1、 外文翻译 原文 Foreign Direct Investment and Industrial Restructuring: The Case of Taiwans Textile Industry Material Source: http:/www.nber.org/chapters/c8504 Author: Tain-Jy Chen, Ying-hua Ku 11.2 Foreign Direct Investment and the Restructuring of Taiwans Textile Industry Before 1980, the textile industr
2、y was Taiwans largest manufacturing industry and largest export sector. Starting in the mid-1980s,rising wages made labor-intensive operations in the textile industry uncompetitive, and many textile firms responded by undertaking FDI in lower wage countries. FDI set off a restructuring process that
3、has completely reshaped the textile industry. Production shifted from garments to fabrics and textile fibers with the method of production becoming more capital intensive and the value added generally increasing. There has been extensive turnover among individual firms since FDI began, and the survi
4、ving firms have recomposed their product lines to cope with the new climate of competition. This experience makes the textile industry a perfect case for the study of the relation between FDI and industrial restructuring. FDI in the textile industry started with garment firms that relocated to nearb
5、y Southeast Asian countries and China with the simple aim of salvaging their export markets. After a massive relocation of garment operations, fabric manufacturers found it difficult to service overseas markets from Taiwan. Some decided to make FDI in the clusters of garment operations in Southeast
6、Asia and China in order to better serve their old customers or to explore new patrons in the same locations. FDI by fabric manufacturers brought with it the dyeing and finishing operators that create the textures and colors distinctive of the Taiwanese industry. When the local fabric industry reache
7、d a certain level of output, spinning operators from Taiwan also started to appear. Spinning operations are more capital intensive than weaving and garment operations. Unlike FDI in weaving and garments, where a large number of small investors congregated in the same locations, FDI in spinning was u
8、ndertaken by a small number of relatively large firms, scattered throughout different countries. Each was to serve a cluster of local weaving and garment firms. Finally, fiber producers from Taiwan also joined these clusters to cap the agglomeration process. Because fiber production is even more cap
9、ital intensive and technologically demanding than spinning, FDI takes place only when the local market is large enough to guarantee economies of scale and competition is such that local production is more advantageous than export. By 1997, Taiwanese fiber producers had made three major investments:
10、in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. FDI has brought about a dramatic change in the textile industry in Taiwan. Table 11.1 lists the employment and output values of three subsectors of the textile industry, namely, synthetic fibers, spinning and weaving (knitting), and garments for 1986-96. I
