1、原文THEREDUCTIONOFSYSTEMATICRISKINTHEUNITEDSTATESFINANCIALSYSTEMGOINGFORWARD,THECENTRALPROBLEMFORFINANCIALREGULATIONDEFINEDASTHEPRESCRIPTIONOFRULES,ASDISTINCTFROMSUPERVISIONORRISKASSESSMENTISTOREDUCESYSTEMICRISKSYSTEMICRISKISTHERISKTHATTHEFAILUREOFONESIGNIFICANTFINANCIALINSTITUTIONCANCAUSEORSIGNIFICAN
2、TLYCONTRIBUTETOTHEFAILUREOFOTHERSIGNIFICANTFINANCIALINSTITUTIONSASARESULTOFTHEIRLINKAGESTOEACHOTHERSYSTEMICRISKCANALSOBEDEFINEDTOINCLUDETHEPOSSIBILITYTHATONEEXOGENOUSSHOCKMAYSIMULTANEOUSLYCAUSEORCONTRIBUTETOTHEFAILUREOFMULTIPLESIGNIFICANTFINANCIALINSTITUTIONSTHISARTICLEFOCUSESONTHEFORMERDEFINITIONBE
3、CAUSEPROPERREGULATIONCOULDHAVETHEGREATESTPOTENTIALTOREDUCESYSTEMICRISKINTHISAREATHEREAREFOURPRINCIPALLINKAGESTHATCANRESULTINACHAINREACTIONOFFAILURESFIRST,THEREAREINTERBANKDEPOSITS,WHETHERFROMLOANSORFROMCORRESPONDENTACCOUNTSUSEDTOPROCESSPAYMENTSTHESEACCOUNTSWERETHEMAJORCONCERNWHENCONTINENTALILLINOISB
4、ANKALMOSTFAILEDINTHEMID1980SCONTINENTALHELDSIZABLEDEPOSITSOFOTHERBANKSINMANYCASES,THEAMOUNTOFTHEDEPOSITSSUBSTANTIALLYEXCEEDEDTHECAPITALOFTHEDEPOSITORBANKSTHESEBANKSGENERALLYHELDSUCHSIZABLEDEPOSITSBECAUSETHEYCLEAREDPAYMENTS,SUCHASCHECKSORWIRETRANSFERS,THROUGHCONTINENTALIFCONTINENTALHADFAILED,THOSEBAN
5、KSWOULDHAVEFAILEDASWELLSECTION308OFTHEFDICIMPROVEMENTACTOF1991GIVESTHEFEDERALRESERVEBOARDPOWERSTODEALWITHTHISPROBLEMTHEACTPERMITSTHEBOARDTOLIMITTHECREDITEXTENDEDBYANINSUREDDEPOSITORYINSTITUTIONTOANOTHERDEPOSITORYINSTITUTIONLIMITATIONOFINTERBANKDEPOSITSMAYBEFEASIBLEWITHRESPECTTOPLACEMENTSBYONEBANKWIT
6、HANOTHERBECAUSETHEAMOUNTOFCREDITEXTENDEDISFIXEDFORAGIVENTERMINDEED,ITAPPEARSTHATTHECHAINREACTIONRISKARISINGFROMBILATERALCREDITEXPOSURESFROMOVERNIGHTFEDERALRESERVEFUNDSTRANSACTIONSISQUITELOWLOSSESWOULDNOTEXCEEDONEPERCENTOFTOTALCOMMERCIALBANKINGASSETSASLONGASLOSSRATESAREKEPTTOHISTORICALLYOBSERVEDLEVEL
7、SEXPOSURESAREMOREDIFFICULTTOIDENTIFYWITHRESPECTTOINTERBANKCLEARINGACCOUNTSWHERETHEAMOUNTOFCREDITEXTENDEDISAFUNCTIONOFPAYMENTTRAFFICFOREXAMPLE,BANKAMAYBECREDITEDBYITSCORRESPONDENTBANKBFORANINCOMINGWIRETRANSFEROF10MILLIONBANKAISTHUSACREDITOROFBANKBFORTHISAMOUNTIFBANKBWERETOFAILBANKAISSERIOUSLYEXPOSEDW
