1、 外文翻译 原文 Intra-industry trade and protectionism: the case of the buy national policy Material Source: Public Choice, Volume 143 Author: Dong-Hun Kim Abstract： This article examines the factors that lead governments to open up their public procurement markets to international competition with a parti
2、cular emphasis on the effect of intra-industry trade. Contrary to the conventional notion that intra-industry trade entails less political pressure for protectionism than inter-industry trade， I argue that such notion does not prevail in the case of discriminatory public procurement Firms in a marke
3、t with a high degree of intra-industry trade are more likely to resist the removal of discrimination than would firms in a market with a high degree of inter-industry trade. Empirically， I find support for the argument both at sub-national and cross-national settings Keywords： Public procurement Int
4、ra-industry trade Protectionism Buy national policy Is intra-industry trade related to less trade protectionism？ Arguments based on distributional consequences of trade tell us that intra-industry trade entails less political action than inter-industry trade and is more favorable to free trade polic
5、ies (Krugman 1981； Marvin and Ray 1987； Rodrik 1995； Alt et al. 1996) . The puzzle， however， remains unsolved Recent studies challenged this conventional wisdom by investigating the effects of political institutions (Kono 2009) and the collective action problem (Gilligan 1997) that modify the impact
6、 of distributional consequences on trade policies However， there are only a few， if any， studies on the impact of intra-industry trade on policies of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) Yet，this is critical since NTBs have gradually replaced tariffs (e.g. Bhagwati et al. 1998； Kono 2006)， and a large part of
7、 the current international trade flow is of the intra-industry type (Brakman et al. 2006) This article further challenges the conventional wisdom by examining the impact of intra-industry trade on discriminatory procurement policies(e.g. the buy national policies)， which is a well-known NTB (Deard o
8、ff and Stern 1998) The conventional wisdom claiming that intra-industry entails less political action than inter-industry trade is not necessary valid in the case of discriminatory procurement policies In the public procurement market, intra-industry trade leads to more discriminatory procurement ag
9、ainst foreign firms. In the following， I begin by discussing discriminatory procurement practices Favoritism toward domestic firms in the government procurement market is one of the well-known non-tariff barriers (NTB) to international trade Some prohibit government purchases of certain imports outr
10、ight， while others provide preferential treatment to domestic producers Certain informal practices also discriminate against foreign producersfor example， soliciting bids on a short notice with minimum publicity， which denies foreign firms access to information on government contracts Since， in most
11、 countries， government is the largest consumer in the market， the government procurement sector has been considered an enormous potential market that could be opened up for international trade Not surprisingly， the attempts by U.S. Congress to insert the Buy American clause in the stimulus package i
12、n early 2009 caused a fierce debate around the world Government procurement， however， has been largely omitted from the scope of multilateral trade rules. As far as the rules of the world trading system are concerned, the government procurement market is rather exceptional in that it lies beyond the
13、 scope of the disciplines of the GATT/WTO. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)， originally negotiated in 1947, explicitly excluded government procurement from its national treatment obligation (Art. III of the GATT) More recently, it was also exempt from the 1995 General Agreement on T
14、rade in Services (Art. XIII.1 of the GATS) As an effort to introduce government procurement into the general multilateral trade rules， the 1979 Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) achieved limited success in subjecting government procurement to the principles of nondiscrimination and transpare
15、ncy at the end of the Tokyo round However， it was not part of the general GATT agreements； it was a side agreement that was negotiated in parallel with the GATT talks due to fact that the GATT explicitly excluded government procurement from the principles of nondiscrimination Consequently， the GPA o
