1、本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目NONAUDITFEES,DISCLOSUREANDAUDITQUALITY外文出处BRISTOLUNIVERSITY,ENGLANDTHEEUROPEANACCOUNTINGREVIEW1999,82,239252外文作者CLIVESLENNOX原文NONAUDITFEES,DISCLOSUREANDAUDITQUALITYABSTRACTTHISPAPERINVESTIGATESTHEEFFECTOFNONAUDITSERVICESONAUDITQUALITYFOLLOWINGTHEANNOUNCEMENTOFTHEREQUIREMENTTODISCLO
2、SENONAUDITFEES,APPROXIMATELYONETHIRDOFUKQUOTEDCOMPANIESDISCLOSEDBEFORETHEREQUIREMENTBECAMEEFFECTIVEWHILSTDISTRESSEDCOMPANIESWEREMORELIKELYTODISCLOSEEARLY,AUDITORSIZE,DIRECTORSSHAREHOLDINGSANDNONAUDITFEESWERENOTSIGNICANTLYCORRELATEDWITHEARLYDISCLOSURETHESERESULTSCASTDOUBTONTHEVIEWTHATVOLUNTARYDISCLOS
3、UREOFNONAUDITFEESWASUSEDTOSIGNALAUDITQUALITYTHEEVIDENCEALSOINDICATESAPOSITIVEWEAKLYSIGNIFICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENDISCLOSEDNONAUDITFEESANDAUDITQUALICATIONSTHISSUGGESTSTHATWHENNONAUDITFEESAREDISCLOSED,THEPROVISIONOFNONAUDITSERVICESDOESNOTREDUCEAUDITQUALITYINTRODUCTIONDEANGELO1981AHASARGUEDTHATAUDITQUA
4、LITYDEPENDSONTHEJOINTPROBABILITYOFANAUDITORDISCOVERINGANDDISCLOSINGAPROBLEMINANACCOUNTINGSYSTEMGIVENTHATAPROBLEMHASBEENDISCOVERED,THEPROBABILITYTHATANAUDITORDISCLOSESTHEPROBLEMDEPENDSONTHEDEGREEOFINDEPENDENCETHETHEORETICALRELATIONSHIPBETWEENNONAUDITSERVICESANDAUDITQUALITYISAMBIGUOUSONTHEONEHAND,NONA
5、UDITSERVICESMAYINCREASEAUDITORSCLIENTKNOWLEDGEANDTHEREFOREINCREASETHEPROBABILITYTHATPROBLEMSAREDISCOVEREDTHEREFORE,FORAGIVENLEVELOFINDEPENDENCE,NONAUDITSERVICESMAYINCREASEAUDITQUALITYONTHEOTHERHAND,NONAUDITSERVICESMAYINCREASEORREDUCEAUDITORINDEPENDENCEIFNONAUDITSERVICESPROVIDEAUDITORSWITHCLIENTSPECI
6、FICRENTS,COMPANIESMAYBEABLETOOBTAINMOREFAVOURABLEREPORTSBYTHREATENINGTOSWITCHAUDITORINTHISCASE,NONAUDITSERVICESMAYREDUCEINDEPENDENCEDEANGELO,1981AANTLE,1984SIMUNIC,1984ACEMOGLUANDGIETZMANN,1997HOWEVER,NONAUDITSERVICESMAYINCREASEACLIENTSDEPENDENCEONITSAUDITOR,THEREBYREDUCINGTHECREDIBILITYOFTHESWITCHT
7、HREATGOLDMANANDBARLEV,1974THEEMPIRICALLITERATUREHASANALYSEDTHEEFFECTOFNONAUDITSERVICESONAUDITQUALITYINTWOWAYSFIRST,SURVEYSOFACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONUSERSHAVEGENERALLYCONCLUDEDTHATNONAUDITSERVICESAREPERCEIVEDTOBEATHREATTOINDEPENDENCETHISISBECAUSEANAUDITFIRMMAYBEUNWILLINGTOCRITICIZETHEWORKCARRIEDOUTBYITS
