1、 外文翻译 Bank Involvement with SMEs: Beyond Relationship Lending Material Source: Author: Sergio L. Schmukler 1 Introduction The “conventional wisdom” argues that SMEs lack appropriate external financing and are difficult to serve because they are opaque. Banks (particularly small or niche banks) are
2、considered to have an advantage in dealing with SMEs because they can overcome information asymmetries through relationship lending. We argue that the recent intensification of bank involvement with SMEs is neither led by small or niche banks nor highly dependent on relationship lending. Rather, all
3、 types of banks are catering to SMEs. Larger multiple-service banks have a comparative advantage in offering a wide range of products and services in a large scale, through the use of new technologies, business models, and risk management systems. New evidence from banks and SMEs suggests that there
4、 is a sharp transformation in the ways they interact with each other. Banks perceive SMEs as a core and strategic business and seem well positioned to expand their involvement with SMEs. The financing of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) has attracted much attention in recent years and has become
5、an important topic for economists and policymakers working on financial and economic development. This interest is driven in part by the fact that SMEs account for the majority of firms in an economy and a significant share of employment. Furthermore, most large companies usually start as small ente
6、rprises, so the ability of SMEs to develop and invest becomes crucial to any economy wishing. The recent attention on SME financing also comes from the perception that SMEs lack appropriate financing and need to receive special assistance, like government programs that increase lending. Various stud
7、ies support this perception. 2 The question of Small and medium-sized enterprise difficult financing The “conventional wisdom” argues that the inadequate financing of SMEs is to a significant extent rooted in “supply-side” factors. That is, the way in which the financial system works is biased again
8、st externally financing SMEs, leading banks and other financial institutions to be uninterested in being involved with them. The conventional view highlights a number of factors. First, financing SMEs is difficult because they are opaque.6 Opaqueness means that it is difficult to know if firms have
9、capacity to pay (they have viable projects) and if they have willingness to pay (due to moral hazard). This opaqueness particularly undermines lending from institutions that want to engage in the more impersonal or arms-length financing and require hard, objective, and transparent information to do
10、so. Second, relative to large firms, SMEs are more likely to be informal, particularly in developing countries. This not only makes opaqueness worse, but it also poses additional obstacles and risks to SME lending.7 For example, banks cannot lend to SMEs as much as would be warranted if firms were n
11、ot to report reliably their full financial activity on their balance sheets.8 Furthermore, informality implies that the firm has unrecorded, contingent senior liabilities to the government and its employees.9 Faced with the risk that tax and/or labor authorities could cause such liabilities to mater
12、ialize, banks would lend less to SMEs or charge a higher risk premium. Third, capital markets do not compensate for these deficiencies in the banking sector as they do not have a comparative advantage to deal with opaque and small firms. In effect, capital market financing rests on comparatively hig
13、h accounting and disclosure requirements which, by definition, opaque SMEs lack. In addition, capital markets are typically not a source of direct funding for SMEs, given that these firms are unable to issue debt or equity in amounts sufficiently large to attract investors (who prefer liquid issues
14、and are not willing to take too large a share of a single asset) and amortize issuance-related transaction costs (including compliance with complex legal, regulatory, accounting, and disclosure requirements). These factors normally render unfeasible the direct access to capital market financing for
15、SMEs.10 In sum, there are good arguments behind the conventional view that supply side factorsparticularly opaquenessplay a key role in the problems of access to finance for SMEs. 3 relationship lending To the extent that “opaqueness” has received special attention in the literature on SME financing
16、, so has “relationship lending,” with the latter seen by the conventional view as the obviousif not the onlyway to cope with the former. The common perception is that “relationship lending” can overcome “opaqueness” because it relies primarily on “soft” information gathered by the loan officer throu
