1、1本科毕业设计（论文）外文翻译原文BUYINGAHOUSEANDTHEDECISIONTOUSEAREALESTATEBROKERINTRODUCTIONWHATISITTHATRESIDENTIALREALESTATEBROKERSDOANDWHYWOULDAHOMEBUYERENGAGETHEIRSERVICESASISOFTENTHECASE,ANSWERINGTHISQUESTIONISNOTASIMPLETASKHOMEBUYERSWHOACQUIRETHEIRHOUSETHROUGHABROKERDONOTPURCHASEJUSTAHOUSETHEYALSOOBTAINTHESER
2、VICESOFTHEBROKERINOTHERWORDS,THESEBUYERSARECONSUMINGABUNDLEDGOODONEDIMENSIONOFTHISGOODISLOWERSEARCHTIME,ANDTHUSLOWERSEARCHCOSTS,ASSOCIATEDWITHBUYINGTHROUGHABROKERRECENTRESEARCHBARYLAANDZUMPANO,1995SUGGESTSTHATCHOOSINGABROKERIMPROVESTHEMARGINALEFFICIENCYOFSEARCH,MAKINGITMORELIKELYTHATABUYERWILLFINDAS
3、ATISFACTORYMATCHEARLIERINTHESEARCHPROCESSBUYINGTHROUGHABROKERALSOINCREASESTHESUPPLYOFHOUSESAVAILABLETOBUYERS,ANDPROVIDESBUYERSWITHINFORMATIONONTHEQUALITYOFDIFFERENTHOUSESANDTHENEIGHBORHOODSINWHICHTHEYARELOCATEDBROKERSFREQUENTLYHELPBUYERSIDENTIFYSOURCESOFMORTGAGEFINANCINGANDPROPERTYINSURANCE,ASWELLAS
4、ASSISTBUYERSINRECORDINGTHETITLEALLOFTHESESERVICESSUGGESTTHATBROKERSPROVIDEVALUEADDEDTOBUYERSINADDITIONTOPROVIDINGASERVICETOSELLERS,SOMETHINGTHATTHESEBUYERSWOULDBEWILLINGTOPAYFORTHUS,THISBUNDLEOFSERVICESANDTHEHOUSETHATISPURCHASEDWOULD,INTUITIVELY,BEPRICEDHIGHERTHANHOMESPURCHASEDWITHOUTTHEASSISTANCEOF
5、ABROKERSEVERALSTUDIESJANSSENANDJOBSON,1980JUDANDFREW,1986OBSERVETHATBUYERSPAYMOREFORHOMESLISTEDWITHBROKERSITISNOTPOSSIBLE,HOWEVER,TODETERMINEWHETHERTHISAPPLIESTOTHEENTIRERESIDENTIALHOUSINGMARKET,SINCERESEARCHTOTHISPOINTHASRELIEDONLOCALDATAHIGHERPRICESINDICATEAWILLINGNESSBYBUYERSTOPAYMOREFORBROKERLIS
6、TEDHOUSESTHANTHOSESOLDDIRECTLYBYOWNERSALTERNATIVELY,COMPETITIONFROMFORSALEBYOWNERPROPERTIESMAYPREVENTSELLERSFROMPASSINGONCOMMISSIONCOSTSTOBUYERSINTHEFORMOFHIGHERPRICESTHEREFORE,ATISSUEISWHETHERBROKERASSISTEDSALESRESULTINHIGHERPRICESIFSEARCHDURATIONISAFFECTEDBYBROKERASSISTANCE,WHATABOUTPRICETHISSTUDY
7、2ATTEMPTSTOANSWERTHESEQUESTIONSBYDEVELOPINGANEMPIRICALLYTESTABLEMODELOFBROKERCHOICEINTHEPROCESS,THISSTUDYSHOULDPROVIDEIMPORTANTINSIGHTSINTOTHEEFFICIENCYOFTHERESIDENTIALHOUSINGMARKETASWELLASTHEEFFECTIVENESSOFBROKERSASMARKETINTERMEDIARIESSPECIFICALLY,THISSTUDYEXAMINESTHEEFFECTSOFAREALESTATEBROKERBYHYP
