1、 外文翻译 原文 Fishery resource management in Chilika lagoon: a study on coastal conservation in the Eastern Coast of India Material Source: J Coast Conserv.2008 Author: himpei Iwasaki Hirasawa 1992;Iwakiri and Neaz 1982;Misra 2002;Rubinoff 1999;Reis and DIncao 2000).It is commonly argued that middlemen e
2、xploit small-scale fishermen in the fish marketing process in combination with money lending. Maintenance of fishery livelihoods often requires the purchase or repair of fishing gears, these being high exhaustive goods. Moreover, fishermen are often forced to push things to the brink to ensure their
3、 livelihoods during the lean season. Hence, fishermen borrow money from middlemen instead of committing informal promises to sell their entire catch to lenders. This give-and-take system leads to the dominant control of middlemen resulting to fishermen selling their catch at lower than market price.
4、 Despite the fact that there exists unfair fish dealings in many parts of the world, there has been little documentation and detailed discussion on the experience and interaction between the two. Entry of non-fishermen As the years passed, however, the traditional view by non-fishermen drastically c
5、hanged. Improved fishing gears and high international demand for prawn attracted a number of non-fishermen including those belonging to the upper caste. Specifically, there has been a rapid increase in the price of prawn; from Indian Rupee(INR)35(approximate US$0.90)per kg in 1980 to INR 250(approxi
6、mate US$6.37)in 1992 and further to INR 550(approximate US$14.01)in 2001(Samal 2002).The attractiveness of improved fishing gears and high price of prawn triggered many poor and rich non-fishermen alike to enter the fisheries of Chilika Lagoon. However, access to fishing grounds is officially limite
7、d to fishermen for commercial purposes and this resulted to non-fishermen demanding the Orissa government to endow them with fishing rights. Every time a claim was made, the Orissa government had time and again reiterated the fact that only the fishermen in Chilika lagoon have the traditional right
8、to fishing and as such, all fishery sources would be settled in favor of the primary fishermen societies except for certain areas with limited traditional fishing gears for non-fishermen (Das 1993).Nonetheless, these settlements by the government did not have their intended effect. In reality, non-f
9、ishermen started fishing by encroaching on fishing grounds managed by fishermen or on unauthorized fishing grounds inside Chilika lagoon. Such illegal fishing activities gradually were tied to chronic conflicts between fishermen and non-fishermen. Between 19881989 and 19921993,up to 187 disputed cas
10、es were filed with the Revenue Department(ibid).For instance, there was a report that the people called mafias dominated 4,130 acres in total where fishing rights have been leased to fishing communities(DHARITRI 2006). Sense of insecurity It is important to note that the boundary of each fishing gro
11、und which tends to be ambiguous and shallow due to environmental changes was easily occupied by others. In the past, each fishing ground was identified not by area or boundary but only by nomenclature(OSFCFL 1996).The ambiguous boundary status of fishing grounds enabled non-fishermen to encroach on
12、other fishing grounds owned by fishermen or on unauthorized fishing grounds inside Chilika lagoon. In addition, introduction of improved fishing gears also affected high competition over fishing grounds. Since the 1970s,most of fishers, irrespective of fishermen or non-fishermen, have changed from v
