1、外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文THEINFLUENCEOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEONTHERELATIONBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDVALUECAPITALSTRUCTURERELATIONWITHCORPORATEVALUEANDMAINRESEARCHSTREAMSWHENLOOKINGATTHEMOSTIMPORTANTTHEORETICALCONTRIBUTIONSONTHERELATIONBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDVALUE,ASILLUSTRATEDINFIGURE1,ITBECOMESIMMEDIATELYEV
2、IDENTTHATTHEREISASUBSTANTIALDIFFERENCEBETWEENTHEEARLYTHEORIESANDTHEMORERECENTONESMODIGLIANIANDMILLER1958,WHOHADORIGINALLYASSERTEDTHATTHEREWASNORELATIONSHIPBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDVALUEIN1963,INSTEAD,REACHEDTHEPARADOXICALANDPROVOCATIVECONCLUSIONTHATAMAXIMUMLEVELOFDEBTWOULDMEANAMAXIMUMLEVELOFFIRMVAL
3、UE,DUETOTHEFACTTHATINTERESTISTAXDEDUCTIBLEMANYLATERCONTRIBUTIONSPOINTEDOUTTHATTHISEFFECTISCOMPENSATEDWHENCONSIDERINGPERSONALTAXESMILLER,1977,ANEVENTUALLACKOFTAXCAPACITY,DUETOTHEPRESENCEOFECONOMICLOSS,THEEFFECTOFOTHERTYPESOFTAXSHIELDSDEANGELOANDMASULIS,1980,ASWELLASTHEINTRODUCTIONOFTHECOSTSDIRECTANDI
4、NDIRECTOFFINANCIALDISTRESSALLTHESESITUATIONSENDUPCREATINGATRADEOFFBETWEENDEBTCOSTSANDBENEFITSPOINTLINFIGURE1CINDICATESANOPTIMALLEVELOFDEBT,BEYONDWHICHANYRISEINLEVERAGEWOULDCAUSEANINCREASEINTHEBENEFITSOFDEBTTHATWOULDBELESSTHANPROPORTIONALWITHRESPECTTOTHECOSTSOFFINANCIALDISTRESSFURTHERMORE,THISNONMONO
5、TONICRELATIONWOULDBEMODIFIEDEVENMOREWHENCONSIDERINGAGENCYCOSTSASWELLASTHECOSTSOFFINANCIALDISTRESSFINALLY,ONELASTSTREAMOFRESEARCHMYERS,1984,MYERS1984POINTSOUTMANAGERIALPREFERENCESWHENCHOOSINGFINANCINGRESOURCESINTHISCASENOOPTIMALLEVELOFDEBTBECOMESOBJECTIVELYEVIDENT,BUTTHISISDUETOTHEVARIOUSSITUATIONSTH
6、EMANAGERHADTODEALWITHOVERTIMETHEFUNCTIONOFMANAGERIALPREFERENCEHASPARTICULARRELEVANCEDUETOINFORMATIONASYMMETRIES,THEREFORETHELEVELOFFIRMINDEBTEDNESSWILLBEDETERMINEDBYTHETANGENTBETWEENTHEFIRMVALUEFUNCTIONANDTHECURVEOFMANAGERINDIFFERENCEFURTHERMORE,ITCANBEOBSERVEDTHATDEBTINCREASESINCORRESPONDENCEWITHTH
7、EBETTERTHEFIRMSREPUTATIONISONTHEMARKETCHEVALIER,1995RESEARCHHASSHOWNSIMILARITIESBETWEENFIRMSTHATBELONGTOTHESAMESECTORTITMANANDWESSELS,1988INOTHERWORDS,CAPITALSTRUCTURETENDSTOBEINDUSTRYSPECIFICTHEEMPIRICALCOMPARISONBETWEENTHETRADEOFFTHEORYANDTHEPECKINGORDERTHEORYSEEMSTOBECONTROVERSIALONONEHAND,EMPIRI