8、OTHESIZINGATWOSTAGEPROCESSINTHEFIRSTSTEP,ABUYERDECIDESWHETHERTOENGAGETHESERVICESOFABROKERTOASSISTWITHTHESEARCHEMPIRICALLY,THISDECISIONISMODELEDASAPROBITEQUATION,WHERETHECHOICETOUSEABROKERISAFUNCTIONOFSUCHVARIABLESASTHECAUSEOFTHEMOVEIE,CHANGESINTHEHOUSEHOLD,ORWORKRELATEDMOVES,THEINCOME,AGE,EXPERIENCE
9、,ANDMARKETKNOWLEDGEOFTHEBUYER,ANDOTHERBUYERCHARACTERISTICSTHESECONDSTEPISTHEPURCHASEHERESELLINGPRICESAREMODELEDASAFUNCTIONOFHOUSECHARACTERISTICS,BUYERCHARACTERISTICS,ANDWHETHERTHESALEWASBROKERASSISTEDTHISAPPROACHSHOULDPROVIDEINFORMATIONABOUTTHEDETERMINANTSOFHOUSINGPRICESINPARTICULAR，THISMODELSHOULDA
10、LLOWUSTODETERMINEWHETHERTHEBROKERASSISTEDBUYERSANDBUYERSFORSALEBYOWNERPROPERTIESCONSTITUTESEGMENTEDMARKETSWHICHWOULDPERMITTHEMAINTENANCEOFHOUSINGPRICEDIFFERENTIALSTHISSTUDYUSESCROSSSECTIONDATAFROMANATIONWIDESURVEYOFRECENTHOMEBUYERSANDSELLERSCONDUCTEDBYTHERESEARCHDIVISIONOFTHENATIONALASSOCIATIONOFREA
11、LTORSTHISDATABASEINCLUDESBOTHBROKERASSISTEDSALESANDSALESBYOWNERS,ALLOWINGANASSESSMENTOFTHEIMPACTOFTHEREALESTATEBROKERONSELLINGPRICE,ANDBYIMPLICATION,THEVALUEOFTHEMARKETINGSERVICESWHICHBROKERSPROVIDETOSELLERSOURRESULTSINDICATETHATINDEEDBUYERSWHOUSEBROKERSDOPAYMOREFORTHEIRHOMESTHANTHOSEWHODONOTBUYTHRO
12、UGHABROKERBUTOURRESULTSALSOIMPLYTHATITISNOTBECAUSETHESEBUYERSHAVEUSEDABROKERRATHER,THISGROUPOFBUYERSWOULDHAVEPAIDAHIGHERPRICEREGARDLESSOFTHEMEANSBYWHICHTHEPURCHASEWASCONSUMMATEDTHESEBUYERSHAVEHIGHERINCOMES,AREMORELIKELYTOBEFROMOUTOFTOWN,AREMORELIKELYTOHAVEEMPLOYERASSISTANCEINTHEPURCHASEALLFACTORSTHA
13、TLEADTHEMTOPAYMOREFORAHOUSE,BUTALSOTOMAKETHEMMORELIKELYTOUSEABROKERINPURCHASINGTHEIRHOMEWHENTHEDECISIONTOUSEABROKERISACCOUNTEDFOR,THESEBUYERSDONOTWINDUPPAYINGMOREFORTHEIRHOMES,ANDTHEREISSOMEEVIDENCETHATTHEYACTUALLYPAYLESSTHANACOMPARABLEBUYERWHOBUYSWITHOUTANAGENTSASSISTANCETHELAYOUTOFTHISSTUDYISASFOL
14、LOWSTHERELEVANTLITERATUREISREVIEWEDIN3SECTION2INSECTION3,THEDATA,VARIABLESELECTION,ANDMODELAREDESCRIBEDSECTION4PRESENTSTHEEMPIRICALRESULTS,ANDTHELASTSECTIONCONTAINSTHECONCLUSIONSOFTHESTUDYLITERATUREREVIEWABROADRANGEOFRESEARCHHASFOCUSEDONTHEDETERMINANTSOFHOUSINGPRICESTHESEINCLUDETRADITIONALESTIMATESO
