1、原文TAXES,TRADABLERIGHTSANDTRANSACTIONCOSTSWITHRESPECTTOMARKETBASEDPOLICYAPPROACHES,ITISAWIDELYHELDVIEWTHATCORRECTIVETAXATIONENTAILSSUBSTANTIALTHISCONCLUSIONONLYHOLDSIFSETUPCOSTSARESINGLEDOUTITISARGUEDTHATTHEPREVALENCEOFTRANSACTIONCOSTSISLARGELYDEPENDENTONTHEDESIGNOFTHEPOLICYINSTRUMENT,RESPECTIVELYTHE
2、TAXBASEORTHETRADINGREGIMECHOSENCOMPARATIVEANALYSISFURTHERSHOWSTHATACAPANDTRADEPROGRAMOFEMISSIONPERMITSDISTRIBUTEDFORFREE,TRADEDONABROKEREDMARKETANDMONITOREDUPSTREAMISNOTONLYMOREEFFECTIVE,BUTALSOLIKELYTOENTAILFEWERTRANSACTIONCOSTSTHANENVIRONMENTALTAXESANYATTEMPT,INTURN,TOSAVETHEHUGEINFORMATION,ENFORC
3、EMENTANDCOMPLIANCECOSTSINCURREDBYCORRECTIVETAXATIONIMPAIRSITSEFFICACYBYSEVERINGTHELINKBETWEENTHEENVIRONMENTALEXTERNALITYANDTHETAXBASEBASICALLY,THEREEXISTFOURPOLICYINSTRUMENTSTOCURBPOLLUTIONDIRECTREGULATION,ENVIRONMENTALLIABILITY,ECOLOGICALTAXESANDTRADABLEEMISSIONRIGHTSTHELATTERTWOARESIMILARINTHESENS
4、ETHATTHEYAREMARKETBASEDINSTRUMENTSTHATUSETHEPRICESYSTEMTOINTERNALIZEENVIRONMENTALDAMAGESTHEYCOMPAREFAVORABLYTOTHETWOFORMERAPPROACHESBECAUSETHEYAREFLEXIBLEANDCOSTEFFECTIVEASFORMALLYDEMONSTRATEDDESPITETHEIRSIMILARITY,MOSTCOUNTRIESRELYONTAXESINSTEADOFTRADABLEPERMITSSINCETHEKYOTOPROTOCOL,HOWEVER,THEREIS
5、ARENEWEDPOLITICALANDSCIENTIFICINTERESTINTRADABLEEMISSIONRIGHTSWITHTHISRISEINPUBLICINTEREST,THEALLEGEDCOMPLEXITYOFTHESYSTEMANDSUBSEQUENTTRANSACTIONCOSTSAREUNREMITTINGLYCRITICIZEDINTHISARTICLE,WEWILLASSESSTHEMERITSOFTHISCRITICISMTAXESTYPICALLYCARRYBOTHANINCENTIVEANDFINANCIALEFFECTALTHOUGHTHEPURPOSEOFP
6、IGOUVIANTAXATIONISTOBRINGABOUTACHANGEINACTIVITYANDPOLLUTIONLEVELS,ENVIRONMENTALTAXESCANBEEASILYCONCEIVEDASJUSTANALTERNATIVESOURCEOFREVENUEFORTHEGOVERNMENTASSUMINGALOWTREASURYPREFERENCE,PUBLICSUPPORTMAYHAVETOBEWONBYANENVIRONMENTALTAXREFORMTHATBALANCESENVIRONMENTALTAXREVENUESWITHTAXCUTSELSEWHEREORPROV
