1、原文OWNERSHIPCONCENTRATION,AGENCYCONFLICTS,ANDDIVIDENDPOLICYINJAPAN1INTRODUCTIONAGENCYCONFLICTSPLAYANIMPORTANTROLEINCORPORATEDECISIONSINTHEIRSEMINALPAPER,JENSENANDMECKLING1976SHOWTHATDECISIONMAKERSMAYSELECTVALUEDECREASINGOUTCOMESTHATAREJUSTIFIEDONLYBECAUSEOFTHEWEALTHTRANSFERFROMOTHERSTAKEHOLDERSTOGIVE
2、AWELLKNOWNEXAMPLE,MANAGERSMAYINVESTINUNPROFITABLEPROJECTSWHOSECOSTSAREBORNEBYSHAREHOLDERSIFDOINGSOENHANCESTHEIROWNSTATUSANDBRINGTHEMPRIVATEBENEFITSLIKEWISE,SHAREHOLDERSMAYTAKEEXCESSIVERISKKNOWINGTHATTHEDOWNSIDEISASSUMEDBYDEBTHOLDERS,WHILETHEYBENEFITFROMTHEUPSIDEAGENCYCONFLICTSCANTAKEMANYOTHERFORMSMY
3、ERSANDMAJLUF1984ARGUETHATFIRMSACTINGINTHEINTERESTOFCURRENTSHAREHOLDERSSHOULDRATIONALLYPASSUPPROFITABLEINVESTMENTPROJECTSIFTHEBENEFITSARECAPTUREDBYOUTSIDEINVESTORSSHLEIFERANDVISHNY1997EMPHASIZETHEAGENCYCONFLICTSBETWEENMAJORITYANDMINORITYSHAREHOLDERS,PROMPTEDBYRECENTEVIDENCETHATDOMINANTSHAREHOLDERSEXT
4、RACTRENTSATTHEEXPENSEOFSMALLSHAREHOLDERSTHROUGHTHETUNNELINGOFASSETSANDPROFITS,SUCHASTHEUSEOFUNFAIRTRANSFERPRICINGBETWEENCONTROLLEDENTITIESJOHNSONETAL2000PROVIDEAFEWEXAMPLESOFEXPROPRIATIONTAKINGPLACEINDEVELOPEDCOUNTRIESPAYOUTPOLICYISONEAREAOFCORPORATEDECISIONSTHATCANNOTESCAPETHEINFLUENCEOFAGENCYCONFL
5、ICTSINFACT,EASTERBROOK1984ARGUESTHATDIVIDENDSCANBEEITHERTHERESULTORTHESOLUTIONTOAGENCYCONFLICTSBECAUSEMANAGERSPREFERTORETAINEARNINGSTOINCREASEPRIVATECONSUMPTIONORREDUCETHERISKONTHEIRHUMANCAPITAL,LOWGOVERNANCESTANDARDSANDPOORSHAREHOLDERPROTECTIONARELIKELYTORESULTINLOWERPAYOUTTHISVIEWISCLEARLYESTABLIS
6、HEDINTHECROSSCOUNTRYANALYSISOFLAPORTAETAL2000CONVERSELY,DIVIDENDPAYOUTCANCONTRIBUTETOMITIGATEAGENCYCONFLICTSJENSEN1986ADVOCATESTOLOWERTHEFREECASHFLOWSAVAILABLETOMANAGERSINORDERTOINCREASEFINANCIALDISCIPLINEPAYINGHIGHDIVIDENDSPRECISELYACHIEVESTHISPURPOSE,THUSPROVIDINGACOSTEFFECTIVESUBSTITUTETOSHAREHOL
7、DERMONITORINGMORERECENTLY,GUGLERANDYURTOGLU2003HIGHLIGHTTHEIMPORTANCEOFAGENCYCONFLICTSBETWEENSHAREHOLDERSBYLOOKINGATTHEDIVIDENDPOLICYOFGERMANFIRMSSINCEDOMINANTSHAREHOLDERSCANEXTRACTPRIVATEBENEFITSFROMTHECASHFLOWSUNDERTHEIRCONTROL,THEIRPREFERENCETRANSLATESINTOLOWERDIVIDENDSHOWEVER,THEPRESENCEOFANOTHE
