1、 外文翻译 原文 Strategic FDI and Industrial Ownership Structure Material Source: Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton 31 68, Victoria, Australia Author: Christopher J. Ellis (1) A direct effect that works through the incentives provided by sharing of the payoffs due to entry, and, (ii) an i
2、ndirect effects that feeds back onto initial entry decisions via changes in delay between initial and subsequent entry. For an increase in cooperation the direct effect causes the probability of FDI to fall while the indirect effects causes it to rise. For both fully cooperative and fully competitiv
3、e industrial ownership structures the direct effect dominates the indirect effect and the relationship between cooperation and the probability of initial FDI is negative. For partially cooperative cases the conclusions are less clear cut. However, for all levels of cooperation, as cooperation increa
4、ses the delay between initial and subsequent entry increases. Furthermore, there is a “dampening effect“ : The greater is the degree of overlapping share ownership the less sensitive will be the probability of entry by the first firm to any changes in the models underlying parameters. Earlier attemp
5、ts to explain the effects of keiretsu membership on FDI have focused on the role of cheap finance supplied by group member banks. These explanations predict that keiretsu membership should facilitate FDI, yet the empirical evidence fails to support this story. Our work suggests why this might be tru
6、e. The cheap finance story may be correct, but is only part of the picture. The strategic incentives we highlight follow naturally from the actual institutional structure of industrial ownership, explain the ambiguities found in the empirical literature, and point to what may be needed to sort out t
7、hese conflicting effects. The Effects of Industrial Ownership Structure on the Timing of FDI The Direct Effect： For a given period of delay between initial and subsequent entry, t, the probability of initial FDI at any time t is a decreasing function of the level of cooperation (i.e. cross-ownership
8、 shares) in the industrial structure.16 This follows immediately from considering the mixed strategy equilibrium condition which says that each firm must be indifferent between FDI and domestic production. the leader shares with the follower a greater proportion of the profit increase, and also shar
9、es in a greater proportion of the profit decrease the follower experiences. t must therefore fall to maintain the equilibrium. In incentive terms the leader has less incentive to undertake FDI as it enjoys both a smaller fraction of the gains and a greater fraction of the losses its action induces.
10、The Indirect Effect： A change in a also has an indirect effect on the probability of initial FDI working through the optimal delay between initial and subsequent entry. This effect is represented by the second term in。 The longer is the optimal delay, the further in the future and hence lower are th
11、e discounted costs of entry that the second entrant imposes on the first. Thus the greater is a the greater is the incentive for each firm to initially enter. Furthermore, the indifference condition of the mixed strategy equilibrium requires that, given a longer optimal delays makes initial entry mo