7、IDESTAXINCENTIVESFORPOLLUTIONREDUCTIONHOWEVER,THISDOESNOTSOLVETHESYSTEMICINFORMATIONPROBLEMWHENENVIRONMENTALTAXESARESETTOOLOW,SUBOPTIMALEMISSIONREDUCTIONSWILLRESULTALTERNATIVELY,HIGHTAXESWILLCAUSEUNWARRANTEDDEADWEIGHTLOSSESMOREOVER,ITHASBEENRECOGNIZEDTHATTHEMEREEXISTENCEOFANEXTERNALITYDOESNOTINITSEL
8、FMERITCORRECTIVESTATEACTIONCOASE1960CONVINCINGLYARGUEDTHAT,UNDERCERTAINCIRCUMSTANCES,THEREDUCTIONOFSPILLOVEREFFECTSCANBEACHIEVEDVIAPRIVATENEGOTIATIONSTHISINSIGHTHASLEDTOTHEDEVELOPMENTOFANEWPOLICYINSTRUMENTTRANSACTIONCOSTSTHEQUESTFORTAXONOMYTRANSACTIONCOSTSARENOWADAYSFREQUENTLYINVOKEDTOEXPLAININSTITU
9、TIONAL,NONMARKETPHENOMENAMANYDIFFERENTDEFINITIONSAPPEARINTHELITERATURE,OFFERINGVARIOUSCONCEPTUALINSIGHTSTHATHAVENOTBEENTRANSLATEDYETINTOSTANDARDCOSTCATEGORIESTHEREFORE,WEFIRSTTAKEANOTHERLOOKATTHEDIFFERENTDEFINITIONSOFFEREDBYVARIOUSAUTHORSFROMWHICHWEWILLDERIVEANOPERATIONALANDPOSSIBLYCOMPLETETAXONOMYT
10、HECONCEPTOFTRANSACTIONCOSTSWASINTRODUCEDBYCOASE1937TOEXPLAINWHYFIRMSEXISTASANALTERNATIVEFORORGANIZINGECONOMICACTIVITYBYMEANSOFEXCHANGETRANSACTIONSACROSSTHEMARKETTHEANSWERISTHATFIRMSARISEBECAUSETHEREARESUBSTANTIALCOSTSINVOLVEDINUSINGTHEMARKETMANYDIFFERENTDEFINITIONSAPPEARINTHELITERATURE,OFFERINGVARIO
11、USCONCEPTUALINSIGHTSTHATHAVENOTBEENTRANSLATEDYETINTOSTANDARDCOSTCATEGORIESCOASEWASNOTVERYEXPLICITABOUTWHATHEMEANTBYTHESETRANSACTIONCOSTSSINCEDIFFERENTTYPESOFCOSTSMAYBEBORNEBYDIFFERENTPLAYERSATDIFFERENTPOINTSINTHEPOLICYPROCESS,APROPERCLASSIFICATIONOFTRANSACTIONCOSTCATEGORIESISIMPORTANTTOASSURETHATALL
12、RELEVANTCOSTSAREACCOUNTEDFORWHENCOMPLETE,TRANSACTIONCOSTTAXONOMYMAYALSOBEHELPFULINIMPROVINGPOLICYDESIGNANDMANAGEMENTACCORDINGTODAHLMAN1979,TRANSACTIONCOSTSINCLUDESEARCHANDINFORMATIONCOSTS,BARGAININGANDDECISIONMAKINGCOSTS,MONITORINGANDENFORCEMENTCOSTSTHEECONOMICRATIONALEOFINSTITUTIONSLIESINTHEREDUCTI
13、ONOFTHOSECOSTSTHISMUSTBEINTERPRETEDCAREFULLYHOWEVER,ALTHOUGHINSTITUTIONSARE,INPRINCIPLE,DESIGNEDTOREDUCETRANSACTIONCOSTSBYDIMINISHINGUNCERTAINTY,THEYMAYNOTSUCCEEDSONEWORCHANGINGINSTITUTIONSMAYGENERATE,ATANYPOINTINTIME,INCONSISTENCIESBETWEENCOMPETINGINSTITUTIONSASWELLASUNCERTAINTYOVERFUTUREINSTITUTIO