8、ITHOUTMATERIALCHANGESINTHEPAYMENTSYSTEM,SUCHASFORCINGBANKSTOMAKEANDRECEIVEALLPAYMENTSTHROUGHFEDERALRESERVERATHERTHANCORRESPONDENTACCOUNTS,ITWOULDBEQUITEDIFFICULTTOLIMITTHESETYPESOFEXPOSURESSECOND,ACHAINREACTIONOFBANKFAILURESCANOCCURTHROUGHNETSETTLEMENTPAYMENTSYSTEMSIFONEBANKFAILSTOSETTLEITSPOSITIONI
9、NANETSETTLEMENTSYSTEMFORLARGEVALUEPAYMENTS,SUCHASTHECLEARINGHOUSEINTERBANKPAYMENTSSYSTEMCHIPSINTHEUNITEDSTATES,OTHERBANKSTHATDONOTGETPAIDMAY,INTURN,FAILTHISRISKWASTHEMAJORSYSTEMICRISKCONCERNOFTHEFEDERALRESERVEUNTILCHIPSCHANGEDITSSETTLEMENTPROCEDURESIN2001TOESSENTIALLYELIMINATETHISRISKTHIRD,ACHAINREA
10、CTIONOFBANKFAILURESCANOCCURTHROUGHIMITATIVERUNSWHENONEBANKFAILS,DEPOSITORSINOTHERBANKS,PARTICULARLYTHOSEWHOSEDEPOSITSAREUNINSURED,MAYASSUMETHATTHEIRBANKSMAYALSOFAILANDSOWITHDRAWTHEIRFUNDS,EXPOSINGTHESEBANKSTOALIQUIDITYCRISISANDULTIMATELYTOFAILURETHISRESULTCOMESFROMALACKOFINFORMATIONINTHEMARKETABOUTW
11、HATSPECIFICALLYCAUSEDTHEFIRSTBANKTOFAILN15THEFEDERALRESERVEPLAYSTHECLASSICROLEOFLENDEROFLASTRESORTTOSTEMIRRATIONALIMITATIVERUNSINSITUATIONSSUCHASTHISONELASTLY,ANDESPECIALLYPROMINENTINTHECURRENTCRISIS,ACHAINREACTIONOFBANKFAILURESCANOCCURASARESULTOFCOUNTERPARTYRISKONDERIVATIVETRANSACTIONS,SUCHASCREDIT
12、DEFAULTSWAPSCDSSHERETHECONCERNISTHATIFINSTITUTIONXFAILSTOSETTLEITSDERIVATIVEPOSITIONWITHINSTITUTIONY,BOTHXANDYWILLFAILIFYINTURNCANNOTSETTLEITSPOSITIONS,OTHERINSTITUTIONSWILLALSOFAILTHISRISKPROVEDPOTENTIALLYSIGNIFICANTINTHEFAILUREOFTHEHEDGEFUNDLONGTERMCAPITALMANAGEMENTIN1998CONCERNSOFTHISTYPEALSOUNDE
13、RLAYJPMORGANCHASESASSISTEDACQUISITIONOFBEARSTEARNSANDTHEINJECTIONOFFEDERALFUNDSINTOAIGN18THISISONEAREAINWHICHTHEFAILUREOFNONBANKSISAMAJORCONCERN,BUTTHESEVERITYOFTHISFORMOFSYSTEMICRISKANDTHEDEGREEOFINTERCONNECTEDNESSAMONGFINANCIALINSTITUTIONSISCURRENTLYUNKNOWNN19AREPORTBYTHESPECIALINSPECTORGENERALFOR
14、THETROUBLEDASSETRELIEFPROGRAMSIGTARPONTHEGOVERNMENTSINVESTMENTSINAIGINDICATEDTHATGOLDMANSACHS,AMAJORCOUNTERPARTY,WOULDHAVEBEENMADEWHOLEINTHEEVENTOFANAIGDEFAULTTHEREPORTFURTHERINDICATEDTHATTHETREASURYANDFEDERALRESERVEWEREPRIMARILYCONCERNEDWITHLOSSESTHATWOULDBEINCURREDBYINVESTORSINAIGINTHEEVENTOFADEFA
