1、 外文翻译 原文 Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade Material Source: National Bureau of Economic Research Author： Judith C. Chin and Gene N. Grossman ABSTRACT We study the incentive that a government in the South has to protect the intellectual property rights of Northern firms, and the cons
2、equences of the decision taken by the South for welfare in the North and for efficiency of the world equilibrium. We conduct our analysia in the context of a competition between a single Northern producer and a single Southern producer selling some good to an integrated world market. In this competi
3、tion, only the Northern firm has the ability to conduct R once generated, knowledge can be used simultaneously by many parties besides the original creator at zero or minimal additional cost. This consideration argues against protection of intellectual property, since the granting of property rights
4、 can only diminish the efficiency of use of a given knowledge base. But absent some form of protection, private agents will have little reason to invest their resources to generate new information and technologies. The socially optimal degree of protection of intellectual property requires a balanci
5、ng of these fundamentally opposing objectives (see Nordhaus, 1969). Most governments have chosen to award limited market power (in the form of narrowly prescribed patents, copyrights and trademarks) to innovators as a compromise solution in which some static misallocation is accepted as the cost of
6、preserving dynamic incentives. In a world economy inhabited by sovereign governments, the issue of protection of intellectual property becomes all the more complex. The globally efficient degree of protection need not serve the separate interests of the individual governments that must enforce prope
7、rty rights. In particular, one would suspect that national well-being is maximized by a higher degree of protection of intellectual property in countries that develop new technologies and stand to earn monopoly rents from their application than in countries that only consume the goods and services t
8、hat are produced using new ideas. But conflict of interest between governments is by no means inevitable. As an extreme example, suppose no product development would take place in an industry absent adequate protection against piracy and infringement. Then a country with no capability to conduct R&D
9、 would nonetheless benefit from enforcement of patent and copyright laws insofar as its consumers stand to capture some surplus from any new products marketed within its borders. Indeed the U.S. government, in its discussions with trade partner governments in the South, has sought to emphasize the s
10、take that the latterhave in the intellectual property rights system (see GAO, 1987, pp.43-44). In this paper, we study the welfare economics of patent protection in a North-South trading environment. We suppose that initially a Northern firm and a Southern firm have access to an “old“ technology to
11、produce a good that is demanded in both countries. The Northern firm alone also has the ability to devote resources to an R&D project in order to improve the production technology. If foreign intellectual property rights are protected by the government in the South, then the Northern firm will gain
12、via its R&D efforts a competitive advantage over its Southern rival. It can exploit this advantage in the ensuing international oligopolistic competition by capturing an increased share of the market, or, in some circumstances, by licensing its superior technology to its rival. If alternatively, the