14、NALCHANGESWHICH,INTURN,ARELIKELYTOLEADTOINCREASINGTRANSACTIONCOSTSMEYER,2001MILGROMANDROBERTS1992DISTINGUISHBETWEENTWOCATEGORIESOFTRANSACTIONCOSTSTHEFIRSTTYPEARISESFROMINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESANDINCOMPLETENESSOFCONTRACTSAMONGPARTIESTHESECONDTYPESTEMSFROMIMPERFECTCOMMITMENTSOROPPORTUNISTICBEHAVIOROFPAR
15、TIESTHEOECDHASCLASSIFIEDTRANSACTIONCOSTSINTOTWOCATEGORIESNONPOLICYRELATEDTRANSACTIONCOSTS,WHICHAREINCURREDBYPARTIESTOVOLUNTARYMARKETTRANSACTIONS,POLICYRELATEDTRANSACTIONCOSTS,WHICHAREASSOCIATEDWITHTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFPOLICIESTHEFORMERINCLUDETHECOSTSASSOCIATEDWITHGATHERINGINFORMATION,NEGOTIATINGPRICES
16、,ASCERTAININGQUALITIES,ESTABLISHINGEXCLUSIONMECHANISMS,ORGANIZINGCOLLECTIVEACTIONSANDSOONTHELATTERCOVERTHECOSTSINCURREDBYGOVERNMENTINGATHERINGINFORMATION,PLANNINGANDDESIGNINGPOLICIES,COLLECTINGREVENUES,DISTRIBUTINGPAYMENTS,ANDMONITORINGTHEOUTCOMEOFPOLICIESACCORDINGTOFURUBOTNANDRICHTER1997,TRANSACTIO
17、NCOSTSINVOLVETHEUSEOFREALRESOURCESTHATCOULDBEDEPLOYEDALTERNATIVELYELSEWHEREINTHEECONOMYORTHESOCIOECONOMICSYSTEMTRANSACTIONCOSTSAREPERVASIVEATALLLEVELSANDTYPESOFACTIVITYANDINACTIVITYANDCOMPRISETHECOSTSOFESTABLISHING,MAINTAINING,ADAPTING,REGULATING,MONITORINGANDENFORCINGRULESASWELLASEXECUTINGTRANSACTI
18、ONSINTERESTINGLY,THEOPPORTUNITYCOSTSOFMISALLOCATEDACTIVITIESALSOFITINTOTHECATEGORYOFTRANSACTIONCOSTSTHEYMAKEADISTINCTIONBETWEENTHREETYPESOFTRANSACTIONCOSTSTHECOSTSOFUSINGTHEMARKETMARKETTRANSACTIONCOSTS,THECOSTSOFEXERCISINGTHERIGHTTOGIVEORDERSWITHINTHEORGANIZATIONMANAGERIALTRANSACTIONCOSTS,THECOSTSOF
19、RUNNINGANDADJUSTINGAPOLITICALSYSTEMPOLITICALTRANSACTIONCOSTSTHEIRTAXONOMYISTHEMOSTCOMPLETETOBEFOUNDINTHELITERATUREANDCOMPRISESTHECOSTSOFUSINGTHEMARKETSASINTRODUCEDBYCOASE1937,THEMANAGERIALCOSTSPUTFORWARDBYWILLIAMSON1985ANDTHEINSTITUTIONALCOSTSDISCUSSEDBYNORTH1990THEFURUBOTNRICHTERAPPROACHALSOABSORBS
