1、外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文SUBNATIONALPUBLICFINANCIALMANAGEMENTINSTITUTIONSANDMACROECONOMICCONSIDERATIONSTRANSPARENTPUBLICFINANCIALMANAGEMENTATTHESUBNATIONALLEVELREQUIRESINSTITUTIONSANDPROCESSESTHATMIRRORTHOSENEEDEDATTHECENTRALGOVERNMENTLEVEL,INORDERTOGENERATEBETTERACCOUNTABILITYANDCOMPETITIONAMONGDIFFERENTSUB
2、NATIONALGOVERNMENTS,CRITICALELEMENTSINENSURINGGOODGOVERNANCEANDEFFICIENCYOFDECENTRALIZEDADMINISTRATIONSFURTHERSUBNATIONALDEBTALSOHASIMPLICATIONSFOROVERALLMACROECONOMICSTABILITYTHATCONCERNSTHECENTRALGOVERNMENTTHEKEYCOMPONENTSAREIDENTIFIED,WITHAPARTICULARFOCUSONSUBNATIONALDEBTMONITORINGANDMANAGEMENTPR
3、ACTICALISSUESRELATINGTOEFFECTIVEPUBLICFINANCIALMANAGEMENTULTIMATELYGOVERNWHETHERORNOTTHEREISGOODGOVERNANCEATTHESUBNATIONALLEVELHENCETHESUCCESSORFAILUREOFDIFFERENTPOLICYOPTIONSALTHOUGHTHEREISAGROWINGLITERATUREON“FISCALRULES“ANDSUBNATIONALDEBTMANAGEMENT,THEREHASBEENLESSATTENTIONTOTHECRITICALGOVERNANCE
4、ASPECTSOFPUBLICFINANCIALMANAGEMENTALTHOUGHSEEPOTTER1997,MOMONIAT,2001PARTOFTHISNEGLECTMAYBEDUETOTHEPRESUMPTIONTHATDECENTRALIZATION,TOGETHERWITHCOMMUNITYBASEDDECISIONMAKING,WOULDSUFFICEINGENERATINGEFFICIENTANDEQUITABLESPENDINGDECISIONSINDEED,THEEMPHASISONCOMMUNITYPARTICIPATIONWASAFEATUREOFDEVELOPMENT
5、STRATEGYINTHE1950S,LARGELYDRIVENBYTHEFORDFOUNDATIONANDUSFOREIGNASSISTANCEPROGRAMSDESPITEALACKOFSIGNIFICANTSUCCESSATTHETIME,THEREHASBEENARESURGENCEOFTHEPOLICYINRECENTYEARSDUETOTHEEFFORTSOFNONGOVERNMENTALORGANIZATIONSNGOSTHEEMPHASISONCOMMUNITYDRIVENDEVELOPMENTWASADOPTEDASONEOFTHECORNERSTONESOFTHEWORLD
6、BANKSCOMPREHENSIVEDEVELOPMENTFRAMEWORKWORLDBANK,2001HOWEVER,THEREISINCREASINGEVIDENCETHATWEAKORABSENTPUBLICFINANCIALMANAGEMENTFUNCTIONSANDINSTITUTIONSARELIKELYTONEGATEANYADVANTAGESTHATMIGHTBEINHERENTINBRINGINGPUBLICSERVICES“CLOSER“TOLOCALCOMMUNITIESTHEUNDERPINNINGSOFPUBLICFINANCIALMANAGEMENTRELATETO
7、THEBASICINSTITUTIONALANDPROCEDURALELEMENTSTHATMIGHTBEENSHRINEDINACONSTITUTION,ORHIGHERLEVELLAWSONTHEBUDGET,ORLAWSORAGREEMENTSGOVERNINGSUBNATIONALOPERATIONSORLEVELSOFINDEBTEDNESSINSOMECOUNTRIES,SUCHASSOUTHAFRICA,WHERETHEPROCESSHASBEENNICELYSEQUENCED,THEREISASETOFCONSISTENTANDWELLDESIGNEDLEGISLATIONCO
