEHAVIORONTHEPARTOFENTRENCHEDMANAGERSANDEXPROPRIATIONACTIVITIESONTHEPARTOFMAJORITYOWNERS,ASDOCUMENTEDINMIGUELETAL2004CONSEQUENTLY,THEAIMOFTHISPAPERISTOANALYSETHEROLEPLAYEDBY

46、INVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONSINEXPLAININGCORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREUSINGSPANISHFIRMSTOACHIEVETHISAIM,WEDERIVETWOMODELSINSIDEROWNERSHIPANDOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONMODELSINACCORDANCEWITHFINANCIALTHEORYBOTHMODELSAREESTIMATEDBYUSINGPANELDATAMETHODOLOGYINORDERTOELIMINATETHEUNOBSERVABLEHETEROGENE

47、ITYSPECIFICALLY,WEUSETHEGMMTOCONTROLFORTHEENDOGENEITYPROBLEM,THEIMPORTANCEOFWHICHHASBEENDEMONSTRATEDBYTHEABOVEMENTIONEDEXTENSIVELITERATUREONHOWOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREINFLUENCESINVESTMENT,FINANCINGANDDIVIDENDDECISIONSACCORDINGTOOURRESULTS,THEFOLLOWINGCONCLUSIONSAREREACHEDFIRST,INSIDERSTENDTOREDUCETHEIRHOL

48、DINGSWHENDEBTINCREASES,ASACONSEQUENCEOFTHEIRRISKAVERSIONSECOND,THEMONITORINGBYLARGEOUTSIDEOWNERSSUBSTITUTESFORTHEDISCIPLINARYROLEOFDEBTTHIRD,HIGHERDIVIDENDSENCOURAGEINSIDERSTOINCREASETHEIRSTAKESINTHEFIRMSOTHATTHEYOFFSETTHEIRLOWERPOTENTIALOFSHIRKINGBYAPPROPRIATINGALARGERFRACTIONOFTHEDIVIDENDSPAIDOUTS

49、IDEOWNERSAREALSOENCOURAGEDTOINCREASETHEIRHOLDINGSINVIEWOFHIGHERDIVIDENDS,SINCEDIVIDENDSARETAXDEDUCTIBLEFOURTH,THELEVELSOFINSIDEROWNERSHIPANDOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONAREALSOHIGHERWHENNEWINVESTMENTSAREUNDERTAKEN,ASAWAYTOCONTROLFORTHEGREATEROPPORTUNITIESFORMANAGERIALDISCRETIONFINALLY,MANAGERIALHOLDINGSDEPENDONTHEFIRMSFREECASHFLOWANDINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIES,WHEREASOUTSIDEOWNERSDONOTSEEMTOHAVESUCHINFORMATIONWHENCHOOSINGTHEIRSTAKESOURSTUDYINVOLVESTWOIMPORTANTMETHODOLOGICALADVANCESINTHECORPORATEGOVERNANCELITERATUREFIRST,WECONSIDERAWAYOFCONTROLLINGFORTHEENDOGENEITYPROBLEMBYUSI