8、RLARGESHAREHOLDERCANRESTRAINTHERENTEXTRACTION,LEADINGEVENTUALLYTOAHIGHERPAYOUTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPAPERISTOEXAMINETHEDIVIDENDPOLICYOFJAPANESEFIRMSFROMANAGENCYPERSPECTIVEIFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONISCONSISTENTWITHTHEALIGNMENTOFINTERESTBETWEENMANAGEMENTANDSHAREHOLDER,ASSTUDIESOFCORPORATEPERFORMANCEHAVESUGGES
9、TED,THERESHOULDBEAHIGHERDIVIDENDPAYOUTHOWEVER,OWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONCANALSOFACILITATERENTEXTRACTIONBYDOMINANTSHAREHOLDERS,RESULTINGINLOWERPAYOUTOURRESULTSSUPPORTTHESECONDHYPOTHESISOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONISASSOCIATEDWITHSIGNIFICANTLYLOWERDIVIDENDPAYMENTSINPROPORTIONOFOPERATINGEARNINGSASINPROPORTIONOFB
10、OOKEQUITYINEFFECT,THEDIFFERENCEBETWEENTHEHIGHCONCENTRATIONANDLOWCONCENTRATIONGROUPSISFOUNDTOBEINTHEORDEROF10WEINVESTIGATETHEREASONSFORTHISDIFFERENCE,FOCUSINGONTHEROLEOFPROFITABILITY,GROWTHOPPORTUNITIESANDCHANGESINLEVERAGEINEXPLAININGTHEDECISIONTOCHANGEDIVIDENDSOURANALYSISUNCOVERSANUMBEROFAGENCYCONFL
11、ICTSFIRST,TIGHTLYCONTROLLEDFIRMSIE,FIRMSWITHCONCENTRATEDOWNERSHIPARELESSLIKELYTOINCREASEDIVIDENDSWHENPROFITABILITYINCREASESANDWHENOPERATINGPROFITSARENEGATIVETHISPATTERNISCONSISTENTWITHTHEIRLOWERPAYOUTANDTHEASSUMPTIONTHATDOMINANTSHAREHOLDEREXTRACTPRIVATEBENEFITSFROMRESOURCESUNDERTHEIRCONTROLWEALSOFIN
12、DTHATTIGHTLYCONTROLLEDFIRMSAREMORELIKELYTOOMITDIVIDENDSWHENINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESIMPROVE,WHICHPROTECTSTHEINTERESTOFCURRENTSHAREHOLDERSCLEARLY,THISDECISIONREDUCESTHELIKELIHOODOFREQUIRINGFURTHERFUNDINGTHATWOULDBENEFITOUTSIDEINVESTORS,HENCEPREVENTINGTHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMPRESENTINMORELIKELYTOINCREA