20、THEDISTINCTIONMADEBYMULLINSANDBARON1997BETWEENDIRECTTRANSACTIONCOSTSEGTOINITIATEANDCOMPLETEATRADEANDOPPORTUNITYCOSTSEGTHELOSSOFTIMEANDRESOURCESDUETODELAYORMANAGERIALSUPERVISIONFURTHERMORE,TRANSACTIONSENTAILCOSTSEXANTEEGTHESEARCHANDINFORMATIONCOSTSANDTHECOSTSOFNEGOTIATINGANDFORMINGACONTRACTORAGREEMEN
21、TANDEXPOSTEGTHECOSTSOFMONITORINGANDENFORCINGACONTRACTORAGREEMENTINPRACTICE,HOWEVER,EXANTECOSTSOFTENCOINCIDEWITHFIXEDCOSTSANDEXPOSTCOSTSWITHVARIABLECOSTSITISIMPORTANTTORECOGNIZETHATTHETWOTYPESOFCOSTSAREUSUALLYINTERDEPENDENTANYATTEMPTTOREDUCETHEFORMERMAYAFFECTTHELATTERTABLE1TRANSACTIONCOSTTAXONOMYTRAN
22、SACTIONCOSTSFIXEDEXANTEVARIABLEEXPOSTMARKETINFORMATIONCOSTSINSURANCECOSTSSEARCHCOSTSSIGNALINGCOSTSNEGOTIATIONCOSTSCONTRACTCOSTSMANAGERIALSETUPCOSTSMONITORINGCOSTENFORCEMENTCOSTSBONDINGCOSTSPOLITICALLOBBYINGCOSTSOPERATIONALCOSTSPUBLICSUPPORTCOSTSCOMPLIANCECOSTSENACTINGCOSTSDELAYCOSTSSOURCEBASEDONFURU
23、TBOTNANDRICHTER1997INTABLE1,WEOFFERANEXTENDEDCLASSIFICATIONBASEDONTHEFURUBOTNRICHTERTAXONOMYTHATISTHOUGHTTOINCLUDEALLRELEVANTTYPESOFTRANSACTIONCOSTSTHISSCHEMEWILLBEUSEDFORPOLICYEVALUATIONINTHENEXTPARAGRAPHCOMPARATIVETRANSACTIONCOSTSANALYSISFROMANECOLOGICALANDECONOMICPERSPECTIVE,ITISCLEARTHATTRADABLE
24、EMISSIONRIGHTSOUTPERFORMENVIRONMENTALTAXES,BUTTHECRUXOFTHEFORMERSYSTEMSEEMSTHETRANSACTIONCOSTSITENTAILSRAO2003HASSUGGESTEDTHATTHESYSTEMSOFMARKETBASEDEMISSIONSTRADINGEVENTHEWELLDEVELOPEDPROGRAMSINTHEUNITEDSTATES,STILLHAVEALONGWAYTOGOBEFOREBEINGEFFECTIVEINANYSENSEBECAUSEOFEXCESSIVETRANSACTIONCOSTSHOWE
25、VER,THEREEXISTSNOEMPIRICALEVIDENCETHATTRANSACTIONCOSTSHAVEPREVENTEDTRADINGORSIGNIFICANTLYAFFECTEDPRICESOFPERMITSINTHEUNITEDSTATESMOREOVER,THEOCCURRENCEOFHIGHTRANSACTIONCOSTSINEMISSIONSTRADINGDOESNOTIMPLYTHATENVIRONMENTALTAXATIONISANYLESSSUSCEPTIBLEASKRUTILLA1999POINTEDOUT,THEENVIRONMENTALECONOMICSLI