13、 government in the South fails to enforce patent protection over the new production process, then the Southern firm will be able to pirate the innovative technology and can once again become an equal competitor in the international marketplace. This prospect, we assume, is well understood by the Nor
14、thern firm, which then sets its R&D outlays accordingly. We investigate the extent to which patent protection by the government of the South adds to social welfare in each country separately, and in the world as a whole. In our model, global patent protection serves to stimulate innovation, so that
15、production costs are lower (for at least the Northern firm) in the sales-stage equilibrium. This effect alone acts to the benefit of both countries. Against this is the fact that enforcement of patent protection mitigates, and in some cases eliminates, oligopolistic competition, to the detriment of
16、welfare in both countries. Finally, the presence or absence of protection of intellectual property in the South has implications for the international distribution of income, as the Northern firm captures a greater share of extra-normal industry profits when rights are protected than it does when in
17、fringement takes place. The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop the model described above, and compare levels of welfare in each country with and without Southern protection for Northern intellectual property. We maintain the assumption, in this section, th
18、at international licensing arrangements between horizontal competitors are infeasible. In Section III, we introduce the possibility of licensing, ask when it will take place, and then re-examine the welfare comparisons of the protection and noprotection regimes. We discuss some implications of our a
19、nalysis for current international economic relations in the concluding section. II. Patent Protection When Licensing is Infeasible We consider a linear-quadratic Cournot duopoly in an integrated world economy. Initially, one firm in the North and one firm in the South can produce some homogenous goo
20、d at constant marginal cost, . The Northern firm now faces an opportunity to devote resources to a deterministic R&D project in order to improve upon the existing production technology. The firm can achieve a coat reduction of amount by spending 2/ on process innovation. Letting R denote its researc
21、h outlay, its post-innovation marginal cost of production will be (1) C(R)= - (R )1/2 , R 2/ . Final marginal cost in the South will depend upon whether or not the Northern firms patent rights to its innovative production process are protected by the government of the South, and on whether or not th
22、e Southern firm is able and willing to negotiate a licensing agreement with its Northern rival. We assume throughout this section that the complexity of the technology and the attendant difficulties in writing an enforceable contract preclude any licensing agreements. Then, if property rights are pr
23、otected, the Southern fins cost of production remains c=. If, alternatively, the government of the South fails to enforce the Northern firms patent rights, the Southern firm will be able to imitate the innovative technology. To make our arguments as sharp as possible, we suppose that the cost of rev
