1、背景文件Background Guide福州市校际模拟联合国大会Fuzhou Interscholastic Model United Nations ConferenceSupported by Fuzhou No.1 Middle SchoolGeneral AssemblyTopic: A. Security Council ReformB. Global IlliteracyFuzhou Interscholastic Model United Nations Conference 2010Page 2ContentsSecurity Council ReformSecurity Co
2、uncil Background.3Calling for Security Council Reform.4Reforms .5Past International Actions.17Overall Positions of countries and blocs.21Global IlliteracyTo all the delegates in the General Assembly .26General Assembly .28Background of the issues .31Blocs Positions .36Questions to consider.44Referen
3、ce .45Background Guide GAPage 3Security Council BackgroundThe Security Council has primary responsibility, under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is so organized as to be able to function continuously, and a representative of each of its members must be present
4、 at all times at United Nations Headquarters. On 31st January 1992, the first ever Summit Meeting of the Council was convened at Headquarters, attended by Heads of State and Government of 13 of its 15 members and by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the remaining two. The Council may meet elsewhe
5、re than at Headquarters; in 1972, it held a session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the following year in Panama City, Panama. When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Councils first action is usually to recommend to the parties to try to reach an agreement by peaceful m
6、eans. In some cases, the Council itself undertakes investigation and mediation. It may appoint special representatives or request the Secretary-General to do so or to use his good offices. It may set forth principles for a peaceful settlement. When a dispute leads to fight, the Councils first concer
7、n is to bring it to an end as soon as possible. On many occasions, the Council has issued cease-fire directives which have been Fuzhou Interscholastic Model United Nations Conference 2010Page 4instrumental in preventing wider hostilities. It also sends United Nations peace-keeping forces to help red
8、uce tensions in troubled areas, keep opposing forces apart and create conditions of calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought. The Council may decide on enforcement measures, economic sanctions (such as trade embargoes) or collective military actions. If a Member State is against any preventi
9、ve or enforcement actions which have been taken by the Security Council, it may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. A Member State which has persistently violated the principles of the Charte
10、r may be expelled from the United Nations by the Assembly on the Councils recommendation. A State which is a Member of the United Nations but not of the Security Council may participate, without a vote, in its discussions when the Council considers that the countrys interests are much correlated. Bo
11、th Members of the United Nations and non-members, if they are parties to a dispute being considered by the Council, shall be invited to take part in, without a vote, in the Councils discussions; the Council sets the conditions for participation of a non-member State. The Presidency of the Council ro
12、tates monthly, according to the English alphabetical listing of its member States.Background Guide GAPage 5Calling for Security Council ReformEven though the geopolitical realities changed drastically since 1945, when the set-up of the current Council was decided, the Security Council changed very l
13、ittle during this long period of time. The winners of Second World War shaped the Charter of the United Nations in their national interests, dividing the veto-power pertinent to the permanent seats amongst themselves. With the enlargement of the United Nations membership and increasing self-confiden
14、ce among the new members, going hand in hand with processes of decolonization, old structures and procedures were increasingly challenged. The imbalance between the number of seats in the Security Council and the total number of Member States became evident and the only significant reform of the Sec
15、urity Council came to pass in 1965 after the ratification of two thirds of the membership, including the five permanent members of the Security Council (which have a veto right on Charter changes). The reform included an increase of the non-permanent membership from 6 to 10 members. With Boutros Bou
16、tros-Ghali elected as Secretary-General in 1992, the reform discussions of the UN Security Council were launched again as he started his new term with the first-ever summit of the Security Council and thereafter published “An Agenda for Peace“. His motivation was to restructure the composition and a
17、nachronistic procedures of the UN organs. Fuzhou Interscholastic Model United Nations Conference 2010Page 6ReformsReform of the United Nations Security Council encompasses five key issues: categories of membership; the veto power held by the five permanent members; regional representation; the size
18、of an enlarged Council and its working methods. Member States, regional groups and other stakeholders developed different positions and proposals on how to move forward on this contested issues. 1. MembershipThe Security Council is never a democratic institution. Chapter 5 of the UN Charter sets up
19、a Council dominated by the five Great Powers that are the victors in World War II-the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China.In speeches and corridor conversations, diplomats often point out that four out of the five Permanent Members are “European“ (a concept that includes the U
20、nited States) and four out of five are “industrialized“ countries. The four-fifths of humankind that live in the poor countries of the Global South, they say, have only one seat-China-among the Permanent Members. Latin America, Africa and the Middle East have no regional presence at all. Reformers i
21、nsist that the Council should better “represent“ the whole population of the globe. But there are considerable differences about how representation should be achieved and what effective SC democracy would be like.Background Guide GAPage 7The sharpest debate turns on the proposal for Permanent Member