26、TERATURESTILLLACKSACOMPARATIVEASSESSMENTOFTRANSACTIONCOSTSENVIRONMENTALTAXESCORRECTIVETAXATIONISITSELFNOTCOSTLESSALLRELEVANTTRANSACTIONCOSTSASSOCIATEDWITHENVIRONMENTALTAXESWILLBEDISCUSSEDFIRST1LEGISLATIVECOSTSTHEDECISIONONTHEINSTRUMENTTOBEAPPLIEDINENVIRONMENTALPOLICYISFORMALLYTHECOMPETENCEOFTHELEGIS
27、LATORWHOISSUPPOSEDTOACTTOFURTHERTHEPUBLICINTERESTBUTPOLITICIANSAREALSOINFLUENCEDBYVARIOUSINTERESTGROUPSLIKETHEPOLLUTINGINDUSTRY,ENVIRONMENTALORGANIZATIONSANDBUREAUCRACY2INFORMATIONCOSTSTHELITERATUREONENVIRONMENTALTAXPOLICYLEAVESROOMFORAPOSSIBLENETWELFAREGAINOFCORRECTIVETAXATIONCONTAININGTHEAMOUNTOFI
28、NFORMATION,ACCURACYRELATESTOBUSINESSDECISIONS,HOWEVER,SOMEINFORMATIONISDIFFICULTTOOBTAININFORMATIONCOSTSMAYFURTHERRISEWHENDIFFERENTIATEDTAXESARETOBEIMPLEMENTEDINACCORDANCE，ENTERPRISESGETMAXIMUMBENEFITFROMFINALLY,ENVIRONMENTALPOLLUTIONISOFTENTHERESULTOFACCIDENTSUNCERTAINTYALSOCOMPLICATESTHECORRECTASS
29、ESSMENTOFEXPECTEDSOCIALCOSTS3SEARCHPLANNINGCOSTSFIRSTBESTANALYSISEXPECTSTHETAXAUTHORITYTOUSEPERSONALIZEDTAXESANDLUMPSUMTRANSFERSSINCETHEYDONOTBRINGADDITIONALDISTORTIONSTOTHEECONOMYSEARCHCOSTSCANBESOMEWHATMITIGATED,THOUGH,WHENTHESOURCECANBELINKEDTOTHECAUSEOFPOLLUTIONTAXINGSUBSTANCESENTAILSFEWERINFORM
30、ATIONANDSEARCHCOSTSCOMPAREDTOPERSONALIZEDORINCENTIVETAXATIONSEARCHCOSTSCANBEFURTHERREDUCEDWHENTHETAXUNITSAREALREADYIDENTIFIED4SETUPCOSTSWITHTHERISEOFTHEMODERNWELFARESTATE,THESCOPEOFTAXATIONHASINCREASEDDRAMATICALLYCONSEQUENTLY,GOVERNMENTSHAVESETUPLARGEAGENCIESTOADMINISTERANDCOLLECTALLTYPESOFDIRECTAND
31、INDIRECTTAXESTHATTOUCHUPONALMOSTEVERYASPECTOFHUMANLIFECONSUMPTION,PRODUCTION,BUSINESSINITIATIVE,WORK,HOMEANDEVENDEATHIFTHENEWENVIRONMENTALTAXESCANBELEVIEDANDCOLLECTEDBYANESTABLISHEDTAXAGENCY,SETUPCOSTSARENEGLIGIBLEANDSUNK5OPERATIONALCOSTSNEGLIGIBLESETUPCOSTSDONOTIMPLYTHATTHECOSTSOFTAXADMINISTRATIONA