13、SEDIVIDENDSWHENDEBTLEVELSAREHIGHANDLESSLIKELYTOOMITDIVIDENDSWHENDEBTINCREASES,WHICHISEQUIVALENTTOAWEALTHTRANSFERFROMDEBTHOLDERSTOSHAREHOLDERSSINCEITDECREASESTHEAMOUNTOFCOLLATERALBACKINGTHEFIRMSDEBTOVERALL,THEANALYSISOFTHEDIVIDENDADJUSTMENTDECISIONPROVIDESSOMEREASONSFORTHELOWERPAYOUTASSOCIATEDWITHOWN
14、ERSHIPCONCENTRATIONMOREIMPORTANTLY,PERHAPS,THERESULTSSUGGESTTHATASINTHECASEOFMANYCORPORATEDECISIONS,DIVIDENDPOLICYISHEAVILYDETERMINEDBYAGENCYCONFLICTSBETWEENMAJORITYSHAREHOLDERSANDOTHERSTAKEHOLDERSINPARTICULAR,THEEMBLEMATICDEBTHOLDERSHAREHOLDERCONFLICTAPPEARSTOBEEXACERBATEDBYTHEPRESENCEOFDOMINANTPLA
15、YERSABLETOCOORDINATETHEACTIONSOFSHAREHOLDERSTHERESTOFTHEARTICLEISSTRUCTUREDASFOLLOWSSECTION2ARTICULATESTHEHYPOTHESESREGARDINGTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDDIVIDENDPOLICYSECTION3DESCRIBESTHESAMPLEANDDATESOURCESTHEEMPIRICALRESULTSAREPRESENTEDINSECTION4SECTION5CONCLUDESRELATIONSHIPBETWEENO
16、WNERSHIPANDDIVIDENDS21POSITIVERELATIONSHIPACCORDINGTOSHLEIFERANDVISHNY1986,OWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONCREATESTHEINCENTIVESFORLARGESHAREHOLDERSTOMONITORTHEFIRMSMANAGEMENT,WHICHOVERCOMESTHEFREERIDERPROBLEMASSOCIATEDWITHDISPERSEDOWNERSHIPWHEREBYSMALLSHAREHOLDERSHAVENOINCENTIVESTOINCURMONITORINGEXPENSESFORTH
17、EBENEFITOFOTHERSHAREHOLDERSBECAUSEOFSTRICTFINANCIALDISCIPLINE,FIRMSIMPROVETHEIRCAPITALALLOCATION,REDUCEUNPROFITABLEINVESTMENTSANDULTIMATELYEXHIBITHIGHERPERFORMANCEINDEED,SEVERALSTUDIESEG,CLAESSENSANDDJANKOV,1999SHOWTHATCONCENTRATEDOWNERSHIPCONTRIBUTESTOHIGHERPROFITABILITYANDMARKETVALUATIONTHERELEVAN
18、TCONSEQUENCEOFFINANCIALDISCIPLINEISTHATFEWERRESOURCESARECONSUMEDINLOWRETURNPROJECTSANDMORECASHFLOWSCANTHUSBEDISTRIBUTEDASDIVIDENDSINSUPPORTOFTHISINTERPRETATION,MITTON2005SHOWTHATFIRMSWITHBETTERCORPORATEGOVERNANCEPAYHIGHERDIVIDENDSINEMERGINGMARKETSLIKEWISE,LAPORTAETAL2000SHOWTHATINCOUNTRIESWITHBETTER
19、SHAREHOLDERPROTECTION,LIKETHEUS,FIRMSPAYMOREDIVIDENDSEASTERBROOK1984SUGGESTSTHATDIVIDENDPAYMENTSCANBEASUBSTITUTEFORMONITORINGLARGESHAREHOLDERSHAVETHEPOWERTOCONSTRAINFIRMSTODISGORGEEXCESSCASHFLOWSINORDERTOREDUCEMONITORINGEXPENSES,RESULTINGINTHESAMEPOSITIVERELATIONSHIP,BUTWITHREVERSEDIRECTIONOFCAUSALI