12、re attractive, then each firm must enter with a higher probability to make the other firm indifferent. Clearly an important question is whether the influence of the direct or of the indirect effect of industrial ownership structure determines inital FDI entry probabilities. Without further assumptio
13、ns we cannot generally say which effect will dominate. Potential Policy Implications of the Analysis Clearly the analysis provided in our theoretical model is too stylized and short on detail to provide an adequate guide to policy. However, equally clearly the effects that we uncover have some polic
14、y relevance. We have shown that there are incentives for keiretsu and chaebol members to be quite conservative in their FDI behavior. For any given set of model parameters firms from partially cooperative industrial groupings may be less inclined to undertake initial FDI and will certainly delay lon
15、ger in undertaking subsequent investments. Furthermore, the Dampening Effect suggests that these firms are also likely to be less responsive at the margin to any incentives for FDI that a potential host country might offer. The underlying intuition seems quite powerful: in this context overlapping o
16、wnership networks seem to dilute incentives. However, we are cautious in suggesting that potential host countries should target policies to attract FDI from less cooperative firms. Our model does not tell us anything about incentives in situations where both keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms are poten
17、tial entrants. Furthermore, while firms from industrial structures with overlapping ownership networks might be less responsive to incentives to undertake FDI, they are by the same logic: less likely to exit once they have entered. 译文 FDI 战略和工业所有制结构 资料来源 : Department of Economics, Monash University,
18、 Clayton 31 68, Victoria, Australia 作者： Christopher J. Ellis 1，一个直接的影响是工作通过进口支付的份额提供激励效果： 2，另一个间接影响就是 通过开始和后来的进口时间变化反馈并影响最初 的决定 。对于增加的合作，一个直接的影响使 FDI 概率的减少 ,间接影响导致它上升。对于充分合作、充分竞争工业所有制结构的企业，直接影响控制着间接影响，它们之间合作和 最初 FDI 概率 的关系 是否定的。对于 部分合作的情况下 ,这种结论不是很 明朗 的 。然而 ,为 了 各层次的合作 ,最初 和后来的 进口 增加 随着合作得增加而 增加。 此外
19、 ,这里是一个“打击效应” :股票所有权重叠 的程度越大，公司的任何变化潜在的模型参数对进口概率的敏感性就越低 。 试图解释 企业集团 成员 在 FDI 有多大 影响 的前者 已经 集中 研究那些由组织银行 提供 的廉价资金成员 。这些解释预测 ,企业集团成员 应 促进 业内的 FDI,但经验上的 证据 不支持这个故事。 我们的工作表明为什么这可能是对的。 这个便宜的财政故事可能 是正确的 ,但只是整个故事 的一角。战略激励我们 能够很自然的看 重实际的工业所有权制度结构 ,来 解释 实证文献中 的 含糊不清的 东西 ,并指出应该 怎样 去整理这些相互矛盾的结果 。 工业所有制结构 在吸收 F
20、DI 时间上的影响 直接影响： 对于 开始和后来之间的延误时间 给定时 ,任何时刻 t，在产业结构下最初的 FDI 概率表现为 功能下降的合作水平 (即跨所有制的大型 企业 ).这个结论立即考虑到了 混合战略平衡条件 ,说明每个公司 在 FDI 和国内生产 之间必须是 没有 关系的 。前者对 跟随者 分享了一个高利润的比例增长 ,同时这个高 利润的 比例增长也为后者带来了经验。 因此 t 必须 不能 保持平衡。在激励条款 中领导者 在 FDI 上缺 少了动机 ,同时具有 在这种行动上引起的收益者 更低的分数和失败者更好的分数 。 间接影响：通过在开始和后来进口的最佳时间延迟上，这种改变在最初的
21、FDI 概率上有这一个间接的影响 。 第二行 所代表的 就是这种结果 。 最佳延迟 的时间越长 ,未来 就越远 ,因此 第二个进入者利用了 第一 个进入者在进口时 折价 的成 本。因此更好 的 是 每个公司 就越有动力 最初进入。此外 , 混合策略均衡 的 不相关条件 要求 ,给予一个更长的最佳 延迟 时间能使 最初的 进口者 更吸引人 ,他们每个人的公司必须要 用 一个更高的 概率 让别的公司不感兴趣。 很明显的 一个重要 问题是 :不管 工业所有制 结构的直接 的 还是 间接的 ，都影响 影响了 FDI 进入的 可能性。没有进一步假设我们不能 说影响是决定性的因素 。 用潜在的政策含义进行
22、分析 在 理论模型 中很清楚提出这种现象对于适当的 指导方针 是 太风格 化 而且缺少详细 信息的 。然而 ,同样明显的影响 表明 我们揭开 的存在 一些政策关联。我们已经表明 在他们 FDI行为 中对企业集团和韩国大企业成员的 激励 是相当保守的 。 任何给定的模型参数公司在部分合作工业集团可能比以往更少的倾向于进行最初的 FDI， 进行后续投资 肯定会延迟时间。此外 ,阻尼效应 表明 ,这些公司 在 FDI 的利润上 可能是反应较少 ，而这个 东道 主可能 会提供。这 潜在的直觉似乎是 强大 的： 此背景下重叠的所有权网络似乎 有 稀释的奖励。但是 ,我们会谨慎的认为潜在的居住国应将目标锁定 在从缺少 合作 的 公司吸引 FDI 的政策 。 我们的模型没有 告诉我们任何 关于激励的情况，在企业集团和非企业集团业 的情况下 ， 公司 是潜在的进口 者。 而且 ,公司在 重叠的 所有权网络 产业结构 下可能对进行 FDI 激励反应较少 ,他们 有 相同的逻辑规律 :他们 不太可能要退出一旦他们进入的 行业 。