13、aried fishing methods to intensified trap nets called khanda, which covered a large portion of Chilika lagoon. In particular, the fishermen tend to install these nets inside the lagoon for several days in the harvest season(87%)more than in the lean season(70%) for more profit. However, utilization
14、of khanda nets obstructed other fishing methods in the areas fixed by trap nets and gave less access to the limited fishing grounds. Due to these external factors, destroying and stealing fishing gears have become ordinary occurrences in many portions of the fishing grounds in Chilika lagoon. Under
15、these circumstances, most of the fishermen, particularly who used khanda nets, began to find it necessary to watch over their territories throughout the day otherwise, their nets might be destroyed and their grounds occupied by others. Accordingly, except outer channel sector, most of the fishermen
16、strive to stay on their boats near their grounds for several days especially in the harvest season; some boat members return to their villages for rest in a few days while the others stay near the grounds for monitoring. In order to be able to stay on the boat for several days, sufficient preparatio
17、n of basic materials such as food, fuel, etc. is required. Although an alternating pair of boat members can sometimes bring materials to the boats, the capacity to carry these items is limited to some extent. Without any support, the fishermen would be forced to go back and forth between their villa
18、ge and fishing grounds with the risk of fish encroachments by others occurring during that time. Under these circumstances, commission agents play an important role in assisting fishermens activities; they sometimes sold grocery items such as rice, water, vegetables, fuel wood, other food, etc. to t
19、he fishermen on the boat(Samal and Meher 2003a)enabling them to stay there for several more days. On the momentum of such transactions, commission agents then strive to buy plenty of fish and prawn from fishermen on the spot. The ingenious commission business makes a great contribution to not only e
20、nsuring that fishing grounds are not encroached upon but also saving on their work and fuel oil in the fish delivery process to buyers. Consequently, their commission business combined with the sale of basic materials and favorable trade location as well as loan finance led to the meeting of both ne
21、eds of fishermen and commission agents. From the perspective of a fish marketing economy, this study identified two major issues plaguing the peoples livelihoods i.e. indebtedness and resource-led conflict. The former is commonly observed in many parts of the world where middlemen exploit the small-
22、scale fishermen. To be able to pay off the debt is of utmost importance but there have been a large number of failures in programmers which introduced loan finance to small-scale fishermen, the case of Chilika lagoon included. Little attention has been paid in considering capacity building that woul
23、d encourage fishermen to develop fishing activities in a sustainable manner. Without these considerations, the debtors may find it difficult to operate the fisheries that are highly exposed to various changes in the environmental and socio-economic sphere. In the past, private and government banks p
24、rovided loan finance to the fishermen for the purpose of cutting off the negative dependency with fish merchants, the attempts were failed due to loan defaults with psychology of loan waiver(Samal and Meher 2003b);the debtors could easily escape the duty for loan repayment from the lenders while con
