1、 外文翻译 原文 The Great Wal-Mart of China Material source: The great of Wal-Mart of China Author: Anonymous author Wal-Mart doesnt get that kind of reception in many parts of the U.S. these days. In its home market the giant retailer is under siege, blamed for evils from squeezing suppliers and crushing
2、the corner grocer to busting unions and driving down wages. But good luck convincing Chinese consumers that the arrival of a supercenter should be cause for public outcry. In Chongqing, a metropolis of 31 million where shopping options have long been limited to dank, state-run stores with surly cler
3、ks or open-air markets where the tomatoes may or may not be as fresh as the garbage, the locals say, “Bring it on!“ Opening day, when it arrives June 30, brings pandemonium. Theres a giddy rush when doors swing wide at 7:30 a.m. Thousands of shoppers scamper from aisle to aisle, heaping carts with s
4、pinach, cooking oil, whatever they can grasp. A truckload of roasted ducks sells out in minutes. By 8 a.m. the queue for rotisserie chicken at 85 cents a bird is 50 people long. Shoppers snatch five-kilogram sacks of rice as fast as employees can unload them. At tanks near the entrance, housewives l
5、unge at live grass fish as long as their arms. At 9:30, a cadre of local officials joins Wal-Marts Asia CEO, Joe Hatfield, for a ceremony on the public square outside. Theres a brass band, fire-breathing Sichuan opera dancers, and a traditional lion dance. Hatfield paints the eye of a lions head to
6、bring good luck. But the gesture seems superfluous: Inside, each of the stores 75 checkout lanes is backed up 15 customers deep. By closing time at 10p.m., 120,000 customers have trooped through the doors. But there is little time to savor success. Wal-Mart opens its next supercenter in Shanghai in
7、less than a month. In the worlds most populous market, the worlds biggest retailer is playing catch-up. Wal-Mart plans to roll out 15 new stores in China this year, including its first supercenters in Beijing and Shanghai, and it has enticed analysts with talk of increasing floor space by as much as
8、 50% a year. Company executives wont elaborate on expansion plans, but Hatfield, a chain-smoking 30-year Wal-Mart veteran who has run the China operation since 1995, says his orders from Bentonville, Ark., are clear. At last years annual meeting, held in Shenzhen, members of Wal-Marts board admonish
9、ed him to “get a lot more aggressive.“ And no wonder. Wal-Mart cant sustain the astronomical U.S. growth rates of the past decade forever. Sooner rather than later, the company will need help from overseas. But the Beast of Bentonville has yet to emerge as a dominant player in any of the foreign mar
10、kets that account for about 20% of its global sales. In Germany it is still struggling to stanch losses at the two retailers it acquired in the 1990s. In Japan it has yet to articulate a clear strategy for its 38% stake in the troubled Seiyu chain. The company has had better luck in emerging economi
11、es, such as Mexico, where there are fewer entrenched incumbents. But executives have long viewed China, with its vast population and booming economy, as their best bet for long-term global growth. In an interview with fortune last year, former Wal-Mart CEO David Glass proclaimed China “the one place
12、 in the world where you could replicate Wal-Marts success in the U.S.“ It was slow going at first. The company sent an advance team of executives to China in 1994 and, two years later, opened the first Wal-Mart supercenter in Shenzhen, the gritty boomtown across the border from Hong Kong. Before the
13、 first store opened, an alliance with a Thai supermarket chain collapsed, forcing Wal-Mart to surrender planned developments in Shanghai and Shenyang. Beijing checked Wal-Marts expansion with regulations, limiting foreign retailers to a handful of large cities and obliging them to offer at least 35%
14、 of each store to local partners. The Sams Club format, with its emphasis on membership fees and high-volume sales, left Chinese customers cold. By the end of last year, Wal-Mart could boast just 43 stores in China-a far cry from the 3,719 it operates in the U.S. The company doesnt disclose financia
15、l results for China. But Chinas chamber of commerce reported in its annual retail ranking that Wal-Mart grossed $916 million last year-less than 2% of the companys international sales, and a tiny sliver of its $288 billion total revenue. Those numbers have nowhere to go but up. The demographics are
16、dazzling: 100 cities with populations of more than a million; 150 million urban families with annual incomes of more than $10,000 within the next ten years; more than $6 trillion in total retail spending this year, and growing at a 15% annual clip. And unlike India, which forbids foreign direct inve
17、stment in the retail sector, China is opening its doors to outside players. The crucial turning point came last December, when Beijing, in keeping with terms of its admission to the World Trade Organization, granted foreign retailers permission to invest independently in any city they choose. But ma
18、ny hurdles remain. Hatfield says his biggest challenge is finding qualified managers. Each supercenter, which mixes produce and general merchandise, requires hiring and training 500 employees. Locating sites is just as tricky. In most Chinese cities, municipal governments control prime real estate,
19、giving an edge to state-owned retailers. And then theres the competition. In America, Wal-Mart may be the 800-pound gorilla, but in China, its still a chimp, jostling with Chinese conglomerates such as the state-run Shanghai Brilliance group, as well as with foreign rivals such as Frances Carrefour.
