1、 外文翻译 原文 China s FDI Policy and Taiwanese Direct Investment (TDI) in China MaterialSource:Department of Economics Author: Jack W. Hou 1. Introduction As we begin the new millennium, there can be no doubt that Asia will be one of the most economically vibrant areas in the world. Indeed, this has been
2、 a continuous development for the past four decades. Since the resurrection of Japan in the 1960s-70s, Asia (especially East Asia) has shown the uncanny ability of almost unbridled growth and development. In the 1980s, the Four Small Tigers took-off and created a new terminology, newly industrialize
3、 countries (NICs),1 while the spectacular growth of China has made her the second largest economy in the world. In between, we also see the emergence of the successors of the Four Small Tigers; be it Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, or Vietnam. Though the area has seen some hard times rec
4、ently, from the burst of Japans bubble economy to the Asian Financial Crisis, recovery is well on its way and most economists would agree that Asia will emerge stronger than before as their economic institutions have undergon significant reform (for the better). Nowhere in the world can one see the
5、bustling markets and the vibrant demonstration of entrepreneur spirit. 1 The Four Small Tigers, along with Israel, were reclassified as “advanced economies” in 1997 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These are all well documented and have contributed to the phenomenal success of the growth in
6、 the region, especially in terms of trade (Hou, et al, 1995). What is perhaps less understood or emphasized is the unique multilateral interdependency of the economies that is continuously accelerating. This is not just trade of goods and services, but increasing in terms of capital movements, espec
7、ially in foreign direct investment (FDI). Japan has always been the largest investor, but recently the NICs are also exhibiting significant capital outflow. For example, Hong Kong is the largest “foreign” investor in China, while Taiwan is the largest investor in Malaysia, and among the top three FD
8、I providers for Vietnam, and the second largest investor in China. The main driving force for such behavior is the fact that Asia has a very complete system of economies in the sense that on the top we have the fully mature industrialized countries like Japan, flanked by the NICs (Hong Kong, Singapo
9、re, South Korea, and Taiwan), complemented by the rest of the “upward mobile” economies of the region (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, etc.). Much like the tropical forests of the Amazon River Basin, Asia is almost a complete ecosystem economically speaking. This is absent in mo
10、st of the other regions in the world, with the exception of perhaps EC and the former socialist economies, though the intimacy in their interdependence is still at a much earlier stage of development. Just as it is hopeless for any individual biologist to unravel the interdependencies of the Amazon
11、ecosystem, it is impossible for any economists to fully characterize the multilateral trade/investment relationship between the Asian economies. In this study, with this big picture in mind, we take a small first step by examining the causal effect of the capital flows from Taiwan to Mainland China.
12、 More specifically, we will focus on Taiwan firms direct investment in China. 2 We will term such investment as TDI (Taiwanese Direct Investment), so as to differ from thebroader FDI in China. Over the last two decades (1979-98), China has emergence as the largest FDI recipient among the developing
13、countries and, next to the United States, second in the world (UNCTAD, 1999). TDI in China has contributed significantly to the Chinas FDI boom. In fact, Taiwan was the second largest investor in China in most of years in the 1990s, next to Hong Kong (SSB, 1998). There is some suspicion that Taiwan
14、may indeed be the largest “true” FDI, as a non-trivial portion of Hong Kong FDI in China may be a form of “money-laundering”; i.e. funds that belong to the Chinas state-owned-enterprises being diverted to Hong Kong and then returned to China as Hong Kong FDI. While there is a growing literature on d
15、eterminants of aggregate FDI flows in China (for example, Pearson 1991; Pompret 1991; Kueh 1992; and Zhang 2000), the studies on TDI in China have been limited. The purpose of the paper is to investigate the influences of both macroeconomic and microeconomic factors of TDI in Mainland China and sali
16、ent characteristics of TDI. The study shows that the direct investment flows cross the Taiwan strait have been motivated by different factors given different macroeconomic conditions in both sides of the strait. It was found that TDI has been attracted most to the other side by Chinas huge market si
17、ze, low labor costs, and cheapabundant resources such as raw materials and land. We will pay special attention towards the evolution process of Chinas attitude towards FDI as reflected in her economic policies. At the same time, we will acknowledge the parallel economic development of Taiwan during