25、tinued to tell a lie on who were debtors. In this respect, there is an innovative approach to loan finance developed by South Indian Federatio n of Fishermen Society (SIFFS). SIFFS supported a large number of fishing communities in the south of India, by providing loan finance from banks to each fis
26、herman with due capacity assessment and introducing automatic deduction of the loan repayment from pay through cooperative fish marketing. Instead of cutting off the loan dependency with fish merchants, SIFFS encouraged the fishermen to join cooperative fish marketing activities for economic improve
27、ment as well as solution ofloan waiver. These efforts may give a great clue to solve the loan issue and then bridge the gap between the controlled and actual price in Chilika lagoon(see Iwasaki 2007). On the other hand, the latter issue defies any attempt at a quick and simple solution. The resource
28、-led conflict is deeply embedded in fishery resource allocation between fishermen and non-fishermen. In an attempt to liberate fishermen from exploitative marketing control by the middlemen, the realistic feasible approach may be to precisely define the ambiguous demarcation of fishing grounds. The
29、defective demarcation of each fishing ground by the Orissa government enabled non-fishermen to encroach on other fishing grounds owned by fishermen or unauthorized fishing grounds inside Chilika lagoon. Therefore, appropriate demarcation of fishing grounds is strongly recommended to remove the under
30、lying cause of resource led conflicts. Likewise, another perspective that aims to strengthen voluntary monitoring system by fishing communities will be required taking into account resource-led conflicts. Iwakiri (1974) remarked that the application of community-based monitoring made a greater contr
31、ibution to keeping a certain harmony with fishery resources. In the case of Chilika lagoon, access to fishery resources was mostly the subject of the locals rather the governments until the late 1980s (Sekhar 2004,2007).Fishermen used to manage a complicated system of partitioned fishing activities
32、on the basis of fishing communities and sub-caste groups so as to sustain fishery resources. Therefore, strengthening community-based monitoring in their fishing grounds will be effective to conserve their fishing grounds from others through parallel efforts on appropriately demarcated fishing groun
33、ds. Putting it all together, this article argued for the link of coastal resource conservation with poverty while focusing on fish marketing economy. The negative dependency on middlemen renders the fishermen vulnerable to exploitative fish marketing. At the same time, it triggers indiscriminate fis
34、h catch, leading to illegal and destructive fisheries. In contrast, the commission business dominates fishermens needs which are under increasing human insecurity pressure. Therefore, it may be concluded that most of the fishermen were exploited by commission agents with reasonable control. The char
35、acteristics of fish marketing structure seem to be more dynamic, multifaceted and region-specific, rather than static, simplified and generalized. It may be implied that for coastal resource conservation understanding of ground realities and threadbare analysis of marketing structure underpin the pr