8、CONSULTANCYDIVISION,ANDITMAYNOTWISHTOLOSELUCRATIVECONSULTANCYSERVICESPANYANDREKERS,1983,1988SHOCKLEY,1981KNAPP,1985HOWEVER,THESESTUDIESDONOTADDRESSTHEEFFECTOFNONAUDITSERVICESONAUDITQUALITYEVENIFNONAUDITSERVICESREDUCEAUDITORINDEPENDENCE,THEIRNETEFFECTONAUDITQUALITYMAYBEPOSITIVEIFTHEYINCREASETHEPROBAB
9、ILITYTHATPROBLEMSAREDISCOVEREDSECOND,SOMESTUDIESHAVEINVESTIGATEDTHEEFFECTOFNONAUDITSERVICESONAUDITREPORTINGWINES,1994BARKESSANDSIMNETT,1994CRASWELL,1998SINCEAUDITORSCANCHOOSEWHETHERTODISCLOSEPROBLEMSBYGIVINGCLEANORQUALIFIEDOPINIONS,THISAPPROACHUSESAUDITREPORTSTOCAPTUREQUALITYTHEMETHODOLOGYIMPLICITLY
10、ASSUMESTHATAUDITORSCANNOTDISCLOSEPROBLEMSBYQUALIFYINGWHENPROBLEMSHAVENOTBEENDISCOVEREDTHEYCANNOTCRYWOLFTHEREARERELATIVELYFEWSTUDIESINTOTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENNONAUDITFEESANDAUDITQUALIFICATIONSBECAUSEMANYCOUNTRIESEITHERBANTHEPROVISIONOFNONAUDITSERVICESORDONOTREQUIRETHEDISCLOSUREOFNONAUDITFEESMOSTEUCOU
11、NTRIESBANTHEPROVISIONOFSOMEORALLNONAUDITSERVICESINTHEUS,NONAUDITSERVICESAREALLOWEDBUTCOMPANIESDONOTHAVETODISCLOSENONAUDITFEESINCONTRAST,NONAUDITSERVICESARENOTBANNEDANDNONAUDITFEESAREDISCLOSEDINTHEUKANDAUSTRALIAEXTANTRESEARCHINTOTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENNONAUDITFEESANDAUDITQUALIFICATIONSHASBEENCONFINEDT
12、OAUSTRALIAWHILSTWINES1994FOUNDANEGATIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENNONAUDITFEESANDAUDITQUALIFICATIONS,ONEPROBLEMWITHTHESTUDYWASITSFAILURETOCONTROLFORTHEEFFECTSOFFINANCIALDISTRESSONAUDITREPORTINGTHISCONTRASTSWITHBARKESSANDSIMNETT1994ANDCRASWELL1998WHOFOUNDNOSIGNICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENNONAUDITFEESANDAUDITQUAL
13、IFICATIONSTHECONTRIBUTIONOFTHISPAPERTOTHELITERATUREISTWOFOLDFIRST,ITANALYSESTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENNONAUDITFEESANDAUDITQUALIFICATIONSINTHEUKSECOND,ITISTHEFIRSTSTUDYTOEXAMINETHEVOLUNTARYDISCLOSUREOFNONAUDITFEESTESTABLEHYPOTHESESUKCOMPANIESWITHFINANCIALYEARSBEGINNINGAFTER1OCTOBER1991AREREQUIREDTODISCLO