24、erse engineering is negligible. Then absent protection for intellectual property marginal production costs in the South are equal to those in the North. After the Northern firm completes its R&D project and the Southern firm imitates if possible, the two firms engage in Cournot (quantity-setting) co
25、mpetition. We adopt a linear form for (inverse) demand in the integrated world market, and choose unita so that this curve has a slope of one. Then （ 2） P= -(y+Y) , where P is the market-clearing price of the good and y and Y are the quantities sold by the Southern and Northern firms, respectively.
26、We assume as well that at every price a constant fraction 1/ of demand originates in the marketplace of the South. This implies an inverse demand function in the South of p(q)=- q, where q is the quantity sold there, and also that the South will enjoy a fraction 1/ of total world consumer surplus at
27、 any equilibrium price. A. Prooertv Rizhts Violated We begin by solving the model under the assumption that the government of the South fails to protect the intellectual property rights of the Northern firm. Then the ultimate market structure is one of symmetric duonoly with common costs C=c. These
28、of course depend on the prior R&D decision of the Northern firm. As is well known, the Cournot equilibrium levels of output in this instance are y=Y=(-C)/3 and the equilibrium price is P=(+2C)/3. We assume that, at the R&D phase, the Northern firm correctly foresees the implications of its actions f
29、or the subsequent product-market competition. That is, we seek a dynamic equilibrium that satisfies the sub-game-perfection constraint. The problem facing the Northern firm in the first stage of the game is to choose R to maximize total profits （ 3） Z(R)= -+ (R )1/22 /9 -R where the expression for o
30、perating profits in (3) represents the product of price and per-unit profit. The first-order condition for a profit maximum implies （ 4） R=(-)2/(9-)2 from whence we derive profits for each firm: （ 5n） Z=(-)2/(9-) （ 5s） z=9(-)2/(9-)2 Consumer surplus, S and a, in each country is the area between the
31、inverse demand curve and the equilibrium price line. Straightforward calculations reveal （ 6n） S=18(-1)/(-)2/(9-)2 （ 6s） s=(18/) (-)2/(9-)2 Finally, total surplus in each country, W and w, is the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, or （ 7n） W=9-+18(-1)/ (-)2/(9-)2 （ 7s） w=9(+2)/ (-)2/(9-)2
32、 B. Prooertv Rights Protected If the government of the South does indeed prevent its local firm from infringing upon the patent rights of the Northern innovator, then the duopolists bear different marginal costs at the time that they meet in the product market. In this case, three types of equilibri
33、a may arise, depending upon the size of the parameter describing the effectiveness of R&D in reducing production costs. For small values of the R&D efforts of the Northern firm will be modest, and asymmetric duoo1v will characterize the final stage of competition. For large values of the it optimal
34、to reduce its costs substantially, so much so that it will enjoy an unfettered monopoly position in the product market. Finally, when takes on intermediate values, the Northern firm will act strategically to induce exit by its rival (see Dixit, 1980). Then its final position in the product market wi
35、ll be one of monopoly, but the firm will find itself constrained to choose a level of R&D spending sufficiently large to guarantee non-positive profits for its rival. We shall refer to this last market structure as one of strateaic oredation. We proceed now to find optimal levels of R&D, and equilib
