1、本科毕业设计(论文)外文翻译INDIVIDUALAGENTS,FIRMS,ANDTHEREALESTATEBROKERAGEPROCESSINTRODUCTIONTHISSTUDYEXAMINESHOWINDIVIDUALAGENTSAFFECTHOUSESELLINGPRICESANDTIMEONTHEMARKETWHILECONTROLLINGFORBROKERAGEFIRMSPECIFICEFFECTSASWELLASSUPPLYANDDEMANDCONDITIONSTHATVARYBYNEIGHBORHOODTHEEXISTINGTHEORETICALANDEMPIRICALRESEA
2、RCHONREALESTATEBROKERAGETENDSTOBLURTHEDISTINCTIONBETWEENTHEFIRMANDINDIVIDUALAGENTSWITHINFIRMSASACONSEQUENCE,THEEMPIRICALLITERATURESTUDYINGTHEHOUSINGMARKETBROKERNEXUSDEALSPRIMARILYWITHIDENTIFYINGFIRMLEVELEFFECTSINREALESTATETRANSACTIONSANDTHEGROWINGSTOCKOFEMPIRICALEVIDENCEOFFERSONLYLIMITEDINSIGHTINTOH
3、OWINDIVIDUALAGENTCHARACTERISTICSORSTRATEGIESAFFECTSALESOUTCOMESTHISSTUDYEXAMINESTHEEFFECTSOFAGENTSUNIQUESKILLSANDREVEALEDSTRATEGIESINTHEMARKETASREFLECTEDINVARIOUSDEGREESOFAGENTSPECIALIZATIONBYFUNCTIONEG,LISTING,SELLING,ANDPARTNERINGORBYGEOGRAPHICAREATHISPAPEREXTENDSTHEMODELDEVELOPEDINTURNBULLANDDOMB
4、ROW2006TOSTUDYINDIVIDUALAGENTEFFECTSONTRANSACTIONOUTCOMESTHEFRAMEWORKCONTROLSFORLOCALIZEDDEMANDANDSUPPLYCONDITIONSSURROUNDINGTHEHOUSEBEINGSOLD,WHICHALLOWSUSTOSEPARATETHEEFFECTSOFLOCALIZEDMARKETCONDITIONSFROMTHEEFFECTSOFAGENTSPECIALIZATIONACROSSLOCATIONSONPRICESANDMARKETINGTIMESINADDITION,THISAPPROAC
5、HMODELSBOTHSELLINGPRICEANDMARKETINGTIMEASENDOGENOUSINTHESEARCH/MATCHINGPROCESS,WHICHENABLESUSTOPICKUPTHESEPARATEEFFECTSOFFIRMSANDAGENTSONBOTHHOUSESALESPRICEANDSALESTIMEUSINGTRANSACTIONDATACOVERINGA2YEARPERIODINBATONROUGE,LOUISIANA,WEFINDTHATFIRMSIZEEFFECTSONSELLINGPRICEDISAPPEARONCEFIRMSPECIALIZATIO
6、NANDAGENTCHARACTERISTICSARETAKENINTOACCOUNTGEOGRAPHICCONCENTRATIONBYFIRMSLEADSTOHIGHERSELLINGPRICESHOUSESLISTEDANDSOLDBYDIFFERENTAGENTSINTHESAMEFIRMSELLFORLESSFORINDIVIDUALAGENTS,NEITHERSEXNORSELLINGOWNLISTINGSAFFECTSPRICEORSELLINGTIME,BUTTHEREARESIGNIFICANTGAINSFROMPARTNERINGTRANSACTIONSACROSSFIRMS