15、FHOUSINGDEMAND,HEDONICMODELINGOFHOUSINGPRICES,THEDETERMINANTSOFTHETRADEOFFBETWEENPRICEANDTIMEONTHEMARKET,ANDMODELSOFTHESEARCHPROCESSOTHERLITERATUREHASEXAMINEDTHEROLEOFREALESTATEBROKERSANDHASFOCUSEDONTHEIMPACTOFBROKERSONBUYERSEARCH,ORHASEXAMINEDTHEWELFAREAND/ORMORALHAZARDIMPLICATIONSOFBROKERINTERMEDI
16、ATIONFEWSTUDIESHAVETRIEDTOMEASURETHEDIRECTEFFECTSOFREALESTATEBROKERSONTHEHOUSINGMARKET,ANDFEWERSTILLONHOMESELLINGPRICESTHEWORKTHATHASBEENPRODUCEDTODATEHASOFTENGENERATEDCONFLICTINGRESULTSINPART,THESEDISPARATERESULTSMAYREFLECTDATAAVAILABILITYPROBLEMS,ASVIRTUALLYALLOFTHESEEARLIERSTUDIESHAVEBEENBASEDONL
17、OCALDATA,ANDSAMPLESTENDEDTOBESMALL,MAKINGGENERALIZATIONSDIFFICULTINONEOFTHEFIRSTEMPIRICALSTUDIESOFBROKERCHOICE,JANSSENANDJOBSON1980FINDTHATREALESTATEAGENTSDOHAVEANIMPACTONPRICEUSINGDATAFROMTHECANADIANHOUSINGMARKET,JANSSENANDJOBSONSRESULTSINDICATETHATWITHREALESTATEFIRMSOFCOMPARABLESIZE,BROKERSWHOLIST
18、COMPARABLEPROPERTIESFORHIGHERPRICESTHANCOMPETINGBROKERSTENDTOREALIZESIGNIFICANTLYHIGHERSELLINGPRICESTHEHIGHERSELLINGPRICESTENDTOBEASSOCIATEDWITHTRANSACTIONSINVOLVINGEXECUTIVETRANSFERSANDBROKERARRANGEDSECONDARYFINANCINGTHESERESULTSMAY,INTURN,INDICATETHATBROKERSOBTAINHIGHERPRICESWHENDEALINGWITHBUYERSW
19、HOAREBOTHLESSKNOWLEDGEABLEABOUTLOCALMARKETCONDITIONSANDLESSSENSITIVETOPRICEYAVASANDCOLWELL1994SUGGESTTHATSELLINGPRICEMAYALSOBE,ATLEASTTOSOMEDEGREE,AFUNCTIONOFTHETYPEOFBROKERLISTINGARRANGEMENTUSEDBYTHESELLERINASTUDYOFTHERESIDENTIALMARKET,JUD1983ESTIMATESTHEDEMANDFORREALESTATEBROKERAGESERVICESUSINGHOU
20、SINGTRANSACTIONSDATAFROMTHREEURBANAREASINNORTHCAROLINA,JUDFINDSTHATBROKERSDONOTAFFECTTHEPRICESOFTHEHOUSESWHICHTHEYSELL,ALTHOUGHTHEYDOAPPEARTOINFLUENCETHELEVELOFHOUSINGCONSUMEDBYBUYERSINASUBSEQUENTSTUDY,JUDANDFREW1986,USINGDIFFERENTDATA,FINDTHATBROKERSDOOBTAINHIGHERPRICESFORTHEHOMESTHEYSELLEVIDENCEIS