32、RELOWENVIRONMENTALTAXATIONREQUIRESSPECIALIZEDPERSONNELTHATGATHERTHEINFORMATIONDISCUSSEDABOVE,IDENTIFIESTHECORRECTTAXBASE,DETERMINESTHEOPTIMALTAXRATE,FEEDSTHATINFORMATIONINTOTHEEXISTINGTAXSYSTEMAND,IFREVENUESAREEARMARKED,COLLECTSTHETAXMONEYANDESTABLISHESASPECIALFUNDALTHOUGHOVERHEADCOSTSCANBESPREADAMO
33、NGTAXPAYERS,THECOSTSOFOPERATINGTHETAXADMINISTRATIONARECERTAINLYNOTNEGLIGIBLEANDRISINGWITHTHECOMPLEXITYOFTHETAXLAW6NEGOTIATIONCOSTSALTHOUGHCORPORATIONSANDTAXAUTHORITIESOFTENNEGOTIATETAXDEALSTHATMAYINCLUDEENVIRONMENTALTAXESANDPERSONALIZEDTAXDEDUCTIBLESFORABATEMENTINVESTMENTS,ITISASSUMEDTHATTHESENEGOTI
34、ATIONSARERESTRICTEDTOLARGERCOMPANIESANDTHATNOTAXBARGAININGOCCURSAMONGTAXSUBJECTSASAMATTEROFFACT,TAXATIONISCOMPULSORYPRECISELYTOERADICATETHESETRANSACTIONCOSTSHENCE,NEGOTIATIONCOSTSARERELATIVELYSMALL7CONTRACTCOSTSNOCOSTSAREINCURREDASARESULTOFCONTRACTINGOVERENVIRONMENTAL8MONITORINGANDENFORCEMENTCOSTSBE
35、CAUSEPOLLUTERSWANTTOREDUCETHETAXBURDEN,THEYCANCHOOSETOINVESTINABATEMENTEQUIPMENTIFTHEPAYOFFEXCEEDSTHETAXPAYMENTS,TOREDUCETHEIRPOLLUTINGACTIVITIES,TOSWITCHTONONTAXEDACTIVITIESORTOTRYANDESCAPETAXPAYMENTSCLEARLY,THEENVIRONMENTALTAXADMINISTRATIONHASTOPERFORMCOSTLYMONITORINGACTIVITIESTOENSURECOMPLIANCEAN
36、DENFORCETAXPAYMENTSITISIMPORTANTTODISTINGUISHTHREEDIFFERENTPROBLEMSTAXEVASION,TAXAVOIDANCEANDTAXDELINQUENCYWHILETAXEVASIONISAFRAUDULENTEFFORTTOESCAPEATAXOBLIGATION,TAXAVOIDANCEOCCURSWHENATAXPAYERADAPTSHISBEHAVIORINALAWFULMANNERSOASTOMINIMIZETAXPAYMENTSTAXDELINQUENCYREFERSTOATEMPORARYFAILURETOPAYTHET
37、AXOBLIGATION9COMPLIANCECOSTSADMINISTRATIVEMECHANISMSTOPREVENTTAXEVASIONALSOLEADTOCOSTSMADEBYTHETAXPAYERSTOCOMPLYWITHTHERULESTHEMAINSOURCEOFCOMPLIANCECOSTSINVOLVESRECORDKEEPINGANDBANKINGOPERATIONSCOMPLIANCECOSTSCANBESUBSTANTIALANDAREESTIMATED,FOREXAMPLE,AT7PERCENTOFTOTALINCOMETAXREVENUECONCLUSIONFROM