18、Chinas changing disposition towards foreign capital and market economic reform in general. The switch in Chinas FDI policy was a perfect match in terms of timing as far the TDI was concerned. This seemingly accidental timing is no coincidence. 3 like the fusion of two hydrogen atoms and an oxygen at
19、om into the molecule called water is no accident, the complementarity between Chinas FDI policy and the influx of TDI is caused by a complex interactive dynamics that warrants much attention. This paper, however, is not an attempt to understand this dynamism. Rather, it is our intention is modest: t
20、o characterize the sequence of events (both in China and in Taiwan), and the effects on TDI location choice. As TDI is on the rise, such understanding is paramount to the complete comprehension of economic dynamics the Greater China and may shed light for the development of similar inter-dependencie
21、s in other regional economic blocs. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discuss TDI in a broad background in which key macroeconomic factors in both Taiwan and China that influence TDI are identified. Section 3 explores microeconomic factors that contribute large TDI flows
22、into China, and discuss main characteristics of TDI in China. Section 4 provides a brief summary and conclusions. 2. Capital Flows Across the Taiwan Strait: Pull and Push Forces The recent development of TDI in Mainland China may be indicated by the number 0f investment projects and the value of the
23、 investment in Table 2. It sho uld be noted that two sources of statistics on TDI, the official data from Taiwan and China, differ substantially. The main reason for the differences is the restrictions imposed by Taiwanese government on TDI such that many Taiwanese investors did not report their cas
24、es to their government. Table 2 shows the gap to be so large that the numbers of cases and realized investment amounts from official data of China in 1991-98 almost double that based on Taiwanese statistics. The significant fluctuation of TDI over time also reflects such restrictions from Taiwanese
25、government, in addition to the troubled. political and military relationship between Taiwan and China. Nevertheless, the cases and magnitude of TDI flows into China are substantially large, and the shares of both cases and amount of TDI in entire China are around 10%, following Hong Kong, close to t
26、he U.S. and Japan (SSB, 1999). The broad background of TDI in China may be summarized the pull force of China that made China to be more attractive to Taiwanese investors and the push force from Taiwan that stimulated growing capital outflows. Prior to the comprehensive economic reform, China was es
27、sentially a closed economy with the bulk of its international trade with other fellow communist nations. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China embarked on the historical journey towards a socialistic market system with Chinese characteristics (Fei and Hou 1994, Hou 2002). To date, we have wit
28、nessed over two decades of such effort, and the economic result is impressive by any standard. One of the main objectives of Chinas reform is to open the Chinese economy to both international trade and foreign investment. To this end, and to further the degree of reform, China formally requested the
29、 membership reinstatement to GATT (now WTO) in July of 1986, and petitioned the WTO in November of 1995. However, both organizations have strict guidelines in terms of market access, both in trade and in capital investment. It is this latter issue that this paper concentrates on. Table 1 summarizes
30、the evolution of Chinas main FDI policy. In terms of inward FDI flows, Chinas first steps were ginger and cautious (Zhang 2000). Foreign investors appeared modestly in China after the passage of the “Law on Joint Venture” in 1979. While permitting entry of foreign firms, the law did not create a cle
31、ar legal framework to facilitate the complicated issues involved in foreign direct investments. As a result, problems like the lack of currency convertibility and the over-bearing red tape caused many would-be-investor to hesitate. In 1986, new provisions (called the “Twenty-Two Provisions“) was int
32、roduced. The timing, in terms of Chinas petition to be reinstated into GATT, is unmistakable. The main theme was the use of preferential tax policies to encourage or induce FDI. The goal is to attract exportoriented ventures, with the exception of offshore oil exploration and the real estate sector
33、(hotels and other tourism-related projects in particular). Under such an export-promotion FDI regime, the biggest difficulty facing most foreign firms is how to reconvert their investment and repatriate their earnings, as Chinese currency (the RMB) was not a convertible currency. Indeed, many of the