8、VERINGALLTHEAREASMENTIONEDABOVEINORDERFORANYLEVELOFGOVERNMENTTOTAKERESPONSIBILITYFORITSACTIONS,THEREMUSTBECLARITYINITSFUNCTIONS,ITSMECHANISMSFORAPPROPRIATINGFUNDSANDPRIORITIZINGANDAUTHORIZINGSPENDING,ANDENSURINGTHATTHESPENDINGISACTUALLYCARRIEDOUTANDACCOUNTEDFORANOTHERCRITICALASPECTRELATESTOTIMELYAND
9、ACCURATEREPORTINGTOTHERESPECTIVELEGISLATUREANDANYHIGHERLEVELSOFADMINISTRATIONINSHORT,QUESTIONSWOULDNEEDTOBEPOSEDCONCERNINGTHETRANSPARENCYANDACCOUNTABILITYOFAGOVERNMENTANDWHETHERTHESEMEETMINIMUMINTERNATIONALSTANDARDSQUITEOFTENTHECONSEQUENCESOFSUBNATIONALSPENDINGCANBESHIFTEDTOHIGHERLEVELSOFGOVERNMENT,
10、ORACROSSGENERATIONS,IFTHEREISNOHARDBUDGETCONSTRAINTATAJUNIORLEVELOFGOVERNMENTRODMEN,LAIDBACK,ANDESKELUND,2003THISGENERALLYTRANSLATESINTOWEAKORNONEXISTENTCONTROLOVERBORROWINGTHEBORROWINGMIGHTBEEXPLICIT,FOREXAMPLE,THROUGHISSUANCEOFDEBTORCONTRACTINGOFLOANS,ORINDIRECT,SUCHASTHOUGHTHEBUILDUPOFARREARSORAC
11、COUNTSPAYABLEUNDERDIFFERENTCONSTITUTIONALARRANGEMENTS,POLICYRESPONSESVARYFROMENFORCEDCONTROLSOVERSUBNATIONALBORROWINGGENERALLYINUNITARYSTATESTOVOLUNTARYAGREEMENTSORRULESINFEDERATIONS,ASWELLASINSUPRANATIONALCONGLOMERATIONSOFSTATES,SUCHASTHEEU,TOSOLERELIANCEONTHESTRICTURESOFTHEMARKETTHECASEFORCOMMUNIT
12、YBASEDGOVERNANCEDEPENDSONTHEPOSSIBILITIESOFLOCALINFORMATIONGENERATIONTOGETHERWITHTHENETWORKSOFINTERCOMMUNITYINTERACTIONSORSOCIALCAPITALTHECOMBINATIONOFTHESEFACTORSCOULD,INPRINCIPLE,GENERATESPENDINGTAILOREDTOLOCALNEEDS,WITHSUBSTANTIVELOCALINTERACTIONSINORDERTOENSURETHATFUNDSARENOTDIVERTEDFROMEXPRESSE
13、DOBJECTIVESANDASSTATEDABOVE,INTERNATIONALANDDONORAGENCIESHAVERAISEDTHESEPOSSIBILITIESINTHEDESIGNOFASSISTANCEPROGRAMSBUT,INPRACTICE,THEREARETWOSUBSTANTIVESINDIFFICULTIESTHEFIRSTRELATESTOWHETHERORNOTTHEREMIGHTBEELITECAPTURE,ANDTHESECOND,THATWOULDSERVETOREINFORCETHEFIRST,RELATESTOTHETYPEOFINFORMATIONTH
14、ATISGENERATEDINTHEFINALANALYSIS,THECASETURNSONTHEEFFECTIVENESSOFLOCALSERVICEDELIVERYANDWHETHERORNOTPOWERFULLOCALINTERESTGROUPSAREABLETOGARNERASIGNIFICANTPROPORTIONOFFUNDSALLOCATEDTOTHELOCALITIESBRADMANANDMOTHERED2005DISCUSSTHEORETICALTRADEOFFSBETWEENCENTRALIZEDANDDECENTRALIZEDDELIVERYOFINFRASTRUCTUR
