1、 1 外文翻译 原文 The impact of incentives on CEO compensation and firm performance Material Source : Economics, 2006, Volume 53, Number 3, Pages 402-420 Author: Mahmoud M. Nourayi and Sudha Krishnan Abstract: A significant component of a management control system is the incentive mechanism and motivationa
2、l underpinning of compensation contracts. Most executives are rewarded in the form of cash and company stock. Our data indicate that over 82.5 percent of the observations include a bonus pay to CEOs and an even larger percentage, about 94.5 percent, have stock option grants. Our analyses indicate th
3、at the means of market-based returns are significantly larger for companies with no stock option incentives. However, the accounting-based returns do not appear to be significantly influenced by stock-based rewards. Keywords: CEO compensation, agency contract, incentives, performance, Accounting - b
4、ased incentives, market-based incentives 1. Introduction A significant component of a management control system is the incentive mechanism and motivational underpinning of compensation contracts. A well-designed incentive system can deal effectively with both adverse-selection and moral hazard issue
5、s in an agency contract. The degree to which compensation contracts vary in relation to the measure of performance, determines the level of self-confidence and risk-taking attributes of the applicants. The main objective of this study is to identify the influence of incentive contracts and performan
6、ce measures on executive compensation. We also assess the sensitivity of CEO pay to cash incentives as 2 compared to stock-based incentives. The relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance has been extensively studied by researchers from various perspectives. Research has c
7、onfirmed the positive relation between firm size and executive compensation as well as the influence of firm performance on theory with a concentration on the linkages between executive compensation and firm performance. Murphy (2000) indicates that a majority of companies use multiple measures of p
8、erformance in rewarding their executives. The most popular forms of reward seem to be cash and company stock. Majority of public companies offer stock options or restricted stock in order to assure the congruity of the managers welfare and the owner wealth-maximization objectives. Cash compensation
9、to executives has two predominant components, fixed salary and bonus. Bonuses are generally linked to some performance measures that signal congruence of managerial choices with specific organization objectives. In this study, we concentrate on stock options and bonus incentive plans. Stock grants a
10、nd stock option grants are intended to reward the executives for choices that influence positive changes in the stock prices and as such may be considered a future-oriented reward system, as opposed to bonuses that are typically based on some accounting measure of profitability. However, it has been
11、argued that accounting-based measures are ex-post, historical measures of performance, and are thus conceptually less relevant from the shareholders perspective. Conversely, market return is generated from stock price changes and is not explicitly defined in accounting terms. In theory, market-based
12、 measures are ex-ante, forward-looking measures of performance, as they reflect managerial decisions that induce future profitability. In practice, however, stock prices are a very noisy signal as they are frequently subject to significant market-wide fluctuations that mirror the determinants of the
13、 business cycle and the conditions of fiscal and monetary policy, and hence do not exclusively reflect executive performance. In this study we analyze the impact of the compensation structure and performance on both cash and total compensations. Earlier studies have looked at the relationships betwe
14、en size, performance and executive pay, where the compensation has been defined as 3 only cash compensation. Unlike past studies, by analyzing both cash and total compensations, we note that the cash compensation is influenced by both the market and accounting measures of performance while the total
15、 compensation is significantly affected by the market based measures of performance. Further analysis after partitioning the data on the basis of the existence of bonus and stock option plans indicates that the firm size, as measured by sales, is not as significant if the company has no bonus or sto