11、t can be seen that total employment in the textile industry fell from 473,662 in 1986 to 287,065 in 1996, a drop of 186,597 jobs, equivalent to 40 percent of the 1986 employment level. Most jobs were lost in the garment sector. The output value of all textile products increased slightly over 1986-96
12、, but its share in manufactured output decreased from 21.6 to 12.2 percent (data not shown). If “deindustrialization” is defined as “the dismantling of a countrys manufacturing base” (Caslin 1987, 240) and if dismantling is taken to mean a rapid decline in output share, then Taiwans textile industry
13、 is a classic case of deindustrialization. But a closer examination reveals that structural change seems to characterize the trend in the industry more vividly than absolute or relative decline. The composition of textile output shifted dramatically between 1986 and 1996, with the garment sector dec
14、lining as synthetic fibers and spinning and weaving gained. Overseas production was an apparent catalyst for domestic restructuring, as manifested in the pattern of exports. In 1986, garments accounted for 55.8 percent of Taiwans textile exports, shrinking to only 19.8 percent in 1996. Taking the pl
15、ace of garments was exports of fabrics and yarn, whose share of total textile exports increased from 40.6 percent in 1986 to 73.9 percent in 1996. The destination of textile exports also shifted dramatically. In 1986, the US. market absorbed 36.8 percent of Taiwans exports of textile products, of wh
16、ich garments took the lions share. The US. market share had shrunk to only 15.9 percent by 1996, as Taiwans exports were supplanted by those from Southeast Asia and China. In turn, the market share of Taiwans exports of fabrics and yarn to this region rose from 23.4 percent in 1986 to 53.8 percent i
17、n 1996 (Chen et al. 1997, 201-8) In the following subsections, we will outline the restructuring process in each subsector of Taiwans textile industry, focusing on how domestic restructuring was brought on by FDI. The outline is based mainly on interviews given by Taiwanese firms operating in Southe
18、ast Asia. Table 11.1Employment and Output Value of Taiwans Textile Industry, 1986-96 Sources: Employment from Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Monthly Report on Wages and Salaries; output value from Ministry of Economic Affairs, Monthly Industry Report. Note: Employment repo
19、rted in number of persons; output value reported in million US. dollars. 11.4 Concluding Remarks We view FDI as a Schumpeterian innovation whereby an old production structure is dismantled in favor of a new one. Therefore, FDI is always accompanied by restructuring. Restructuring may take place at t
20、he firm, industry, or economy-wide level. In this paper, we examine the firm-level restructuring of Taiwans textile industry between 1992 and 1995 and find that restructuring was indeed extensive and sweeping. We find that the average textile firm reduced its number of product lines and increased it