8、CALEVIDENCESHOWSMODERATECOHERENCEWITHTHETRADEOFFTHEORY,WHENREVENUEANDAGENCYPROBLEMSARETAKENINTOCONSIDERATIONCONTEXTUALLYONTHEOTHERHAND,THENEGATIVERELATIONBETWEENLEVERAGEANDFIRMPROFITDOESNOTSEEMTOSUPPORTTHETRADEOFFTHEORY,ASITCONFIRMSAHIERARCHICALORDERINFINANCIALDECISIONMAKINGITIS,THUS,CLEARTHATTHETOP
9、ICOFCAPITALSTRUCTUREISANYTHINGBUTDEFINEDANDTHATTHEREARESTILLMANYOPENPROBLEMSREGARDINGITASMANYAUTHORSHAVENOTEDRAJANANDZINGALES,1995CAPITALSTRUCTUREISAHOTTOPICINFINANCEBYANALYZINGINTERNATIONALLITERATURETHEMAINRESEARCHPRIORITIESANDNEWANALYTICALAPPROACHESARERELATEDTOTHEIMPORTANTCOMPARISONBETWEENRATIONAL
10、ANDBEHAVIOURALFINANCEBARBERISANDTHALER,2002ALIVELYCOMPARISONMADEBETWEENTHEPECKINGORDERTHEORYANDTHETRADEOFFTHEORYSHYAMSUNDERANDMYERS,1999THEATTEMPTTOAPPLYTHESETHEORIESTOSMALLFIRMSBERGERANDUDELL,1998,FLUCK,2001THEROLEOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEONTHERELATIONBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDVALUEHEINRICH,2000,BHAGAT
11、ANDJEFFERIS,2002,BRAILSFORDETAL,2004,MAHRTSMITH,2005THEBEHAVIOURALAPPROACH,THATCONSIDERSTHEPECKINGORDEROFFINANCIALRESOURCESINTERMSOFIRRATIONALPREFERENCES,CAUSEDANIMMEDIATEREACTIONFROMSTEWARTMYERSIN2000AND2001ANDJOINTLYWITHSHYAMSUNDERIN1999MYERS,20002001SHYAMSUNDERANDMYERS,1999STEWARTMYERSISTHEFOUNDE
12、ROFTHEPECKINGORDERTHEORY7PROBLEMSOFINFORMATIONASYMMETRY,TOGETHERWITHTRANSACTIONCOSTS,WOULDBEABLETOOFFERARATIONALEXPLANATIONTOMANAGERIALBEHAVIOURWHENFINANCIALCHOICESAREMADEFOLLOWINGAHIERARCHICALORDERFAMAANDFRENCH,2002INOTHERWORDS,ACCORDINGTOMYERSANDFAMA,THERESHOULDBEARATIONALEXPLANATIONTOTHEPHENOMENO
13、NOBSERVEDBYSTEIN,BAKER,WRUGLER,BARBERISANDTHALERMOREOVER,STUDIESONCAPITALSTRUCTUREHAVEALSOBEENDONELOOKINGATSMALLANDMEDIUMSIZEFIRMSBERGERANDUDELL,1998,MICHAELASETAL,1999,ROMANOETAL,2000,FLUCK,2001,DUETOTHERELEVANTECONOMICROLEOFTHESEFIRMSINEUROPETHEYARE95PERCENTOFTHETOTALFIRMSOPERATINGZINGALES2000ASWE
14、LLHASEMPHASIZEDTHEFACTTHATTODAYTHEATTENTIONSHOWNTOWARDSLARGEFIRMSTENDSTOPARTIALLYOBSCUREFIRMSTHATDONOTHAVEACCESSTOTHEFINANCIALMARKETSINONEOFTHEMOSTINTERESTINGSTUDIESDONEONTHISTOPIC,BERGERANDUDELL1998ASSERTEDTHATFIRMFINANCIALBEHAVIOURDEPENDSONWHATPHASEOFTHEIRLIFECYCLETHEYAREININFACT,THERESHOULDBEANOP