16、ck option plans. Our analysis reveals larger market-based returns for firms that do not offer stock option incentives. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature relevant to executive incentive compensation and firm performance. This is followed by
17、Section 3 where we present the research design and hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and sample, followed in Section 5 by the results of our analyses. We present our conclusions in Section 6. 2. Review of Literature Several empirical studies support the sensitivity of executive pay to perform
18、ance. More specifically, studies have looked at the relationship between the cash compensation and performance measures of the firm such as the return on equity, and aggregate earnings, as well as the impact of non-recurring earnings components such as discontinued operations and restructuring charg
19、es. Empirical results have shown that compensation (defined as cash compensation) is more closely associated with accounting-based measures than market returns. For the most part, research on executive compensation has utilized the sum of salary and bonus as the proxy for the total compensation. Man
20、y studies have used cash compensation as the dependent variable in their efforts to explain the relationship between a firms performance and executive pay. Others have suggested the importance of a stock-base in executive compensation research The change over time in the composition of compensation
21、contracts and the enormous increase in non-cash compensation, together with changes in reporting requirements (regarding stock option grants issued to executives), have resulted in increased attention to the relevance of stock-based compensation in 4 pay-performance studies. The use of cash compensa
22、tion in earlier studies, as the only dependent variable in compensation models, was deemed appropriate and justified on the basis of data availability and the relative magnitude of the cash component of compensation contracts. However, a significant increase in the number of companies that offer sto
23、ck options to their executives and employees, the magnitude of stock-based compensation in relation to total compensation, and the SEC disclosure Requirements regarding option grants to executives, have influenced the choice of total compensation in more recent studies In this study, we analyze the
24、relationship between CEO compensation and performance using a logarithmic transformation of the general model in order to reduce the problem of heterosce dasticity in error terms. 译文 激励措施对高管的报酬和固定表现的影响 资料来源 : Economics, 2006 作者 ： Mahmoud M. Nourayi and Sudha Krishnan 摘要 ： 管理控制系统的一个最重大的成分就是激励机制和激发性基础
25、的报酬契约。大部分的高管以现金和公司股份的形式作为奖赏。我们的数据表明：超过 82.5%的观察值包括给高管的额外津贴，甚至于更高的份额大约 94.5%，高管都有职工优先认 股权。们的分析表明以市场为基础的回报方法对没有职工优先认股权的公司意义更大。然而，以会计学为基础的回报显然不会被以股份为基础的奖励所严重影响。 关键词 ：高管报酬，代理合同，激励机制，表现，以会计学为基础的激励机制，5 以市场为基础的激励机制 1 介绍 管理控制系统的一个最重大的成分就是激励机制和激发性基础的报酬契约。一个精心设计的激励制度能有效地处理好在代理合同出现的不理选择和道德危机。业绩考核的报酬合同变化程度决定着应征
26、者自信和冒险属性的水平。这次研究的主要目标是确定激励合同和业绩考核对高管报酬的影响。我们也会 评估高管的现金激励的敏感度与股份为基础的激励作比较。高管报酬与公司绩效之间的关系已经被研究人员从多方面的视角进行研究。研究已经确认公司规模和高管报酬及公司业绩对于高管报酬的影响之间的积极联系。最重要的是，人们的兴趣已经聚集在关注高管报酬和公司业绩之间的联系的代理理论的影响上了 . 墨菲（ 2000）表明大部分的公司在奖励高管上使用多样的业绩考核标准。最常用的奖励形式似乎是现金和公司股份。大多数公众公司为了确保经理的福利和所有者财产最大化目标的一致性，而提供股分购买权或者是限制性股分。给高管的现金报酬有
27、两个主要的成分：固定工资和分红。通常分红会与特殊组织目标的标志性管理选择的业绩考核挂钩。在这项研究中，我们会着重于股份认购及分红激励机制上。 股份津贴和优先认股权是为了奖励高管的选择，这种选择在股票价格有着积极地改变。同时，这种方式被认定为是一种以未来为目标的奖励制度。分红形式截然相反，分红是典型地以一 些盈利会计测量为基础的。然而，以会计为基础的测量已被认为是事后的，历史性的考核标准。因此，它与股东的观点从概念上来说，关系不大。相反地，市场回报是从股票价格变化中产生的，且并没有用会计条款明确定义。从理论上来说，以市场为基础的考核方法是前瞻性措施的方法，因为他们反映未来盈利的行政决策。然而，在
28、实践中，股票价格是一个非常杂乱无章的信号，因为他们经常受到那些放映商业周期决策和财政状况的重要波动的影响 ,因此不完全反映执行绩效。 在这项研究中，我们分析报酬结构和报酬考核对现金和总报酬的影响。之前的研究已经看透规模， 业绩和高管报酬之间的联系了。报酬仅仅被定义为现金报酬。不像过去的研究，通过扥西现金和总报酬，我们注意到现金报酬受市场及会计考核制度的双重影响，而总报酬则显著地受其影响。分割以分红和股份认购存6 在形式为基础的数据，进一步表明：如果公司没有分红后和股份认购机制，以销售而定的公司规模显得不那么的重要。我们的数据显示：对公司而言，更大的以市场为基础的回报并不提供股份认购机制。 这份
29、论文由以下几个部分组成：第二部分简明的综述了行政激励机制报酬及公司业绩的相关著作，第三部分则呈现了调查设计和假定，第四部分描述了相关数据和 例子，接下来的第五部分则是我们分析的结果。在第六部分，我们将呈现我们的结论。 2.著作回顾 几项实验研究支持根据业绩表现付给高管报酬。更具体地说，研究已经看透了现金报酬和业绩考核之间的关系，比如公司资产收益率 ,总收益 ,不循环收入的成分如不连续的操作和重组费用。先前的结果已经显示报酬（被定义为现金报酬）与以会计为基础的考核的联系比市场回报要更为密切。 就绝大部分而言 关于经理人报酬的调查 是利用奖金和薪水的 总数作为整个报酬 。 很多研究利用 现金报酬作
30、为因变数解释公司表现和高管薪酬之间的关系。 另外一些则表 明股票债券的重要性 。因时而变的报酬合同的组成，非现金报酬的大量增加与报告要求（关于股票期权向高管赠款）的同步变化已引起在支付补偿性能研究中关于基于股票报酬的相关性的进一步重视。作为报酬模式中唯一的因变量，早期研究中关于现金报酬的用处在基于基础数据的可用性与相对大小的报酬合同现金部分上被认为是恰当合理的。然而 ，通过最近更多的研究发现， 那些为行政人员及其雇员提供股票报价的公司的显著增加，相对于总报酬而言基于股票报酬的规模的明显扩大以及美国证券交易委员会披露的对管理人员期权要求的显著提高已经影响到总报酬的 选择。在早期研究中，作为赔偿模式中唯一的因变量，现金赔偿的运用时很恰当和公平的。因为它是以有效数据和报酬合同中相关现金组成数量为根据的。然而，在最近更多的调查中显示，随着那些给管理人员和雇员提供股票买卖权的公司的增长，和总赔偿有关的基于股票的赔偿的重要性的增加， SEC 还揭露对管理人员期权方面的允许要求，已经影响到了总赔偿的选择。在这项调查中，我们分析 CEO 的赔偿和业绩的关系用的是一般模式的对数转换，以减少在错误项的异方差问题。