15、ESERVICESUNDERCONDITIONSOFCONSIDERABLEINEQUALITY,POORERANDVULNERABLESECTIONSOFSOCIETYMIGHTBEDISADVANTAGEDBYCOMMUNITYBASEDDEVELOPMENT,ASEXISTINGSOCIALANDECONOMICRELATIONSMIGHTBEUSEDBYMOREINFLUENTIALGROUPSTOTHEDISADVANTAGEOFTHEUSUALTARGETGROUPSPLATEAU,2004PLATEAUALSOEMPHASIZESTHERISKSOFTHEOUTRIGHTEMBE
16、ZZLEMENTOFFUNDS,INADDITIONTOWASTEFULORMISDIRECTEDSPENDINGTHESETENDENCIESARELIKELYTOBEREINFORCEDWHENASDESCRIBEDABOVETHEPFMINFRASTRUCTURE,ESPECIALLYINFORMATIONFLOWSANDINDEPENDENTAUDIT,AREWEAKTHEEVIDENCEONCOMMUNITYBASEDDEVELOPMENTISMIXED,ATBESTSEETHESURVEYBYMANSURANDRAE,2004ANASSESSMENTOFSOCIALINVESTME
17、NTFUNDSSUGGESTSTHATTHESEHAVEBEENLESSTHANSUCCESSFULINGENERATIONOWNERSHIP”THELOCALCOMMUNITIESTENDER,2000,ITAMISMATCHBETWEENTHEPREFERENCESOFTHEDONORSANDRECIPIENTS,A“FACADE”OFCONSULTATIONBETWEENCOMMUNITIESANDDONORSTHROUGHTHEPPAPROCESSFRANCISANDJAMES,2003ASTRONGCONCLUSIONBYPLATEAU2004ISTHATELECTORATESMAY
18、NOTBEWILLINGORABLETODISCIPLINECORRUPTLOCALLEADERS,SPECIALLYIFTHEREISSOMETRICKLEDOWNANDIMPROVEMENTREGARDLESSOFTHEMAGNITUDEOFFUNDSDIVERTEDANDCOMPETITIONAMONGDONORSMAYMAKEMATTERSWORSEISPROPOSALSINCLUDEASEQUENTIALDISBURSEMENTOFASSISTANCE,ANDONACCURATEINFORMATIONONTHESPENDING,TOGETHERWITHANIMPROVEDTECHNO
19、LOGYOFFRAUDDETECTIONEQUALLYIMPORTANTARETHEEFFECTIVEMECHANISMSPUTINPLACETOPREVENTANDPUNISHMISUSEOFPUBLICFUNDSTRANSLATEINTOTHEINFRASTRUCTUREOFBUDGETINGANDPUBLICSPENDING,CONCLUDINGADEQUATEANDEFFECTIVECONTROLANDAUDITMECHANISMSINORDERTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTOFPROVIDINGACCURATEANDTIMELYINFORMATIONTOPOLICYMAKE
20、RS,THELEGISLATUREANDTHEBROADERPUBLIC,THEREISINCREASINGEMPHASISINORGANICBUDGETLAWSAROUNDTHEWORLDTHATTHEBUDGETSHOULDCOMPLYWITHTHEPRINCIPLESOFCOMPREHENSIVENESS,UNITY,ANDINTERNALCONSISTENCYWITHOUTTHEASSOCIATEDBUDGETING,REPORTINGANDAUDITINFRASTRUCTURE,ITISUNLIKELYTHATTHEGOODGOVERNANCEASPECTSOFDECENTRALIZ
21、EDOPERATIONSWOULDBEREALIZEDTHEPRINCIPLEOFCOMPREHENSIVENESSREQUIRESTHATTHEBUDGETCOVERALLGOVERNMENTINSTITUTIONSUNDERTAKINGGOVERNMENTOPERATIONS,SOTHATTHEBUDGETPRESENTSACONSOLIDATEDANDCOMPLETEVIEWOFTHESEOPERATIONSANDISVOTEDON,ASAWHOLE,BYTHEBODYVESTEDWITHNATIONALLEGISLATIVEAUTHORITYUNFORTUNATELY,INMANYCA