14、SENONAUDITFEESPAIDTOAUDITORSPROPOSALSTOINTRODUCETHEDISCLOSUREREQUIREMENTWEREFIRSTANNOUNCEDIN1989DURINGTHESECONDREADINGOFTHECOMPANIESBILL,LORDYOUNGSTATED,WHENFEESAREUNDISCLOSED,THEREMAYBEGREATERSCOPEFORIMPLICITCOLLUSIONORAUDITORMANAGERSIDECONTRACTING,WHEREBYMANAGERSPROVIDEAUDITORSWITHFINANCIALINCENTI
15、VESTOGIVEFAVOURABLEREPORTSACEMOGLUANDGIETZMANN,1997THEREFORE,ITISIMPORTANTTODISTINGUISHBETWEENTHEEFFECTSOFNONAUDITSERVICESONAUDITQUALITYWHENFEESAREDISCLOSEDANDWHENTHEYARENOTDISCLOSEDMANAGERSANDAUDITORSWHOUSENONAUDITSERVICESTOFACILITATECOLLUSIONWOULDFINDDISCLOSUREMORECOSTLYCOMPAREDTONONCOLLUDINGMANAG
16、ERSANDAUDITORSHENCE,EARLYDISCLOSUREMIGHTBEUSEDTOSIGNALGREATERINDEPENDENCELESSCOLLUSIONANDHIGHERAUDITQUALITYTHEFIVEHYPOTHESESTESTEDINTHISPAPERAREBASEDONTHEGENERALARGUMENTTHATNONAUDITSERVICESAREPOSITIVELYRELATEDTOAUDITQUALITYCOMPANIESWITHGREATERSEPARATIONOFOWNERSHIPANDCONTROLWISHTODISCLOSEEARLYH1DISTR
17、ESSEDCOMPANIESWISHTODISCLOSEEARLYH2LARGEAUDITFIRMSPREFERTHEIRCLIENTSTODISCLOSEEARLYH3COMPANIESWITHHIGHNONAUDITFEESDISCLOSEEARLYH4ANDNONAUDITSERVICESPOSITIVELYAFFECTTHEPROBABILITYOFRECEIVINGANAUDITQUALIFICATIONH5THEPREANNOUNCEMENTOFTHEDISCLOSUREREQUIREMENTGAVECOMPANIESTHEOPPORTUNITYTODISCLOSENONAUDIT
18、FEESBEFORETHEREQUIREMENTWASMADEMANDATORYHYPOTHESES1AND2ARETESTEDUSINGOBSERVABLEPROXIESFORTHEDEMANDFORAUDITQUALITYTHEORYANDEMPIRICALEVIDENCESUGGESTTHATTHEREISAGREATERDEMANDFORAUDITQUALITYWHENAGENCYCOSTSAREHIGHBARYOSEFANDLIVNAT,1984DEFOND,1992THEREFORE,IFVOLUNTARYDISCLOSUREISASSOCIATEDWITHGREATERAUDIT
19、QUALITY,COMPANIESSHOULDHAVEMOREINCENTIVETODISCLOSEEARLYWHENTHEREISAGREATERSEPARATIONOFOWNERSHIPFROMCONTROLTHEFIRSTHYPOTHESISISH1THEREISANEGATIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENEARLYDISCLOSUREANDTHEFRACTIONOFEQUITYOWNEDBYCOMPANYDIRECTORSEXISTINGEVIDENCESUGGESTSTHATCONCERNSABOUTAUDITQUALITYAREPARTICULARLYACUTEINDI
20、STRESSEDCOMPANIESAUDITFAILURESAREOFTENASSOCIATEDWITHCORPORATEFAILURESSUCHASTHEBANKOFCOMMERCEANDCREDITINTERNATIONALANDPOLLYPECK,ANDFINANCIALDISTRESSISSTRONGLYCORRELATEDWITHLITIGATIONAGAINSTAUDITORSSTPIERREANDANDERSON,1984PALMROSE,1988THEREFORE,IFVOLUNTARYDISCLOSUREOFNONAUDITFEESISASSOCIATEDWITHGREATE