15、ULT,INCLUDING10BILLIONOFSTATEANDLOCALGOVERNMENTMONEY,40BILLIONIN401KPLANS,AND38BILLIONINRETIREMENTPLANSTHEREPORTSEXPLANATIONOFTHEGOVERNMENTSACTIONALSOMENTIONEDCONCERNOVERSTEMMINGRUNSONMONEYMARKETFUNDS,WHICHHELD20BILLIONINAIGCOMMERCIALPAPERSIMILARLY,INTHEIRRECENTTESTIMONYONTHE“FEDERALBAILOUTOFAIG,“TR
16、EASURYSECRETARYTIMOTHYGEITHNERANDNEWYORKFEDERALRESERVEGENERALCOUNSELTHOMASBAXTERALSOEMPHASIZEDFACTORSOTHERTHANDERIVATIVESCOUNTERPARTYRISK,INCLUDINGTHEIMPACTTHATTHEFAILUREOFAIGWOULDHAVEONMONEYMARKETFUNDS,PERSONALSAVINGSANDRETIREMENTPLANS,ANDINSURANCEPOLICYHOLDERSIFPROSPECTIVEINVESTORLOSSES,RATHERTHAN
17、THEFALLOUTOFINTERCONNECTEDNESS,WERETHETRUEBASISFORTHEGOVERNMENTPOLICYWITHRESPECTTOAIG,ITMAYBETHATTHECONCERNWITHSYSTEMICRISKISOVERSTATEDFURTHERSTUDYANDBETTERDISCLOSUREFROMTHETREASURYANDFEDERALRESERVEISNEEDEDTOSUPPORTINFORMEDESTIMATESOFTHEMAGNITUDEOFTHEPROBLEMINANYEVENT,GAUGINGTHEIMPACTOFSYSTEMICRISKI
18、SDIFFICULTTODETERMINEANDBEYONDTHESCOPEOFTHISARTICLETHETHREATOFSYSTEMICRISKWHETHERREALORIMAGINEDRESULTSINBOTHTHENEEDFORGOVERNMENTBAILOUTSATTAXPAYEREXPENSEANDINANINCREASEINMORALHAZARDTHESERESULTSOCCURBECAUSEBOTHEQUITYANDDEBTHOLDERS,ASWELLASCOUNTERPARTIES,MAYBEPROTECTEDAGAINSTLOSSESOFCOURSE,THEGOVERNME
19、NTCOULDDECIDENOTTOINTERVENE,BUTTHISLAISSEZFAIREAPPROACHCOULDPUTTHEENTIREGLOBALECONOMYATRISK,ANEVENWORSEOUTCOMEASTHEFINANCIALCRISISHASILLUSTRATED,BANKSCANNOTALWAYSCOUNTONTHEGOVERNMENTTOCUTOFFSYSTEMICRISKWHENITOCCURSTHEPOLITICSOFSUPPLYINGMONEYTOBANKSAREUNPOPULARANDUNSUSTAINABLEBYTHEFEDERALRESERVEOVERT
20、HELONGTERMWITHOUTINTENSEPUBLICSCRUTINYANDLOSSOFINDEPENDENCEATTHEOUTSET,ITISALSOWORTHNOTINGTHATTHE“VOLCKERRULES“ANDRELATEDLIMITATIONSONBANKSIZEANNOUNCEDBYTHEOBAMAADMINISTRATIONONJANUARY21,2009DONOTHAVEMUCHIFANYPOTENTIALTOREDUCESYSTEMICRISKTHEVOLCKERRULESWOULDPROHIBITBANKHOLDINGCOMPANIESANDALLOFTHEIRS