15、TIMALPROTEMPORECAPITALSTRUCTURE,RELATEDTOTHEPHASEOFTHELIFECYCLETHATTHEFIRMISINFINALLY,THEOBSERVATIONSOFMICHAELJENSEN1986,MADETHROUGHOUTHISMANYCONTRIBUTIONSONCORPORATEGOVERNANCE,ASWELLASTHOSEOFWILLIAMSON1988,HAVEENCOURAGEDALINEOFRESEARCHTHAT,REVITALIZEDINTHESECONDPARTOFTHENINETIES,SEEMSTOBEQUITEPROMI
16、SINGASAMEANSTOANALYZEHOWCORPORATEGOVERNANCEDIRECTLYORINDIRECTLYINFLUENCESTHERELATIONBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDVALUEFLUCK,1998,ZHANG,1998,MYERS,2000,DEJONG,2002,BERGERANDPATTI,2003,BRAILSFORDETAL,2004,MAHRTSMITH,2005INSYNTHESIS,ITISPOSSIBLETOAFFIRM,ASITFOLLOWS,THATAJOINEDANALYSISOFCAPITALSTRUCTUREAND
17、CORPORATEGOVERNANCEISNECESSARYWHENDESCRIBINGANDINTERPRETINGTHEFIRMSABILITYTOCREATEVALUEZINGALES,2000,HEINRICH,2000,BHAGATANDJEFFERIS,2002THISTYPEOFCONSIDERATIONCOULDHELPOVERCOMETHECONTROVERSYFOUNDWHENSTUDYINGTHERELATIONBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDVALUE,ONBOTHATHEORETICALANDEMPIRICALLEVELINFLUENCEOFCOR
18、PORATEGOVERNANCEONTHERELATIONBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDVALUECAPITALSTRUCTURECANBEANALYZEDBYLOOKINGATTHERIGHTSANDATTRIBUTESTHATCHARACTERIZETHEFIRMSASSETSANDTHATINFLUENCE,WITHDIFFERENTLEVELSOFINTENSITY,GOVERNANCEACTIVITIESEQUITYANDDEBT,THEREFORE,MUSTBECONSIDEREDASBOTHFINANCIALINSTRUMENTSANDCORPORATEGO
19、VERNANCEINSTRUMENTSWILLIAMSON,1988DEBTSUBORDINATESGOVERNANCEACTIVITIESTOSTRICTERMANAGEMENT,WHILEEQUITYALLOWSFORGREATERFLEXIBILITYANDDECISIONMAKINGPOWERITCANTHUSBEINFERREDTHATWHENCAPITALSTRUCTUREBECOMESANINSTRUMENTOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCE,NOTONLYTHEMIXBETWEENDEBTANDEQUITYANDTHEIRWELLKNOWNCONSEQUENCESASF
20、ARASTAXESGOMUSTBETAKENINTOCONSIDERATIONTHEWAYINWHICHCASHFLOWISALLOCATEDCASHFLOWRIGHTAND,EVENMOREIMPORTANTLY,HOWTHERIGHTTOMAKEDECISIONSANDMANAGETHEFIRMVOTINGRIGHTSISDEALTWITHMUSTALSOBEEXAMINEDFOREXAMPLE,VENTURECAPITALISTSAREPARTICULARLYSENSITIVETOHOWCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDFINANCINGCONTRACTSARELAIDOUT,SOT
21、HATANOPTIMALCORPORATEGOVERNANCECANBEGUARANTEEDWHILEINCENTIVESANDCHECKSFORMANAGEMENTBEHAVIORAREWELLESTABLISHEDZINGALES,200010COASE1991,INASORTOFCRITIQUEONHISOWNWORKDONEIN1937,POINTSOUTTHATITISIMPORTANTTOPAYMOREATTENTIONTOTHEROLEOFCAPITALSTRUCTUREASANINSTRUMENTTHATCANMEDIATEANDMODERATEECONOMICALTRANSA