7、AGENTSWHOSPECIALIZEINLISTINGPROPERTIESOBTAINHIGHERPRICESFORTHEIRSELLERSWHILETHOSEWHOSPECIALIZEINSELLINGOBTAINLOWERPRICESFORTHEIRBUYERSHOUSESNEARERTOOTHERTRANSACTIONSOFANAGENTSELLFORHIGHERPRICESFINALLY,GREATERSCALEOFLISTINGANDSELLINGACTIVITYBYANAGENTTENDSTOLOWERSELLINGPRICEORLENGTHENTHETIMEONTHEMARKE
8、TTHEPAPERISORGANIZEDASFOLLOWSAGENTSANDTHESALESPROCESSDISCUSSESEXISTINGEMPIRICALEVIDENCEASITRELATESTOAGENTSROLESINTHESALESPROCESS,EMPHASIZINGTHATDIFFERENTAGENTSMAYHAVECOMPARATIVEADVANTAGESINDIFFERENTPHASESOFTHETRANSACTIONSEQUENCEANDMAYTHEREFOREFINDITBENEFICIALTOSPECIALIZETHEIRFUNCTIONSTOSOMEDEGREETHE
9、EMPIRICALMODELEXPLAINSTHEEMPIRICALMODEL,THEVARIABLESANDTHEIRINTERPRETATIONFORFIRMANDAGENTEFFECTSEMPIRICALANALYSISDESCRIBESTHEDATASETANDDISCUSSESTHEEMPIRICALRESULTSTHELASTSECTIONCONCLUDESAGENTSANDTHESALESPROCESSWECANCONCEPTUALLYPARTITIONTHETRANSACTIONPROCESSINTOTHELISTING,SEARCHANDMATCHING,NEGOTIATIO
10、N,ANDCLOSINGPHASESDOINGSOEMPHASIZESTHATINDIVIDUALAGENTSMAYHAVEINCENTIVESTOINVESTMOREHEAVILYINCERTAINSKILLSTHATAPPLYMOSTREADILYTOASUBSETOFPHASESINTHETRANSACTIONSEQUENCE,ASTRATEGYADOPTEDBYASIGNIFICANTNUMBEROFAGENTSTHETHEORETICALMODELSTHATADDRESSLISTINGACTIVITIESTYPICALLYDEPICTTHISPHASEASAMATCHINGPROCE
11、SS,WHEREAGENTSEXPENDEFFORTCOMPETINGWITHEACHOTHERTOOBTAINLISTINGSFROMTHEPOOLOFPOTENTIALSELLERSWILLIAMS1998YINGER1981WILLIAMS1998DEPICTSAGENTEFFORTSPENTINTHISTYPEOFMATCHINGASUNPRODUCTIVECOMPETITIONAMONGHOMOGENEOUSAGENTSHEALSONOTES,HOWEVER,THATAGENTEFFORTEXPENDEDTOOBTAINLISTINGSMAYINCREASEMARKETEFFICIE
12、NCYWHENAGENTSANDSELLERSAREHETEROGENEOUSSURVEYDATAARECONSISTENTWITHTHELATTERVIEW,REVEALINGTHATSELLERSAREDRAWNTOBROKERAGEFIRMSWITHGOODREPUTATIONSANDAGENTSWHOEXHIBITASOLIDKNOWLEDGEOFTHEMARKETANDWITHWHOMTHESELLERSFEELCOMFORTABLEJOHNSONETAL1988BUTOBTAININGALISTINGISMORETHANAMATCHINGPROCESS,SINCETHEAGENTW
13、HOENDSUPWINNINGTHELISTINGWILLHAVEALREADYSETTHESTAGEBYINFLUENCINGTHESELLERSASKINGPRICE,RESERVATIONPRICE,ANDVIEWOFMARKETCONDITIONSTHETHEORETICALANDEMPIRICALLITERATURESTENDTOFOCUSONTHESEARCHPHASEOFTHETRANSACTIONPROCESSINWHICHSELLERSAREMATCHEDWITHBUYERSWILLIAMS1998WUANDCOLWELL1986YAVAS1992,1996YINGER198