20、TYTHISINTERPRETATIONISSUPPORTEDBYTHELOWERCASHHOLDINGSOFBETTERGOVERNEDFIRMSANDFIRMSWITHCONCENTRATEDOWNERSHIPDITTMARETAL,2003FOLLOWINGTHESEARGUMENTS,ITISPOSSIBLETOFORMULATETHEHYPOTHESISTHATOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONISASSOCIATEDWITHHIGHERDIVIDENDPAYMENTS21NEGATIVERELATIONSHIPTHEOPPOSITEVIEWISTHATWELLGOVERN
21、EDFIRMSDONOTNEEDTOPAYHIGHERDIVIDENDSTOINCREASEFINANCIALDISCIPLINEORENHANCETHEALIGNMENTOFINTERESTBETWEENMANAGERSANDSHAREHOLDERSINTHEABSENCEOFAGENCYCONFLICTS,SHAREHOLDERSCANBECONFIDENTENOUGHTHATTHEFIRMSCASHFLOWSAREPROPERLYUSEDHENCE,THEHIGHERDIVIDENDPAYOUTADVOCATEDBYEASTERBROOK1984DOESNOTAPPEARTOBEESSE
22、NTIALTODISCIPLININGMANAGEMENTCONSISTENTWITHTHISVIEW,JENSENETAL1992SHOWTHATINSIDEROWNERSHIPISASSOCIATEDWITHSIGNIFICANTLYLOWERDIVIDENDPAYOUTAMONGUSFIRMSFARINHA2003DOCUMENTSASIMILARNEGATIVERELATIONSHIPINTHEUKCHENETAL2005PROVIDEEVIDENCETHATSOMEINDICATORSOFGOVERNANCEQUALITYEXISTENCEOFAUDITCOMMITTEEANDPER
23、CENTAGEOFINDEPENDENTDIRECTORSNEGATIVELYAFFECTDIVIDENDPAYOUTSINHONGKONGTHESESTUDIESSTRONGLYSUGGESTTHATTHEHIGHERALIGNMENTOFINTERESTBETWEENMANAGERSASAGENTSANDSHAREHOLDERSASPRINCIPALSSHOULDACTUALLYRESULTINLOWERDIVIDENDPAYMENTSWHATSMORE,AGENCYTHEORYHASRECENTLYHIGHLIGHTEDPOSSIBLECONFLICTSBETWEENLARGEANDSM
24、ALLSHAREHOLDERSSHLEIFERANDVISHNY1997EMPHASIZETHATLARGESHAREHOLDERSPREFERTOGENERATEPRIVATEBENEFITSOFCONTROLTHATARENOTSHAREDBYMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSJOHNSONETAL2000GIVESEVERALEXAMPLESOFCONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSEXPROPRIATINGMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSOFPROFITABLEBUSINESSOPPORTUNITIESCLAESSENSANDDJANKOV1999EXPLAIND
25、OWNWARDSLOPINGFIRMVALUEATHIGHLEVELSOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONBYTHEPOTENTIALRISKOFEXPROPRIATIONBYCONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSGUGLERANDYURTOGLU2003SHOWTHATTHELOWERDIVIDENDPAYOUTOFMAJORITYCONTROLLEDFIRMSINGERMANYISRELATEDTOTHEPROBABILITYTHATCONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSEXTRACTPRIVATEBENEFITSATTHEEXPENSEOFMINORITYSH
