1、The central problem in the stock market is that the return on capital hasnt risen with inflation. It seems to be stuck at 12 percent.1 It is no longer a secret that stocks, like bonds, do poorly in an inflationary environment. We have been in such an environment for most of the past decade, and it h
2、as indeed been a time of troubles for stocks. But the reasons for the stock markets problems in this period are still imperfectly understood.股票市场的资本回报率没有随着通货膨胀而上升，而似乎是停滞在了 12%股票在通货膨胀环境下像债券一样表现不佳，这已经不是个秘密。在过去 10 年里，我们一直处于这种通胀环境里。确实，这是一个股票遇到麻烦的时期。但是，在这段时间里造成股票市场难题的原因仍然没有被人们完全理解。2 There is no mystery a
3、t all about the problems of bondholders in an era of inflation. When the value of the dollar deteriorates month after month, a security with income and principal payments denominated in those dollars isnt going to be a big winner. You hardly need a Ph.D. in economics to figure that one out.在通胀时期债券持有
4、者所遇到的问题一点也不神秘。当美元月复一月地贬值，一种本金和收入都用美元支付的证券不会是个大赢家。你根本不需要一个博士学位就能搞懂这个问题。3 It was long assumed that stocks were something else. For many years, the conventional wisdom insisted that stocks were a hedge against inflation. The proposition was rooted in the fact that stocks are not claims against dollars,
5、 as bonds are, but represent ownership of companies with productive facilities. These, investors believed, would retain their Value in real terms, let the politicians print money as they might.一直以来，人们认为股票是不同的。多年来，传统智慧坚持认为股票是对通货膨胀的对冲。这个说法来源于一个事实，那就是股票不像债券一样是对美元的所有权，而是对有着生产设施的公司的所有权。因此，股票投资者们相信，无论政客们如
6、何印钞票，股票投资者仍然能保持他们投资的实际价值。4 And why didnt it turn but that way? The main reason, I believe, is that stocks, in economic substance, are really very similar to bonds.但是为什么实际上不是这么回事？主要原因在于：我认为股票在经济实质上非常类似于债券。5 I know that this belief will seem eccentric to many investors. They will immediately observe t
7、hat the return on a bond (the coupon) is fixed, while the return on an equity investment (the companys earnings) can vary substantially from one year to another. True enough. But anyone who examines the aggregate returns that have been earned by companies during the postwar years will discover somet
8、hing extraordinary: the returns on equity have in fact not varied much at all.我知道我的主张对很多投资者来说显得古怪。他们马上就观察到债券的回报（利息）是固定的，而股票投资的回报（盈利）会每年变化极大。这确实是事实。但是，任何研究战后公司总体回报的人都会发现一个现象：资本回报率实际上并没有变化那么多。A. The coupon is sticky停滞的息票6 In the first ten years after the war - the decade ending in 1955 -the Dow Jones
9、industrials had an average annual return on year-end equity of 12.8 percent. In the second decade, the figure was 10.1 percent. In the third decade it was 10.9 percent. Data for a larger universe, the FORTUNE 500 (whose history goes back only to the mid-1950s), indicate somewhat similar results: 11.
10、2 percent in the decade ending in 1965, 11.8 percent in the decade through 1975. The figures for a few exceptional years have been substantially higher (the high for the 500 was 14.1 percent in 1974) or lower (9.5 percent in 1958 and 1970), but over the years, and in the aggregate, the return on boo
11、k value tends to keep coming back to a level around 12 percent. It shows no signs of exceeding that level significantly in inflationary years (or in years of stable prices, for that matter).战后 10 年，一直到 1955 年，道琼斯工业指数里的公司的资本回报率是 12.8%。战后的第二个 10 年，这个数字是 10.1%。在第三个 10年，是 10.9%。财富 500 强（历史数据最早到 50 年代中期）
12、 ，这一个更大范围的数据显示了相似的结果：1955-1965 年资本回报率11.2%，1965-1975 资本回报率 11.8%。这个数字在几个特殊年份里非常高（财富 500 强的最高值是 1974 年的 14.1%）或者非常低（1958 年和 1970 年是 9.5%） 。但是，过去这些年，总体上，净资产的回报率持续回到 12%的水平。在通胀时期，这个数字没有显著超越这一水平。在价格稳定的时期净资产的回报率也没有超越这一水平。7 For the moment, lets think of those companies, not as listed stocks, but as produc
13、tive enterprises. Lets also assume that the owners of those enterprises had acquired them at book value. In that case, their own return would have been around 12 percent too. And because the return has been so consistent, it seems reasonable to think of it as an “equity coupon“.让我们先不把这些公司看成上市的股票，而是生
14、产的企业。让我们假定企业的所有人按净资产价值购买了这些企业。如果是这样，这些企业的所有人自己的回报也是 12%左右。由于回报如此固定，我们有理由把回报看成“股票的息票” 。8 In the real world, of course, investors in stocks dont just buy and hold. Instead, many try to outwit their fellow investors in order to maximize their own proportions of corporate earnings. This thrashing about,
15、 obviously fruitless in aggregate, has no impact on the equity, coupon but reduces the investors portion of it, because he incurs substantial frictional costs, such as advisory fees and brokerage charges. Throw in an active options market, which adds nothing to, the productivity of American enterpri
16、se but requires a cast of thousands to man the casino, and frictional costs rise further.当然，在现实世界里，股票投资者并不只是购买并持有。相反，很多人在股票市场上反复买卖，试图战胜其它投资者，以获得公司盈利里面自己那部分的最大化。这种争斗，从总体上来说是无效的，对股票及股票自身的盈利无影响，却减少投资者的收益。因为这些活动会造成很高的摩擦成本，比如咨询费和交易费等。一个活跃的期权市场的引入根本无法增加美国企业的生产率，只不过是产生了给这个赌场配置数以千计的人手的需求。而摩擦成本则进一步升高。B. Stoc