14、1APOPULARPERSPECTIVEOFAGENTACTIVITYINTHEACADEMICLITERATUREENVISIONSAHOUSESELLERWHOSEAGENTMATCHESTHESELLERWITHABUYERFROMTHEPOPULATIONOFPOTENTIALBUYERSFORAHOUSE,TYPICALLYBYINFLUENCINGTHESELLERSASKINGPRICESALANT1991ATTHESAMETIME,WECANALSOVIEWTHEAGENTENGAGEDWITHABUYERWHETHERAFORMALBUYERSAGENTORATRADITIO
15、NALSELLERSAGENTASASSISTINGTHEBUYERWITHTHEIRSEARCH,MATCHINGTHEBUYERWITHAHOUSEFROMTHEPOPULATIONOFAVAILABLEHOUSESBARYLAANDZUMPANO1995INEITHERCASE,WEEXPECTTHATDIFFERENTSKILLSORINFORMATIONEXPERTISEAREHELPFULINTHESEARCH/MATCHINGPHASEWHENCOMPAREDWITHTHELISTINGPHASEIFSO,THENWEEXPECTTOSEEAGENTSWITHSTRONGCOMP
16、ARATIVEADVANTAGESINTHEMARKETEMPHASIZETHEFUNCTIONSINWHICHTHEYHOLDTHEADVANTAGEINTHISVIEW,BROKERAGEFIRMSCANBETHOUGHTOFASPORTFOLIOSOFINDIVIDUALAGENTSWITHDIFFERINGSKILLSSOTHAT,EVENTHOUGHINDIVIDUALAGENTSMAYSPECIALIZEINLISTINGORSELLING,THEREISNONEEDTOEXPECTFIRMSTOSPECIALIZEINTHESEFUNCTIONSTOTHESAMEEXTENTTH
17、ENEGOTIATIONPHASEOFTHETRANSACTIONPROCESSISWHERESOMEOFTHEMORESUBTLEASPECTSOFTHEAGENTSEFFORTSINCULTIVATINGTHESELLERINTHELISTINGPHASECANAFFECTTHEOUTCOMETHEAGENTCANINFLUENCETHESELLERSPERSPECTIVEONTHELIKELIHOODOFFINDINGABETTEROFFERATTHISSTAGETHELEVELOFTRUSTESTABLISHEDBYTHELISTINGAGENTTHROUGHTHEENTIREPROC
18、ESSTOTHISPOINTCANHELPOVERCOMEINCIPIENTSELLERSREMORSEORFALLINGINTOUNREALISTICVALUATIONSOFSPECIFICHOUSEFEATURESTOWHICHTHESELLERMAYHAVEBECOMEESPECIALLYATTACHEDOVERTIMEOFCOURSE,WEEXPECTAGENTSTOPRESENTINFORMATIONTOSELLERSINAWAYTHATWILLPROMOTETHEIROWNINTERESTSSALANT1991THERELATIONSHIPSBETWEENBUYERSANDTHEI
19、RAGENTSAREPRONETOANALOGOUSPRINCIPLEAGENTISSUESTHEREISSOMERECENTEMPIRICALEVIDENCETHATINDIVIDUALSNEGOTIATIONSKILLSAPPEARTOMATTERFORBOTHSIDESOFTHETRANSACTIONHARDINGETAL2003ANDTHEREISEVIDENCETHATTHEOVERALLDIFFICULTYOFTHENEGOTIATIONPROCESSCANAFFECTPRICESSIRMANSETAL1992WHILETHESESTUDIESDONOTEXAMINETHEROLE
