1、1,A Japanese Perspective on Space Deterrence and the Role of the US-Japan Alliance,Kazuto SuzukiHokkaido Universitykazutosjuris.hokudai.ac.jp,Space systems are,Critical for socio-economic welfareIndispensable for modern military systemsVulnerable to intentional and unintentional damageDifficult to d
2、efend; difficult to deter attacks uponMost effectively defended through use of non-space means to increase the costs of attack,2,Vulnerabilities in Space,Domain constraints do not permit substantially meaningful physical protectionHigh velocity due to orbital speeds of approximately 28,000 kilometer
3、s per hour mean virtually any impact can kill a satelliteSpace objects, human-origin debris, intentional attacksSolar flares, electromagnetic pulses also threats,3,Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Attacks,Incentives to attack may be substantial: Space assets are valuable, scarce, vulnerableAttacks are non-leth
4、al (hence possibly seen as less escalatory), difficult to attribute, and could accord big first-mover advantagesAttribution can be difficult due to blind spotsKinetic ASATs: create large debris cloudsInternational condemnation of China after 2007 test,4,Non-Kinetic ASAT Attacks: Cyber Attacks on Spa
5、ce Systems,Taking over satellites via hacking is possibleCommand and control systems for commercial and civilian satellites are relatively vulnerableTaking over a satellite can make it a space weaponRadio-frequency problem:Not enough bandwidth for encrypted transmission leads to use of open frequenc
6、ies which are more vulnerable,5,Non-Kinetic, Non-Cyber ASAT Attacks,Methods include:Jamming: Interferes with up-link/down-link communications by overpowering the signals through radiofrequency interference so as to prevent transmissions from getting throughSpoofing: Intentionally feeds false informa
7、tion to devices or ground-based receivers by intercepting and overriding weak signals traveling between space and earthDazzling: Temporarily or permanently damages functions of reconnaissance satellites using directed energy (lasers)Rendezvous and docking technology (also known as: killer satellites
8、),6,Deterrence in Space is Very Difficult,Tit-for-tat is not an attractive option:Different degree of dependency on space for various actorsCreation of space debris if kinetic attacks employed is also unappealingDeterrence by denial is difficult:Shooting down all the ground-based kinetic attackscost
9、ly, hardProtecting all radio transmissionsvery hardProtecting all sensorsvery hard,7,Deterrence in Space?,Life expectancy of satellites is long, posing challenges for modernizing space asset architecturesSpace-based assets can be decades-oldUpgrading hardware to meet new challenges almost impossible
10、Software upgrades often limited by hardware capacityAttribution problem:Knowing the real motivations for actions in space extremely difficultSatellite failure could be caused by malfunction, debris,8,A Tallinn Manual for Space?,Tallinn Manual 1.0:A non-binding set of rules drafted by experts from ar
11、ound the world for use in applying international laws of armed conflict to cyberspaceTallinn Manual 2.0: Updated version suggests military retaliation to cyber-attack is not legitimate unless authorized by United NationsIf attack perpetrated by non-state actor, victim requires consent of state where
12、 non-state actor is based to retaliate MILAMOS: Tallinn Manual for space is now being drafted,9,The Role of the U.S. Japan Alliance in Space Deterrence,Increasing transparency and shaping norms: Space Situational Awareness (SSA)Information sharing with international communityInternational rule-makin
13、gResilience/deterrence through (a measure of) denial:Increasing interoperability for replacing and recovering assetsDeterrence through punishment: Prepare and plan for military actions to convince adversaries not to take actions against our space assets,10,Conclusions,Importance and vulnerability of space assets needs to be better understoodEspecially in JapanAlliance plays key roles for:TransparencyResilienceDeterrence through punishmentSpace attacks cannot be deterred by space means aloneDeterrence in space requires cross-domain deterrence,11,