36、riu profits, consumer surplus, and total welfare for each of these scenarios, and to delimit the values of for which each applies. 译文 知识产权和南北贸易 资料来源：国际经济研究局工作报告系列 作者： Judith C. Chin 和 Gene H. Grossman 一、 引言： 在最近的南北贸易关系中，知识产权成为一个有争议的话题。在北方，新知识和新思想的生产者们依靠对专利权、版权和商标权的保护使他们能够独吞在研究与发展过程中的投资收益。北方政府已经对他们那些
37、因为盗版和假冒面临了数十亿美元的收入和利润损失的公司的援助请求做出了回应，政府决定对南方施加压力使之加强产权执法力 度及推动国际新程序的建立。在美国的迫切要求下，例如，关贸总协定的党部建立，在乌拉回合中作为十四个谈判小组的一员来阐明关税贸易总协定的规定并详细阐述关于国际知识产权执法的新的规则和新的纪律 (Baldwin， 1988， p.65)。南方，作为它的部分，表明其生长和发展的科技需要几乎完全依赖北方。鉴于他们薄弱的商谈地位，这些国家害怕北方的创新性企业的剥削。他们相当勉强同意北方关于加强知识产权保护标准的要求 (GAO， 1987)。 在封闭式经济的框架下，知识产权的福利经济学理所当然
38、地很容易被人理解。一个基本的不安存在于 对可利用的技术秘诀的广泛分布的社会期望和对提供足够的报酬给新信息的承办商的社会需求之中。这不安来自于大多数知识形式的公共福利的性质，一旦生成，除了原创造者外，在零或更小的额外支出下，知识还能同时被很多政党运用。这个考虑反驳了知识产权保护，因为产权的授予只会减少一个给定的知识库的运用效率。但是一些保护形式的空缺，私人代理基本上没有理由将他们的资源投资到新信息和新科技的生成上面。社会的最佳知识产权保护程度要求在这些相反的基础目标中有一个平衡 (参阅 Nordhaus， 1969)。对一些静态的错误分配作为保持动态激 励的代价被接受，大多数政府选择奖励限制创新
39、者的市场力量（狭窄规定的专利，版权和商标的形式）作为一个折衷的解决方法。 在被独立自主的政府占据的世界经济中，知识产权保护的问题变得愈加复杂。全球性的有效率的保护等级要求不提供个别必须执行产权的政府的个别利益。特别是，有人会怀疑国家间更高的知识产权保护程度将国际性福利最大化，发展新技术并准备从他们的申请应用中赚取的垄断租金，大于从那些只消费用新思想生产的商品和服务的国家中赚取的利润。但是政府间的利益冲突并没有不可避免。作为一个极端的例子，假设没有产品开发发生在一个 针对盗版和侵害行为缺乏足够保护的行业里。那么一个没有能力管理研究与开发的国家将反而从专利权和版权的执法中获利，因为消费者准备从在国
40、界内的任何新产品的上市中捕获一些盈余。甚至美国政府在与南方的贸易伙伴的商谈中，探索强调后者存在于知识产权制度中 (参阅 GAO， 1987， pp.43-44)。 在这篇论文中，我们学习在南北贸易环境下的专利保护的福利经济学。我们假设最初一个北方公司和一个南方公司有途径获得一个 “老 “技术去生产一个被双方国家都需要的商品。为了提高产品科技含量，北方公司单独也有能力奉献资源到一个研究与开 发项目中。如果国外知识产权被南方政府保护，那么北方公司会通过研究与开发的努力收获一些超过南方对手的有竞争性的优势。这优势可以在接踵而至的国际寡头竞争中通过夺取增长的市场份额来开发，或者在一些环境下，通过许可较
41、高的科技给他们的对手来开发。假如相反的，南方政府在新生产过程中未能执行专利保护，那么南方的公司将会有可能去盗版这些创新科技，再一次在国际市场成为一个平等的竞争者。我们假设这个前景被北方的公司很好的理解，然后因此设置研究与开发的费用。 我们调查南方政府专利保护在每一个国家增加社会福利的程度，世界作为一个整 体。在我们的模型里，全球专利保护可以刺激革新，所以在销售额平衡的情况下，生产成本会降低（至少对于北方公司来说）。这个效果达到了双方国家的利益。基于专利保护执法减轻，在有些情况下甚至消除这样一个事实，寡头竞争损害双方国家福利。在最后，南方有还是没有知识产权保护，牵连着国际收入分配，因为在产权发生
42、遭到侵害时被保护的时候，北方公司夺取更多的正常行业之外的利润份额。 我们论文的剩余内容组织如下：在下一个部分，我们发展上述的模型，比较对北方的知识产权有或者没有南方保护的两种情况下的每个国家的福 利水平。在这一块，我们继续假定在水平竞争者中的国际许可安排是不可实行的。在第三块部分，我们介绍许可的可能性，疑问什么时候这个会发生，然后复审在有保护和无保护的政权体制下福利的比较。我们对在缔结部分下当前国际经济关系的一些分析含意进行讨论。 二、当许可不可行时的专利保护 我们认为线性二次型古诺双头垄断存在于一体化的世界经济中。最初，北方的一个公司和南方的一个公司在不变的边际成本 下可以生产一些同质的商品
43、。为了提高现有的生产技术，北方公司正面临一个机会将资源投入到一个确定性的研究与开发项目中。该公司可以通过花 费 2/在创新过程上实现成本减少 。 R 表示调查费用，它创新后的边际生产成本就是： （ 1） C(R)= - (R )1/2 , R 2/ . 最后南方的边际成本取决于北方公司在创新性生产过程中的产权是否受南方政府的保护，也取决于南方公司是否有能力和有意愿去和北方竞争者协议许可安排。我们设想这样一整个部分：在书写一份排除任何许可安排的强制性执行的合同中存在技术的复杂性和服务员的困难。这样，如果产权被保护，南方公司的生产成本保持 c=。如果相反的， 南方政府未能执行北方公司的专利保护，南
44、方公司就会模仿这些创新技术。为了使我们的论点尽可能明显，我们假设逆向策划的成本是可以忽略不计的。那么南方的缺乏知识产权保护的边际生产成本和在北方的是相等的。 当北方的公司完成他们的研究与开发项目及南方公司有可能的模仿之后，两方公司开始着力于古诺（数量设定）竞争。我们给整个世界市场中的（逆向）需求采用线性形式，且选择单位以便这曲线有一个斜率。那么 （ 2） P= -(y+Y) , 在这里， P 是市场供求平衡后商品的价格， y 和 Y 分别是南方公司和北方公司卖出的数量。我们也假设在每一个价格下，固定不变的需求的 1/ 来源于南方市场。这暗示在南方有一个逆需求函数： p(q)=- q，在这里，
45、q 是在那里卖出的数量，并且南方还能以任何平衡价格享有 1/ 的总的世界消费盈余。 A.知识产权侵犯 我们以通过解决假设南方政府没有保护北方公司的知识产权的模型开始。这时这个最终市场结构是对称的双头垄断之一，它的普遍成本是 C=c。这些理所当然地依赖于北方公司预先的研究与开发的决定。众所周知的是，古诺产量的均衡水平在这种情况下是 y=Y=(-C)/3,均 衡价格是 P=(+2C)/3。 我们这样子假设，在研究与开发阶段，北方公司正确地预知他们为后来的产品市场竞争所做出的行动的含义。那就是，我们寻求一个动态的平衡，满足不完全信息约束。北方公司在第一阶段的问题是选择 R 将总利润最大化。 （ 3）
46、 Z(R)= -+ (R )1/22 /9 -R 公式 3 里营业利润的表达代表产品的价格和每个单位的利润。这第一步利润最大化的条件意味着 （ 4） R=(-)2/(9-)2 在这里为每个公司得到利润： （ 5n） Z=(-)2/(9-) （ 5s） z=9(-)2/(9-)2 消费者剩余， S 和 s，在每一个国家是逆需求曲线和均衡价格线之间的地区。直截了当的计算展现 （ 6n） S=18(-1)/(-)2/(9-)2 （ 6s） s=(18/) (-)2/(9-)2 最后，在每个国家的总剩余， W 和 w，是消费者剩余和生产者剩余的总和，或者 （ 7n） W=9-+18(-1)/ (-)2/(9-)2 （ 7s） w=9(+2)/ (-)2/(9-)2