38、THISANALYSIS,TWOMAINCONCLUSIONSCANBEDRAWNFIRST,THETRANSACTIONCOSTSOFENVIRONMENTALTAXATIONARECONDITIONALUPONTHESELECTEDTAXBASEALTHOUGHSETUPCOSTSARERELATIVELYLOWWHENDRAWINGUPONEXISTINGTAXADMINISTRATIONS,THEENFORCEMENTANDCOMPLIANCECOSTSARELIKELYTOBESUBSTANTIALTHELATTERCOSTSAREDETERMINEDBYTHETAXRULESCOM
39、PLEXITYWHICH,INTURN,SEEMSACONSEQUENCEOFTHELINKAGEPRINCIPLETHEMOREACCURATELYTHETAXBASEISDEFINED,THEHIGHERTHEINFORMATIONCOSTSANDSUBSEQUENTMONITORING,ENFORCEMENTANDCOMPLIANCECOSTSECONDLY,THEREAPPEARSATRADEOFFBETWEENTRANSACTIONCOSTSANDTHEEFFICACYOFENVIRONMENTALTAXESCORRECTIVETAXATION,THOUGHDESIRABLEINPR
40、INCIPLE,MAYENTAILPROHIBITIVELYHIGHTRANSACTIONCOSTSTHATCANONLYBEREDUCEDTOSOMEEXTENTBYSACRIFICINGITSORIGINALGOALVIZMATCHINGPRIVATEANDSOCIALCOSTSSOURCELODEVEREECK,2005”TAXES,TRADABLERIGHTSANDTRANSACTIONCOSTS”,EUROPEANJOURNALOFLAWANDECONOMICSNO20,P199223译文税收、交易权和交易成本关于以市场为基础的政策方针，普遍认为需要纠正的税务量很大。这个结论只能在强
41、调设置成本的情况下成立。我们认为，交易成本的盛行在很大程度上源于选择的计税基数或贸易体制。进一步的对比分析表明，排放限额和交易许权的免费发放，在促成市场交易和上游监管上不仅更有效，而且所需要的交易成本可能比环境税更少。反过来，环境外部性和计税基础联系的加强，会削弱任何试图以纠正税收来节省巨大的信息、执行和遵从管理费用的方法的效率。基本上有四种政策工具可以减少污染，它们分别是直接管理、环境责任、生态税收和排放权交易。后两者是相似的，因为它们都是基于市场，使用改变价格体系的手段来减少环境损失。它们比前两个的做法更受人喜爱，是因为它们灵活且具有成本效益。虽然它们相似，但是大多数国家依靠的是税收而不是
42、交易许权。自从京都议定书后，国家对交易排放权产生了新的兴趣。随着公共利益的提高，复杂的系统和其随后的交易成本受到了不断的质疑。税收通常既有激励的影响，又能产生财务效应。尽管皮古税的目的是为了有关活动的减少和污染程度的变化，但是环境税通常被理解为只是政府替代收入的来源。如果国库偏好低，公众可能支持环境税制的改革。他们认为可以用税收减免政策来平衡环境税收或者运用到其他地方来激励污染的减少。然而，这并不能解决系统信息的问题。当环境税收过低时，欠佳减排的问题就会产生。另外，高税收将导致不必要的损失。此外，人们认识到少量存在的某些外部性原因并不值得让国家纠正税收。科斯（1960）认为，在某些情况下，溢出
43、效应的减少可以通过私下谈判达成。这种认识导致了一项新的政策工具的发展。交易成本分类如今交易成本经常用来解释非市场现象。在文献中出现的许多不同定义，为很多还没有被翻译成标准的成本项目的概念提供了认识。因此，我们应该从另外的角度看看不同作者给出的不同定义，这为我们完成分类提供了可操作性。科斯（1937）认为交易成本的概念解释了为什么其在企业外汇交易过程中是不可替代的，即企业活动因涉及市场交易所产生的巨额费用。许多文献中也总结出了各种定义，并且对于那些尚未被归类的费用有着不同的见解。但科斯也明确地表示，他所说的不一定就是交易成本的具体意思。不同类型的企业成本组成并不相同，在不同的政策过程中，交易费用
44、的类别是根据在成本费用中所承担的重要程度而定的。明确交易成本的分类也可以对改进政策设计和加强管理有所帮助。据达尔曼（1979）指出，交易成本包括搜索和信息成本，谈判和决策成本，监督和执法成本。为了减少这些成本费用，必须将其各组成部分解释清楚。尽管通过不确定性的原则，各组成部分间因相互协调而减少了部分交易成本，但有时也可能不会成功。无论在任何时候，新产品或更新的产品与原有产品之间都存在竞争矛盾，而变革的不确定性，很可能反过来导致交易成本的增加（迈耶，2001）。米尔格罗姆和罗伯次（1992）将交易成本划分为两类。第一类是由于信息的不对称性和合同中条款的不完整性产生的，第二类则是因为承诺的不完善或