22、SES,DONORSDEMANDSTOMAINTAINDONORFUNDSINEXTRABUDGETARYOROFFBUDGETACCOUNTSHAVEUNDERMINEDTHETRANSPARENCYANDFINANCIALDISCIPLINEOFGOVERNMENTOPERATIONSPREMHANG,1996,ANDOFTENGENERATEDPARALLELANDUNCOORDINATEDBUDGETSYSTEMSTHEPRINCIPLEOFUNITYREQUIRESTHATTHEBUDGETINCLUDESALLREVENUESANDEXPENDITURESOFALLGOVERNME
23、NTAGENCIESUNDERTAKINGGOVERNMENTOPERATIONSTHISPRINCIPLEISIMPORTANTTOENSURETHATTHEBUDGETISANEFFECTIVEINSTRUMENTTOIMPOSEACONSTRAINTONTOTALANDGOVERNMENTEXPENDITURE,ANDPROMOTEHIGHEREFFICIENCYINTHEALLOCATIONOFRESOURCESTHEPRINCIPLEOFINTERNALCONSISTENCYBETWEENDIFFERENTCOMPONENTSOFTHEBUDGETREQUIRES,INPARTICU
24、LAR,HATCURRENTEXPENDITURENEEDEDFORTHEMAINTENANCEANDOPERATIONOFPASTINVESTMENTSBEFULLYREFLECTEDINTHEBUDGETMOREOVER,THISPRINCIPLEIMPLIESTHATTHERESHOULDBENODUALBUDGETSYSTEMSINVOLVINGASPLITBETWEENCURRENTANDCAPITALORDEVELOPMENTSPENDINGTHEPRINCIPLESABOVETRANSLATEINDIFFERENTWAYSINTERMSOFINFORMATIONREQUIREME
25、NTSFORAPPROPRIATIONS,ACCOUNTING,CONTROLSANDREPORTING,DEPENDINGONTHEBUDGETINGFRAMEWORKINUSEANDWEDISTINGUISHHEREBETWEENACONTINUUMBASEDONTRADITIONALBUDGETINGFRAMEWORKSTOTHOSEONTHEBASISOF“PERFORMANCEOROUTCOMES“THESEAREDISCUSSEDSEQUENTIALLYBELOWAGOVERNMENTACCOUNTABILITYGOVERNMENTACCOUNTABILITYISANESSENTI
26、ALPRINCIPLEOFDEMOCRACYTHROUGHWHICHELECTEDANDUNELECTEDPUBLICOFFICIALSAREOBLIGATEDTOEXPLAINTHEIRDECISIONSANDACTIONSTOTHELEGISLATUREANDTHEBROADERPUBLICTOENSUREANAPPROPRIATEUSEOFPUBLICRESOURCESTHEFRAMEWORKFORGOVERNMENTACCOUNTABILITYUSUALLYINCLUDESACOMBINATIONOFPOLITICALANDADMINISTRATIVEMECHANISMSDESIGNE
27、DTOHOLDPUBLICOFFICIALSRESPONSIBLEFORTHEIRPERFORMANCEFIXEDTERMSOFOFFICEANDFAIRELECTIONSAREKEYPOLITICALMECHANISMSTOHOLDPOLICYMAKERSACCOUNTABLEITTHESEMECHANISMS,HEELECTORATECOULDREMOVEELECTEDGOVERNMENTOFFICIALSIFTHEIRPERFORMANCEISNOTINLINEWITHPUBLICEXPECTATIONSLEGALMECHANISMSOFACCOUNTABILITYFORBOTHELEC
28、TEDANDUNELECTEDOFFICIALSINCLUDEALLLEGISLATIONPROSCRIBINGACTIONSTHATPUBLICOFFICIALSCANANDCANNOTTAKEANDWELLASSANCTIONSAGAINSTOFFICIALSWITHUNSATISFACTORYCONDUCTPRECONDITIONLEGALACCOUNTABILITYISANINDEPENDENTJUDICIALSYSTEMADMINISTRATIVEACCOUNTABILITYMECHANISMSENTAILINDEPENDENTAUDITORSANDOMBUDSMEN,ONSURET
29、HATPUBLICOFFICIALSDONOTTRANSGRESSMANDATESORMISUSEPUBLICMONIESACOMMUNITYBASEDSCHEMEFORGOVERNMENTACCOUNTABILITYCOMBININGPOLITICAL,ANDADMINISTRATIVEMECHANISMSHASRECEIVEDINCREASINGATTENTIONBYINTERNATIONALAGENCIESPARTICULARLYIMPORTANTUNDERTHISSCHEMEARETHELEGALINSTRUMENTSTHATREQUIREINPUTFROMTHECOMMUNITIES