22、CTIONSWITHINTHEFIRMAND,CONSEQUENTLY,BETWEENENTREPRENEURSANDOTHERSTAKEHOLDERSCORPORATEGOVERNANCERELATIONSASEXPLICITLYPOINTEDOUTBYBHAGATANDJEFFERIS2002,WHENTHEYPAYPARTICULARATTENTIONTOTHERELATIONSBETWEENCAUSEANDEFFECTANDTOTHEIRINTERACTIONSRECENTLYDESCRIBEDONATHEORETICALLEVELFLUCK,1998,ZHANG,1998,HEINR
23、ICH,2000,BRAILSFORDETAL,2004,MAHRTSMITH,2005,ARESEARCHPROPOSALTHATFUTUREEMPIRICALSTUDIESSHOULDEVALUATESHOULDBE,HOWCORPORATEGOVERNANCECANPOTENTIALLYHAVEARELEVANTINFLUENCEONTHERELATIONBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDVALUE,WITHANEFFECTOFMEDIATIONAND/ORMODERATIONTHEFIVERELATIONSIDENTIFIEDINFIGURE2DESCRIBETHER
24、ELATIONBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDFIRMVALUERELATIONATHROUGHAROLEOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEMEDIATIONTHERELATIONBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDFIRMVALUERELATIONATHROUGHTHEROLEOFCAPITALGOVERNANCEMODERATIONRELATIONDTHEROLEOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEASADETERMININGFACTORINCHOICESREGARDINGCAPITALSTRUCTURERELATIONEALLFIVERE
25、LATIONSSHOWNINFIGURE2AREPARTICULARLYINTERESTINGANDSHOWTWOTHREADSOFRESEARCHTHATFOCUSONTHERELATIONSBETWEENCORPORATEGOVERNANCEANDCAPITALSTRUCTURE,WHERETHEDIMENSIONSOFTHECORPORATEGOVERNANCEDETERMINEFIRMFINANCINGCHOICES,CAUSINGAPOSSIBLERELATIONOFCOCAUSATIONWHETHERMANAGEMENTVOLUNTARILYCHOOSESTOUSEDEBTASAS
26、OURCEOFFINANCINGTOREDUCEPROBLEMSOFINFORMATIONASYMMETRYANDTRANSACTION,MAXIMIZINGTHEEFFICIENCYOFITSFIRMGOVERNANCEDECISIONS,ORTHEINCREASEINTHEDEBTLEVELISFORCEDBYTHESTOCKHOLDERSASANINSTRUMENTTODISCIPLINEBEHAVIORANDASSUREGOODCORPORATEGOVERNANCE,CAPITALSTRUCTUREISINFLUENCEDBYCORPORATEGOVERNANCERELATIONEAN
27、DVICEVERSARELATIONBONONEHAND,ACHANGEINHOWDEBTANDEQUITYAREDEALTWITHINFLUENCESFIRMGOVERNANCEACTIVITIESBYMODIFYINGTHESTRUCTUREOFINCENTIVESANDMANAGERIALCONTROLIF,THROUGHTHEMIXDEBTANDEQUITY,DIFFERENTCATEGORIESOFINVESTORSALLCONVERGEWITHINTHEFIRM,WHERETHEYHAVEDIFFERENTTYPESOFINFLUENCEONGOVERNANCEDECISIONS,
28、THENMANAGERSWILLTENDTOHAVEPREFERENCESWHENDETERMININGHOWONEOFTHESECATEGORIESWILLPREVAILWHENDEFININGTHEFIRMSCAPITALSTRUCTUREEVENMOREIMPORTANTLY,THROUGHASPECIFICDESIGNOFDEBTCONTRACTSANDEQUITYITISPOSSIBLETOCONSIDERABLYINCREASEFIRMGOVERNANCEEFFICIENCYONTHEOTHERHAND,EVENCORPORATEGOVERNANCEINFLUENCESCHOICE