26、AREHOLDERSINDEED,THEYFINDTHATINCREASESINDIVIDENDPAYMENTSAREASSOCIATEDWITHSIGNIFICANTLYPOSITIVEABNORMALRETURNSAMONGFIRMSWHERERENTEXTRACTIONISMOSTLIKELYGIVENTHEDISCREPANCYBETWEENCASHFLOWRIGHTSANDCONTROLRIGHTSFURTHERMORE,THEPRESENCEOFASECONDLARGESHAREHOLDERCONTRIBUTESTOINCREASETHEDISTRIBUTIONOFPROFITS,
27、ASITDECREASESTHESCOPEOFEXPROPRIATIONMAURYANDPAJUSTE2002DOCUMENTASIMILARNEGATIVEASSOCIATIONBETWEENOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONANDDIVIDENDPAYMENTSINFINLAND,ASWELLASEVIDENCEOFTHEMITIGATINGROLEOFANOTHERLARGESHAREHOLDERINASIMILARWAY,WECANHYPOTHESIZETHATFIRMSWITHCONCENTRATEDOWNERSHIPAREASSOCIATEDWITHLOWERDIVIDE
28、NDPAYMENTSOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONANDDIVIDENDPAYOUTINTHISSECTION,WEEXAMINETHEEFFECTOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONONDIVIDENDPAYOUTCONTROLLINGFOROTHERFIRMCHARACTERISTICSTHATCOULDINFLUENCEPAYOUTPOLICYTABLE3SHOWTHATTHECOEFFICIENTSONTHEHERFINDHALINDEXLHHANDITSASSOCIATEDDUMMYQ2HAREBOTHSIGNIFICANTLYNEGATIVETHECOEF
29、FICIENTONQ2HFORTHEDIVIDENDPAYOUTRATIOISLESSNEGATIVETHANTHE25INUNIVERSITYANALYSISBUTTHECOEFFICIENTFORDIVIDENDYIELDISMORENEGATIVETHEDIFFERENCEINDIVIDENDPAYMENTASPROPORTIONOFEQUITYISSEENTOBEABOUT10ACROSSTHETWOGROUPSTHESERESULTSDONOTSUPPORTTHEROLEOFDIVIDENDSASSUBSTITUTEFORSHAREHOLDERMONITORINGSUGGESTEDB
30、YEASTERBROOK1984INFACT,FIRMSWITHCONCENTRATEDOWNERSHIP,WHICHAREMORELIKELYTOBECLOSELYMONITORED,ACTUALLYDISTRIBUTELOWERDIVIDENDSTHISPATTERNISMORECONSISTENTWITHTHECLAIMBYSHLEIFERANDVISHNY1997THATDOMINANTSHAREHOLDERSPREFERTOEXTRACTPRIVATEBENEFITS,SUCHASSYNERGIESWITHOTHERCONTROLLEDENTITIES,RATHERTHANRECEI
31、VEDIVIDENDSTHATEQUALLYBENEFITMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSTHERESULTSARECONSISTENTWITHGUGLERANDYURTOGLU2003WHOREPORTTHATMAJORITYCONTROLLEDINGERMANYHAVELOWERPAYOUTSMAURYANDPAJUSTE2002ALSOFINDTHATTHECUMULATEDOWNERSHIPOFTHETHREELARGESTSHAREHOLDERSHASANEGATIVEEFFECTONTHEDIVIDENDPAYOUTOFFINNISHFIRMSAMONGCONTROLVAR