21、ALSOPRESENTEDTHATBROKERASSISTEDBUYERSHAVEAGREATERDEMANDFORHOUSESTHANTHEIRNONBROKERASSISTEDCOUNTERPARTSTHEIRRESULTSLEADTHEMTOCONCLUDETHATBROKER4INTERMEDIATIONHASANEFFECTANALOGOUSTOTHATOFADVERTISINGINMARKETSWITHIMPERFECTINFORMATIONMORERECENTRESEARCHBYTURNBULLANDSIRMANS1993EXAMINESTHEEXTENTTOWHICHDIFFE
22、RENCESININFORMATIONANDSEARCHCOSTSARERELATEDINHOUSINGPRICESUSINGDATAFROMTHEBATONROUGEMARKETAREA,TURNBULLANDSIRMANSCOMPARETHEPRICESPAIDBYFIRSTTIMEANDOUTOFTOWNBUYERSTOTHEPRICESPAIDFORCOMPARABLEHOUSINGBYMOREKNOWLEDGEABLE,LOCALANDREPEATHOMEBUYERSTHEIRRESULTSINDICATETHATHOMEPRICESARESIMILARACROSSBUYERSWIT
23、HDIFFERENTINFORMATIONSETSANDSEARCHCOSTSSINCETHESEWEREALLBROKERASSISTEDTRANSACTIONS,TARNBULLANDSIRMANSCONCLUDETHATEXISTINGBROKERAGEINSTITUTIONS,SUCHASTHEMLS,SUCCESSFULLYELIMINATETHEPOTENTIALPRICEEFFECTSOFASYMMETRICINFORMATIONAND,THEREBY,IMPROVETHEEFFICIENCYOFTHEHOUSINGMARKETITISNOTPOSSIBLE,HOWEVER,TO
24、DETERMINEFROMTHISSTUDYWHETHERPRICEDIFFERENCESEXISTBETWEENBROKERASSISTEDANDNONBROKERASSISTEDTRANSACTIONSALTHOUGHSELLINGPRICESARENOTCOMPARED,ASTUDYBYBARYLAANDZUMPANO1995,FORTHEFIRSTTIME,USESANATIONALSAMPLEOFBROKERASSISTEDANDNONBROKERSALESTRANSACTIONSTOASSESSTHEIMPACTOFINTERMEDIATIONBYTHEAGENTONSEARCHE
25、FFORTTHISSTUDYINDICATESTHATINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESAREPRESENTINTHERESIDENTIALREALESTATEMARKETANDTHATINTERMEDIATIONBYAGENTSDOESAFFECTBUYERSEARCHEFFORTSFIRSTTIMEBUYERSANDOUTOFTOWNBUYERSSEARCHLONGERTHANMOREEXPERIENCEDANDLOCALHOMEBUYERSEQUALLYIMPORTANT,REALESTATEBROKERSAREABLETOREDUCESEARCHTIMEFORVIRTUALL
26、YALLCLASSESOFCONSUMERS,WHETHERFIRSTTIME,EXPERIENCED,LOCAL,OROUTOFTOWNBUYERSAFOLLOWUPSTUDYBYBARYLA,ZUMPANO,ANDELDER1995FINDSTHATTHEMECHANISMBYWHICHAGENTSREDUCEBUYERSEARCHDURATIONISANINCREASEINSEARCHINTENSITYHAVINGMOREMARKETACCESSANDHOUSINGINFORMATIONTHANBUYERSWORKINGWITHOUTBROKERS,BROKERASSISTEDCONSU
27、MERSAREABLETOVISITMOREHOMESDURINGAGIVENPERIODOFTIMETHESERESULTSSUGGESTTHATBUYERSWITHHIGHINFORMATIONANDSEARCHCOSTSAREMORELIKELYTOSEEKOUTTHESERVICESOFREALESTATEBROKERSWHETHERTHISIMPLICATIONISTRUE,ANDWHATEFFECTSUCHASEARCHDECISIONHASONSELLINGPRICE,HOWEVER,REMAINSTOBESEENTHENEXTLOGICALSTEP,THEREFORE,ISTO