34、 FDI that are at least partially market-oriented (e.g. the tourist hotels, etc.) were unable to earn sufficient foreign exchange to cover their obligation at home, including distribution of profits to investors. On the other hand, Taiwan (and perhaps Hong Kong) firms were almost 100% exported-orient
35、ed, and were hence able to directly earn foreign exchange and had been the most successful in avoiding serious foreign exchange deficits. Not to mention the common culture and language provided links for “connections” and back-door channels to by-pass many of the official restrictions. As a result,
36、TDI and others with export-orientation rose steadily but Western investors, for the most part, did not view China as attractive relative to other developing countries. This “export promotion” FDI regime persisted till 1992. That was when China exhibited a shift in paradigm and began to gradually ope
37、n certain sectors of its domestic market to multinational firms, including services such as telecommunication, transportation, banking, and insurance. This change in regime is due to many reasons. Among them was that Chinas economy had reached a stage of maturity and confidence by 1992, as the real
38、GDP was over five times as large as in 1979, and its annual GDP growth rate was 11% during the period 1992-97 (SSB, 1998). Years of export-orientation have led to significant accumulation of foreign exchange which. allowed partial convertibility of the RMB. The most important consideration is undoub
39、tedly to send a signal of sincerity and commitment to the WTO. This, and the increasing pressure from the West, China finally allowed FDI firms to access (though only partially) her domestic. This institutional change, along with the increased purchasing power of the general population, led to a dra
40、matic rise in TDI and the broader FDI. Now let us turn our attention briefly towards the other side of the Taiwan Strait. During this same period, Taiwan has taken great strides both in terms of her economic development and political pluralism. It is not the intention of this paper to examine the po
41、litical climate. The focus is on economic issues. It is generally believed that Taiwan achieved economic takeoff in terms of Rostows terminology in the mid 1980s. Undoubted, the economic and industrial structure of Taiwan must have undergone major transformations as the old “sunset” industries gave
42、way to the new generation of technology oriented industries. Three macroeconomic factor have been identified to be important to the TDI boom: (1) Taiwans currency appreciated sharply in the late 1980s; (2) Wages rose substantially and at the same time there were labor shortages; and (3) Since 1987 T
43、aiwanese government has become increasingly liberalized toward FDI outflows. Taiwan appears to be the fastest-growing overseas investor in the developing world. Its outward FDI stock grew at an annual rate of 42% over 1980-91. The latest investment surge started in 1987, when the Taiwanese dollar ap
44、preciated by about 20% over the previous year and foreign exchange regulations were liberalized. In the 1980s TDI was distributed in roughly equal proportions between developing countries (South east Asia) and developed countries (the US) After that TDI was substantially biased to China and other As
45、ian developing economies. About 60% of TDI stock had gone into manufacturing by 1991; electrical equipment and chemicals. 译文 中国的外国直接投资政策和台湾 在中国的直接投资 （ TDI） 资料来源 : Department of Economics 作者： 杰克瓦特侯 当 我们开始新的千年，不可能有任何疑问，亚洲将是 世界上 一个最 具有 经济活力的地区。事实上，这一直是一个不断发展的 。 过去四十年 ， 由于日本在20 世纪 60 年代， 70 年代复活，亚洲（尤其是东
46、亚） 显示几乎肆无忌惮离奇的增长和发展的能力。在 20 世纪 80 年代，四 小 虎了 实现了 小康，创造了一个新名词，新工业化国家（ NIC），以及 中国惊人的增长，已经在 她的世界 的 第二大经济体。在 此 之间，我们也看到了四小 虎的继承人出现，无论是泰国，马来西亚，印尼，菲律宾或越南。 虽然该地区最近出现了一些困难时期，从日本的泡沫经济 破灭 在亚洲 出现了 金融危机，恢复良好的道路上，经济学家会一致认为亚洲将出现 变革， 他们的经济体制发生了较强的重大改革（为更好）。环顾全球，在四小虎的精神示范下 可 以 看到熙熙攘攘的市场和充满活力的企业家 。 随着以色列在 1997 年被 国际货
47、币基金组织（ IMF） 重新分类为 “ 先进经济体系 ” 。 这些都是有据可查，并 造就 了 快速 成功增长的地区，特别是贸易条件（侯等， 1995） 。这不仅是商品和服务贸易，但在以下方面 可以 增加资本流动，尤其是在外国直接投资（ FDI）。日本一直是最大的投资者，但最近也表现出显 著 的 资本外流。主要驱动力是这种行为的 动力 ，亚洲有一个非常完整的系统在这个意义上的经济体在山顶，我们有完全 成熟的工业化国家 比如 日本， 有 （香港，新加坡，韩国和台湾）补充，两侧的 “ 向上移动 ” 的地区（印度尼西亚，马来西亚，菲律宾经济的休息， （ 泰国，越南等）。就像亚 马逊河流域的热带雨林，亚
48、洲几乎是一个完整的生态系统 。 从经济上来说 ， 这是在其他地区没有的 但 也许欧盟和前社会主义国家例外，虽然亲密 但 他们的相互依存 关系仍处于非常早期的发展阶段。只是因为它是没有希望的，任何 生物学家解开的相互依存关系 甚至 亚马逊生态系统不可能 充分体现多边贸易 /投资亚洲经济体之间的关系 的 。 有鉴于此，我们需要通过 从台湾的资本流动第一步 在 中国内地 的因果效应 进行 研究， 。更具体地说，我们将集中于台湾公司在中国的直接投资 进行研究 。 因为这样的 TDI（台湾直接投资），以不同于更广泛的外国 在中国 的 直接投资。 在过去的二十年（ 1979 至 1998 年），中国已经成
49、为最大的外国直接投资接受 者 出现 在 发展中国家之间 ， 在中国 TDI 已经大大推动了中 国的外国直接投资热潮。事实上， 20 世纪 90 年代年之 初 台湾是中国第二大投资者 （国家统计局，1998）。 任然 有一些怀疑，台湾可能的确是 最大的 “ 真正的 ” 外国直接投资 的 一个不小的部分 ，香港的外国直接投资在中国可能是 “ 洗钱 ” 的形式，即属于 中国的国有企业 基金 被转移到香港，然后返回到中国的 香港 的 外国直接投资。 虽 然在中国越来越多的文献 表明这 是一个对外国直接投资总流量的决定因素（ 例如，皮尔逊 1991; Pompret 1991 粿 1992 张 2000 年），在中国 TDI 的研究是有限的。本文的目的是探讨宏观经济政策的影响 和 TDI 的微观经济因素在中国大陆 有 显着特点。该研究结果表明，直接投资流入台湾海峡两岸一直 有 不同的 动机考虑因素 这取决于 两岸不同的宏观经济条件。结果表明， TDI 发动机被吸引到了中国 形成了这个 最庞大的市场规模， 原因在于 劳动力成本低 ， 另一方面 ， 还有大量的 资源，如原材料和土地。我们将支 持 中国的态度， 特别关注外国直接投资 的演变过程 来 反映在她的经济政策。与此同时