32、IABLES,FIRMSIZEAPPEARSTOREDUCEBOTHTHEDIVIDENDPAYOUTANDTHEDIVIDENDYIELDACOMPARABLEEFFECT,WITHASIMILARORDEROFMAGNITUDE,ISREPORTEDBYGUGLERANDYURTOGLU2005REGARDINGGERMANFIRMSCONSISTENTWITHGUL1999THEINFLUENCEOFPROFITABILITYISPOSITIVEFORDIVIDENDYIELD,BUTNEGATIVEFORDIVIDENDPAYOUTSTHISCOULDBEEXPLAINED,FOLLO
33、WINGLINTNER1956,BYTHEFACTTHATDIVIDENDSARESTICKYFIRMSTHATAREMOREPROFITABLEHAVEHIGHERDIVIDENDPAYMENTS,ALTHOUGHTHEDIVIDENDSARELOWERINPROPORTIONOFTHEIRHIGHEREARNINGSCONTROLLINGFORENDOGENOUSLY,JENSENETAL1992FINDTHATROAHASAPOSITIVEEFFECTONTHEDIVIDENDPAYOUTSOFUSFIRMSTAKENTOGETHER,ITISMORELIKELYTHATTHETRUER
34、OLEOFPROFITABILITYISREFLECTEDBYITSEFFECTONDIVIDENDYIELDBOTHMEASURESOFGROWTHOPPORTUNITIESARESEENTOHAVEAPOSITIVEEFFECTONDIVIDENDPAYOUTANDYIELDTHERESULTISINSHARPCONTRASTTOSTUDIESREGARDINGUSFIRMSFAMAANDFRENCH2002ANDJENSENETAL1992REPORTNEGATIVECOEFFICIENTSFORGROWTHPROXIESFARINHA2003ALSOREPORTANEGATIVEEFF
35、ECTONTHEDIVIDENDPAYOUTOFUKFIRMS,ALTHOUGHTHERESULTSAPPEARTOBESENSITIVETOTHEMODELSPECIFICATIONONTHEOTHERHAND,GUL1999SHOWSTHATGROWTHOPPORTUNITIESHAVEAPOSITIVEANDSIGNIFICANTEFFECTONTHEDIVIDENDYIELD,BUTANINSIGNIFICANTEFFECTONDIVIDENDPAYOUTBENITOANDYOUNG2003OFFERANINTERESTINGEXPLANATIONTOTHISPUZZLEBYCONTR
36、OLLINGFORFIRMFIXEDEFFECTSUNOBSERVABLECHARACTERISTICSEXAMININGASAMPLEOFUKFIRMS,THEYSHOWTHATNONPAYERSAREMOSTOFTENHIGHGROWTHFIRMS,WHICHHAVENEVERPAIDDIVIDENDS,RATHERTHANTROUBLEDFIRMSSEEKINGTOREPAIRTHEIRBALANCESHEETBYCUTTINGDIVIDENDPAYMENTSITISMORELIKELYTHATJAPANESEFIRMSADJUSTTHEIRDIVIDENDPOLICIESTOBUSIN
37、ESSCONDITIONS,CONSISTENTWITHDEWENTERANDWARTHER1998FINALLY,LEVERAGEISSEENTOHAVEANEGATIVEEFFECTONDIVIDENDPAYOUTSASINJENSENETAL1992GUGLERANDYURTOGLU2003REPORTAMORENEGATIVESENSITIVITYOFABOUT046FORGERMANFIRMSCOMPAREDWITHOURRESULTOF026FORJAPANESEFIRMSTHEPOSITIVECOEFFICIENTONDIVIDENDYIELDSEEMSTOBEDUETOTHEL