30、ONCERTAINGOVERNMENTDECISIONSORPROVIDEACCESSTOTHEPRESSORTHEBROADERPUBLICTOINFORMATIONONGOVERNMENTACTIVITIESBTRADITIONALBUDGETINGMODELSTHETRADITIONALCYCLEOFBUDGETAPPROPRIATIONS,COUNTING,CONTROLANDREPORTINGAREDESCRIBEDFORBOTHUNITARYANDFEDERALSTATESHERECENTEXPERIENCESOFDEVELOPINGCOUNTRIESINMEETINGTHEEXP
31、ENDITUREACCOUNTABILITYREQUIREMENTSOFTHEHEAVILYINDEBTEDPOORCOUNTRYHIPCINITIATIVEARESUMMARIZEDINSKYANDFLOYD2004THETYPICALSTAGESOFBUDGETINGINCLUDEDECISIONSBYTHEADMINISTRATIONANDAUTHORIZEDBYTHEELATIVELEGISLATUREONWHATTOSPENDTHISISTHEAPPROPRIATIONSTAGETHISWOULDINCREASINGLYPLACEINAMEDIUMTERMFRAMEWORKTOFUL
32、LYCAPTURETHEEFFECTSOFDECISIONSTHATLASTFORMULTIPLEPERIODSINAUNITARYSTATEWITHSUBNATIONALGOVERNMENTS,THEBUDGETDECISIONSWOULDBEMADEBYTHECENTRALGOVERNMENTANDAPPROVEDBYTHENATIONALLEGISLATURESUCHANARRANGEMENTWOULDBEPERFECTLYCOMPATIBLEWITHLOCALCOMMUNITIESREFLECTINGTHEIRPRIORITIESTOTHEAGENTSOFTHECENTERFORINC
33、ORPORATIONINTHENATIONALLISTOFAPPROPRIATIONS,SWELLASINVOLVEMENTWITHACTUALIMPLEMENTATIONINAFEDERALSYSTEM,HECENTERWOULDAPPROPRIATETRANSFERSFOREACHLEVEL,WHICHINTURNWOULDPREPARETHEIROWNBUDGETSTHEREWOULDTHENBEAPREMIUMONENSURINGTHATPROMISEDTRANSFERSITSPECIALPURPOSEORGENERAL,“EQUALIZATION”TRANSFERSAREMADEIN
34、ATIMELYMANNERUNDEREITHERSYSTEM,AFUNDAMENTALRULEFORPREVENTINGRENTSEEKINGANDENSURINGACCOUNTABILITY,THROUGHOUTTHEENTIREBUDGETPROCESS,ISTHATTHERESHOULDBENOSPENDINGWITHOUTADEQUATEAPPROPRIATIONSANDFINANCINGARRANGEMENTSINCOUNTRIESWITHTHEOLDFRANCOPHONEPFMSYSTEMS,FUNDINGCOULDBEPROVIDEDTOPUBLICENTITIESWITHOUT
35、APPROPRIATIONSDURINGTHEBUDGETEXECUTIONPROCESS,AND“LEGALIZED”ASANEXPOSTAPPROPRIATIONINTHEBUDGETOFTHESUBSEQUENTYEARTHISPRACTICECLEARLYWEAKENSTHEPOSSIBILITIESOFENSURINGGOVERNMENTACCOUNTABILITYATYPOLOGYOFCLASSIFICATIONOFBORROWINGCONTROLSDESCRIBEDBYTERMINASSIAN1997,REFERSTOFOURBROAD“STYLIZED“CATEGORIES1M
36、ARKETDISCIPLINE2RULESBASEDCONTROLS3ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLSAND4COOPERATIONBETWEENDIFFERENTLEVELSOFGOVERNMENTMARKETDISCIPLINESOMECOUNTRIESRELYEXCLUSIVELYONCAPITALMARKETSTORESTRAINSUBNATIONALBORROWINGINTHISCASE,THECENTRALGOVERNMENTWOULDNOTSETANYLIMITSONSUBNATIONALBORROWINGANDLOCALGOVERNMENTSAREFREETODEC