21、UBSIDIARIESFROMENGAGINGINPROPRIETARYTRADING,ASWELLASFROMINVESTINGINORSPONSORINGHEDGEFUNDANDPRIVATEEQUITYOPERATIONSALTHOUGHPRESIDENTOBAMAHASCHARACTERIZEDPROPRIETARYTRADINGASTRADING“UNRELATEDTOSERVINGCUSTOMERS,“APRECISELEGALSTANDARDHASNOTBEENGIVENTHERELATEDSIZELIMITATIONSWEREINITIALLYDESCRIBEDASSTRAIG
22、HTFORWARDCAPSONEACHBANKSMARKETSHAREOFNONDEPOSITLIABILITIESASDEPUTYTREASURYSECRETARYNEALWOLINDESCRIBES,HOWEVER,THESIZELIMITSWOULDNOTREQUIREBANKSTODIVESTEXISTINGOPERATIONSORRESTRICTORGANICGROWTH,BUTWOULDINSTEADLIMITBANKSABILITYTOGAINMARKETSHARETHROUGHMERGERSANDACQUISITIONSTHEVOLCKERRULESAREUNLIKELYTOR
23、EDUCESYSTEMICRISKFORSEVERALREASONSFIRST,BANKSGENERALLYENGAGEINRELATIVELYLITTLEPROPRIETARYTRADINGFOREXAMPLE,WELLSFARGOANDBANKOFAMERICA,TWOOFTHELARGESTDEPOSITFUNDEDBANKS,AREESTIMATEDTOEARNLESSTHAN1OFREVENUESFROMPROPRIETARYTRADINGSECOND,ACTIVITIESTHATTHREATENTHEFINANCIALSYSTEMDONOTOCCURONLYINBANKSINFAC
24、T,NONEOFTHEMOSTPROMINENTFAILURESOFTHEFINANCIALCRISISFANNIEMAE,FREDDIEMAC,AIG,BEARSTEARNS,ORLEHMANWASADEPOSITTAKINGBANKANDTHIRD,FOCUSINGONPROPRIETARYTRADINGIGNORESTHEREALCAUSEOFTHEFINANCIALCRISISLOSSESFROMLENDINGANDSECURITIZATIONGOLDMANSACHSHASESTIMATEDTHATLOSSESFROMLENDINGANDSECURITIZATIONACCOUNTEDF
25、ORAPPROXIMATELY80OFOVERALLCREDITLOSSESINCURREDBYUSBANKSNORSHOULDWEEXPECTREDUCTIONSINSYSTEMICRISKTORESULTFROMTHESIZELIMITATIONSANINSTITUTIONDOESNOTPOSESYSTEMICRISKBECAUSEOFITSABSOLUTESIZE,BUTRATHERBECAUSEOFITSDEBT,ITSDERIVATIVESPOSITIONS,ANDTHESCOPEANDCOMPLEXITYOFITSOTHERFINANCIALRELATIONSHIPSBECAUSE
26、THEPROBLEMISNOTSIZEBUTINTERCONNECTEDNESS,REFORMSHOULDFOCUSONREDUCINGTHEINTERCONNECTIONSSOTHATFIRMSCANFAILSAFELYFURTHERMORE,EVENIFSIZEWERETHERIGHTISSUE,MRWOLINSTESTIMONYIMPLIESTHATTHESIZELIMITATIONSWOULDNOTREQUIREANYEXISTINGBANKTOSHRINKIFSIZEISTHESOURCEOFSYSTEMICRISK,PRESUMABLYWESHOULDBECONCERNEDABOU
27、TITWHETHERITISTHERESULTOFACQUISITION,ORGANICGROWTH,OROTHERWISETHEDRAFTLEGISLATIONINTRODUCEDBYSENATORDODDONMARCH15,2010THESENATEDRAFTCONTAINEDAMODIFIEDVERSIONOFTHEVOLCKERRULESANDSIZELIMITATIONSTHOUGHTHESENATEDRAFTCALLSONTHEFINANCIALSTABILITYOVERSIGHTCOUNCILTOCONDUCTSTUDIESOFWHETHERTHESEREFORMSWILLRED