29、SREGARDINGCAPITALSTRUCTURERELATIONEMYERS1984ANDMYERSANDMAJLUF1984SHOWHOWFIRMFINANCINGCHOICESAREMADEBYMANAGEMENTFOLLOWINGANORDEROFPREFERENCEINTHISCASE,IFTHEMANAGERCHOOSESTHEFINANCINGRESOURCESITCANBEPRESUMEDTHATSHEISAVOIDINGAREDUCTIONOFHERDECISIONMAKINGPOWERBYACCEPTINGTHEDISCIPLINEREPRESENTEDBYDEBTINT
30、ERNALRESOURCEFINANCINGALLOWSMANAGEMENTTOPREVENTOTHERSUBJECTSFROMINTERVENINGINTHEIRDECISIONMAKINGPROCESSESDEJONG2002REVEALSHOWINTHENETHERLANDSMANAGERSTRYTOAVOIDUSINGDEBTSOTHATTHEIRDECISIONMAKINGPOWERREMAINSUNCHECKEDZWIEBEL1996HASOBSERVEDTHATMANAGERSDONTVOLUNTARILYACCEPTTHEDISCIPLINEOFDEBTOTHERGOVERNA
31、NCEMECHANISMSIMPOSETHATDEBTISISSUEDJENSEN1986NOTEDTHATDECISIONSTOINCREASEFIRMDEBTAREVOLUNTARILYMADEBYMANAGEMENTWHENITINTENDSTOREASSURESTAKEHOLDERSTHATITSGOVERNANCEDECISIONSAREPROPERINTHISLIGHT,FIRMFINANCINGDECISIONSCANBESTRICTLYDELIBERATEDBYMANAGERSENTREPRENEURSORELSECANBEINDUCEDBYSPECIFICSITUATIONS
32、THATGOBEYONDTHEWILLOFTHEMANAGEMENTCONCLUSIONTHISPAPERDEFINEATHEORETICALAPPROACHTHATCANCONTRIBUTEINCLEARINGUPTHERELATIONBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTURE,CORPORATEGOVERNANCEANDVALUE,WHILETHEYALSOPROMOTEAMOREPRECISEDESIGNFOREMPIRICALRESEARCHCAPITALSTRUCTUREREPRESENTSONEOFMANYINSTRUMENTSTHATCANPRESERVECORPORATEG
33、OVERNANCEEFFICIENCYANDPROTECTITSABILITYTOCREATEVALUETHEREFORE,THISTHREADOFRESEARCHAFFIRMSTHATIFINVESTMENTPOLICIESALLOWFORVALUECREATION,FINANCINGPOLICIES,TOGETHERWITHOTHERGOVERNANCEINSTRUMENTS,CANASSURETHATINVESTMENTPOLICIESARECARRIEDOUTEFFICIENTLYWHILEFIRMVALUEISPROTECTEDFROMOPPORTUNISTICBEHAVIORINO
34、THERWORDS,VARIOUSAUTHORSBORSCHSUPANANDKOKE,2000,BHAGATANDJEFFERIS,2002ANDBERGERANDPATTI,2003POINTOUTTHENECESSITYTOANALYZETHERELATIONBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDVALUEBYALWAYSTAKINGINTOCONSIDERATIONTHEINTERACTIONBETWEENCORPORATEGOVERNANCEVARIABLESSUCHASOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATION,MANAGEMENTPARTICIPATIONINTHE
35、EQUITYCAPITAL,THECOMPOSITIONOFTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORS,ETCFURTHERMORE,THEREISAPROBLEMINTHEWAYTOOPERATIONALIZETHESECONSTRUCTS,DUETOMULTIDIMENSIONALNATUREOFTHESEITISQUITEDIFFICULTTOIDENTIFYINDICATORSTHATPERFECTLYCORRESPONDTOTHEORETICALCONSTRUCTSITMEANSTHATPROXYVARIABLES,OREMPIRICALMEASURESOFLATENTCONSTRUCT
