1、 外文翻译 原文 Trade credit,collateral liquidation and borrowing constraints Material Source: National Centre of Competence in Research Financial Valuation and Risk Management Working Paper No.251 Author: AnnaMaria C.Menichini The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 provides a sketch of t
2、he related literature. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyses the determinants of trade credit, distinguishing between liquidation and incentive motives. Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Section 5 explores the effect of incorporating the specific content of the bankruptcy and
3、 commercial laws on our predictions. Section 6 concludes. 1 Related literature One of the main objectives of the literature on trade credit has been to explain why agents should want to borrow from firms rather than from financial intermediaries. The traditional explanation has been that trade credi
4、t serves a non financial role. More precisely, it allows to reduce transaction costs (Ferris, 1981), implement price discrimination across customers with different creditworthiness (Brennan et al., 1988), facilitate the establishment of long term relationships with customers (Summers and Wilson, 200
5、2), and even provide a warranty for product quality when customers cannot observe product characteristics (Long et al., 1993). Although these non-financial theories can explain the existence of trade credit, they do not deliver any prediction on how borrowing constraints affect the demand for trade
6、credit, since credit rationing is not explicitly modeled in any of these papers. Financial theories have attempted to fill this gap (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004, among others). In these theories the supplier has an information advantage over financial institutions in lending
7、 to the buyer. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), whose analysis is closest to ours, construct a model in which banks have an intermediation advantage, while suppliers have an information advantage which mitigates their exposure to borrowers opportunistic behaviour. It turns out that sufficiently rich fi
8、rms, facing no incentive problems, never use trade credit, while, poorer firms, which do face incentive problems, experience bank credit rationing. For these firms, suppliers information advantage becomes relevant, as they can relax borrowing constraints by extending trade credit to their customers.
9、 Similarly, Biais and Gollier (1997) construct a screening model in which the sellers provision of trade credit signals the creditworthiness of the buyer and thus mitigates credit rationing. Hence,both of these papers,and more generally existing financial theories of trade credit,fail to explain:(i)
10、why trade credit is used also by financially unconstrained firms;and (ii) why reliance on trade credit does not necessarily increase with the severity of financial constraints, as documented by the empirical literature (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Marotta, 2001). In order to distinguish between ration
11、ed and non-rationed firms, we model the information advantage as in Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) but interact it with a liquidation advantage, which can explain why even wealthy firms may wish to use trade credit. The liquidation advantage of suppliers, when it exceeds the banks intermediation advan
12、tage, warrants reliance on trade credit by rationed and unrationed firms alike. This squares withthe evidence that firms facing different degrees of credit rationing tend to rely to the same extent on trade credit. The idea that trade credit can offer a way to exploit the suppliers liquidation advan
13、tage has been proposed and tested in various empirical contributions (Mian and Smith,1992; Petersen and Rajan,1997, among others). Frank and Maksimovic (2004) have also theoretically modeled the effects of such advantage, and shown that it makes trade credit cheaper than bank financing. However, in
14、their setting bank credit is never rationed, so that no prediction regarding the demand for trade credit by financially unconstrained firms can be derived. Finally,the existing literature has disregarded the relations between financing and input decisions and has offered no explanation for why firms
15、 only lend inputs. The use of a multi-input technology allows us to fill these gaps. 2 The model A risk-neutral entrepreneur has an investment project which uses a tangible and an intangible input to produce a verifiable output. The tangible input can be interpreted as raw material as well as physic
16、al capital, while intangibles as skilled labour, for example employees working in R在违约的情况下取得的抵押品的份额。 之间的企业家和有形输入供应商的合同规定：由供应商最小二乘授予信用，在提供投入到 QK 创业者的还款义务，这对已实现的收入和对贷款规模而定；抵押品的股份 违约的情况下取得（ 1 - ）。 请注意，不同的是银行，供应商条件的合同也可以在输入购买到 Qk。最后，考虑到无形的投入是完全在购买时支付，企业家和供应商之间的合同规定的输入 qL 值购买的数额。我们假设每一个政党都有限责任保护。 时间线 第一， 考虑到 企业家的财富 ， 竞争使银行和供应商合同报 价 ; 第二， 企业家 接受或拒绝 ; 第三， 对验收条件，投资和转移作出决定 ; 第四， 不确定性的解决 ; 第五， 调整实现的收益和还款。