28、UCESYSTEMICRISKBEFORETHEYAREIMPLEMENTED,STUDIESARENOTNEEDEDTOCONFIRMTHATBENEFITSFROMTHESEREFORMSWILLBENEGLIGIBLEOUTRIGHTRESTRICTIONSONPROPRIETARYTRADINGPROPOSEDINTHESENATEDRAFTWOULDAPPLYTOINSUREDDEPOSITORYINSTITUTIONS,COMPANIESTHATCONTROLINSUREDDEPOSITORYINSTITUTIONS,BANKHOLDINGCOMPANIES,ANDALLSUBSI
29、DIARIESOFTHEFOREGOINGTHEDODDPROPOSALISEVENMORESTRICTTHANCHAIRMANVOLCKERRECOMMENDEDACCORDINGTOCHAIRMANVOLCKERITWOULDBEACCEPTABLEFORGOLDMANSACHSTODROPITSBANKCHARTERANDCONTINUETOENGAGEINPROPRIETARYTRADINGHOWEVER,UNDERTHESENATEDRAFT,GOLDMANWOULDALMOSTCERTAINLYBEASYSTEMATICALLYIMPORTANTNONBANKFINANCIALCO
30、MPANYWHENITDROPPEDITSBANKCHARTER,ANDTHUSWOULDCONTINUETOBESUPERVISEDBYTHEFEDERALRESERVEWHILEGOLDMANCOULD,ASANONBANK,CONTINUETOENGAGEINPROPRIETARYTRADING,ITWOULDBESUBJECTTOFEDERALRESERVECONTROLS,INCLUDING“ADDITIONALCAPITALREQUIREMENTS“AND“ADDITIONALQUANTITATIVELIMITS“THUS,EVENIFGOLDMANSACHSWERETOGIVEU
31、PITSBANKCHARTER,ITWOULDBEREQUIREDTOHOLDADDITIONALCAPITALAGAINSTITSPROPRIETARYTRADINGPOSITIONSBECAUSEINSTITUTIONSTHATARESYSTEMICALLYIMPORTANTARELIKELYTOBEMORETHOROUGHLYREGULATEDTHANTHOSETHATARENOT,THISCOULDENCOURAGEPROPRIETARYTRADINGTOSHIFTTOLESSCAREFULLYMONITOREDFIRMS,THEREBYINCREASINGSYSTEMICRISKSA
32、DDLINGNONBANKFINANCIALCOMPANIESENGAGEDINPROPRIETARYTRADINGWITHADDITIONALCAPITALREQUIREMENTSISTHUSPROBLEMATICTHISARTICLEADDRESSESWHATIREGARDASTHEFIVEMOSTIMPORTANTPOLICIESFORDEALINGWITHSYSTEMICRISKTHEIMPOSITIONOFCAPITALREQUIREMENTSORLIMITSONLEVERAGE,THEUSEOFCLEARINGHOUSESANDEXCHANGESFOROVERTHECOUNTERD
33、ERIVATIVES,THERESOLUTIONOFINSOLVENTINSTITUTIONS,THEEMERGENCYLENDINGBYTHEFEDERALRESERVE,ANDTHESTRUCTUREOFTHEREGULATORYSYSTEMASITAFFECTSTHECONTROLOFSYSTEMICRISKIICAPITALREQUIREMENTSEXANTE,REGULATORYCAPITALREQUIREMENTSHAVEBEENTHECHIEFMEASURETOREDUCESYSTEMICRISKCAPITALREQUIREMENTS,WHICHHAVEFOCUSEDPRINCI
34、PALLYONBANKS,AREDESIGNEDTODECREASETHELIKELIHOODOFFINANCIALINSTITUTIONFAILUREIFINSTITUTIONSDONOTFAIL,THEPROBLEMOFSYSTEMICRISKLARGELYDISAPPEARSCAPITALREQUIREMENTSHAVEBEENHIGHLYREGULATEDFORALONGTIMESINCE1988,THEREQUIREMENTSHAVEBEENSTANDARDIZEDWORLDWIDEBYTHEBASELCOMMITTEEONBANKSUPERVISIONTHEUNITEDSTATES