21、RAUDITQUALITY,DISTRESSEDCOMPANIESMIGHTHAVEMOREINCENTIVETOSIGNALAUDITQUALITYBYDISCLOSINGEARLYH2THEREISAPOSITIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENFINANCIALDISTRESSANDEARLYDISCLOSUREINCONTRASTTOH2,ITCOULDBEARGUEDTHATDISTRESSEDCOMPANIESHAVEMOREINCENTIVETOCOLLUDEWITHAUDITORSTOAVOIDRECEIVINGUNFAVOURABLEAUDITREPORTS,INWH
22、ICHCASEONEWOULDEXPECTDISTRESSEDCOMPANIESTOBELESSLIKELYTOVOLUNTARILYDISCLOSENONAUDITFEESDEANGELO1981BHASARGUEDTHATLARGEAUDITFIRMSHAVEMOREVALUABLEREPUTATIONSBECAUSEOFHIGHERCLIENTSPECIFICRENTSWHICHMAYBELOSTFORISSUINGNEGLIGENTREPORTSWHILSTH1ANDH2ASSUMEDTHATMANAGERSDECIDEWHENTODISCLOSENONAUDITFEES,HIGHRE
23、PUTATIONAUDITORSMIGHTPUTMOREPRESSUREONMANAGEMENTTODISCLOSEEARLYIFDISCLOSUREISASIGNALOFQUALITYH3THEREISAPOSITIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENAUDITORSIZEANDEARLYDISCLOSURETHETHEORETICALRELATIONSHIPBETWEENNONAUDITSERVICESANDAUDITQUALITYISAMBIGUOUSNONAUDITSERVICESMAYINCREASETHELIKELIHOODOFPROBLEMDISCOVERY,BUTMAYA
24、LSOINCREASEORDECREASEAUDITORDEPENDENCEIFEARLYDISCLOSUREISASIGNALOFAUDITQUALITYANDNONAUDITSERVICESINCREASEQUALITY,ONEWOULDEXPECTCOMPANIESTOHAVEMOREINCENTIVETODISCLOSEEARLYWHENNONAUDITFEESARELARGEH4THEREISAPOSITIVEASSOCIATIONBETWEENNONAUDITFEESANDEARLYDISCLOSUREFINALLY,NONAUDITSERVICESMIGHTINCREASEAUD
25、ITQUALITYEITHERBYINCREASINGTHEPROBABILITYTHATPROBLEMSAREDISCOVEREDAND/ORBYINCREASINGAUDITORINDEPENDENCEH5ISTESTEDBYUSINGAUDITQUALIFICATIONSASASURROGATEFORAUDITQUALITY,ANDBYEXAMININGTHEASSOCIATIONBETWEENNONAUDITSERVICESANDAUDITREPORTINGH5THEREISAPOSITIVEASSOCIATIONBETWEENDISCLOSEDNONAUDITFEESANDAUDIT
26、QUALIFICATIONSINCONTRASTTOH5,NONAUDITSERVICESCOULDREDUCEAUDITQUALITYBYINCREASINGAUDITORDEPENDENCEINTHISCASE,ONEWOULDEXPECTANEGATIVEASSOCIATIONBETWEENDISCLOSEDNONAUDITFEESANDAUDITQUALIFICATIONSDATACOLLECTION,SAMPLEANDVARIABLESINTHISSTUDY,THEPOPULATIONOFINTERESTISALLUKLISTEDCOMPANIESBETWEEN1988AND1994
27、DATAWERECOLLECTEDFROMTHREESOURCESMICROFICHECOPIESOFCOMPANIESANNUALREPORTS,STOCKEXCHANGEFINANCIALYEARBOOKSSEFYSANDTHEDATAUSEDTOESTIMATETHEBANKRUPTCYMODELOFLENNOX1999ACOMPANIESWEREREQUIREDTOHAVEMICROFICHESFORATLEASTTWOCONSECUTIVEYEARS,BECAUSEPREVIOUSSTUDIESHAVESHOWNTHATACOMPANYISMORELIKELYTORECEIVEACL