20、OFAGENTS,THEYIMPLYTHATAGENTSWHOCANREINFORCETHEBARGAININGPOWEROFTHEIRPARTYORGENERALLYSMOOTHTHENEGOTIATIONPROCESSWILLLIKELYAFFECTSELLINGPRICESMANYREALESTATESCHOLARSVIEWTHECLOSINGPHASEALMOSTASANAFTERTHOUGHTMOSTTRANSACTIONSTHATREACHTHEPOINTOFANACCEPTEDSALESCONTRACTCLOSEWITHOUTMAJORMISHAPNONETHELESS,REAL
21、ESTATEAGENTSHAVEAROLEANDINCENTIVEHELPTHEIRSELLERORBUYER,INTHECASEOFBUYERSAGENTSCOMPLETETHETRANSACTION,WHETHERBYCOORDINATINGTASKSREQUIREDTOFULFILLTHESALESCONTRACTORHELPINGTORESOLVESALESCONTRACTPERFORMANCEISSUESALLOFTHESETYPESOFINPUTSBYAGENTSLOWERSELLERSANDBUYERSTOTALTRANSACTIONSCOSTSANDTHEREBYPOSSIBL
22、YAFFECTPRICESORLIQUIDITYINSUMMARY,WEARGUETHATAGENTSHAVEMORECHANNELSTHROUGHWHICHTOINFLUENCETRANSACTIONOUTCOMESTHANJUSTTHROUGHTHEIRSKILLINMATCHINGWILLINGSELLERSWITHWILLINGBUYERSINDIVIDUALAGENTSCANVARYHOWTHEYSPLITTIMEAMONGARANGEOFACTIVITIESANDTHATSOMEMAYHAVECOMPARATIVEADVANTAGESANDTHEREFORESPECIALIZEMO
23、REHEAVILYINCERTAINASPECTSOFTHETRANSACTIONPROCESSTHISOBSERVATIONMOTIVATESOUREFFORTTOMEASUREHOWMARKETOUTCOMESAREAFFECTEDBYINDIVIDUALAGENTSDECISIONSTOSPECIALIZEINLISTINGORSELLINGORIENTEDACTIVITIESORCONCENTRATETHEIRINVESTMENTINMARKETINFORMATIONTOFOCUSONSPECIFICNEIGHBORHOODSORMARKETSEGMENTSTURNINGTOTHERO
24、LESOFFIRMSVERSUSINDIVIDUALAGENTS,THEREALESTATEAGENCYRELATIONSHIPISANINTERLACINGSETOFPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSBETWEENTHESELLERANDAGENT,OFCOURSE,BUTALSOBETWEENTHEBROKERAGEFIRMANDITSASSOCIATEDAGENTSASWELLASBETWEENBUYERSANDTHEIRAGENTSTHISSUGGESTSTHATWENEEDTOINCLUDEVARIABLESINTHEEMPIRICALMODELTOCAPTURE
25、BOTHFIRMLEVELANDINDIVIDUALAGENTLEVELEFFECTSONOBSERVEDTRANSACTIONSWEDOSOINTHISSTUDY,ESTIMATINGASERIESOFMODELSWITHFIRMEFFECTSANDWITHBOTHFIRMANDINDIVIDUALAGENTEFFECTSDESPITETHEIMPORTANCEOFTHETOPIC,PUBLISHEDREALESTATERESEARCHDOESNOTOFFERMUCHSOLIDEVIDENCEABOUTHOWINDIVIDUALREALESTATEAGENTSAFFECTPROPERTYMA
26、RKETSMUCHWORKHASBEENDONEONREALESTATEBROKERAGEINGENERAL,BOTHTHEORETICALANDEMPIRICALTHETHEORETICALMODELS,HOWEVER,OFTENASSUMENODISTINCTIONBETWEENAFIRMANDITSINDIVIDUALAGENTSINDEED,THETERMSFIRMANDAGENTARESOMETIMESUSEDINTERCHANGEABLYTURNBULL1996YANGANDYAVAS1995ANDWHILETHEREISAGROWINGEMPIRICALLITERATURECON
