1、Playing PoliticsAs Chinas economic slowdown has become a global concern， the countrys economic policies have dominated the government docket and monopolized media coverage of this years Two Sessions， the annual political gatherings of the National Peoples Congress （NPC） and the Chinese Peoples Polit
2、ical Consultative Conference （CPPCC）. But， beyond the economic arena， both meetings conveyed delicate yet important messages revealing Beijings perspective toward the various political challenges it faces in 2016. Charity Law One of the most-watched political issues of this years Two Sessions was th
3、e new Charity Law， Chinas first piece of legislation regulating this sector. The law eases restrictions on fundraising and operations for charity organizations， and was passed on March 13 by the NPC， a major function of which is to enact legislation， and will become effective September 1. Despite an
4、 overall trend of rapid growth in charitable donations in the past decade， during which the amount given increased more than tenfold， from 10 billion yuan（US$1.54bn） in 2004 to 104 billion yuan（US$16bn） in 2014， China remains far behind most of the rest of the world in terms of giving. Out of the 14
5、5 countries and regions listed on the Charities Aid Foundation World Giving Index for 2015， China came in second to last. A major setback is a general lack of confidence in charities authenticity， especially following scandals in recent years that have tarnished the reputation of domestic philanthro
6、pic organizations as a whole. The new law appears aimed at fixing various institutional problems underlying Chinas ailing charity sector. It liberalizes restrictions on registration， fundraising and donations； offers tax cuts for donations； and improves regulations on transparency. Chinese officials
7、 answer questions from the press as they walk the so-called “ministers corridor” in Beijings Great Hall of the People， March 16， 2016 Currently， charity groups can only register legally through a State-run “master” organization. Under the new law， they will be able to register directly with the Mini
8、stry of Civil Affairs， although foreign-run groups are required to register “in cooperation with Chinese charities.” The new law relaxes the restriction on fundraising by allowing any registered group that has been operating for two years to seek donations from the general public. The law also offer
9、s tax credits for donations made by corporations， though it only applies if the donated amount is lower than 12 percent of the corporations profits. To tackle the publics low level of trust in charities ?C especially the countrys largest， government-run foundation， the Red Cross Society of China， wh
10、ich has been implicated in a number of flashy， high-profile scandals in recent years ?C the law requires donationdependent charities to publish annual reports that specify staff pay and benefits. In addition， these financial reports must be audited. While the new law has been widely welcomed， activi
11、sts remain concerned and view it with a critical eye. Many are worried about the implementation of the law at the local level， as local government agencies tend to distrust private charitable organizations and lack experience working with them. Moreover， the laws narrow scope covers only “charitable
12、 groups， ” and not organizations that would have been included in a broader term， such as “non-profit organizations.” Many are concerned that public interest groups， such as human rights organizations and environmental groups， will continue to be tightly restricted. Activists are particularly concer
13、ned that the laws ban on activities that “threaten national security， ”without detailing how this allegation would be defined， could lead to abuses in implementation. By passing the Charity Law， authorities have taken a major step towards promoting a healthy charity sector， but it appears that the l
14、eadership is not yet ready to loosen its grip on other civil organizations. Defense Budget China watchers follow the Two Sessions closely， as Chinas leadership often drops hints about its views on a variety of issues during the annual meetings. This year was no exception. Among a wide range of figur
15、es that are released during the annual meetings， perhaps the most highly anticipated number， apart from Chinas official GDP growth target， is the annual military budget. On March 5， China announced that national defense spending will increase by 7.6 percent to 954 billion yuan （US$147bn） in 2016， th
16、e lowest percentage increase since 2010. Between 2011 and 2015， Chinas military expenditure saw a five-year run of double-digit increases， following a hike of 7.5 percent in 2010. The relatively low figure this year surprised some， as various Hong Kong and overseas Chinese media groups had predicted
17、 that Chinas defense budget would grow by 20 percent following the recent launch of ambitious military reforms， which aim to modernize the countrys military. In an interview with the State-run Xinhua News Agency， Major General Chen Zhou of the Peoples Liberation Army Academy of Military Science desc
18、ribed that smaller increase in defense expenditure as “a prudent and moderate move， ” in line with Chinas“economic and social status quo.” Chen Guangbiao （center） ， a Chinese tycoon， gives donations to earthquake victims in Yingjiang， Yunnan Province， March 16， 2011 Challenged with an economic slowd
19、own， Chinas economy expanded by 6.9 percent in 2015 and government revenue increased by 8.4 percent， marking the lowest such growth figures since 1990. Apart from economic concerns， some analysts argued that this modest increase in military expenditure is a signal that China seeks to lower tensions
20、regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea， where a confrontation with the US has become increasingly likely as Wash-ington has ramped up its freedom of navigation operations in the region. In a separate report released on March 13， Zhou Qiang， president of Chinas Supreme Peoples Court， a
21、nnounced that China will create an “international maritime judicial center” to protect its national sovereignty and maritime rights. China has refused to participate in an arbitration case brought by the Philippines at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague regarding Chinas maritime claims
22、in the South China Sea. The move to establish an international maritime judicial center comes as the world waits for the Hague ruling to be issued in May. So far， there are few specifics on how Chinas judicial center will operate， but it could become a major focal point in the coming months. Across
23、the Straits Beijings Taiwan policy was also a major focus of this years Two Sessions. Earlier this year， pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen defeated the ruling Kuomintang （KMT） Party candidate in the general election， and will assume the islands top leadership posi
24、tion on May 20. Tsai has pledged to maintain the “status quo” of the cross-Straits relationship， but does not accept the 1992 Consensus， which represents a principle agreed upon by the KMT and Beijing in 1992 that there is “One China， ” with both sides free to interpret this concept individually. In
25、 recent months， Beijing has repetitively warned that the 1992 Consensus is the political foundation of the cross-Straits relationship， and the failure to endorse it will severely damage the Beijing-Taipei bond. As Tsais May inauguration day approaches， her vague stance has put the Chinese mainland i
26、ncreasingly on edge. On March 5， in a meeting with Shanghai delegates during the NPC session， Xi Jinping further delineated Beijings position. Xi reit- erated the significance of the 1992 Consensus and urged the Taiwanese side to “both recognize the historical reality of the 1992 Consensus and ackno
27、wledge its core significance.” Delegates representing various sectors sing Chinas National Anthem in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing at the opening of the Two Sessions Xi said： “We will resolutely contain. secessionist activities in any form， safeguard the countrys sovereignty and territoria
28、l integrity， and never allow the historical tragedy of a split nation to happen again.” Without mentioning Tsai specifically， Xi said Beijings policy “will not change with the changes in Taiwans political situation.” Xis statement appears to be a response to a speech Tsai made in January， in which s
29、he directly addressed the 1992 Consensus issue for the first time. She said she would accept the 1992 meetings as a “historical fact， ” but fell short of accepting the 1992 Consensus in principle. Almost immediately after the Two Sessions conclusion， China announced on March 17 that it had resumed d
30、iplomatic relations with Gambia， a country which had maintained official ties with the Republic of China， Taiwans official name， for two decades. Gambia suspended its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan in 2013. This latest gambit has been widely interpreted as a warning to Tsai. Under the administr
31、ation of Ma Ying-jeou， Beijing and Taipei had agreed on a “diplomatic truce.”Many are now concerned that truce could turn sour after Tsai assumes office， making the cross-Straits relationship one of the biggest uncertainties Beijing will face in 2016. By and large， occupied with the daunting task of maintaining Chinas economic growth， the central leadership has adopted a low-profile， prudent but firm position toward the various contingencies it faces in the political and security realm.