37、IDEAMOUNTS,SOURCESANDUSESOFBORROWINGPROVINCESINCANADAASWELLASUSSTATESHAVETHERIGHTTOBORROWWITHNOCENTRALREVIEWORCONTROLSIMILARLY,INARGENTINA,ALLLEVELSOFGOVERNMENTAREPERMITTEDTOBORROWBOTHDOMESTICALLYANDABROADMARKETSHAVEBEENMYOPIC,ASINTHECASEOFARGENTINA,ANDINMANYPARTSOFTHEWORLD,INADEQUATECAPITALMARKETSA
38、TTHELOCALLEVELAREINADEQUATELYDEVELOPEDTOCONCEIVEOFEXTENSIVERELIANCEONMARKETBASEDBORROWING,ORTHEABILITYOFMARKETSTODISCIPLINESUBNATIONALGOVERNMENTMOREOVER,ITISINCREASINGLYBECOMINGCLEARTHATTHERATINGSAGENCIES,WHERETHEYOPERATEATTHESUBNATIONALLEVEL,EVALUATEALLTHEPUBLICFINANCIALMANAGEMENTCRITERIADESCRIBEDA
39、BOVE,ASWELLASTHEOVERALLDESIGNOFINTERGOVERNMENTALSYSTEMSUBNATIONALGOVERNMENTSMAYHOWEVERDECIDEONTHEIROWNTOADOPTAFISCALRULEINANATTEMPTTOENHANCETHEIRCREDITSTANDINGINTHEMARKETSUCHSELFIMPOSEDRULESAREFOUNDFOREXAMPLEINCANADA,SWITZERLAND,ANDTHEUNITEDSTATESINTHESECOUNTRIES,SENSATIONALGOVERNMENTSHAVEGENERALLYD
40、IRECTACCESSTOFINANCIALMARKETSTOMEETTHEIRBORROWINGREQUIREMENTS,ANDTHEREAREFEWPRECEDENTSOFBAILOUTSOFINSOLVENTSUBNATIONALGOVERNMENTSBYTHECENTRALGOVERNMENTHENCETHEIRDESIRETOMAINTAINAFAVORABLECREDITRATINGINTHEMARKETSMORERECENTLY,ARGENTINASOUGHTTOFOLLOWTHISAPPROACHWITHTHEINTRODUCTIONOFAFISCALRESPONSIBILIT
41、YLAWANDTHEESTABLISHMENTOFAFEDERALCOUNCILFORFISCALRESPONSIBILITYRULESBASEDAPPROACHINSOMECASES,HISCENTRALGOVERNMENTMIGHTTRYTOCONTAINSUBNATIONALBORROWINGBYIMPOSINGAFISCALRULEBOTHFEDERALANDUNITARYSTATESHAVERELIEDONVARIOUSSTANDINGRULESSPECIFIEDINTHECONSTITUTIONORINLAWSTOCONTROLSUBNATIONALBORROWING,INANEF
42、FORTTOCONFERCREDIBILITYFORTHECONDUCTOFMACROECONOMICPOLICIESSUCHRULESINTRODUCEACONSTRAINTONFISCALPOLICYTOGUARANTEETHATFUNDAMENTALSWILLREMAINPREDICTABLEANDROBUSTREGARDLESSOFTHEGOVERNMENTINCHARGEENFORCINGBORROWINGCONTROLSTHREEBASICMECHANISMSAREUSEDBYCOUNTRIESTOENFORCEBORROWINGCONTROLSATTHESUBNATIONALLE
43、VEL1MARKETDISCIPLINE2INTERGOVERNMENTALENTITIESOPERATINGWITHINACOOPERATIVEARRANGEMENT3ADMINISTRATIVEPROCEDURESCARRIEDOUTBYANENTITYOFTHEPUBLICSECTORTHISPAPERFOCUSESONTHEINSTITUTIONALANDPROCEDURALBACKBONEOFDECENTRALIZEDGOVERNANCEITILLUSTRATESTHATDECENTRALIZATIONRELYINGSOLELYONCOMMUNITYSAFEGUARDSWILLGEN