16、f 1979 only applied to those GATT contracting parties who signed it. In the 1990s， during the Uruguay Round， a new GPA was concluded and became one of the agreements administered by the WTO This new agreement has a much wider scope than the 1979 agreement， extending to sub-national governments and s
17、tate enterprises. However, like its predecessor, the new GPA is still voluntary and binds only the WTO members who signed it. By 2008, only 37 countries had signed the GPA, which represent less than one quarter of the WTO members. Why do some allow foreign competition in government procurement while
18、 others do not? It is because governments face a dilemma. As consumers who need to purchase the necessary products and services, governments have an incentive to buy them at the best possible terms by opening up their procurement markets to foreign competition.3 Governments, however, are not ordinar
19、y purchasers like individual consumers. As political actors who want tomaximize political support, they often purchase for reasons other than direct consumption, such as to raise the income of a particular group or to increase employment in a particular region. Awarding lucrative contracts in exchan
20、ge for political support by imposing discriminatory regulations in the procurement market has its incentives.4 This article suggests that a high degree of intra-industry trade strengthens governments incentive as a political actor and leads to a more protectionist procurement policy According to the
21、 standard trade theories (often referred to as the Heckscher-Ohlin model and the Ricardo-Viner model)， winners and losers from free-trade can be identified by examining the changes in the relative factor prices caused by international trade. The Stolper- Samuelson (SS) theorem (Stolper and Samuelson
22、 1941) discusses precisely how relative factor prices change in response to a change in the relative price of goods When the relative price of a labor intensive good increases in a labor abundant country due to international trade， it will cause an increase in the wage rate and a fall in the rental
23、rate on capital Although this brings the wage rate to increase relatively more than the price of a labor intensive good， the benefit from international trade is uneven. Owners of the abundant factor will find their real income rising while owners of the scarce factor will find their real income fall
24、ing. Not surprisingly, this clean conclusion of the SS theorem has been widely applied to explain political conflict within one country (Magee et al. 1989; Rogowski 1989； Alt et al. 1996； Thorbecke 1997； Hiscox 2002) 译文 产业内贸易和保护主义：关于国家政策的情况 资 料来源 :公共选择，卷 143 作者： 吉姆 东珲 摘要：本文 主要 考察了政府打开公开 国际竞争 采购市场时我国
25、产业内贸易影响的原因。与传统的观念相比 ， 产业内贸易保护主义政治压力要少 , 我认为这样的观念在区分公共采购的情况下不会流行。公司在产业内贸易中有一个较高的地位便更能有效的消除一些歧视，相对于公司在产业贸易中有个较高地位。事实上，我也找到 了 一些支持国内和国外贸易方式争论的不同观点 ，而他们也具有 相通之处。 关键词：公共采购 产业内贸易 保护主义 国家政策 以下是产业内贸 易相关的贸易保护主义吗？争论的观点是贸易分布的结果，从中我们了解到产业内贸易相对于产业贸易要少一些政府调控并且对于自由贸易有更好的支持（克纳格曼 1981，马文和雷 1987，雷迪克 1995，备案文选。 1996）。
26、但是总的来说，这还是个未解决的问题。传统的研究被最新研究成果所挑战， 在 调查了政治制度对于其的影响（克恩 2009）和集体行动问题（吉里根 1997）在贸易政策中改变了分布的影响后果 基础之上 。然而，仍旧有一些研究是关于政府非关税壁垒在产业内贸易中的影响。然而，问题的关键是非关税壁垒逐渐取代了关税壁垒（巴格瓦 蒂 1998；克恩 2006），并且当前大部分的国际贸易流程都是产业内贸易的类型（布雷克曼 2006）。本文进一步强调了传统的研究中的不足，检查在产业内贸易的影响区分采购政策，也就是众所周知的非关税贸易壁垒（迪多夫和斯特恩 1998）。传统的研究声称产业内贸易中的国家调控少于产业贸易
27、中的国家调控是没有什么有效的用处 ， 在 面对 带有歧视性的采购政策中。在开放的公共采购市场中，产业内贸易导致更多的带有歧视性的采购从而抵制国外市场。接下来，我先讨论歧视性的采购工作。 对于国内企业在政府采购市场中的一种偏袒方式就是众所周知的通 过非关税壁垒来抵制国外贸易。一些政府直接禁止本国企业从国外进口货物，然而有些政府给予本国的企业提供优惠政策。某些非正式的政策带有对国外生产者的歧视 例如，投标招揽时对于一些企业临时通知和最低宣传，并且否决国外公司了解政府合约的信息。在大多数国家，政府是市场的最大消费者，政府采购部门已经考虑到一个巨大的潜在市场即将在国际市场的巨大压力下被开放。这一点也不
28、奇怪， 在 2009 年的年初 美国国会企图在刺激经济的一揽子方案中插入“购买美国货”的方案 。而 这一方案在世界各地引起了激烈的辩论。 政府采购部门，在很大程度上忽略了 多边贸易规则的范围。至于有关世界贸易体系的规则，政府采购市场就好比是超越关贸总协定和世界贸易组织学科范围的 一个 例外的谎言。关贸总协定，最初在 1947 年的谈判，明确的从国民待遇义务中排除政府采购。最近，关贸总协定也免除了关于一般贸易协定的服务项目。作为把政府采购引入一般的多边贸易的努力的结果， 1979 年政府协定的东京回合在结束政府采购非歧视和透明度原则上取得了有限的成功。然而，这不仅仅是一般的关贸总协定协议的一部分
29、，这是一个“世界性”的协议 。 由于它 是 平行于关贸总协定的关于明确排除政府采购中的非歧视原则的一个 谈判结果 。因此，在乌拉圭回合中，一个崭新的政府采购协定孕育而生，从而成为一个在世贸组织中的 新的 协议。这个新的协议所包括的范围比 1979 年的协议更加广泛，延伸到国家主管政府和国有企业。然而，就好比其原来的协议，新的政府采购协议仍旧只 是 对签署世贸组织的成员国有效。到 2008 年为止，只有37 个国家签署政府采购协定，这也表示了只有不到世贸成员国四分之一的国家签署该协议。 为什么一些国家允许国外企业在政府采购中的竞争而一些国家不允许呢？这是因为政府面临的进退两难的处境。作为消费者
30、的 我们购买生活中的必要产品和服务，政府 鼓励购买的最佳条件 ,是 基于开放他们的采购市场从而引进外国竞争。然而，政府并不是像个体消费者一样的普通消费者。作为一个需要最大限度的政治支持的政治家，他们 的 购买会因为其它的原因而不是直接的消费，就比如在一个特定的群体内增加收入或者在一个特定的区域内增加就业。作为获得更多政治支持交换条件的是在政府采购市场中实施歧视法规从而给予更多的可获盈利的合同。本文提出高度的产业内贸易会加强政府的政治激励作为一个政治演员，从而导致更具保护主义色彩的采购政策。 按照标准的贸易理论，在国际贸易中对要素的相对价格的变化的把握不同，使得一部分 的人 在自由贸易中成为了赢
31、家而另一部分人则变成输家。 斯托尔珀 萨缪尔森 定理（ 斯托尔珀 和 萨缪尔森 1941）精确地阐述了要素相对价格的变化是如何影响相关商品物价的变化的。在国际贸易中，当一个劳动力资源丰富的国家的劳动密集型商品的相对价格增加时，会引起工资的普遍上涨和成本中相对租金的下降。虽然这带来了相对于劳动密集型商品的价格有所提高的工资率，但是国际贸易带来的益处是不均匀的。一些企业家凭借其丰富的经验发现他们实际收入 的增长。 然而那些没有丰富经验的企业家却发现他们实际收入的减少。这一点也不奇怪，这个清晰的 斯托尔珀 萨缪尔森 定理已经被广泛应用于解释一个国家政治冲突的原因（马基 1989；罗柯夫斯基 1989；艾特 1996；贝克 1997；希思克 2002） 。