36、S,MUSTBEUSEDCORBETTA,1992MOREOVER,ITMUSTBECONSIDEREDPOSSIBLETHATTHEREMAYBEDISTORTIONSINTHESIGNSANDENTITIESOFTHECONNECTIONSBETWEENVARIABLESDUETOENDOGENEITYPROBLEMS,ORRATHERTHEPRESENCEOFCOVARIATIONEVENWHENTHEREISNOCAUSE,ANDRECIPROCALCAUSE,WHERETHEDISTINCTIONBETWEENTHECAUSEVARIABLEANDTHEEFFECTVARIABLEA
37、RELACKING,ANDTHETWORECIPROCALLYINFLUENCEEACHOTHERFROMANECONOMETRICPOINTOFVIEW,THEREFORE,ITWOULDSEEMTOBEIMPORTANTTOFURTHERINVESTIGATETHERESEARCHPROPOSALOUTLINEDABOVE,BYEMPIRICALLYEXAMININGTHEMODELPROPOSEDINFIGURE2USINGAPPROPRIATEECONOMETRICTECHNIQUESTHATCANHANDLETHECOMPLEXITYOFTHERELATIONSBETWEENTHEE
38、LEMENTSSTUDIEDSOMEPROPOSALSFORSTUDYCANBEFOUNDINLITERATURETHEUSEOFLAGGEDVARIABLESISCRITICIZEDBYBORSCHSUPANANDKOKE2000THATAFFIRMTHATITWOULDBEBETTERTODETERMINEINSTRUMENTALVARIABLESTHATINFLUENCEONLYONEOFTHETWOELEMENTSOFSTUDYBERGERANDPATTI2003,BORSCHSUPANANDKOKE2000ANDCHENANDSTEINER1999PROMOTETHEAPPLICAT
39、IONOFSTRUCTURALMODELEQUATIONSTOSOLVETHESEPROBLEMS,THATISAMETHODAPPROPRIATEFOREXAMININGTHECAUSALRELATIONSBETWEENLATENT,ONEDIMENSIONALORMULTIDIMENSIONALVARIABLES,MEASUREDWITHMULTIPLEINDICATORSCORBETTA,1992INCONCLUSION,THISPAPERDEFINESATHEORETICALMODELTHATCONTRIBUTESTOCLARIFYINGTHERELATIONSBETWEENCAPIT
40、ALSTRUCTURE,CORPORATEGOVERNANCEANDFIRMVALUE,WHILEPROMOTING,ASANAIMFORFUTURERESEARCH,AVERIFICATIONOFTHEVALIDITYOFTHISMODELTHROUGHAPPLICATIONOFTHEANALYSISTOAWIDESAMPLEOFFIRMSANDTOSINGLEFIRMSTOSTUDYTHEINTERACTIONBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTURE,CORPORATEGOVERNANCEANDVALUEWHENANALYZINGAWIDESAMPLEOFFIRMS,THERESEA
41、RCHERHASTOTAKEINTOACCOUNTTHERELATIONSSHOWEDINFIGURE2,LOOKATPROBLEMSOFENDOGENEITYANDRECIPROCALCAUSALITY,ANDMAKESURETHEREISCOMPLEMENTARITYBETWEENALLTHETHREEFACTORSSUCHANANALYSISDESERVESTHEAPPLICATIONOFREFINEDECONOMETRICTECHNIQUESMOREOVER,THESERELATIONSSHOULDBEINVESTIGATEDINACROSSCOUNTRYANALYSIS,TOCATC
42、HTHEROLEOFCOUNTRYSPECIFICFACTORSSOURCEMAURIZIOLAROCCA,2007“THEINFLUENCEOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEONTHERELATIONBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDVALUE”CORPORATEGORERNANCE,VOL7,NO3APRIL,PP312325二、翻译文章译文公司治理对资本结构和企业价值关系的影响资本结构关系到公司价值及其主要研究趋向当查看关于描述资本结构与企业价值两者之间总体关系的最重要的理论文献时，会明显感觉到早期的理论与新近的理论有实质性的不同。莫迪里亚尼和米勒1958年,宣