17、gh continuous, personalized, direct contacts with SMEs, their owners and managers, and the local community in which they operate, to mitigate opacity problems (See Berger and Udell 2006).Relationship lending has different implications on the ways that banks lend to SMEs. First, while banks can compe
18、nsate for opaqueness through relationship lending, other things being equal, banks lend less to SMEs than if they were transparent and, hence, subject to arms-length lending technologies. Moreover, relationship lending implies a cost that makes dealing with SMEs less attractive and, in equilibrium,
19、raises the required returns for SME loans. Second, because of the personalized, community-based nature of the contacts, the literature has argued that it is difficult for large and foreign banks to engage in relationship lending. These banks are perceived as relatively less capable of processing “so
20、ft” information. It is difficult for them to quantify and transmit this type of information through the formalized communication channels of large/complex organizations or financial institutions for which the headquarters are far away.11 Therefore, large and foreign banks are not well suited to lend
21、 to SMEs, leaving this segment to small or niche small banks, which are close to the relevant sector, community, or neighborhood and, therefore, are typically domestic. Third, in better institutional environments (typical of developed countries) relationship lending is expected to be less common, be
22、cause banks would need to rely less on soft information and could count on well-functioning contract enforcement institutions, making it easier for them to screen SME debtors, originate and monitor loans, and recover loans in case of default. Finally, In this paper, we explore whether and to what ex
23、tent the main tenets of the conventional wisdomthat banks in general are not interested in dealing with SMEs and that small and niche banks do engage with SMEs but mainly through relationship lendingholds in practice. the question of whether SMEs are receiving “adequate” financing remains unanswered
24、. Hence, it may well be that the case that the patterns documented in this paper reflect only an embryonic “bancarization” process and that, as a result, the fraction of viable SMEs being served by banks is still dreadfully low. Alternatively, the SMEs that are not receiving adequate financing might
25、 simply be too risky or not have good projects for banks to finance. The type of data presented in this paper constitutes only a first step in this direction. 商业银行中小企业贷款 -关系型贷款 资料来源 : 作 者： Sergio L.Schmukler 摘要 ： 一般 认为，中小企业缺乏相应的外部融资，而且难以满足，因为他们是不透明的。银行（尤其是小型或利基银行）被认为在与中小企业打交道，因为他们可以克服信息不对称，通过关系型贷款的优
26、势。我们认为，与中小型企业参与银行最近加剧的既不是领导的小型或利基银行也不是 高度依赖借贷关系。相反，银行的所有类型都 迎合中小型企业。较大的多提供服务的银行中有大规模的产品和服务，通过多 种新技术，业务模式和风险管理系统的使用，具有相对优势。从银行和中小企业的新证据表明，有一个与他们交往的方式相互尖锐的转变。银行认为中小企业作为核心和战略业务似乎能很好地扩展它自身与中小企业的参与关系 。 小型和中小型企业（中小企业）的融资，近年来已引起广泛关注，并已成为经济学 家和金融政策制定者和经济发展工作的重要课题。这种 对中小企业感兴趣缘由 是中小企业在经济中 和就业 中 所占的重要份额。此外，大多数
27、大公司通常开始为小企业，使中小企业的发展和投资能力，对任何经济体系变得至关重要希望。最近对中小企业融资的关注也来自人 们认为中小企业缺乏适当的融资和需 要接受政府的方案，如增加贷款的特别援助。各种研究支持了这一 看法 1 中小企业融资难的问题 中小企业的资金不足在很大程度上是在 “供方 “植根因素。也就是说，在其中金融系统的工作原理是针对中小型企业的外部融资，导致银 行和其他金融机构在和他们在一起参与的方式 有 不感兴趣的。 以前的思想 突出了 这 些因素。 首先，中小企业的融资困难，因为是他们的不透明的手段，这是很难知道他们是否是有支付能力的企业（他们有可行的项目），如果他们愿意支付（因道德
28、风险）。这种不透明，特别是损害了想从事更多的贷款，并 要求客观和透明的信息去这样做的贷款机构。 其次，相对于大企业，中小企业更可能是非正式的，特别是在发展中国家。这不仅使不透明性差，但它也带来了额外的障碍和中小企业贷款风险，例如，银行不能贷款给 那些是否 企业没有充分可靠地报告资产负债表上的金融活动 的中小型企业 。 此外 ， 意味着企业有未记录的，或有负债的高级政府及其 雇用的 .与风险所面对的 税务 或劳动部门可能造成这样的责任兑现，银行将 减少贷款或收取较高的中小企业风险溢价。 第三，资本市场不能弥补这些有 缺陷在 银行界 中 ，因为它们不具有比较优势处理不透明和小型公司。实际上，资本市
29、场融资建立在较高的会计和信息披露要求上，按定义，不透明中小企业缺乏。此外，资本市场通常不是中小企业的直接资金来源，因为这些公司都无法 足够数量的 发行债券或股票 ，以吸引投资者（谁 不愿采取过大的份额单一资产）和摊销发行有关的交易，包括复杂的法律，法规，守法成本会计（披露要求）。这些因素通常呈现不可 直接通过 资本市场融资 。 总之，有良好的传统观点背后的论据，供应方面的因素，特别是不透明， 在 中小企业 融资问题上发挥着 关键角色，以资助中小企业。 2关系型贷款 在 某种 程度上不透明已得到了特别的关注在中小企业融资的文献中，所以有 了关系型贷款作为明显的一种方式，如果不是唯一的方法来处理不
30、透明化。共同的看法是，关系型贷款可以克服不透明，因为它主要依靠由信贷员通过不断收集，个性化，直接与中小企业又联系的软信息。企业业主和管理人员，在当地团体中已 用 这种方式，来减轻不透明的问题。 关系型贷款对银行中小企业贷款方式有着不同的影响。 （ 1）虽然银行可以通过关系型贷款弥补企业不透明的问题， 但在其他条件相同的情况下，比起那些信息透明的企业，银行对中小企业贷款较少，因此，仍然受贷款技术的限制 。此外，关系型贷款意味着由于惜贷成本的关系，使得要与中小企业打交道的吸引力，在平衡中提高了对中小企业贷款所要求的回报。 （ 2） 由于个性化，以社区为基础的本质联系，文献认为，这对于大型银行或者外
31、资银行从事关系型贷款来说很难。这些银行都被视为只能处理相对较少的软信息的银行。他们很难通过大且复杂的形式化的沟通渠道来量化和传递这种类型的信息，因此这些金融机构的总部都尽量避免它。另外，大型和外国银行也不是很适合中小企业，因此，把中小企业留给那些接近有关部门、社区或邻居的，通常是国产的小或利基小的银行。 （ 3） 在更好的 制度环境中 (典型的发达国家 )关系型贷款预计将不是很常见 ,但是由于银行将需要较少依靠软信息和能够依靠运行良好的合同执行的机构 ,使他们易于屏幕监控债务人 ,原产地和中小企业的贷款和贷款在违约时恢复。 3结 论 在本文中，我们发现 以前研究 的主要原理是银行总体上对处理中小企业贷款不感兴趣，只有小银行确实从事中小企业业务，但在实践中主要通过关系型贷款解决。 最后，这个是否适当的接受中小企业融资的问题还未解决，因此，在 关系型贷款这一 模式记录的情况下， 由于中小企业的可行性小部分被供应，但银行对这些企业的资金供给仍然是非常低的。 另外，中小企业 没有得到足够的资金对银行融资来说可能不仅仅是危险的而且不是一个好的项目。