28、EXAMINETHISCHOICEANDITSCONSEQUENTEFFECTONHOMEPRICESDATAANDMETHODOLOGYTHISSTUDYUSESDATAFROMANATIONWIDESURVEYOFHOMEBUYERSCONDUCTEDBYTHENATIONALASSOCIATIONOFREALTORSIN1987THESURVEY,THEHOMEBUYINGANDSELLINGPROCESS,WASMAILEDTOOVER30,000HOUSEHOLDSAFTERELIMINATINGINCOMPLETEORFAULTY5QUESTIONNAIRES,THEDATABAS
29、ETOTALED2,495OBSERVATIONS,ALLOFWHICHTOOKPLACEIN1986TABLE1DISPLAYSSUMMARYSTATISTICSFROMTHESURVEYSAMPLE,CATEGORIZEDBYWHETHERTHETRANSACTIONWASAGENTASSISTEDORNONAGENTASSISTEDTABLELADISPLAYSAGENTUSAGEBASEDONDIFFERENCESININFORMATIONANDSEARCHCOSTSAMONGTHEBUYERSEVALUATINGTHEIMPACTOFTHEREALESTATEBROKERONPRIC
30、ESPAIDBYHOMEBUYERSWOULDSEEM,INITIALLYASTRAIGHTFORWARDPROCESSONEESTIMATESAPRICEEQUATIONUSINGORDINARYLEASTSQUARES,CONTROLLINGFORDIFFERENCESINHOUSINGCHARACTERISTICSASINAHEDONICPRICEMODELANDTHEIMPACTOFBUYERCHARACTERISTICSONTHEPRICE,INCLUDINGADUMMYVARIABLEDEFINEDTOINDICATEWHETHERTHEBUYERUSEDABROKERINTHET
31、RANSACTIONORONECOULDESTIMATESEPARATEEQUATIONSFORTHEBROKERASSISTEDANDNONBROKERASSISTEDBUYERSTHEDIFFICULTYISTHATTHEPRICEPAIDBYTHEBUYERANDTHECHOICEOFWHETHERTOUTILIZEABROKERMAYBELINKEDAHIGHERPRICEPAIDBYBUYERSUSINGABROKERMAYNOTIMPLYTHATPRICESAREHIGHERFORHOMESLISTEDBYBROKERSINSTEAD,ITMAYBETHATTHISGROUPOFB
32、UYERSWOULDHAVEPAIDAHIGHERPRICEREGARDLESSOFWHETHERORNOTTHEYUSEDANAGENTTHISISACLASSICEXAMPLEOFSELFSELECTIONIFTHOSEWHOUSEANAGENTAREPREDISPOSEDTOPAYAHIGHERPRICE,THEORDINARYLEASTSQUARESESTIMATEOFTHECOEFFICIENTONTHEAGENTVARIABLEWILLOVERESTIMATETHEEFFECTOFTHEAGENTONTHEPRICEPAIDBYTHEBUYERTHEPRESENCEOFSELECT
33、IONBIASCOULDIMPLYANUMBEROFPOSSIBILITIESONEISTHATTHEBIASEXISTS,ANDTHATAFTERTAKINGINTOACCOUNTTHESELFSELECTIONBYTHESEBUYERS,HOUSINGPRICESARESTILLHIGHERFORTHEGROUPUSINGABROKERASINDICATEDBYTHECOEFFICIENTOFTHEBROKERVARIABLETHISRESULTWOULDIMPLYTHATTHEREARETWOSEPARATERESIDENTIALREALESTATEMARKETSONEFORBROKER
34、ASSISTEDPROPERTIES,ANDTHESECONDFORTHEFORSALEBYOWNERFSBOPROPERTIESTHISSEPARATIONCOULDPERMITTHEMAINTENANCEOFHOUSINGPRICEDIFFERENTIALSBETWEENTHETWOGROUPSOFCONSUMERSIFSELECTIONBIASISPRESENT,ANDHOUSINGPRICESAREHIGHERFORBROKERLISTEDPROPERTIES,THEPRICEDIFFERENCESOBSERVEDCOULDBEATTRIBUTEDTOTHEPREDISPOSITION