43、称原本资本结构与价值没有关系的理论者，在1963年得出了与此前自相矛盾的结论,最大程度的债务由于可以申请扣减税项将意味着公司的价值的最大化。很多晚期的文献中指出了这种效果是在考虑补偿个人所得税米勒,1977,但是由于最终缺少付税能力,以及增进直接或间接的财务危机成本使得最终由于债务资金成本的增加，导致利润的减少。表明了一个最理想水平的债务,由于财务杠杆的增加将导致债务的增长。此外,这个非单调的关系会被修改甚至考虑了代理金融灾难成本。最后,还有研究麦尔斯,梅尔斯1984年指出管理偏好在于融资资源的选择。在这种情况下没有最理想客观的水平债务,但这是由于不同的情形而使得经营者不得不这样处理。功能管理
44、的偏好由于特定的相关信息不对称,所以对企业债务水平的切线将会由企业之间的价值功能和管理曲线相切而成。此外，我们可以观察到，在市场中，企业的债务增加和企业的声誉变好是一致的。研究表明，公司之间的相似在相同的部门，换句话说，资本结构是趋于特定行业的。实证证明交换理论和顺序理论是有争议的。一方面，研究显示，一贯稳定的交换理论允许考虑收入与代理问题。另外一方面，公司的利润与财务杠杆的负面影响，似乎并没有支持交换理论，因为他在确定财务决策了有了等级的秩序。这也因此清楚地表明，资本结构除了定义呀还有好多值得研究的话题。许多作者所著的文献,如拉詹1995的资本结构理论是一种“热”的金融话题。通过国际文献的主
45、要研究重点和新的分析方法涉及到比较重要的“理性行为金融”是一个顺序理论和交换理论SHYAMSUNDER和梅耶,1999,我试图把这些理论运用到中小公司和大公司的治理，最终体现出资本结构与价值的关系。行为方法认为顺序金融资源的偏好“非理性”条款,造成了斯图尔特在2000年和2001年会同SHYAMSUNDER提出在1999年所做出的反映，斯图尔特是顺序融资理论的创始人之一。信息不对称结合交易成本,将提供一个合理的解释，财务管理行为做出选择是分等级的。换句话说,根据梅尔斯的理论,应该有一种“理性”所观测到现象的解释。此外,有些学者研究过中小企业资本结构的理论柏格与UDELL,1998,MICHAE
46、LAS等,1999,2000年,罗马FLUCK等后发现,由于这些公司有关经济的作用在欧洲,他们是95的总数公司经营，现在强调的是“这种关注表明大型企业将趋向那些没有进入金融市场的企业”。最有趣的一个关于这个主题所做的研究是赫和UDELL1998所宣称的“公司的财务行为取决于他们生活循环的阶段。”事实上,相关生命周期阶段的公司应该有一个最优的资本结构。最后迈克尔杰森1986年对资本结构与价值及公司治理关系的研究有许多贡献，威廉姆斯1988在90年代也鼓励研究了公司治理与资本结构这两个部分内容,使之很有希望成为公司治理与资本、企业价值的直接或间接关系的分析方法FLUCK,1998年,JONG,20
47、02,柏格与帕蒂,2003,2004年,等。确认合成是可能的,因为在解释公司主要创造价值的能力时联合分析公司的资本结构和公司治理是有必要的ZINGALES,2000,海因里希,2000,BHAGAT和JEFFERIS,2002。这方面的考虑可以帮助克服在理论和经验层面之间的研究发现资本结构与价值的争议。公司治理影响资本结构与价值的关系资本结构可以在权利和属性的前瞻性特点下进行公司资产以及不同层次的管理活动的影响下进行分析。因此，股票和债券必须被视为两种金融工具与治理工具威廉姆森,1988债券的管理活动更加严格，而股票有更大的灵活性和更多的决策能力，由此可以推测,当资本结构成为企业治理的影响因素
48、,众所周知债务和股权的混合体要考虑税收的影响。现金流量的方法是分配现金现金流权,更重要的是,做出如何决定对这家公司的管理权选举权的管理方法也是必须研究的。例如,风险资本家们对资本结构和金融合同是怎样布局特别敏感,这样，最佳企业管理将得到保证，而管理激励机制和约束机制也可同时建立。科斯（1991）在他1937完成的一篇文章里，明确指出,它是很重视资本结构的作用,并将其作为可以调整经济业务的工具,因此,企业家之间以及其他利益相关者之间具有很重要的作用。正如BHAGATANDJEFFERIS2002明确指出，当他们重点注意因果关系和在理论水平上的相互作用时，提到一个未来应评估实证研究的“研究计划”。
49、公司治理如何影响公司的资本结构和企业价值之间的关系。图二中清晰的描述了五种关系资本结构与企业价值之间的关系通过公司治理来“调解”（关系A）；资本结构与企业价值之间的关系通过角色的资本治理关系稳定（关系D），选择一个确定的因素对资本结构对公司治理的作用进行分析（关系E）。图二中显示的五种关系特别有趣并且体现两个线性关系企业治理与资本结构，其中对公司的治理的规模来确定企业的融资的选择，造成了因果关系的可能。无论管理层是否自愿选择使用管理的一种债务融资来降低信息不对称和交易的问题,最大程度的提高公司决策的效率，或迫于股东的行为提高债务水平作为一种政策，以保证公司资本结构的良好发展，资本结构影响公司治理（关系E），反之亦然（关系B）。一方面，如何处理债务和股权变更，是通过影响公司管理活动改变激励机制和管理来控制的。如果，通过债务和股权的组合，各种不同种类的投资者都在收敛公司，在那里他们对不同类型的治理决定上产生影响，然后经理往往会用自己的偏好决定这些类别的公司资本结构。更重要的是通过具体设计的债务和股权的合同有可能大幅度提升公司治理效率。另一方面，甚至公司治理影响着资本结构（关系E）。梅尔斯1984展示了这种关系，选择都是由管理层的偏好决定的，在这种情况下,，如果经理选