22、ship for Germany and Japan. Since both countries have middle-ranking military forces which have been constitutionally restricted in their foreign deployment, they justify their claim to a permanent seat by referring to their wealth and their role as major funders of the organization. A few countries
23、 have argued for adding more veto-wielding permanent members from the Global South. Nigeria, Brazil and India, would like to become permanent members, and they have been campaigning actively for seats. But their regional rivals are staunchly opposed. Smaller countries, in turn, are unhappy about any
24、 system that will strengthen the power at their expense.Reports of discussions within the Working Group suggest that a majority of countries oppose an expansion of the number of permanent members and still insist on veto restrictions firmly. The majority prefers to enlarge the Council with additiona
25、l non-permanent members-a common figure is ten-bringing the Council to present 25 members altogether. Though opinions vary widely, most countries seem to believe that an electoral process will yield better representation of regions, and of diverse kinds of states-poor as well as rich, small as well
26、as large. Better representation, they argue, will help create a Council that can act credibly and legitimately in the name of all humanity.Many UN diplomats and reformers are unhappy about permanent membership, especially the veto, and they want to re-consider the issue, even if the number of perman
27、ent members does not increase. Fuzhou Interscholastic Model United Nations Conference 2010Page 8Because Art. 23, Sect. 1 of the Charter speaks of criteria for the selection of non-permanent members (their “contribution“ to the “maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purpose
28、 of the Organization“), some countries have called on the General Assembly to develop objective measures for this purpose. Criteria might be embarrassing to the Permanent Five, though. They are, after all, possessors of nearly all the worlds nuclear weapons as well as most of the stock of chemical a
29、nd biological weapons. They have the largest military establishments and spend collectively about two-thirds of the worlds $775 billion in military outlays. They account for a very large share (about 85%) of the worlds major arms exports. And they have ignored Charter injunctions that they abstain i
30、n Council voting when they are parties to disputes (Art. 27, Sect. 3).The Permanent Five have an additional advantage over the non- permanent members in the Council, because elected members serve for only two years and cannot, according to the Charter, be immediately re-elected.Many reformers would
31、like to limit or do away with the veto and even with permanent membership itself. In debates, phrases like “obsolete privilege“ and “exclusive club“ tend to crop up. “The right to veto undermines the principle of sovereign equality of states as provided in the Charter,“ said Hasmy Agam, Deputy Secre
32、tary General of the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a speech to the General Assembly. “No country, however powerful, should arbitrarily stand in the path of collective needs as determined by the general membership of the UN.“ Background Guide GAPage 92.Veto powerThe five permanent members o
33、f the Security Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States) enjoy the privilege of veto power. This power has been intensely controversial since the drafting of the UN Charter in 1945. Vetoes (whether threatened or actually used) are a block to action, as UN performance in form
34、er Yugoslavia and other recent crises has clearly shown. A singe veto-wielding power can stop international response dead in its tracks and totally frustrate the will of the overwhelming majority of the international community. This blockage, which has frustrated UN action on key questions since its
35、 founding, must be progressively eased, insist reformers. New veto-wielding permanent members would only increase the likelihood of blockage and still further paralyze the organization.Vetoes have not just been cast to block substantive resolutions. Over the years, 59 vetoes have been cast to block
36、the admission of member-states - a dubious enterprise - as well as 43 vetoes cast to block nominations for Secretary-General. The veto strangles the UN and prevents a broad consensus from guiding its work across a wide range of issues.Most reformers admit that at present their chances of doing away
37、with the veto or with permanent membership are slim, since the permanent members would block the necessary changes in the Charter. So reformers have proposed incremental strategies, including a slow but steady assault on the veto, seeking to restrict its use through procedural changes, which do not
38、require Charter revision. Austria, among others, has called for this type of restrictions and Olara Fuzhou Interscholastic Model United Nations Conference 2010Page 10Otunnu, President of the International Peace Academy, has said that the burden of proof in future should be on permanent members to ju
39、stify veto use. The prestigious Commission on Global Governance, of which Otunnu was a member, has proposed veto restrictions in its recent report. One proposal being discussed would require two concurrent vetoes. Another would restrict circumstances in which vetoes are cast (e.g. to cases of intern
40、ational aggression under Chapter VII). Yet another would develop a kind of weighted vote to replace vetoes altogether. 3. Issues Go Beyond Membership Change and Veto PowerThe debate on membership expansion (and new permanent members) attracts most of the attention, but Council reform involves much m
41、ore than the chairs around the table and who sits in them. other concerns including a) Size and EfficiencyMost reformers want to increase the size of the Council, to enable it to be more representative of different regions, countries of different sizes and other criteria of diversity.Reformers are not impressed by the “efficiency“ argument and see it as an effort to preserve the privilege of the Great Powers. They argue that “efficiency“ is in the eye of the beholder