20、 Wang Zongnan, president of Brilliance, Chinas largest retailer with 3,300 stores and sales of $8.1 billion, says he doesnt lose much sleep worrying about Wal-Mart. “Local retailers have the advantage in all large economies,“ he says. “I see no reason to doubt that will be the case in China too.“ Wa
21、l-Mart hopes to prove that thinking wrong. By opening in Chongqing, on the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, it is establishing a beachhead for expansion well beyond Chinas densely populated eastern seaboard. And to get it right, Hatfield and his lieutenants pulled out all the stops, working with
22、development partners from Shenzhen and Singapore to secure a prime location at Nine Dragon Plaza, a public square across from the municipal zoo. The store is surrounded by residential developments and lies at the terminus of a new light-rail line. Store manager Sunny Han estimates that more than a m
23、illion people live within a four-mile radius. But that same circle includes three stores operated by New Century, a retail group owned by the local government, as well as a lively street market and a gleaming new Carrefour as big as Wal-Mart. To lure customers, Wal-Mart will open an hour and a half
24、earlier and close later, and it will deploy a fleet of free shuttle buses to ferry residents to the store. At the open-air market on nearby Go Forward Street, peddlers hawking long beans and acorn squash were bracing for the worst a few weeks before the opening. “Ill definitely switch to Wal-Mart,“
25、said Liu Bijuan, a stocky housewife picking through baskets of eggplants and cucumbers. In a stall nearby, a butcher scratched himself lazily as flies swarmed over slabs of beef. But at the Carrefour up the road, it was a different story. The space is vast and well stocked. Shoppers thronged the foo
26、d counter, and prices for many items were comparable to those in Wal-Mart stores. Carrefour came to China a year after Wal-Mart but has expanded more rapidly. The French retailers China CEO, Jean Luc Chereau, credits his success to the 12 years he spent building Carrefours business in Taiwan. “It wa
27、s in Taiwan that we discovered Chinese culture,“ he says. “By the time I moved to Shanghai in 1999, I was well prepared.“ But Carrefour has also demonstrated superior operating savvy and a greater tolerance for risk. By forging alliances with local governments, it circumvented many of Beijings restr
28、ictions, fashioning a network of 60 hypermarkets in 25 cities, with sales last year of nearly $2 billion. This year Chinas largest foreign retailer vows to match Wal-Marts China expansion store for store. Still, its early days, and Wal-Mart has deep pockets. More important, perhaps, is that Hatfield
29、 and his team have become adept at replicating Wal-Marts corporate culture and figuring out what Chinese consumers want. Headquarters for Wal-Marts retail operation-a dingy warren tucked behind the first supercenter in Shenzhen-reflect the companys reputation for pinching pennies. But Hatfield spend