35、OFBUYERSUSINGABROKERTOPAYMOREFORTHEIRHOMESIFNOSELECTIONBIASISPRESENT,THEHIGHERPRICESMAYREPRESENTTHEVALUEADDEDBYTHEBROKERWHICHTHEBUYERSAREWILLINGTOPAYFORALTERNATIVELY,NOPRICEDIFFERENTIALSMAYEXISTDUETOTHECOMPETITIVEIMPACTOFFSBOSONTHEPRICESPAIDFORBROKERASSISTEDTRANSACTIONSTHECHOICEOFWHETHERTOUSEABROKER
36、ANDITSSUBSEQUENTEFFECTONPRICEISMODELEDUSINGAHECKMANTWOSTAGEMODELINTHEFIRSTSTAGE,APROBITEQUATIONIS6EMPLOYEDTOMODELTHEDECISIONTOCHOOSEAREALESTATEBROKERTHEDECISIONISMODELEDASAFUNCTIONOFEIGHTVARIABLESBUYERINCOMEAINCISEMPLOYEDASAMEASUREOFTHEOPPORTUNITYCOSTOFSEARCHITHASALREADYBEENSHOWNTHATBUYERSEARCHDURAT
37、IONCANBEREDUCEDBYWORKINGWITHAREALESTATEBROKERIFHIGHERINCOMEBUYERSHAVEHIGHEROPPORTUNITYCOSTS,WEWOULDEXPECTTHATTHEYWOULDCHOOSETOBUYTHROUGHAREALESTATEBROKERSOURCELEONARDVZUMPANO,HAROLDWELDER,EDWARDABARYLA1996JOURNALOFREALESTATEFINANCEANDECONOMICSACADEMICPUBLISHERS,131691817译文决定通过房地产经纪人买房子简介房地产经纪人究竟是做什么
38、的，为什么购房者会激发他们的服务呢在通常情况下，这是一个不容易回答的问题。其实购房者在通过经纪人买房子的过程中买到的不仅仅是房子，而同时是在取得经纪人的服务。换言之，这些购买者通过经纪人拥有了一个很好的的购房途径。通过经纪人购买房子的一个好处就是可以减少搜寻房子的时间，从而降低了买房过程中的成本。最近的研究认为（巴雷拉和祖帕诺,1995），通过房地产经纪人买房子，大大提高了购房者购房的效益，因为这样这些购房者在寻找房子的过程中更有可能找到称心如意的房子。通过经纪人买房子增加了可供购房者选择的房源，购房者还可以向经纪人提出自己对房子的要求，如要求的房屋的质量以及希望房屋的街道位置。经纪人经常会记
39、录买家的信息并协助买家办理按揭融资和财产保险服务。这些服务都表明，经纪人向买家提供了额外的有价值的服务（除了向卖方提供服务），有时候，那些买家愿意支付那些额外的费用。因此，包含这些服务的房屋的销售价格会高于无经纪人协助置业的房屋的价格。一些学者注意到买家对于那些业主代理上市的房子会支付更多。然而，要确定这是否适用于整个住宅市场是不可能的，因为研究这一点要依靠当地的数据资料。较高的价格预示着买家相对于那些直接出售的房子更愿意较多支付那些业主代理上市的房子。另外，来自自有产权出售的竞争可能会阻止卖家以高价的形式将委托成本传递给买家。因此，问题是业主辅助销售是否会导致价格的提高。如果购房者是在经纪人
40、的协助下搜寻房子的，那么价格会是怎么样呢本文尝试从经纪人选择的发展经验检验模式来回答这些问题。在这个过程中，本文对整个住宅市场的效率以及经纪中介市场的有效性提供了重要的见解。具体来说，本文探讨的是在以两阶段进程的假设条件下对一个房地产经纪人的影响。第一步，买方决定是否聘请一个协助搜寻房屋的服务经纪人。根据经验，这个是由普罗比模型方程决定的，而收入，年龄，经验和对买方市场的认识，以及其他买主的特点都将作为变量引起函数的移动（即改变在家庭或工作有关方面的移动），从而影响买方是否选择使用代理。8第二步是购买。在这里房屋的销售价格是根据房屋的特色，购买者的喜好，以及是否需要提供经纪协助而确定的。这种方