44、ERALLYBEINSUFFICIENTTOENSUREPROPOORSPENDING,ANDTHATTHERENEEDSTOBECONCOMITANTEMPHASISONTHEGENERATIONOFACCURATEANDTIMELYINFORMATIONONTHEACTUALSPENDING,IFNOTONTHEOUTCOMESTHISNEEDSTOBESUPPLEMENTEDBYEFFECTIVEMECHANISMSTODETECT,PREVENT,ANDPUNISHMISUSEOFRESOURCESORDIVERSIONOFFUNDSEVENWITHADEQUATEMONITORING
45、OFSUBNATIONALSPENDING,THEREHASTOBEANEMPHASISONTHEEFFECTSOFSUCHSPENDING,PARTICULARLYTHEINCURRINGOFDEBTANDOTHERCONTINGENTLIABILITIES,ONOVERALLMACROECONOMICAGGREGATESAGAIN,THEIMPLEMENTATIONOFORDERLYMACROECONOMICADJUSTMENTSWILLRELYONTHENATUREOFTHEPUBLICFINANCIALMANAGEMENTINFRASTRUCTUREATALLLEVELSOFGOVER
46、NMENTSOURCEEHTISHAMAHMAD,MARIAALBINOWAR,ANDRAJUSINGHSUBNATIONALPUBLICFINANCIALMANAGEMENTINSTITUTIONSANDMACROECONOMICCONSIDERATIONSIMFWORKINGPAPER,2005（108）,PP126二、翻译文章译文国家公共财务管理机构和宏观经济的思考中央政府在透明的公共财政管理过程中，需要地方一级机构的配合，这反映了其职能的需要，同时为了能和地方政府创造更好的下放管理效率，确保良好的问责制和竞争机制是关键因素。此外国家债务这样一因素对整个宏观经济稳定有着影响，中央政府要特
47、别关注国内债务的监测和管理。在实际问题上，地方一级有是否有良好的最终有效的公共财务管理治理取决于成功或失败的不同政策选择。虽然有一系列有关地方财务和“财务规则”的文献表明已经出现不太重视公共财务管理的重要治理方面的情况（见波特1997年，月夜，2001）。这一疏忽部分原因可能是由于权力下放，以及以社区为基础的产生有效和公平的支出决策所导致的。事实上，在以社区参与为发展重点的战略是在20世纪50年代，主要特征是由福特基金会和外国缓助方案所驱动。但在当时并未取得重大成就，即使由于近几年来经过非政府组织的一系列政策努力。以社区推动为发展重点采用的是世行的综合发展框架（世界银行，2001）基石之一。但
48、是，越来越多的证据表明，弱或缺乏公共财务管理职能和机构很可能会导致接近地方社区所固有的公共服务没有任何优势。有关涉及到基础公共财务管理的基本制度和程序因素可能已经在宪法，或在预算，或法律或协议管辖下的国家经营或负债较高层次中的法律中规定。在一些国家，比如南非，就已经有一个涵盖上述领域的精心设计的法例法规。在任何一级政府采取的负责秩序的行动中，必须明确其功能，优先考虑和授权支出对挪用其资金，确保合理的实际支出。另一重要方面则涉及到需要及时准确地报告给各自的立法机关和更高层次的机构。但问题是需要政府提出相关的透明度和问责制，以及是否符合最起码国际标准的制度。常常国家大量的支出可能会转移到上级政府，
49、但如果政府没有在初级水平进行硬预算约束的情况下有可能超过预算（利特瓦克和强持隆德，2003）。弱或不存在的借款超过控制时可能通常需要转换，例如，通过债务或发放贷款承包，或间接地拖欠应付账款建设。在不同的政制安排下，来自各不相同的国家对实施的借贷自愿协议（一般指州）或规则（联合会，以及超国家的团块的国家，如欧盟）有不同的政策反应。以社区为基础的治理情况取决于当地信息产生的可能性以及社区间的相互作用或者是社会网络的资本。在原则上，这些因素的结合可以针对当地产生的消费需求与当地的实际情况进行相互作用以达到资金不被挪用的目标。而针对这些情况，国际社会和捐助机构有可能提出缓助方案设计。但是，在实践中有俩个实质性的困难一个问题涉及到是否有可能被集团垄断；另一个涉及到的问题是这以方案是否有助于加强信息类型的生成。最后要分析当地服务的有效性和是否有强大的地方利益群体能够争取到一个大比例的分配到地方的资金。布拉德曼和戴安娜2005讨论了集中和分散之间的基础设施服务的提供理论权衡。在不平等的条件下，贫困或弱势社会条件可能对以社区为基础的发展不利，因为现有的社会经济关系通常可能受到目标群体缺点的影响。同时，高原还强调了直接挪用资金的风险，除了受消费或误导消费因素影响。这些倾向有可能会加强基础设施，特别是使信息的流动性和审计的独立性薄弱。证据显示，以社区为基础的发展现象是复杂的（参见由曼苏里，2004