30、s little time there. Most days youll find him roaming Wal-Mart stores, scouting the competition, or foraging for products in urban street markets. “Im a big believer in Sams philosophy that when it comes to good ideas, you should steal shamelessly,“ he says. “You have to get out there and ask, What
31、are our competitors doing that were not? You have to be hungry for new knowledge every day.“ Hatfields pursuit of local knowledge has produced surprising differences in the look and feel of Wal-Marts stores in China. Chinese customers tend to do their shopping on foot, not by car. They have smaller
32、apartments and smaller refrigerators, so they buy in smaller quantities and are accustomed to going to market every one or two days. So Wal-Mart supercenters in China devote lots of floor space to food. Perishable products get pride of place and come in a mind-boggling assortment of shapes, colors,
33、and flavors. Except for the prices and the smiley faces, a U.S. customer venturing into the produce department at a Chinese Wal-Mart might think he had stumbled into a Whole Foods store in San Francisco. Wal-Marts managers have learned a lot about Chinese customers. One early discovery: They want to
34、 put their hands on the merchandise, shucking each corncob before putting it in their basket, or demanding that associates not only take a fitted sheet out of the plastic but demonstrate it on an actual bed. Chinese shoppers also have a thing for clamor. Often managers can goose sales simply by disp
35、atching associates to restack an item noisily in the middle of the floor. And at the Chongqing opening, bottles of red wine moved briskly when bundled with free cans of Sprite. (In China they like their cabernet carbonated.) The fare can get a lot more exotic than that. Since the SARS epidemic two y
36、ears ago, Wal-Marts China stores have stopped slaughtering poultry on the premises and no longer offer rabbits or snakes. But spicy chicken feet and stinky tofu are perennial favorites. In Chongqing, those who come too late to catch a grass fish can choose from a selection of lobsters, turtles, and
37、live bullfrogs the size of soccer balls. At most supercenters, the bestselling items are prepared lunches served in Styrofoam containers: two meats, two vegetables, rice, and a cup of hot soup, freshly prepared onsite-all for less than $1. A typical supercenter sells more than 1,000 a day. Hatfield
38、says the sight of truck and taxi drivers retching on the side of the road helped convince him that there was an opportunity for Wal-Mart to boost midday store traffic by luring customers from local street vendors. Another innovation is what Wal-Mart calls “retail-tainment.“ Stores provide space for
39、local school groups to perform, and they organize daily activities for the elderly. Residents are welcome to wander in and freeload on air conditioning. Its savvy marketing, of course. But it may have long-term benefit: If Wal-Mart can succeed in weaving itself into the fabric of urban communities,