41、法需要提供相关决定因素的信息才能确定住宅的价格。尤其，这个模型可以让我们确定买家是否可以接受代理协助房屋与业主自行出售房屋之间的差价。本文参考了美国房地产经纪人协会研究部对全国购房者和销售者所进行的调查的数据。该数据包括了房地产经纪人对经纪辅助销售和业主销售的两种模式在影响销售价格方面的评估，并揭示了经纪人为卖方所提供的营销服务的价值。我们的研究结果表明，通过经纪人买房的买家的确要比不通过经纪人的买家支付更多的费用。但我们的结果也同样表明，支付更多的费用并不是单单因为使用了经纪人。相反的，这类买家无论以何种方式购买房子都会比其他买家花更多的钱。导致他们花更多钱的因素是可能这些购买者的收入很高，
42、可能他们来自其他地方，也可能是受别人的雇佣而这么做，更有可能的是他们通过经纪人来购买自己的房子从而使自己的房子升值。当这些买家决定使用经纪人来买房时，他们也并不打算为此而付更多的钱，并且有一些证据表明，他们实际支付的钱比不使用经纪人协助的买家要来的少。本文的布局如下第2部分回顾有关文献，第3部分对数据、变量选择和模型进行描述，第4部分用实例证明结果，最后一部分记载本文的结论。文献综述大多数文献都集中的在研究房价的决定因素，包括对住房需求，住房价格，以及价格和时间之间的关系的研究。当然也有一部分文献研究了房地产经纪人的作用，经纪人对购房者买房的深远影响，以及利益和道德对经纪中介的影响。但很少有研
43、究试图衡量房地产经纪人对住房市场的直接影响，因为在如今的工作中往往会产生很多与研究文献相矛盾的结果。在某种程度上，这些不同的结果可能反映了数据的可用性问题，因为几乎所有的这些早期研究都以本地数据为依据，并且所抽取的样本的数量又往往很少，因此很难一概而论来衡量房地产经纪人对住房市场的直接影响。詹森和乔布森1980在关于经纪人选择的第一个实证研究中发现，房地产经纪人也会对价格产生影响。分析了来自加拿大的房屋市场数据后，詹森和乔布森表明，在一定规模的房地产企业，对于同类物业经纪人会比竞争者列出更高的价9格从而实现销售价格的显著提高。较高的售价往往与行政转让和经纪人安排的再融资有关。这些结果可能反过来
44、说明对于那些不了解当地市场信息并且对价格缺乏敏感的买家，经纪人能卖出高价格。亚瓦斯和科维尔（1994）认为至少在一定程度上卖方想通过经纪人来控制价格。乔德（1983）凭借其在住宅市场的研究，他估计了房地产经纪服务的作用。根据来自北卡罗来纳州的三个城市的住房交易数据，乔德认为，经纪人不影响他们出售的房屋的销售价格，即使他们似乎影响了购房者的住房消费水平。但在之后的研究中，乔德和弗瑞（1986）使用了不同的数据后发现经纪人能将房子卖到更高的价格。同时也证实了有经纪人协助的买家市场要比非经纪协助的买家市场大。根据以上的结果他们得出了这样的结论，他们认为在完全没有信息的市场中经纪人起到了类似广告的作用
45、。近期特恩布尔和锡尔曼斯1993在调查不同的信息量和搜寻成本与房价的关系。根据巴吞鲁日的市场数据，恩布尔和锡尔曼斯把第一次购房的买房者出示的价格和有着大量的信息量并且有广阔的购买市场的外镇买房者出示的价格进行了比较。经过比较后他们发现，房价在不同的信息量和不同搜寻成本的买家中是相近的。恩布尔和锡尔曼斯的结论针对的是现有的经纪机构，如大联盟，成功地消除了信息不对称的影响，从而提高了住房市场的效益。尽管巴雷拉和祖帕诺（1995）的首次研究没有比较销售价格，而是对经纪人辅助交易和非经纪人销售交易进行调查研究。这项研究表明住宅房地产市场的信息是不对称的，而且买方代理中介确实会影响房屋的搜寻工作。同时研
46、究还表明，房地产经纪人确实可以减少几乎所有类型消费者的买方过程的时间，无论是第一次买房的，买房经验丰富的，本地的购房者或者是外地的。数据和方法本文使用来自由美国房地产经纪人协会在1987年对全国的购房者进行的调查数据。调查结果显示，在整个房屋购买和销售过程中，是邮寄到超过30000户人家的。在排除不完整或错误的问卷调查，共计2495观测数据库，所有这些都发生在1986年。表1汇总统计显示，从调查样本中，对有关交易是否代理不协助或代理辅助进行分类。香格里拉表显示购房者之间的信息和搜寻成本的差异。10选择性偏见的存在可能暗示了一些可能性。其中之一是偏见存在，并且在考虑到这些购房者的自我选择，使用一
47、个代理集团的房价仍较高（由代理的变量系数表示）。这一结果将意味着有两个不同的住宅房地产市场经纪辅助为其中之一，如果选择存在偏差，住房价格的经纪属性就越高，价格差异可能是由于购房者倾向使用经纪人来购买他们的房子。如果没有选择性偏见存在，价格较高的价值可能是由通过经纪人买房的购买者来补充。赫克曼两阶段模型是是否使用代理及其后续效应对价格的影响。在第一阶段，采用概率方程来模拟决定选择一个房地产经纪人。这一决定被建模成一个八变量的函数。买方收入作为搜索的机会成本。它已被证明，通过房地产经纪人可以减少买方搜寻期间的工作。如果收入较高的购房者有较高的机会成本，则我们可以预料，他们会选择通过房地产经纪人来购买。出处伦纳德V祖帕诺，哈罗德W埃德尔，爱德华A巴雷拉房地产金融和经济，学术出版社199613169181