28、EANMODIFIEDAUDITOPINIONINTHECURRENTYEARIFITRECEIVEDACLEANMODIFIEDOPINIONINTHEPREVIOUSYEARMONROEANDTEH,1993MUTCHLER,1985NOGLER,1995LENNOX,1999BSUCHPERSISTENCEEFFECTSINAUDITREPORTINGARECONSISTENTWITHEVIDENCETHATACHANGEINOPINIONCANTRIGGERLOSSESFORTHEAUDITORTHROUGHLITIGATIONAND/ORCLIENTLOSSLYSANDWATTS,1
29、994KRISHNANANDSTEPHENS,1995ANNUALREPORTSYIELDEDINFORMATIONONDIRECTORSSHAREHOLDINGSDIRSHIT,NUMBEROFEMPLOYEESEMPIT,COMPANYAUDITORS,NONAUDITFEESNAFIT,AUDITFEESANDAUDITOPINIONSMOSTREPORTS97CONTAINEDCLEANAUDITOPINIONSOTHERSDISCLOSEDGOINGCONCERNPROBLEMS,FUNDAMENTALUNCERTAINTIESSUCHASPROVISIONSMADEFORTAX,S
30、LOWMOVINGSTOCKS,BADDEBTSORLITIGATION,ANDNONCOMPLIANCEWITHSTATEMENTSOFSTANDARDACCOUNTINGPRACTICESSAPSCOMPANIESTHATENTEREDADMINISTRATION,RECEIVERSHIPORLIQUIDATIONWERENOTEDFROMSEFYSALLSUCHCOMPANIESAREHEREDENEDASFAILINGMICROFICHESWEREAVAILABLEFOR1987COMPANIESBETWEEN1988AND1994,GIVING5,801OBSERVATIONSFOR
31、THEAUDIT,EMPLOYEEANDSHAREHOLDINGVARIABLESAND2,412OBSERVATIONSFORTHENONAUDITFEEVARIABLEAFINANCIALDISTRESSVARIABLEDISTITWASCONSTRUCTEDFORTHESECOMPANIESUSING6,416PREDICTEDBANKRUPTCYPROBABILITIESFORTHEPERIOD198794THESEWEREOBTAINEDFROMLENNOX1999A,WHOFOUNDTHATBANKRUPTCYWASAFUNCTIONOFTHEECONOMICCYCLE,INDUS
32、TRYSECTOR,COMPANYSIZE,PROTABILITY,CASHOWANDLEVERAGETHEINTERSECTIONOFTHEDISTRESSANDOTHERVARIABLESREDUCEDSAMPLESIZESTO5,572FORTHEAUDIT,EMPLOYEEANDSHAREHOLDINGVARIABLESAND2,266FORTHENONAUDITFEEVARIABLEBYCHECKINGALLYEARENDS,8379733COMPANIESWEREFOUNDTOHAVECOMPLIEDBEFORE,ON,ORAFTERTHEREQUIREDDISCLOSUREDAT
33、E,WHILST23267COMPANIESWERESTILLNOTDISCLOSINGNONAUDITFEESBY1994PRIORTOTHEANNOUNCEMENTOFTHEDISCLOSUREREQUIREMENT,NOCOMPANIESDISCLOSEDNONAUDITFEESDESPITEHAVINGHADTHEOPPORTUNITYTODOSOTHISISCONSISTENTWITHTHEVIEWTHATVOLUNTARYDISCLOSUREWASNOTASIGNALOFAUDITQUALITYTHEMAJORITYOFCOMPANIES5907RSTDISCLOSEDONTHER
34、EQUIREDDATEFIVECOMPANIES058DISCLOSEDTHREEREPORTINGPERIODSBEFORETHEREQUIREDDATE,30349DISCLOSEDTWOPERIODSBEFOREAND2653081DISCLOSEDONEPERIODEARLYAFEWCOMPANIESDISCLOSEDAFTERTHEREQUIREDDATE27314DISCLOSEDONEPERIODLATEANDTWOCOMPANIES023DISCLOSEDTWOPERIODSLATEITISUNCLEARWHY23COMPANIESWERESTILLNOTREPORTINGNO
35、NAUDITFEESBY1994ONEREASONMAYHAVEBEENTHATSOMENONPURCHASINGCOMPANIESFAILEDTODISCLOSEZERONONAUDITFEESBETWEEN1991AND1994,THEPROPORTIONOFCOMPANIESREPORTINGZERONONAUDITFEESROSEFROM108TO267THISSUGGESTSTHATEITHERCOMPANIESWERELESSLIKELYTOPURCHASENONAUDITSERVICESAFTERTHEINTRODUCTIONOFTHEDISCLOSUREREQUIREMENT,