40、it may head off the image problems that have arisen in other markets. Unlike the merchandise, Wal-Marts management practices have required little tinkering for China. If anything, the red shirts, mass cheering, incessant pep rallies, and veneration of a deceased founder seem characteristics far bett
41、er suited to the Peoples Republic than the American South. Two hours of buttonholing Chongqing associates as they left work failed to identify anyone who would confess to feeling oppressed. Whats striking about all this regimentation, though, is that its so focused on answering the wants of individu
42、als. At times, Baker and Sunny, with their folksy PR tours and community-outreach projects, seem like old-time Boston ward heelers. Wal-Mart has become Dongs top customer. But while sales are booming, profits arent. “They want the lowest prices I can possibly give them,“ says Dong. “I see this is a
43、long-run relationship, so Im doing my best to hold down costs.“ At the headquarters of Yunan Red Wine, a salesman says that to win Wal-Marts business his company had to knock prices down 15%, undermining its pricing power with other customers. 译文 在中国杰出的沃尔玛 资料来源 : 在中国杰出的沃尔玛 作者： 佚名 现在，沃尔玛在美国许多地区并不受欢迎。
44、沃尔玛作为零售业的巨子在其本土市场承受各种压力。因为它占据了大部分市场，致使其他商品供应商处境困窘，不得不压低工资，甚至面临倒闭。但是沃尔玛在中国市场的情况却截然相反。中国消费者认为公众应该支持像沃尔玛这样的大型购物中心的入驻。比如：重庆市有 3100 万人口，但市民的购物目的地却有限。一为国营商场，但这些商场购物环境并不理想，又潮湿，服务员态度又差。第二就是露天 市场，但这种市场的东西质量比较差，极有可能西红柿都没有垃圾新鲜。因此 ， 当地人们渴望沃尔玛入驻重庆。 重庆沃尔玛 6 月 30 日开业，刚一开业就被围了个水泄不通。在早上 7 点半开门的时候，一股人流涌了进来。成千的消费者从这个区
45、域涌向另外一个，手推车里面堆满了，菠菜、食用油，还有他能所能拿到的一切。一货车的烤鸭在瞬间就被卖光了。截至到早上 8 点， 8 美分一只的烤鸭门口以排起了 50 人的长队。顾客们抢夺那些销售员刚才货架上拿下来的 50 公斤一袋的大米。当看到出口有一些东西的时候，家庭主妇们会猛的加快速度只要要他们有需要。在 9 点30 分的时候，当地的一个主要官员和沃尔玛的亚洲首席执行官，在外面的一个广场上举行了开业典礼。还有专业的乐队，四川歌剧院的舞蹈，当然中国传统的舞狮也是不能少的。哈特菲尔德为狮子点睛，以昭示将带来好运。但是一些手势看似是多余的，比如每一个商店 70|%的检验证实可以满足 15 个顾客的长
46、度。在晚上 10 点关门的时候，大约有 120000 的顾客从门口通过。但是没有一点时间让沃尔玛的员工品尝成功的滋味，因为沃尔玛在下个月在上海将要开设下一个大型卖场。 沃尔玛想要在中国开设 15 家新的卖场在这一年里，包括他第一在北京和上海开 的卖场，并且也已经和一些分析家讨论过将占地面积扩大 50%在这一年里。公司的一些主管并没有明确的说清扩张计划，但是，哈德菲尔德，一个从 95年就开始运营中国操作的有着 30 年沃尔玛工作经验的老手，他说他的使命来自于本顿维尔，虽然陈旧但是很明朗。在每年一次的年终会议在深圳举行，沃尔玛董事会的一些成员告诫他“多一些侵略性” 怪不得，沃尔玛在过去的十年间没办
47、法承担美国好似天文的增长率。迟早，沃尔玛公司会向海外求助。但是本顿维尔的人们在海外的 市场上并没有成为占有优势的角色，因为他们只占有了 20%的份额。在 90 年代的德国，沃尔玛仍在挣扎的减少损失。在日本，他不得不使用很清晰的战略来维持自己 38%的份额。但是沃尔玛公司还是有比较好的运气的，在墨西哥，这里没有多少根深蒂固的观念。但是沃尔玛的高级官员，在中国观察了好长时间，关于他巨大的人口和高速发展的经济，作为他们长期全球增长的最重要的赌注 .在去年一次采访的机会里面，前任的沃尔玛首席执行官大卫正式宣布“这是一个可以复制沃尔玛在美国成功的地方” 刚开始的时候进展很缓慢。沃尔玛公司派遣了一个主管团
48、队来中国 在 1994年，两年后，沃尔玛在深圳开设了第一家大型商场。一个在香港对面的新兴都市。但开设第一家店之前，一个泰国的连锁超市暴跌，这迫使沃尔玛放弃了在沈阳和上海的计划。北京意识到沃尔玛的扩张规律，限制外国零售商成为中国一些大城市的一把手，所以让他们提供至少 35%的股份给当地的合作伙伴。山姆俱乐部安排了，强调关于全体会员的费用和高价值的销售，使中国的顾客感到失望。截至到去年年底，沃尔玛在中国开设了 43 家超市，这和美国有 3179家在运作的情况差距很大。沃尔玛公司没有揭露在中国的财政情况。但是中国商会根据每年一度的连 锁超市的地位报告表示沃尔玛去年获得了 9.16 亿美元的收入，这比
49、沃尔玛全球收入少了 2%，这对于沃尔玛 2880 亿美元的总收益来说只是很小的一个碎片。 那些数字不能其他变化必须是要增长，可以说人口的数量是客观的： 100个城市和超过一百万的人口， 1.5 亿的城市家庭和每年 10 万美元的收入在下一个 10 年里。总过花销超过 6 万亿，每年超过 15%。但是不同是的印度，禁止外国的人在零售领域直接投资，而中国已经对外国的朋友打开了大门。这个决定性的转折点在去年 12 月到来，当中国以这个为条件加入世界贸易组织，外国零售商在中国任何一个 地方投资都是理所当然了。 但是许多困难依然存在。哈德菲尔德说他现在最大的挑战就是寻找一个合格的经理人。每一个或者着生存和普通货物的大卖场，都需要租赁场地和 500名的员工。选址似乎是最棘手的。在中国的大多数城市里面，是政府控制着土地的所有权，只把一些边缘的房产给零售商。这好有一比，沃尔玛在美国好比一个 800 磅的大猩猩，但是在中国，他就好比一个小的黑猩猩，和像上海集团那样的联合大企业，还有来自法国的竞争对手抢夺市场。卓越总裁，中国最大的零售商有 3300 的店和 81 亿的销售业绩。他没有因为沃尔玛而导致失眠。他说“当 地的