17、ks are perpetual股票是永久的9 It is also true that in the real world investors in stocks dont usually get to buy at book value. Sometimes they have been able to buy in below book; usually, however, theyve had to pay more than book, and when that happens there is further pressure on that 12 percent. Ill ta
18、lk more about these relationships later. Meanwhile, lets focus on the main point: as inflation has increased, the return on equity capital has not. Essentially, those who buy equities receive securities with an underlying fixed return - just like those who buy bonds.实际上，在现实世界，股票投资者通常并不用净资产价格购买股票。有时他
19、们能在净资产价格之下购买。但是大多数的情况下他们的购买价格要比净资产价格高。这种情况下，就进一步增加了 12%的资本回报的压力。在后面的文章里我会进一步谈二者的关系。现在，让我们关注主要的一点：通货膨胀已经增加，但资本回报不变。本质上，买股票的人得到的是内在的固定收益 - 和买债券的人一样。10 Of course, there are some important differences between the bond and stock forms. For openers, bonds eventually come due. It may require a long wait, b
20、ut eventually the bond investor gets to renegotiate the terms of his contract. If current and prospective rates of inflation make his old coupon look inadequate, he can refuse to play further unless coupons currently being offered rekindle his interest. Something of this sort has been going on in re
21、cent years.当然，股票和债券有一些重要的不同。首先，债券最终会到期。债券可能需要等很长时间才到期，但是最终债券投资者能够重新谈判合同的条款。如果目前和未来的通货膨胀率上涨使债券投资人旧的息票率显得不够，他可以拒绝再买。除非目前的息票率提高，重新引起他的兴趣。这种情况在近些年一直在持续上演。11 Stocks, on the other hand, are perpetual. They have a maturity date of infinity. Investors in stocks are stuck with whatever return corporate Ameri
22、ca happens to earn. If corporate America is destined to earn 12 percent, then that is the level investors must learn to live with. As a group, stock investors can neither opt out nor renegotiate. In the aggregate, their commitment is actually increasing. Individual companies can be sold or liquidate
23、d and corporations can repurchase their own shares; on balance, however, new equity flotations and retained earnings guarantee that the equity capital locked up in the corporate system will increase.股票，与之相反，是永久的。股票具有无限的到期日。股票投资者只能接受美国企业的盈利，无论好坏。如果美国企业注定获得 12%的资本回报，这就是股票投资人必须接受的水平。作为一个群体，股票投资者无法退出，也无
24、法重新谈判。从总体上说，他们的投入是增加的。单个的公司可以被买卖或破产清算。公司可以回购股票。但是从总体来说，增发新股和未分配利润肯定会使锁定在公司系统里的资本增加。12 So, score one for the bond form. Bond coupons eventually will be renegotiated; equity “coupons“ wont. It is true, of course, that for a long time a 12 percent coupon did not appear in need of a whole lot of correct
25、ion.所以，债券在这点上占了上风。债券最终会被重新谈判，股票的“息票”不会。确实，在很长时间里，12%的息票率看起来并不需要很多调整。C. The bondholder gets it in cash债券投资者拿的是现金13 There is another major difference between the garden variety of bond and our new exotic 12 percent “equity bond“ that comes to the Wall Street costume ball dressed in a stock certificate
26、.这是另外一个债券与 12%回报的“股权债券”的重要的区别。股票就好像是穿着股票证书华丽外衣参加华尔街化妆舞会的一种新的债券 - “股权债券” 。14 In the usual case, a bond investor receives his entire coupon in cash and is left to reinvest it as best he can. Our stock investors equity coupon, in contrast, is partially retained by the company and is reinvested at whate
27、ver rates the company happens to be earning. In other words, going back to our corporate universe, part of the 12 percent earned annually is paid out in dividends and the balance is put right back into the universe to earn 12 percent also.通常情况下，债券投资者拿到现金息票。他可以自己决定这笔现金最好的投资方式。我们的股票投资者的“息票” - 盈利，则与之相反
28、，一部分被公司留用并重新投资，而且投资回报率完全取决于公司。换句话说，公司的 12%的年资本回报率一部分以现金方式发股息，剩下的重新投入盈取 12%的回报。D. The good old days美好的旧日时光15 This characteristic of stocks - the reinvestment of part of the coupon - can be good or bad news, depending on the relative attractiveness of that 12 percent. The news was very good indeed in,
29、 the 1950s and early 1960s. With bonds yielding only 3 or 4 percent, the right to reinvest automatically a portion of the equity coupon at 12 percent via s of enormous value. Note that investors could not just invest their own money and get that 12 percent return. Stock prices in this period ranged
30、far above book value, and investors were prevented by the premium prices they had to pay from directly extracting out of the underlying corporate universe whatever rate that universe was earning. You cant pay far above par for a 12 percent bond and earn 12 percent for yourself.股票盈利的一部分重新再投入的特性，是好消息也
31、是坏消息，这取决于那 12%的回报到底有多诱人。在 1950 年代和 60 年代早期，这的确是好消息。当债券收益率只有百分之三或四的时候，能够有权自动把股票盈利的一部分再投入，取得 12%的回报，具有极大的价值。注意，投资人无法把自己的资金投资其他的东西而取得那 12%的回报。在这个时期，股票价格远超过净资产价格。由于价格高涨，无论公司内在的回报率是多少，投资者都无法直接从公司的收益中获得回报。这就好比年息 12%的债券，如果你以远远超过票面价值的价格购买，是无法获得 12%的回报的。16 But on their retained earnings, investors could earn 12 percent. In effect, earnings retention allowed investors to buy at book value part of an enterprise that, in the economic environment than