21、s concentration of product line distribution as measured by the Herfindahl index. About half of the textile firms under our observation switched their main product lines in the short time span of three years. More than one-fifth of the textile firms switched between four-digit industry categories. S
22、ome even moved from downstream operations to upstream operations, Year Fibers Spinning & Weaving Garments Total Employ Output Employ Output Employ Output Employ Output 1986 16,945 1,897 185,328 7,560 271,389 5,457 473,662 14,91 1987 27,217 2,545 186,277 9,802 247,175 7,138 460,669 19,485 1988 26,575
23、 2,711 186,365 9,517 226,427 6,136 439,367 18,364 1989 24,839 3,222 174,234 6,842 196,000 6,693 395,073 16,757 1990 24,330 2,918 159,763 10,444 171,771 5,672 355,864 19,034 1991 23,916 3,700 155,292 12,633 160,067 6,299 339,275 22,633 1992 23,547 3,672 157,273 11,974 146,684 5,443 327,504 21,090 199
24、3 22,560 3,092 153,241 10,253 139,142 4,777 314,943 18,088 1994 22,974 3,996 155,768 11,866 137,897 4,449 316,943 20,311 1995 23,654 5,206 149,832 12,002 126,901 3,946 300,387 21,154 1996 23,412 4,389 143,756 11,884 119,897 3,863 287,065 20,136 such as from garments to weaving, to take advantage of
25、new schemes in the international division of labor. In fact, the product mix of the whole textile industry has been reshuffled to an amazing degree. For an average textile firm, nearly half of sales revenue comes from newly introduced product lines or from disproportional expansion of existing produ
26、ct lines. When compared with textile firms that did not undertake FDI, those investing abroad show a significantly higher degree of restructuring by all indexes. There is no evidence that overseas investment led investing firms to shed jobs from domestic operations. In fact, there is even some indic
27、ation that FDI enables firms to increase employment at their headquarters. Most job losses in Taiwans textile industry during the sample period were attributable to the exit of firms, and there is no evidence that FDI contributed to exit either. Firms that undertook FDI were also likely to expand sa
28、les in domestic markets, casting doubt on the assertion that “FDI hollows out domestic industry.” However, this paper falls short of uncovering intrinsic differences in terms of the nature of restructuring, except for product line shift. Scanty evidence suggests that non-FDI firms resort more often
29、to capacity expansion and process innovation whereas FDI firms are more keen on new product introduction and technology change. More research in this area is desirable. 译文 外商直接投资和产业重组：以台湾纺织业为例 资料来源 : http:/www.nber.org/chapters/c8504 作者： Tain-Jy Chen, Ying-hua Ku 11.2 外商直接投资和台湾纺织业的产业重组 1980 年以前 ， 纺织
30、业是台湾最大的制造业和最大的出口部门 。 20 世纪 80年代中期开始 ， 工资的上涨使集约经营在纺织业变得没有竞争力 ， 许多纺织企业响应 FDI 在低 工资 国家的承诺 。 FDI 引起了一个重组的过程 ， 使纺织业彻底地被改造 。 产品从服装转移到纤维织物和纺织纤维 ， 通过这种方式产品不断加强并且附加值也不断提升 。 在 FDI 初期 ， 个体公司存在非常丰厚的营业额 ， 幸存的公司也重新组合他 们的生产线来迎合新的竞争需求 。 这种经验使纺织行业成为研究 FDI 和产业结构调整关系的非常典型的例子 。 FDI 在纺织业从服装公司开始 ， 以它们出口市场这个简单的目标重新迁移到邻近的东