35、IMPLEMENTEDBASELIANDISINTHEPROCESSOFIMPLEMENTINGBASELIIFORBANKSANDTHEIRHOLDINGCOMPANIESTHESECHADALREADYIMPLEMENTEDPILLARIOFBASELIIFORSECURITIESFIRMSHOLDINGCOMPANIESBEFORETHEONSLAUGHTOFTHECREDITCRISISTHESECAPITALREQUIREMENTSPROVEDHIGHLYINADEQUATETHESECSBASELIIBASEDRULESPERMITTEDTHETOPFIVEMAJORINVESTM
36、ENTBANKSTOACHIEVELEVERAGEOFOVERTHIRTYTOONEINSUFFICIENTCAPITALWASASIGNIFICANTCAUSEOFTHEFAILUREOFLEHMANBROTHERSANDBEARSTEARNSINSUFFICIENTCAPITALALSOPLAYEDAMAJORROLEINFORCINGMERRILLLYNCHTOSELLITSELFTOBANKOFAMERICAINDEED,THEMOSTINTENSIVEANDDETAILEDAREAOFREGULATION,CAPITAL,HASPROVENINEFFECTIVETHISFAILURE
37、DEMONSTRATESTHATMOREREGULATIONDOESNOTNECESSARILYTRANSLATEINTOLESSSYSTEMICRISKSOURCESCOTT,HALS,2010“THEREDUCTIONOFSYSTEMATICRISKINTHEUNITEDSTATESFINANCIALSYSTEM”HARVARDJOURNALOFLAWPP25译文减少美国金融系统的系统性风险一、系统性风险减少核心问题展望未来,中央金融监管问题指处方的规则,有别于监督或风险评估是减少系统性风险。系统性风险是没有一个重要的金融机构可以导致或有助于失败的其他重要金融机构的联系。系统性风险也可以确
38、定的可能性,包括一个外来冲击,同时可导致失败的多种重要金融机构。这篇文章的重点是前定义,因为可以适当规管最大的潜力,减少系统性风险。主要有四种联系可以导致连锁反应失败。第一,有银行同业存款,无论从贷款或代理账户用于处理付款。这些账户主要关注的是大陆伊利诺斯银行。大陆举行了大量存款的其他银行，在许多情况下,该笔存款数量大幅超过资本的储户银行。这些银行普遍拥有庞大存款,因为他们能够清楚的付款,例如通过大陆检查或电汇。如果大陆失败,这些银行就会失败。第308联邦存款保险公司改进了1991年美国联邦储备委员会的力量来处理这个问题。该法案允许董事会限制信贷保险的存款机构到另一个存款机构。事实上,看来连锁
39、风险双边信贷风险从占联邦储备资金是相当低，损失将不超过百分之一的商业银行资产总额只要损失率保持在历史上观察到的水平。风险更难确定关于银行同业结算账户的金额的信贷是一个功能的支付交通。例如,银行A可贷记其代理银行B转帐1000万美元。对B银行这笔款项来说银行A是一个债权银行。如果银行B失败银行A是严重暴露。没有重大变化的支付系统,如迫使银行,并得到所有支付联邦储备而不是代理账户,它会比较困难的限制这些类型的动向。第二,连锁失败的银行可以通过净结算支付系统。如果一个银行未能解决其地位净结算系统的大额支付,如银行同业支付结算系统芯片在美国,其他银行,并不可能支付,反过来则是失败的。这种风险是对重大系
40、统性风险的关注,美国联邦储备委员会在2001年改变了芯片解决程序,基本上消除这种风险。第三,连锁失败的银行可以通过模仿运行。当一个银行失败,在其他银行存户,特别是那些存款没有医疗保险,可能认为他们的银行也要失败,所以撤回他们的资金,使这些银行流动性发生危机并最终失败。这一结果来自缺乏市场信息使第一银行造成失败。在这种情况下，美国联邦储备委员会发挥作用以阻止模仿运行。最后,特别是突出在目前的危机,一个连锁的银行可能会出现失误,结果造成对方的风险,衍生工具交易,如信用违约换汇。在这里关注的是,如果机构X未能解决其衍生立场与机构Y,X和Y将失败。如果Y又无法解决自己的立场,其他机构也将失败。这种风险
41、可能显著的证明了在1998年对冲基金长期资金管理公司的失败。这种类型的关注也涉及了摩根大通辅助收购贝尔斯登及在美国国际集团的联邦基金。非银行机构发放在某一方面的失败是一个主要关注的问题,但这种严重的系统性风险的程度和金融机构之间相互联系是目前不明确的。公布的一份报告显示特殊的检察长为翻腾的资产的救济程序在政府的投资表明,高盛集团的主要对手在美国国际集团的默认值。报告进一步表示,财政部和联邦储备委员会主要是关心的是在美国国际集团的投资者的情况下,默认的设置中所造成的损失,包括100亿美元州和地方政府的钱,40亿美元的养老金计划和380亿美元退休计划。该报告对政府的行动也提到表明关注运行在货币市场