38、OWERDENOMINATOREQUITYRATIOAMONGHIGHLYLEVERAGEDFIRMSALTHOUGHOLSISTHECOMMONLYREPORTEDMETHODFORANALYZINGDIVIDENDPAYMENTS,THEFACTTHATTHEDIVIDENDTOEQUITYRATIOISBOUNDEDBELOWZEROCANMEANTHATOLSPROVIDESBIASEDESTIMATESFOLLOWINGBARCLAYETAL1995,WEAPPLYTOBITREGRESSIONSTOTHECENSOREDDEPENDENTVARIABLEDYLDTOCHECKTHA
39、TWEHAVECONSISTENTRESULTSALTHOUGH182INSTANCESOFOBSERVATIONSARECLUSTEREDATZERO,THERESULTSAPPEARQUALITATIVELYSIMILARBOTHPROXIESOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONQ2HANDLHHARESIGNIFICANTLYNEGATIVEWITHSLIGHTLYMORENEGATIVECOEFFICIENTSPROFITABILITYROAASSETGROWTHGROWANDLEVERAGEDEBTRETAINTHEIRLEVELOFSIGNIFICANCE,BUTFIR
40、MSIZEANDGROWTHOPPORTUNITIESQBECOMELESSSIGNIFICANTRELATIVETOOLSRESULTSOVERALL,THEANALYSISCONFIRMSTHENEGATIVEINFLUENCEOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONONDIVIDENDPAYOUTSSOURCEKIMIEHARADA,PASCALNGUYEN,2006“OWNERSHIPCONCENTRATION,AGENCYCONFLICTS,ANDDIVIDENDPOLICYINJAPAN”JELCLASSIFICATIONSG35WORKINGPAPERSERIES译文日本
41、的股权集中度，代理冲突及股息政策代理冲突在公司决策中发挥着重要作用。在他们的开创性论文中，延森和迈克林（1976）表明，决策者可以选择以价值递减的结果仅仅因为从其他利益相关者转移合理的财富。举一个众所周知的例子，管理者可以投资无益的由股东承担的项目成本，如果这样做提高自己的地位并且带给他们私人利益。同样，股东可能采取由债权人承担过度的风险，而他们从上部受益。代理冲突可以有许多其他形式。迈尔斯和麦吉罗夫（1984）认为，企业在对现有股东的利益行事时，应理性地放过有利可图的投资项目，如果他们被外部投资者所捕获。胥利夫和维什尼（1997）强调多数与少数股东之间的代理冲突，最近的证据表明，主导股东以牺
42、牲小投资者的资产和利润来提取租金，如使用控制实体之间的不公平转让定价。约翰逊等人（2000）提供一个在发达国家进行征用的几个例子。股利政策是决定一个企业无法逃避的代理冲突影响的因素。事实上，伊斯特布鲁克（1984）认为，红利可以是结果也可以是代理冲突的解决方案。因为管理者倾向于保留盈利增加私人消费或减轻对他们的人力资本风险，低治理标准和对贫困股东的保护可能导致较低的支出。这种观点显然是建立在拉帕塔等人的跨国分析（2000年）。相反，派息有助于缓解代理冲突。詹森（1986）主张以降低现金流量有效的提供给管理人员，以增加财政纪律。支付高额股息正是达到这一目的，从而给股东的监管提供了一种成本效益的替
43、代品。最近，古乐和郁塔路（2003）强调通过在德国的公司股利政策的股东之间寻找代理冲突的重要性。由于主导股东可以在其控制下从私人收益中提取现金流量，他们倾向于转换低股息。不过，另一大股东的存在可以抑制提取租金，最终导致更高的支出。本文的目的是从机构的角度研究对日本企业的分红政策。如果股权集中度与管理层和股东之间的利益调整一致，作为企业绩效的研究建议，应该有更高的派息。但是，股权集中度也可以方便提取主要股东的租金，从而降低支出。我们的结果支持了第二种假设。股权集中度是与经营中的股东权益账面价值的比例相关的。实际上，两者的高浓度，低浓度组差异在10的顺序被发现的。我们研究这种差异的原因，重点是对盈