36、ORTHATSOMEOFTHENONDISCLOSERSMIGHTNOTHAVEPURCHASEDNONAUDITFEESANDDIDNOTIMMEDIATELYFEELTHENEEDTOREPORTZEROTHEESTIMATIONRESULTSFORTABLES3AND4WEREDERIVEDAFTERDROPPINGTHE23NONDISCLOSERS,SINCETHEREWASNOWAYOFKNOWINGWHETHERTHESECOMPANIESPURCHASEDNONAUDITSERVICESANDIFSOHOWMUCHTHEYPURCHASEDTHISTREATMENTSHOULD
37、NOTCHANGETHEMAINCONCLUSIONS,SINCETHEREWERERELATIVELYFEWNONDISCLOSERS267THE29LATEDISCLOSERSWEREPOOLEDWITHTHE508COMPANIESWHOFIRSTDISCLOSEDONTHEREQUIREDDATEHOWEVER,THERESULTSINTABLES3AND4WEREQUALITATIVELYUNCHANGEDWHENBOTHTHENONDISCLOSERSANDLATEDISCLOSERSWEREDROPPEDFROMTHEESTIMATIONSAMPLETABLE1SHOWSTHET
38、IMESERIESPATTERNOFFEES,BANKRUPTCYANDAUDITREPORTINGMEANAUDITAVAFTANDNONAUDITAVNAFTFEESWEREFAIRLYSTATICAFTERTHEINTRODUCTIONOFTHEDISCLOSUREREQUIREMENTWHILSTTHISCOULDINDICATETHATDISCLOSUREDIDNOTMATERIALLYAFFECTTHEDEMANDFORNONAUDITSERVICES,THEREWASANINCREASEINTHENUMBEROFCOMPANIESREPORTINGZERONONAUDITFEES
39、ANDONECANNOTRULEOUTTHEPOSSIBILITYOFANUNOBSERVEDCHANGEINNONAUDITFEESPRIORTODISCLOSURESOURCECLIVESLENNOXBRISTOLUNIVERSITY,ENGLANDTHEEUROPEANACCOUNTINGREVIEW1999,82,239252译文非审计费用，信息披露和审计质量摘要本文研究了非审计服务对审计质量的影响。继要求披露非审计费用，大约三分之一的英国前引述的要求披露公司宣布第三生效。虽然公司更有可能早披露，事务所规模，董事持股与非审计费用不与早期公开显着相关。这些结果令人对非自愿性披露审计费用用
40、于信息的审计质量观的怀疑。证据还表明了披露非审计费用和审计资格的显着关系。这表明，当非审计费用披露，非审计服务的审计质量不降低。一、简介审计质量对审计师发现和披露的会计制度中的一个问题，联合概率而定。鉴于问题已被发现的概率，一个核数师披露问题上的独立程度而定。之前的非审计服务，审计质量的理论关系是模糊的。一方面，非审计服务可能会增加审计师的客户知识，从而增加了问题被发现的概率。因此，对于一个给定级别的独立性，非审计服务可能会增加审计质量。另一方面，非审计服务可能会增加或减少审计师的独立性。如果非审计服务与客户提供特定的租金核数师，公司可以通过威胁获得更有利的转核数师报告。在这种情况下，非审计服
41、务可能会降低独立性。然而，非审计服务可能会增加客户的关于其核数师的依赖，从而降低了交换的信誉。实证文献有两方面分析了非审计服务对审计质量的影响。首先，会计信息使用者的调查普遍认为，非审计服务被认为是一个独立的具有威胁性的项目。这是因为审计事务所可能不愿意开展批评其顾问师的工作，它可能不希望失去利润丰厚的咨询服务。然而，这些研究没有涉及非审计服务对审计质量的影响。即使非审计服务降低审计师的独立性，如果他们增加了问题被发现的概率，那么他们对审计质量的影响也可能是正面的。其次，一些研究已经调查了非审计服务对审计报告是否生效。由于审计人员可以选择是否披露给予或保留意见的问题，这种方法使用以捕捉质量的审
42、计报告。该方法隐含假设审计人员不能披露问题时，由资格尚未被发现的问题。对于非审计费用和审计资格的关系的研究相对较少，因为许多国家要么禁止非审计服务的提供或不要求非审计费用披露。大多数欧盟国家禁止的部分或所有非审计服务。在美国，非审计服务是被允许的，但公司没有透露非审计费用。相比之下，在英国和澳大利亚，非审计服务不被禁止，非审计费用可以披露。非审计费用和审计资格现存问题的关系研究一直局限在澳大利亚。虽然葡萄牙发现在非审计费用和审计资格之间存在负相关关系，研究的问题之一，是其无法控制审计报告的财务危机的影响。与此相反，史内特没有发现非审计费用和审计资格之间的显着关系。这种文献的贡献是双重的第一，分
