1、 外文翻译 原文 China and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Material Source: RIETI Discussion Paper Series Author: Ichiro ARAKI* China became a Member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001, after more than 15 years of difficult negotiations. This paper reviews the negotiating hi
2、story of Chinas accession with special emphasis on the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which dealswith standards and technical regulations as well as conformity assessment procedures. Because of the unique domestic system in China, the negotiations regarding the TBT Agreement posed special
3、 difficulties both for China and the existing Members of the WTO. A close examination ofthe negotiation process reveals that Chinas negotiating position was a sophisticated one, with full understanding of the cutting edge of the developing jurisprudence in the WTO. The Agreement on Technical Barrier
4、s to Trade (TBT Agreement) sets out rules to be observed by WTO Members in their administration of technical regulations and standards, as well as conformity assessment procedures. Under the TBT Agreement, technical regulation is defined as a “document which lays down product characteristics or thei
5、r related processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory”. The Agreement further notes that technical regulations “may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements as
6、they apply to a product, process or production method”. The TBT Agreement defines standard as a “document approved by a recognized body that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with which compliance is
7、not mandatory”. As in the case of technical regulations, the Agreement further notes that standards “may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or productionmethod”. Conformity assessment procedures
8、 are defined as “any procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine that relevant requirements in technical regulations or standards are fulfilled”. The Agreement further notes that “conformity assessment procedures include, inter alia, procedures for sampling, testing and inspection; evaluati
9、on, verification and assurance of conformity; registration, accreditation and approval as well as their combinations”. Trade negotiators have long been aware that national and local rules governing technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures can be used, intentionally or un
10、intentionally, as trade barriers against foreign products. This is the reason why the old Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards Code) was negotiated in the Tokyo Round. At the conclusion of the Tokyo Round, the Director-General of the General Agreementon Tariffs and Trade (GATT) observ
11、ed as follows, explaining the rationale behind thenewly negotiated Standards Code: Technical regulations are essential in modern society. They are adopted to protect human and animal life and health; to ensure that products offered to the consumer meet the necessary levels of quality, purity, techni
12、cal efficiency and adequacy to perform the function for which they are intended; to protect the environment; and for reasons connected with safety; national security; and the prevention of deceptive practices. However, international trade can be complicated and inhibited by disparities between regul
13、ations, adopted at local, State, national or regional levels; by insufficient information on the often complex and detailed requirements; by the introduction of regulations without allowing time for producers, especially foreign ones, to adjust their production; by frequent changes to regulations wh
14、ich create uncertainty; by the drawing up of regulations in terms of design rather than performance in order to suit the production methods of domestic suppliers, thus causing difficulties to suppliers using different techniques; by exacting testing requirements; by the denial of access to certifica
15、tion systems; and finally by the manipulation of regulations, testing or certification to discriminate against imports. The problem has been to strike a balance between the essential needs referred to in the preceding paragraph and the demand of exporters that their goods should not unreasonably or
16、unfairly be excluded from the market. This explanation is still valid today. These considerations were also the driving forcebehind the new Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, negotiated in the Uruguay Round. The new TBT Agreement builds upon the old Standards Code, making it a more effective
17、tool for preventing technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures from being used as a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade. The most significant feature of the