44、利能力的利用，成长机会和解释变化对股息改变决定的影响。我们的分析揭示了机构的一些冲突。首先，利润的增加和营业利润为负时严格控制企业（即与集中所有权公司）不太可能增加分红。这种模式是在与他们较低的支出和股东占主导地位的前提下提取其控制下的资源的私人利益是一致的。我们还发现，严密控制的企业更容易忽略改善分红时的投资机会，这保护了现有股东的利益。显然，这一决定需要进一步降低资金，这将有利于提高外来投资者的可能性，因此，防止更多的分红可能增加的投资不足问题，当目前的债务水平很高并且不太可能省略股息时，这相当于把债权人的财富转移给股东，因为它降低了支持该公司的债务担保金额。总体而言，股息调整提供了决策分
45、析与股权集中度较低的支出相关联的一些理由。更重要的是，也许，结果表明，在许多公司决策的情况下，股利政策在很大程度上取决于大股东和其他利益相关者之间的代理冲突。特别是，象征债券股东持有人的冲突似乎会加剧，因为存在显著能协调股东利益的人。这篇文章的其余部分的结构如下第2条假设有关的产权结构和股利政策的关系。第3节描述样本和日期来源。实证结果显示在第4第5部分的结论。所有权和分红之间的关系积极关系根据胥利夫和维什尼（1986），股权集中度创造了大股东的监督激励公司的管理，克服了搭便车与股权分散的问题，使小股东没有激励去监测股东利益的其他开支。由于严格的财务纪律，企业提高资本配置，减少无利可图的投资，
46、最终表现出更高的性能。事实上，若干研究（如科莱森和达坚科，1999年）表明，集中的所有权能够获得较高的盈利能力和市场评价。有关的财务纪律的结果是，在低回报的项目中消耗较少的资源和更多的现金流消耗，因此可以作为股利分配。在这种解释的支持下，米顿（2005年）表明，在新兴市场更好的治理公司与支付企业更高的股利。同样，拉帕塔等人（2000年）表明，在有些国家更好的保护股东，如美国，支付企业更多的股息。伊斯特布鲁克（1984）认为，分红可以成为监测的替代品。大股东拥有限制公司交出多余的现金流量，以减少监测费用的权利，导致相同的正相关关系，但方向相反的因果关系。这种解释是支持更好的管治现金持有量的公司和
47、集中所有权的企业（迪特马尔等，2003）。按照这些论点，是有可能的制定所有权集中度较高的股息支付相关的假说。消极关系与此相反的观点是，治理良好的公司并不需要支付更高的股息，增加财政纪律或提高管理者与股东利益。在代理冲突的情况下，股东可以有足够的信心，使公司的现金流量用得其所。因此，伊斯特布鲁克（1984）所倡导的较高的股利支付是纪律管理必不可少的。根据这一观点，延森等人（1992年）表明，内部人持股与美国企业之间的较低的派息有关。法尼哈（2003）记载在英国存在着类似的负相关关系。陈等人（2005年）提供的证据表明，治理质量（审核委员会及独立董事比例的存在）的一些指标对香港派息产生负面影响。这
48、些研究有力地表明，作为代理商之间的管理者和作为委托人的股东利益导致较低的分红。更何况，代理理论最近强调大，小股东之间可能发生的冲突。胥利夫和维什尼（1997）强调，大股东倾向于生成对并不是由少数股东共享的私人利益的控制。约翰逊等人（2000年）提供了利用有利可图的商业机会剥夺少数控股股东的几个例子。科莱森和达坚科（1999）解释由控股股东侵占的潜在风险下，向下倾斜的所有权集中在高层次企业的价值中。古乐和郁塔路（2003）表明，多数控股企业在德国的低股利支付是与控股股牺牲小股东的私人利益的可能性相关的。事实上，他们发现，在增加支付股息与提取租金之间，其中最有可能由于是由于现金流权和控制权的企业差
49、异存在着正相关的异常报酬。此外，第二大股东的存在有助于提高利润的分配，因为它降低了征收范围。莫瑞和帕驹斯（2002）文档之间的负相关类似的所有权集中在芬兰和分红，以及另一大股东缓解作用的证据。以类似的方式，我们可以推测，集中所有权与较低的股息支付有关。股权集中度和分红派息在本节中，我们将探讨所有权集中度可能会影响公司派息政策的控制支出的影响。表3表明，在赫希曼指数（LHH）及其相关道具（Q2H）的系数都存在显著的负相关。关于Q2H派息比率的系数小于单因素分析中的负25，但对股息收益率系数是负面的。按股权比例分红，在这两个群体中大约10被认为是作为支付差额。这些结果不支持，作为供股东监督替代股息的作用的建议（伊斯特布鲁克（1984）。事实上，股权集中的公司，这是更容易受到密切监视，实际上降低了股利分配。这种模式是更符合由胥利夫和维什尼（1997）中提到的主要股东应该倾向于私人利益的要求相一致，如与其他控制实体的协同作用，而不是平等地从少数股东获益分红。其结果与古乐和郁塔路（2003）谁在德国控制了过半数控制权就可能有较低的支出一致。莫瑞和帕驹斯（2002）也发现，三个最大的股东累计所有权对芬兰公司派息有负面影响。在控制变量中，企业规模都出现减少派息和股息率的情况。一个类似的效果与一个数量级类似的命令，是由古乐和郁塔路（2005）关于德国公司提出的。与居尔一致（1999