45、者说当事方的机会主义行为而产生的。另外，经济组织将交易成本分为两类非相关的交易成本，双方自愿交易（市场政策）导致的相关成本，政策相关的交易成本，执行有关政策所需要付出的成本。前者包括了收集资料、进行议价、确定素质、建立排斥机制、组织集体行动等过程。后者包括了由政府承担的信息收集的成本、规划和制定政策、缴费收入、分期付款和政策监测下的结果。吕博腾和瑞切尔（1997）则认为，交易成本是指在经济制度下，所涉及的可以真正调动资源所产生的费用。交易成本涉及很多方面，包括设备的建立、维护、调整和规范，以及执行并监督交易活动中各项规则运用的全部过程。有趣的是，在错误配置下的交易活动所产生的成本也能归入到适合
46、的机会成本当中。他们根据交易成本之间的区别也将之分为三类使用市场（市场交易成本）的费用，组织内部发布命令权的费用（管理交易成本），运行和调整政治系统的费用（政治交易成本）。这种分类是最完整的，他们的文献中包括了科斯（1937）的有关介绍、威廉森（1985）提出的管理费用的知识点以及罗斯1990提出有关市场体制方面的成本费用的论点。吕博腾和瑞切尔的分类方法里也涵盖了穆林斯和拜伦（1997）所作的直接交易成本（如启动和完成交易）和机会成本（如由于延误或监督管理损失的时间和资源）的区别。此外，交易成本需要区分是在事前（如形成合同或协议之前搜索信息的费用和谈判的成本）还是事后（如监测和强制执行合同或协
47、议的费用）。但在实践中，事前成本往往配合着固定费用，而事后成本则为可变费用。重要的是要认识到，这两种费用通常是相互依存的，任何试图减少前者的举动都可能会影响到后者。表1交易成本的分类交易成本固定（事前）可变（事后）市场信息成本保险费用搜索成本信号费用谈判成本合同成本管理设置成本监测费用执行成本焊接成本政治游说费用业务费用公共支持成本遵从成本颁布成本延迟成本来源根据吕博腾和瑞切尔（1997）在表1中，我们提供了一个以吕博腾和瑞切尔分类方法为基础扩展的方法，其中包括了所有交易成本的类型。这个将在未来一段时间内被论证。交易成本比较分析从生态和经济角度来看，很明显，生态税收要优于排放权交易，其中交易成
48、本似乎是以往的制度政策所造成的。尧（2003）表明，交易成本的存在并没有严重影响或阻碍美国许可证的交易价格。此外，和生态税收相比，拥有高排放权的贸易活动并不意味着会产生较少的交易成本。生态税收税收本身并非没有成本，因此首先将所有与环境税收有关的交易费用进行讨论。1立法成本；制定有关政策是以促进公众利益为前提的，所有企业则应在法律权限范围内采取适当的行动。但是，领导们也会受到不同利益集团的影响，如无污染企业和环境保护组织等。2信息成本；提出环境税收政策是为了能够拥有一个税收净收益的可能性。信息的含有量、准确度都关系到企业决策的进行。然而有的信息是很难获得的。区别各种税收方式，使企业获取最大收益，
49、信息成本就可能进一步上升。到最后，往往产生让人意外的结果环境污染。社会的不确定性也使得预期的成本评估复杂化了。3搜索（计划）成本。首先最好的分析预计是税收机关使用个性化方式。税收一次性全额转移是因为它们不会带来额外的经济负担。尽管来源和污染原因联系在一起，但是搜索成本还是可以有所减轻的。同个性化和激励税收相比，税收物质需要更少的信息和搜索成本。当税收部门已经确定时，搜索成本可以进一步减少。4设置成本。随着现代福利国家的兴起，征税范围已大大增加。因此，政府已经组建了大型机构来管理和收集所有类型的直接和间接税，这几乎触及了人们生活的方方面面生产、消费、经营主动性、工作、家庭，甚至死亡。如果新的环境税可以由建立的税务机关来征收，设置和沉没成本则可以忽略不计。5业务费用。税收征管的比率比较低并不意味着设置成本就可以忽略不计。环境税收需要专门人员收集资料，结合现行税制，讨论并确定正确的税基及最优税率，通过征收的税款设立特别基金。虽然管理费用可以由纳税人负责，但税收经营管理的成本仍然不容忽视，其复杂性也在不断上升。6谈判费用；企业和税收机关经常对有关交易的税收进行谈判，其中可能包括减少生态税收和减免个性化投资的税收，但这些谈判仅限于大公司。事实上，税收的强制性正是为了消除这些交易成本。因此，谈判的成本相对较小。7合同费用；任何费用支出是对