31、南亚国家和中国 。 经过大量服装经营的迁移 ， 面料制造商发现从台湾服务海外市场是非常困难的 。 一些人决定让外商直接投资在东南亚和中国的服装经营集群中 ， 以便能够更好的服务它们的老顾客或者在同一地区探索新的顾客 。 外商直接投资结构制造商带来了印染经营者创建的纹理和色彩鲜明的台湾产业 。 当本地的面料达到一定的产量时 ， 源自台湾的纺纱经营者也开始出现了 。纺纱业务有更多的资金和比纺织及服装经营更加集中 。 不像 FDI 投资在制造和服装 ， 那里有很多小投资者聚集在同一个地区 ， FDI 在纺纱工程中被一小部分相对规模较大的公司接手 ， 并分布在不同的国家 。 每一个人都要服务于当地的纺
32、织和服装企业集群 。 最后 ， 台湾的纤维生产商也加入这些集群来覆盖这个聚集的过程 。 由于纤维产品比纺纱有更高的资本密集和技术要求 ， 在当地市场足够大到能保证规模经济和竞争时 ， FDI 才发生 ， 这样 ， 当地的生产才比出口更有利 。 到 1997 年 ，台湾的纤维生产者已经创造了三项主要的投资 ： 在泰国、马来西亚和菲律宾 。 FDI 为台湾的纺织行业带来了戏剧性的变化 。 表格 11.1 列出了在 1986-96年纺织业三个分部门的 就业和产值 ， 分别是合成纤维 ， 纺织和针织 ， 以及服装 。可以看出 ， 纺织业的总就业从 1986 年的 473， 662 下降到 1996 年
33、的 287， 065，减少了 186， 597 的工作 ， 相当于 1986 年 就业水平的 40%。 大部分工作的减少是在制衣行业 。 所有纺织产品的产值在 1986 年到 1996 年 有小幅度的增长 ， 但是其生产产出的份额从 21.6%下降到 12.2%。 如果 “限制工业化 ”被定义为 “一个国家制造基础的拆除 ”（ Caslin 1987， 240） 并且如果拆除意味着产出份额的迅速减少 ， 那么台湾的纺织工业是限制工业化的经典例子 。 但是 ， 进一步的研究指出结构的变化比起绝对或相对的下降似乎有更强烈产业特色的趋势 。 纺织产出的构成在 1986 到 1996 年间有个戏剧性的
34、变化 ， 因为合成纤维 ， 纺纱和织布上涨 ， 导致服装部门衰退 。 海外产品 对国内重组是一个明显的催化剂 ， 这表现在出口格局 。 1986 年 ，服装组成了台湾纺织出口的 55.8%， 到 1996 年收缩至 19.8%。 纤维和纱线的出口取代了服装 ， 它们在所有纺织品出口的份额从 1986 年的 40.6%增加到 1996年的 73.9%,纺织 出口的目的地也发生了巨大的转变 ， 1986 年 ， 美国市场 吸纳了36.8%的台湾纺织品的出口商品 ， 其中服装占了非常大的份额 。 到 1996 年 ， 美国市场份额收缩到 15.9%， 因为台湾的出口商品被那些东南亚和中国的产品 代替
35、了 。 反过来 ， 市场纱线织物及台湾的出口份额在这个区域从 1986 年的 23.4%增长到 1996 年的 53.8%（ Chen et al. 1997， 201-8） 。 在下面的部分 ， 我们会列出台湾各地纺织业 子行业的重组过程 ， 集中于 FDI是怎样引起国内重组的 。 这个大纲是主要基于对台商在东南亚经营的公司的采访 。 表格 11.1 台湾纺织业的 就业 和产值 ， 1986-96 年份 纤维 纺纱和编织 服装 总计 就业 产值 就业 产值 就业 产值 就业 产值 1986 16,945 1,897 185,328 7,560 271,389 5,457 473,662 14
36、,91 1987 27,217 2,545 186,277 9,802 247,175 7,138 460,669 19,485 1988 26,575 2,711 186,365 9,517 226,427 6,136 439,367 18,364 1989 24,839 3,222 174,234 6,842 196,000 6,693 395,073 16,757 1990 24,330 2,918 159,763 10,444 171,771 5,672 355,864 19,034 1991 23,916 3,700 155,292 12,633 160,067 6,299 339,
37、275 22,633 1992 23,547 3,672 157,273 11,974 146,684 5,443 327,504 21,090 1993 22,560 3,092 153,241 10,253 139,142 4,777 314,943 18,088 1994 22,974 3,996 155,768 11,866 137,897 4,449 316,943 20,311 1995 23,654 5,206 149,832 12,002 126,901 3,946 300,387 21,154 1996 23,412 4,389 143,756 11,884 119,897
38、3,863 287,065 20,136 资料 来源 ： 就业 人数由 行政院主计处统计 ， 每月工资和薪金的报告； 产量和 经济部 ， 月度行业报告的价值 。 注意 ： 就业 以 人数 报告 ， 产值以百万美元 报告 。 11.4 结论摘要 我们把 FDI 看作是熊彼特的一个创新 ， 老的产业结构被新的取代 。 因此 ，FDI 总是伴随着结构重组 。 重组会发生在公司 ， 产业和广泛的经济水平层面 。在本文中 ， 我们考察了企业级台湾纺织工业在 1992 年和 1995 年之间的重组 ，并且发现重组的确是非常广泛和彻底的 。 我们也发现通过赫芬达尔指标的测量 ，普通的纺织品企业减少了生产线的
39、数量和提高了生产线分配的集中程度 。 大约一半我们 观察的纺织企业在短短的三年的时间内转变了它们的生产线 。 超过五分之一的纺织企业在四数位的行业分类中转变 。 有些甚至从下游的运营转至上游的运营 ， 比如从服装转至织造 ， 以便能够利用国际劳动力分工的新计划优势 。事实上 ， 整个纺织产业的产品搭配组合已经在一个令人惊异的程度上重组了 。对于一个普通的纺织品公司 ， 将近一半的产品销售收入来自于最新引进的生产线或者来自 现有生产线的不相称扩大 。 与那些没有进行 FDI 的纺织企业相比 ，那些国外投资显示了在所有指数上的高程度重组 。 并没有证据表明 ， 海外投资导致投资企业的工作从国内运营中摆脱 。 实 际上 ， 甚至有更多的迹象表明 ， FDI 使企业在它们总部增加了 就业 。 主要台湾纺织业的失业在试验期对企业退出市场做出了贡献 ， 并且也并没有证据显示 FDI有助于出口 。 FDI 企业的承诺有可能扩大国内市场的销售 ， 因此产生了对 “FDI挖空国内产业 ”断言的怀疑 。 然而 ， 本文属于内在的差异 ， 除了生产线的转变 ， 揭示了结构调整的性质 。仅有的证据表明非外商直接投资的公司更多的求助于能力的扩张和工艺创新 ，然而 FDI 企业则更热衷于新产品的引进和技术的变化 。 因此在这方面进行更多的研究是可取的 。