43、析了非审计费用与英国审计资格的关系第二，它是第一个研究探讨非自愿披露审计费用的项目。二、可检验的假说英国公司1991年10月1日后开始被要求披露支付给审计师的非审计费用。建议对首次披露要求在公司条例草案中宣布。当收费不公开，可能隐含着更大的问题，即管理人员给予财务审计人员奖励和提供有利报告的范围。因此，重要的是要区分对审计质量非审计服务的影响，但在收费披露方面，当他们没有透露时，经理和审计师谁使用非审计服务，会发现披露比非串通经理和审计师时更加昂贵。因此，通过早期的披露可能会促使产生更大的独立性（较少串通）和较高的审计质量。本文的五个测试假说是基于一般的说法，非审计服务与审计质量正相关。所有权
44、和控制权分离的公司早期希望披露（H1）早期公司希望向公众披露（H2）大型会计师事务所的客户更喜欢早期披露（H3）；拥有高非审计费用的公司早期披露（H4）非审计服务对一个审计资格流行性问题产生积极的影响（H5）；公告的披露准备工作要求给公司机会，之前披露非审计费用的要求是强制性的。假设H1和H2是测试使用审计质量需求可观的代理。理论和经验证据表明，有一个审计质量时，代理成本高有更大需求。因此，如果自愿披露与更好的审计质量相关，企业应该有更多更大的激励机制来披露控制权的分离。第一个假设是H1在年初至披露由公司董事拥有的股权比例存在负相关关系。现有的证据表明，关于审计质量存在问题尤其是严重不良的公司
45、。审计失败往往与诸如商业银行和国际信贷企业倒闭相关，与金融危机时强烈抨击核数师的诉讼相关。因此，如果非自愿披露审计费用与审计质量的提高有关，经营不良的公司可能获得更多的信号去披露审计质量。H2财务困境与早期公开之间存在积极的关系。可以说是希望公司有更多的激励措施与核数师，以避免接受不利的审计报告，在这种情况下，人们认为公司不太可能自愿披露非审计费用。德安哥的大型会计师事务所认为，由于较多数的客户有特定的可发放租金的损失疏忽报告及更有价值的声誉。虽然H1和H2假设管理者决定何时披露非审计费用，如果较早期公开披露质量信号，审计人员可能有很大的声誉压力。H3事务所规模和早期披露中存在积极的关系。之前
46、的非审计服务与审计质量的理论关系是模糊的，非审计服务可能会增加发现问题的可能性，但也可能增加（或减少）对核数师的依赖。如果早期披露的审计质量是非审计业务增长质量的信号，当非审计费用很大的时候人们期待有更多的措施来激励公司进行早期披露。H4非审计费用和早期披露呈正相关的关系。最后，非审计服务可能会增加或者促进审计质量的提高及发现问题和增加审计师独立性的可能性。是测试作为审计质量替代审计资格并通过检查，与非审计服务和审计报告的关联。H5非审计费用和审计资格存在正相关的关系。非审计服务可以通过提高审计人员的依赖来降低审计质量，在这种情况下，人们期望非审计费用和审计资格存在的负相关的关系。三、数据采集
47、，样品和变量在这项研究中，1988年到1994年之间的所有英国上市公司其数据有三个收集来源公司的年度报告缩微胶片拷贝；联交所财政年鉴（SEFYS）；伦诺克斯模型。公司必须有至少连续两年的缩微胶片，因为以往的研究表明，公司更可能在本年度获得一个正确的（修改）的审计意见，如果它收到一个不正确的前一年（修改）的意见，在审计报告这类证据中表明影响是持久并一致的，民意的变化可以触发核数师的损失，包括通过诉讼的客户的损失。年度报告产生的董事持股（DIRSHIT），雇员（EMPIT），公司审计师，非审计费用（NAFIT），审计费用和审计意见数量的信息。大多数报告（97）含有的审计意见是其披露持续经营根本问题
48、的不确定性（如税收，滞销库存，坏账或诉讼作出规定），以及不符合标准会计报表实务的情况（会计准则）。进入公司的管理，从接管或清盘中指出，联交所财政年鉴（SEFYS）中所有这些公司都在这里被定义为失败。通过所有检查的结束，9733的公司之前被发现有遵守当日或之后所要求的披露日，而267的公司仍然没有披露至1994年的非审计费用。此前公布的披露要求，尽管有过这样的机会做非审计费用的披露，仍然没有公司透露。这与文中观点一致，自愿披露不属于审计质量的信号。该公司在规定日期首次披露，五家公司在规定的报告期前透露了三项，目前还不清楚为什么有23家公司仍然不报至1994的非审计费用。原因之一可能是一些非采购公
49、司没有透露零非审计费用。1991年至1994年，报告零非审计费用的公司比例从108上升至267。这表明，无论是公司不太可能要求引进非审计服务进行披露，或者说有些人可能不会支付非审计费用，并没有觉得有必要立即报告零非审计费用。上文显示的费用中，破产和审计报告的时间序列模式显示，平均审计（AVAFT）和非审计（AVNAFT）费用相当后的披露要求是静态的。虽然这也可能表明，信息披露与没有重大影响的非审计服务的需求之间，报告零非审计费用的公司数目在增加，并不能排除非审计费用的可能性披露之前有一个不可观测的变化存在。出处英国布里斯托尔大学学伦诺克斯克莱夫，英格兰的欧洲会计报告1999，82，239252