36、ovision of sustainable solutions. This consideration may also be the case in other parts of the world in their own ecological and socio-economic contexts. In this respect, the perspective of fish marketing economy and its implications on fishing activities will be a good entry point to develop a bet
37、ter understanding of coastal resource conservation in the local context. 译文 琪利卡礁湖的渔业资源管理：一项对印度东海岸海洋保护研究 资料来源 : J Coast Conserv.2008 作者 ： himpei Iwasaki Hirasawa 1992;Iwakiri 和 Neaz 1982;Misra 2002;Rubinoff 1999 年 ,Incao Reis 和 DIncao 2000 年 )。 一般认为中间人在鱼的销售过程中结合商业借贷业务来利用 小型渔民们。维护渔业的生计往往需要购买或修理的渔网 ,而这
38、些都是高利贷的货物。此外 ,渔民们常常被迫为他们做一些事情 ,以确保在渔业淡季能够维持生计。因此 ,渔民们向中间商借钱并做出非正式的承诺来出售他们捕获的所有的鱼。这个“主宰体制”导致了渔民不得不把他们的鱼以低于市场价的价格出售给中间商。尽管这不公平的渔业交易存在于世界的许多地方 ,但渔民和中间商双方之间几乎没有具体详细的文件和交流。 非渔民的进入 随着时间的推移 ,传统意义上的非渔民正在不断地发生巨大变化。不断改进的渔网、高度国际化社会的要 求，吸引了为数众多的非渔民，其中也包括上层阶层。具体地说 ,可以看迅速增长的对虾的价格 ;从印度卢比 35 元 (近似我们每千克 0.897 元 )， 1
39、980 年增长至印度卢比 250 元， 1992 年猛涨 43.5%，进一步增长到印度卢比 550 元，近似于 2001 年 14.01 美元， 2002 年，改良的渔网和高价格的虾的吸引力引发了许多贫困和富裕的非渔民想要进入琪利卡礁湖的捕渔业。然而 ,获得渔场对渔民的资格要求是有限的 ,为了达到自己的商业目的 ,非渔民们要求当局政府赋予其捕捞的权利。但每一次做出声明 ,政府都一次又一次地重申这样一个事实 :只 有住在琪利卡礁湖的传统渔民们才有权利在琪利卡礁湖捕鱼 ,正因为如此 ,除了某些地区有限的传统非渔民渔网外，所有渔场资源都支持大多数渔民（ 1993 年 )。但毫无疑问，政府的这些条款并
40、没有得到预期的效果。事实上 ,非渔民们已经开始在未被管理者认可的情况下侵蚀进入琪利卡礁湖范围内的渔场捕鱼。像这样的非法捕捞活动逐渐都加深了渔民和非渔民的慢性冲突。从 1988 年至 1989 年，到 1992 年至 1993 之间，争端已经多了 187 例，例如 ,有一个报告说 ,人们称 mafias 拥有的总共 4,130 英亩的地方的钓鱼权利都已经出租给渔业协 会 (DHARITRI 2006)。 不安全感 值得注意的是 ,由于环境的变化，所有渔场的边界往往都是模糊而不清晰的，很容易侵犯到别人的领地。在过去 ,每个渔场的确认并不是靠区域或边界，只是只被命名， （ OSFCFL 1996),
41、模糊边界地位使非渔民有机会侵占所有其他渔场或在未经授权的琪利卡礁湖渔场的范围内捕鱼。 此外 ,介绍引进的渔网也受到了渔业市场高竞争的影响。 1970 年以来 ,大多数的人 ,不分渔民或 non-fishermen,都从不同的捕鱼方法改变为用被称作khanda 的陷阱网来捕鱼 ,它的范围涵盖了大部分的琪利卡礁湖。特别是 ,渔民们倾向于安装这些网在泻湖，可以供人们用几天的时间在旺季 (87%)比在淡季(70%)为更多的利润。然而 ,利用 khanda 网遮住了这一地区的其他的捕鱼方法所设的陷阱网 ,给渔场提供了更加有限的捕鱼空间。 由于这些外部因素的影响 ,在许多部分渔场在琪利卡礁湖，破坏和偷渔网
42、已成为普遍的事件。在这种情况下 ,大多数渔夫 ,特别是用 khanda 网 ,开始发现有必要一整天监视他们的领土 ,否则渔网可能会被破坏，他们的领土也会被别人侵占。 因此 ,除外渠道部门 ,大部 分的渔民好几天留在他们的船只附近，特别是在丰收的季节 ,部分船员回到他们的村庄休息几天 ,而另外一部分人进行监测。为了能够保持在船上待好几天 ,必须充分预备好基本材料 ,如食物、燃料等是必需的，尽管有时候结伴船只可以分一些原料，但是搬运这些物品的能力在某种程度上是有限的。在没有任何保障的情况下 ,渔民们将被强制承担来回往返村庄渔场期间鱼被他人抢夺的风险。 在这些情况下 ,佣金代理商扮演了协助者的重要角
43、色 ,他们有时对渔民销售货物和食品 ,诸如大米、水、蔬菜、燃木、别的食物等等，对在船上的渔民来说（ Samal 和 Meher 2003a)使他们能够在那里呆上几个更多的天数。在此类交易的动力下 ,佣金代理商就随之努力去渔场买很多鱼和虾。精明的经销商不仅对确保渔场不被侵犯做出了很大贡献 ,还在鱼和燃油等的发货进程上为买家做了节约工作。因此 ,他们的经销商把出售基本材料和良好的贸易位置以及贷款金融因素都结合起来，促成了渔民和佣金代理的讨论需求。 从渔业的市场经济的这个角度来看 ,本研究指出市场经济的两个困扰改善民生的重要问题，即 resource-led 债务和冲突。前者通常是在世界上许多地方的
44、小规模开发中间商渔民。能还清欠债是最 重要的，但在琪利卡礁湖渔场范围内，向渔民介绍引进小型金融贷款已经出现了很多的失败。到目前为止很少有人投资建设来鼓励渔民以可持续发展的方式开展捕捞活动。没有这些考虑 ,债务人会发现很难经营渔业，并在各种各样的变化在环境和社会经济的领域大量暴露出来。在过去 ,私人和政府银行提供贷款的财政政策，来阻止渔业在商人影响下的消极发展，这一尝试由于贷款拖欠的心理学 loan waiver(Samal 和 Meher 2003b)而失败了 ;债务人可以很容易地谎称谁是债权人并逃避银行贷款偿还的责任。由于这些原因 ,南印度开发渔民协会 (SIFFS 联合会 )研究出一种针对
45、贷款金融业的革新。 SIFFS 向渔民们提供银行金融贷款来支持在南印度的大量捕鱼业 ,通过能力评估和介绍自动扣除贷款还款缴纳来进行渔业的合作销售。 SIFFS 鼓励渔民们加入合作鱼营销活动为经济增长以及解决“放弃贷款”而不是切断商人的货物贷款。这些努力可能会成为一个促成贷款问题解决的伟大线索 ,进而成为解决琪利卡礁湖的价格控制的桥梁 (见 Iwasaki 2007)。另一方面 ,后者也是足以抵御任何问题尝试性的一种快速、简单的解决办法。 resource-led 的冲突已经深深地根植于渔民 和非渔民之间的渔业资源配置问题。 为了使渔民从开发营销的中间商的控制中解放出来 ,来从新精确地定义被模糊
46、划分渔场。每次当地政府划分渔场，都使非渔民或其他渔场的渔民能够在未经授权的情况下侵犯琪利卡礁湖的渔场。因此 , 除了资源的根本原因外，最好能有恰当的渔场划分来减少冲突。同样地 ,从另一个角度来看 ,也能使捕鱼业团体被加强监测将产生的 resource-led 冲突。 Iwakiri(1974 年 )指出，社区生态监测的应用在一定程度上对保持渔业资源的和谐起到了重大的贡献。这样一来，直到 1980 年底琪利卡礁湖的渔业资 源都是当地人主导而不是由政府掌握的（ Sekhar 2004 年 ,2007)。因此 , 在渔场上加强社区监测并恰当地划分渔场范围会有效地保护当地人的渔场和渔业资源。 把以上几
47、点结合起来看 ,本文主张把关注沿海资源保护与萧条的渔业市场经济结合起来。消极的依赖于中间人会使渔民在销售中更容易受到剥削。同时 ,也容易触发乱捕鱼 ,导致非法的和非可持续性的捕捞。相比之下 ,占主导地位的渔民的需求使经销商正面临着越来越大的压力。因此 ,可以从调查中得出结论 ,多数的渔民们正在佣金代理商的合理控制之下。渔业市场结构的特点 ,是比较动态的 ,而 且涉及方方面面 ,有区域化特点 ,而不是静态的简化和推广。这也许暗示了如何理解分析当地现实和已有的规定，对沿海资源的保护的营销结构提出可持续的解决方案。这一讨论也许也可以使世界的其他地方适用于自己的生态和经济社会环境。在这方面来看 ,渔业市场经济和其相关的捕鱼活动的影响将是一个很好的进一步理解在当地的沿海资源保护切入点。