42、基金于200亿元在美国国际集团的商业票据。同样,在其最近的证词“联邦缓急,美国国际集团”财政部长蒂莫西盖特纳和纽约联邦储备委员会一般律师托马斯巴克斯特还强调衍生品交易对手以外的其他因素,包括在货币市场基金中影响美国国际集团的失败、个人储蓄和退休计划、保险的保单。如果准投资者损失不是相互关联的影响,是真正的基础上的政府政策,那可能是系统性风险的夸大。进一步研究和更好地披露财务和联邦储备委员会,以支持知情估计问题的严重性。在任何情况下,量规系统性风险的影响是很难决定的,远远超出了本文所涉及的范围。威胁的系统性风险不论是真实或想像的结果,需要政府在纳税人救援费用和道德风险上面的增加和防范。这些结果可
43、能发生因为股票和债券持有人,以及交易对手,可免受损失。当然,政府可以决定不进行干预,但这种自由放任办法可以把整个全球经济的处于风险当中,甚至更糟的结果。金融危机表明,银行不能永远相信政府切断系统性风险的存在。在政治上,向银行提供金钱是不得人心的,不可持续的，联邦储备委员会在长期没有激烈公众的监督而损失其独立性。从一开始,它还有一点值得注意的是,2009年1月21日“沃尔克规则”和相关限制奥巴马宣布的银行规模在管理上没有任何潜在的可以减轻全身的风险。沃尔克规则将禁止银行控股公司及其所有子公司从事专有交易,以及投资或赞助对冲基金和私人投资业务。虽然总统奥巴马的贸易的自营交易与服务客户并没有得到应有
44、的法律规范。有关的大小限制最初是限制了每一个银行市场份额的非存款负债，像财政部副部长尼尔沃林介绍的那样，然而,大小限制不会要求银行剥离现有业务或限制有机增长,但取而代之的是将通过兼并和收购限制银行获得市场份额的能力。沃尔克规则可能减少系统性风险有几个原因。第一,银行一般较少从事专有交易。例如,富国和美国银行,两个最大存款银行,估计不到1的收入来自专有交易。第二，活动,威胁金融体系不只是发生在银行。事实上,所有的最突出的失败的财政危机联邦国民抵押协会,弗雷迪麦克,美国国际集团，贝尔斯登或雷曼兄弟的集资,都是银行。第三,专注于私有贸易忽略了真正的原因是亚洲金融危机，资产证券化贷款。高盛公司估计,资
45、产证券化贷款和占所有信用损失的80是美国银行。我们也不应该期望减少系统性的风险。一个机构构成系统性风险,不是因为它的绝对大小,而是因为其债务,其衍生工具职位的范围和复杂性的其他金融关系。因为这个问题不在大小,改革应关注的焦点在于减少公司的失败使之更安全。此外,即使大小权利的问题,沃林先生的证词,意味着的大小限制并不需要任何现有银行收缩。如果大小的来源是系统性风险,可能是我们应该关注它是否由于收购、有机增长,或其他方式。立法草案参议员多德介绍了2010年3月15日参议院的修订版中的沃尔克规则和大小的限制。虽然草案呼吁参议院的金融稳定监督局进行研究,这些改革是否会减少系统性风险才实施,研究是不需要
46、得到确认,这些改革将是微不足道的。完全限制专有交易的参议院提出的草案将适用于保险保存机构、公司,控制保险保存机构、银行控股公司,和所有附属公司。杜德建议更严格于主席沃尔克的建议。主席沃尔克是可以接受高盛放弃其银行宪章和继续从事专有交易。不过,根据参议院的草案,高盛几乎肯定会是一个系统重要金融公司。高盛,可以作为一个非银行,继续从事专有交易,它将受到美国联邦储备委员会的管制,包括“附加的资本要求”和“额外的数量限制”。因此,即使高盛公司放弃其银行宪章,它也需要增加额外资金保持其专利贸易地位。因为重要的机构系统可能更彻底地调节,这可以鼓励专有交易,从而提高系统性风险。让非银行金融公司从事自营交易与
47、另外的资本要求是有这样的问题的。本文我认为五个最重要的政策处理系统性风险实行资本要求或限制利用,使用的交流和交换网上交易衍生工具、解决破产机构、紧急贷款的美国联邦储备委员会和结构的监管制度的管制影响的系统性风险。二、资金需求事先,管理所需资金的主要措施,减少系统性风险。资本要求,主要集中在银行,旨在减少可能性的金融机构的失败。如果机构没有失败,这一问题的系统性风险在很大程度上就消失了。资本的要求都高标准规范化了很长时间。自1988,要求得到全世界的标准化委员会的巴塞尔银行监管。证券交易委员会实施新巴塞尔协议的支柱的证券控股公司在信贷危机的冲击这些资本要求被证明是非常不足的。证券交易委员会的巴塞尔的规则允许的五大银行,主要投资达到利用0比1。资本不足一个重要原因是失败的雷曼兄弟、贝尔斯登。资本不足也发挥了重要作用,迫使美林集团出售自己的美国银行。其实,最密集和详细的规定方面,资本,已证明无效。这次失败表明更多的规定并不转化为减少系统风险。出处SCOTT,HALS减少美国金融系统的系统性风险哈佛大学法学杂志,2010P25