18、 new TBT Agreement is that the new dispute settlement mechanism under the Dispute Settlement Understanding with enhancedautomaticity and stronger enforcement is applicable to it.5 One might question then why there has been so few disputes involving technical barriers to trade adjudicated under the D
19、SU. This presents a stark contrast with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). The SPS Agreement, which was newly negotiated in the Uruguay Round as a companion to the TBT Agreement, has been invoked in a number of controversial disputes, including t
20、he famous Hormonescase. This is not to say that there has been no complaint where the TBT Agreement was formally invoked. Starting with the Gasoline case7, the very first case to reach the Appellate stage, a number of complaining parties alleged violations of the TBT Agreement as part of their claim
21、s. However, to date, there has been no case where a dispute settlement panel found violation of the TBT Agreement. In many cases, parties reached a mutually agreed solution before the panel was established or even when it was established, before it made a definitive ruling on TBT issues. In other ca
22、ses, panels declined to rule on TBT issues for the sake of judicial economy. Most recently, Canada alleged violation of the TBT Agreement in its complaint against the European Communities on asbestos. Again, the panel avoided a ruling on the TBT Agreement arguing that a general ban on asbestos was n
23、ot a “technical regulation” within the meaning of the TBT Agreement.9 Although this part of the panels finding was reversed by the Appellate Body, which found that the measure, viewed as an integrated whole, constituted a “technical regulation” under the TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body declined fr
24、om examining Canadas specific claims regarding theviolation of the TBT Agreement due to the lack of adequate factual basis. However, the fact that there have been no violation findings on the TBT Agreement does not diminish its utility. As Thorn and Carlson argue, “the most important provisions of t
25、he TBT Agreement are those relating to procedural requirements, and the Agreements principal (not insignificant) contribution to the international trading system has been to promote transparency and information exchange”. TBT Issues in China In view of Chinas long history of state control over econo
26、mic activities, it is not surprising that many foreign traders doing business in China have complained about the lack of transparency in, and the discriminatory nature of, Chinas technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment systems. 译文 中国和贸易技术壁垒协定 资料来源 : 瑞耶提讨论文件系列 作者： 荒木一郎 * 经过 15年的艰苦谈
27、判， 2001年 12月中国成为世界贸易组织成员（世贸组织） 。文章回顾了中国的入世之侧重于技术性贸易壁垒协定谈判的特殊历史 ，其中涉及符合标准和技术法规以及合格评定 程序。由于中国独特的社会制度， 关于 TBT协定的谈判给中国与世贸组织现有成员造成了特殊的困难。 一个关于谈判过程的检查表明 ，根据世贸组织对发展中国家裁决的充分理解，中国的谈判立场 很复杂 。 技术贸易壁垒协议（ TBT协定）通过世贸组织成员对技术法规和技术管理条例标准的观察制定相关规定，合格评定程序也是如此。 根据 TBT协定，技术法规被定义为 “ 文件规定产品的特性或与其相关工艺和生产方法，包括适用的管 理规定，都应该遵守
28、。 ” 该协议还指出，技术法规 “还可能包括 他们要求，适用于产品，工艺或生产方法 的或 专门处理术语，符号，包装，标志或标签。 ” 技术贸易壁垒协议标准规定 :由公认机构批准的的文件提供为共同和反复使用，规则，准则或特性的产品或相关工艺和生产方法，但不强迫遵守实施。由于在技术法规的情况下，该协议还注意到 标准 “也可 以包括或专门术语，符号，包装， 标记或标签要求适用于产品，工艺或生产法 。 ” 合格评定程序的定义是 “任何程序直接或间接地的使用，都决定了必须满足技术法规或相关要求标准。 ” 该协议进一步指出， “合格评定程序除其他外还包括，抽样，检验和检查程序 ; 评估，验证和合格保证 ;
29、注册，认可和批准以及各项的组合。 ” 贸易谈判早期就有规定，作为对外国产品的贸易壁垒，国家和地方规则 ，技术法规，标准和合格评定程序可以有意或无意使用。 这是在东京回合谈判上规定的老技术壁垒贸易的协定（标准代码）。 在东京回合，总干事的总协定缔结关税和 贸易（关贸总协定）的观察如下解释背后的理据新协商的标准守则： 技术法规是现代社会不可或缺的。他们采用保护人类和动物的生命与健康，以确保能提供给满足消费者的质量，纯度的必要水平，技术效率和充分履行它们的预定功能的产品，保护以及与安全有关的原因 ;国家环境安全 ; 并防止欺诈行为。 然而，国际贸易的规章由于地方，州，国家或地区层面原因是复杂和存在差
30、距的 ; 复杂和详细的规定 的 资料往往是不足的 ; 未经允许的时间生产者引进的法规，尤其外国的生产者，需要时间来调节他们的产品。通过规例频繁的变化造成不确定性 ;国内生产者或供应商应该在设计方面就满足技术贸易壁垒的规定而不是产品表面上满足。从而导致了供应该在技术生产方面有了不同的困难。通过严格的测试要求 ;通过拒绝获得认证系统，最后由操纵法规，测试或认证，对进口的歧视。这个问题是关于社会基本需要求与出口商的需求不平衡，他们的货物不应该他们的货物不应在市场上不合理或不公平被排除。 这种解释是今天仍然有效。这些考虑也是对技术贸易壁垒的新协议背后的动力 。 在乌拉圭谈判回合 ， 新的贸易技术壁垒协
31、定建立在旧的标准规范， 在用来防止国家之间在同样的条件优先或变相限制 国际贸易 技术法规，标准和合格评定程序被作为一种任意或无理歧视的手段方面，使其成为一个更有效的工具。 新的贸易技术壁垒协定最重要的特点是，新的争端 下解决争端解决机制，加强执法的认识和更强的自动化，适用于它。有人可能会这样问： 为什么有几个涉及到技术贸易壁垒的案子是关于 DUS 的。 这表明了一个关于应用协议形成鲜明的对比 的 卫生与 植物卫生措施（ SPS协定）。卫生和植物检疫协定，该协定是刚在乌拉圭回合谈判作为对 TBT协定的伴侣， 涉及到一些争端，其中包括著名的激素案件。 这并不是 说， 没有人抱怨 出 现了 TBT协
32、定正式援引投诉 。首先发生的汽油案，第一个到达上诉阶段的案件，很多抱怨方声称他们的侵害行为违反了 TBT协议的相关规定。然而，迄今为止，没有一个案例有设立一个争端解决小组来发现了这些违反 TBT协定的行为。在许多情况下，双方都在小组成立之前或者甚至小组成立时，已经作出了明确的关于技术贸易壁垒问题的裁决。 在其他情况下，因为司法经济的缘故专门小组拒绝遵守技术性贸易壁垒规则。 最近，加拿大在其关于石棉欧洲共同体中被指控投诉违反了 TBT协定。同样，专门小组避免了 TBT协定中关于石棉的全面禁止不是 ”技术法规 ”的规定的争议。 虽然发现该措施 这个小组的结论部分被上诉机构逆转，作为一个整体来看，构成了 “技术法规 ”下的技术性贸易壁垒协议，上诉机构由于缺乏足够的事实根据下降对加拿大的关于技术贸易壁垒的审查要求。 然而，以上已违反 TBT 协议的结果，但这并没有削弱它的效用。 正如索恩和卡尔森说， “贸易技术壁垒协定的最重要的规定是有关程序要求的规定，协议在国际贸易系统中主要（不显着）的贡献是促进透明度和信息交流。 ” 中国的技术贸易壁垒问题 ， 由于中国的国家对经济活动的控制悠久的历史，这并不奇怪许多做中国业务的外国商人都抱怨缺乏透明度， 以及，中国的技术法规， 标准和合格评定体系的歧视性质。