27、CERNINGINDIVIDUALREALESTATEAGENTS,THEBULKOFITFOCUSESONAGENTSEARNINGSRATHERTHANTHEIRROLEINTHEMARKETBENJAMINETAL2000BENJAMINETAL2002YAVAS1994THEEMPIRICALLITERATURETHATDOESEXAMINEOBSERVABLEPERFORMANCEINTERMSOFPRICEORSELLINGTIMETENDSTOFOCUSONFIRMSSIRMANSETAL1991,TURNBULLANDSIRMANS1993FINDSOMEFIRMSIZEAND
28、COBROKEREDSALESEFFECTSONTHESALESPRICEANDMARKETINGTIMEJUDANDWINKLER1994FINDHIGHERPRICESFORCOBROKEREDHOUSESHUGHES1995FINDSTHATHOUSESLISTEDWITHLARGERBROKERAGEFIRMSTENDTOSELLFORHIGHERPRICESITISNOTCLEARWHETHERTHEEMPIRICALESTIMATESOFFIRMSIZEEFFECTSINANYOFTHESESTUDIESREFLECTECONOMIESOFSCALEOROTHERINHERENTA
29、DVANTAGESASSOCIATEDWITHFIRMSIZEORMARKETINGADVANTAGESFROMESTABLISHEDNAMEBRANDRECOGNITIONFROMTHEWIDERMARKETPRESENCETHEBRANCHOFLITERATURELOOKINGATHOWINDIVIDUALAGENTSAFFECTTRANSACTIONSOUTCOMESYIELDSFEWSTRONGEMPIRICALCONCLUSIONSYANGANDYAVAS1995,ZUMPANOETAL1996,JUDANDWINKLER1994,JUDETAL1996,ANDMUNNEKEANDY
30、AVAS2001GENERALLYFINDTHATTHECHARACTERISTICSOFINDIVIDUALAGENTSHAVEINSIGNIFICANTEFFECTSONSELLINGPRICESORTIMEONTHEMARKETBLACKANDNOURSE1995SIMILARLYFINDNOSIGNIFICANTPRICEEFFECTFROMINTRODUCINGBUYERSBROKERSINTOTHERESIDENTIALPROPERTYMARKETTHESESTUDIES,HOWEVER,DONOTADDRESSWHETHERORNOTGREATERSPECIALIZATIONBY
31、LISTSELLINGFUNCTIONORBYMARKETSEGMENTIMPROVESAGENTPERFORMANCETHESEAREQUESTIONSEXAMINEDHEREITISAPPROPRIATEATTHISPOINTTORAISEACAVEATWITHRESPECTTOEMPIRICALSTUDIESOFFIRMANDAGENTBEHAVIORANDCOMMONINFERENCESABOUTECONOMICEFFICIENCYONECOMMONNOTIONISTHATTHEPRIMARYBENEFITTOUSINGBROKERSORAGENTSINANYMARKETCANBEME
32、ASUREDBYTHEHIGHERRETURNORQUICKERSELLINGTIMETHATSELLERSOBTAINTHISISNOTTRUEINGENERALOBSERVEDPRICEEFFECTSDONOTGENERALLYREFLECTTHENETADVANTAGEOFBROKERASSISTEDSALESINTHEMARKETBECAUSEPROFESSIONALAGENTASSISTANCELOWERSSEARCHANDTRANSACTIONSCOSTSFORBOTHBUYERSANDSELLERS,WHICHYIELDSANAMBIGUOUSNETEFFECTONSELLING
33、PRICEMOREGENERALLYFOROURSTUDY,THISIMPLIESTHATWENEEDNOTOBSERVEPRICEEFFECTSFROMFIRMSORAGENTSEVENWHENFIRMSORAGENTSYIELDNETTRANSACTIONCOSTSAVINGSTOTHEBUYERSANDSELLERSFOROURPURPOSES,ITISWORTHEMPHASIZINGTHAT,WHILEIMPROVEDPRICEORMARKETINGTIMEPERFORMANCEPROVIDESEVIDENCEOFNETADVANTAGESTOBUYERSORSELLERS,THEAB
34、SENCEOFOBSERVEDPRICEORMARKETINGTIMEEFFECTSDOESNOTBYITSELFIMPLYZERONETADVANTAGESTOBUYERSANDSELLERSWORKINGWITHSPECIFICBROKERAGEFIRMSORAGENTSTHISALSOEXPLAINSWHYDIFFERENCESINOBSERVEDSELLINGPRICEANDMARKETINGTIMEPERFORMANCECANPERSISTACROSSAGENTSORDIFFERENTSIZEFIRMSEVENINAHIGHLYCOMPETITIVEINDUSTRYLIKERESID
35、ENTIALREALESTATEBROKERAGETHEEMPIRICALMODELSIRMANSETAL1991DEVELOPANEMPIRICALMULTIEQUATIONMODELOFTHEJOINTHOUSINGANDBROKERAGESERVICESMARKETSTURNBULLANDDOMBROW2006MODIFYTHEFRAMEWORKINTOASIMULTANEOUSMODELOFSALESPRICEANDMARKETINGTIMETHATSPECIFICALLYCONTROLSFORTHEEFFECTSOFCOMPETITIONAMONGNEARBYHOUSESFORSAL
36、EWEEXTENDTHEFRAMEWORKTOMEASURESEPARATEFIRMANDAGENTEFFECTSONSELLINGPRICEANDMARKETINGTIMESOURCEGEOFFREYKTURNBULL,JONATHANDOMBROW2007JREALESTATEFINANECONSPRINGERSCIENCE,355776译文个人代理人,企业和房地产经纪过程简介本文探讨的是价格和时间如何影响房屋销售市场上的个人代理问题,而经纪公司所产生的供应和需求状况的影响,通过相互变化得以控制。现有的理论与实证研究说明房地产经纪模糊了企业内部的公司经纪和个人代理人的区别。因此,实证文献研
37、究的是住房市场和经纪人之间的关系对企业在房地产方面交易水平的影响,实验证据还表明个人代理人对销售特点和战略眼光的影响。本文考察了代理的独特技能的影响,专业化代理已经不同程度的体现在市场策略(例如,上市,销售,合作)或地理区域上。本文扩展了特恩布尔和度布朗(2006)的研究成果个人代理人的交易效果模型。该框架控制器运用需求和供给条件分析正在出售的房子,这使我们明白专业化代理人的市场条件对销售价格的影响。此外,这种销售价格和销售时间为一体的搜索/匹配过程,使我们能够弄清楚公司经纪和个人代理人对房屋销售价格和销售时间的的独立影响。使用巴吞鲁日,路易斯安那州2年的交易数据,我们发现,在企业规模效应一度
38、消失和考虑代理公司专业化特点的情况下,地理集中的企业的销售价格相对比较高。同一公司的不同的代理商对于上市出售的房屋的卖多卖少与个人代理人的性别或出售自己的物品价格或销售时间有关。有些个人代理人专门为他们的销售商抬高出售价格,而有些却专门为买家压低价格。最后,较大规模的上市和销售代理活动往往会降低销售价格或延长上市时间。本文的结构如下“代理及销售流程”讨论现有的实证证据,因为它涉及到代理商在销售过程中的所扮演的角色,强调不同的药物也许在不同阶段的交易过程中有不同的优势,因此可能有利于发现一些专门的职能度。“经验模型”解释了实证模型,解释公司和代理意义。“实证分析”描述实证,并讨论了实证结果。最后
39、一节对全文进行总结。代理及销售流程我们可以从概念上将交易过程分割成上市,搜索,匹配,谈判,结束这几个阶段。这样做强调,个别代理商可能有动力投资于那些最容易申请到的一个交易。在交易过程中的谈判阶段,代理人在上市阶段培养卖方的一些细微方面的努力都能影响销售结果。代理人能影响卖方对在该阶段寻求一个更好的工作机会的可能性的观点。对于这一点,上市阶段通过整个进程建立的信任程度能帮助克服初期卖方的自责以及防止掉入卖方一直赋予特定功能的房子的不切实际的估价。当然,我们期望代理人以一种能促成自身利益的方式将信息传递给卖方。买方与他们代理人之间的关系容易发生类似的委托代理问题。最近有一些经验证据表明,个人的谈判
40、技巧似乎影响着交易双方谈判进程的总体难度。也有证据表明谈判进程的总体难度会影响价格。虽然这些研究没有审查代理人的角色,但是他们申明那些能强化他们组织的议价能力或能使谈判进程大体上顺利的代理人将可能影响卖出的价格。许多房地产学者将结束阶段几乎当作一个事后来看待。大部分符合公认交易合同要求的交易的促成都没有重大意外的发生。尽管如此,房地产经纪人的一个功能是帮助他们的卖方(或是买方,在买房代理人的情况下)完成交易,无论是通过协调任务来完成销售合同或是帮助解决合同绩效问题。所有这些类型的投入全部包含在代理商卖方和买方的总交易成本之中,从而可能影响价格及流动性。总之,我们认为代理人可以通过很多方式去影响
41、交易结果而不仅仅通过他们的技能使买卖方相互配合来影响交易结果。个体代理人可以改变他们在一系列活动中时间的分配,有些可能具有比较优势和专长,因此在交易进程的某些方面表现的更为强烈。这个观察促使我们努力去衡量当个体代理人决定从事上市或以销售为导向的活动或是集中他们在市场信息方面的投资将重点放在特定地区或市场,市场结果是如何被影响的。谈到个人代理公司的角色,真正的地产代理关系是委托代理关系不仅在卖方和代理人之间的隔行扫描设置,当然,还有经纪公司和相关人员,以及买卖双方之间的代理人。这表明,我们需要收录在实证模型中的变量去获取企业层面和个体代理人水平上观察到的交易影响。在这项研究中我们确实这样做了,同
42、时也估算了一系列机构的影响,包括公司的影响以及公司和个体代理人的影响。撇开该专题的重要性,已发表的房地产研究并没有提供更多关于个别房地产代理如何影响房地产市场的确凿证据。一般地,房地产经纪业务无论是理论还是实证方面已经做了许多工作。然而,该理论模型往往主张公司和它的个体代理人之间的无差异。事实上,术语“公司”和“代理人”有时是可以互换使用的。虽然有越来越多的实证文献关注着个别地产代理公司,但是其中大部分集中于代理收入而不是他们在市场上的角色及功能。根据实证研究表明,在价格、销售时间上观察的表现往往侧重于公司。包括锡尔曼斯等(1991年),特恩布尔和锡尔曼斯(1993)发现一些企业规模和合作对促
43、成的销售价格和市场销售时间的影响。士和温克勒(1994)找到共同促成的住宅价格较高。休斯(1995年)发现,较大的房屋经纪公司往往卖更高的价格。目前还不清楚在这些所研究公司的规模效应的实证能够反映规模从成立时,是否是名称或从更广阔的市场存在的品牌知名度的优势还是企业规模或市场营销相关的其他经济体的先天优势。理论分支研究出个人代理交易结果是如何产生一些影响较强的经验性结论。杨和亚瓦斯(1995),祖帕诺(1996年),士和温克勒(1994),乔德(1996年)和木内科和亚瓦斯(2001)发现,通常个别代理人的特点,在市场上出售的价格或时间有着显著效果。黑与诺斯(1995)同样没有找到引入住宅物业
44、市场买家经纪人显著的价格效应。这些研究,不涉及是否按列表不大于销售功能专业化细分市场或改善剂的性能。审查的问题就在于此。这一点就是提出的企业和代理行为,对经济效率的共同推论实证研究具有适当的告诫作用。这是一个常见的概念主要好处在于使用任何市场经纪人或代理人可以通过更高的收益或更快的销售时间,取得卖家计量。这不是一般的事实。观测到价格的影响一般不反映在市场上经纪人辅助销售网络的优势,因为专业代理援助,为买家和卖家降低了由此将产生的一个模糊的价格出售的净影响这便是搜索和交易成本。超过2项的研究为我们说明,这就意味着我们需要向买方和卖方从企业不遵守,甚至当企业或代理人产量净节省交易成本产生的价格效应
45、。对我们而言,值得强调的是,买家和卖家使用具体的经纪公司或代理人而他们提高价格或营销时代的性能优势,虽然净买家或卖家提供证据,但是观测时间对价格或市场本身并不缺乏零净优势。这也解释了为什么在销售价格和市场观察时性能差异可以通过代理人或不同规模的公司,即使在像住宅房地产经纪行业的竞争非常激烈。经验模型锡尔曼斯等人(1991年)制定了一个联合住房和经纪服务市场的经验方程模型。特恩布尔和度布朗(2006)修改了销售价格和销售时间的同步模型,该框架专门控制房屋竞争销售的影响。我们扩展了该框架来衡量销售价格和销售公司及代理时间的单独影响。出处杰弗里K特恩布尔,乔纳森布朗房地产经济学,施普林格科学2007355776