1、 外文翻译 原文 Tax Policies for Low-Carbon Technologies Material Source: National Tax Journal Author: Gilbert E. Metcalf I. Introduction The U.S. tax code provides a number of subsidies for low-carbon technologies. I discuss the difficulties of achieving key policy goals with subsidies as opposed to using
2、 taxes to raise the price of pollution-related activities. In particular, subsidies lower the cost of energy (on average) rather than raising it. Thus consumer demand responses work at cross purposes to the goal of reducing emissions (especially as average cost pricing is used for electricity). Seco
3、nd, it is difficult to achieve technolo gy neutrality with subsidies here defined as an equal subsidy cost per ton of CO2 avoided. Third, many subsidies are inframarginal. Finally, subsidies often suffer from unintended interactions with other policies. The next section describes current tax policie
4、s to support low-carbon energy sources. The next section focuses on taxes versus production tax credits for wind generation, currently the largest recipient of tax subsidies in renewable electricity generation. I conclude with some observations on the use of price-based instruments. In particular I
5、discuss how a carbon tax could be designed to achieve environmental goals of emission caps over a control period. II. Current Policies Current tax policy includes a variety of tax preferences for low-carbon technologies. I discuss the most important preferences in this section. While not especially
6、costly in terms of foregone tax revenue, I will argue that these preferences have been important in shaping low-carbon energy investment over the past decade. A. Transportation Fuels Most of the tax provisions related to transport fuels are focused on reducing the reliance of the transport sector on
7、 petroleum. But some arguably also reduce carbon emissions. The alternative motor vehicle credit provides investment tax credits for certain fuel cell vehicles, hybrids, plug-in hybrids, and advanced lean burn technology vehicles. Qualified fuel cell vehicles are eligible for base credits ranging fr
8、om $8,000 to $40,000 with additional credits based on fuel economy relative to base fuel economy. Credits for hybrid automobiles and light trucks combine a fuel economy and a conservation credit with the maximum possible credit equally $3,400 based on vehicle characteristics. The Volumetric Ethanol
9、Excise Tax Credit (VEETC) currently provides a 45 cent per gallon of ethanol exemption from the motor fuels excise tax. For ethanol blended at a 10 percent rate, this reduces the fuel tax by 4.5 cents per gallon of blended fuel. Whether corn-based ethanol should be viewed as a low-carbon technology
10、is a matter of some controversy. In addition to VEETC, various other credits are provided including a $1.00 per gallon credit for biodiesel and a $.50 per gallon for alternative fuels and alternative fuel mixtures. B. Efficiency and Other A variety of energy efficiency investment credits exist for n
11、onbusiness property. A credit equal to 30 percent of the cost of qualified investments (windows, doors, insulation, burners, etc.) up to $1,500 is eligible for investments through 2010. Manufacturer credits for energy efficient new homes range from $1,000 to $2,000 depending on the efficiency improv
12、ements and extend through this year. C. Summary of Low-Carbon Energy Tax Benefits Table 1 provides an estimate of the tax expenditures related to low-carbon fuels from the Presidents latest budget submission. Table 1. Low-Carbon Energy Tax Expenditures Item FY09 FY09-13 New Technology Credit (Sec. 4
13、5 and 48) 1,000 5,010 Alcohol Fuels and VEETC 5,190 12,930 Biodiesel 30 80 Clean-Fuel Burning Vehicles 130 -50 Exclusion of Utility Conservation Subsidies 120 560 CREBs 70 350 New Home Construction Efficiency Credit 20 30 Existing Home Efficiency Investment Credit - - Energy Efficient Appliance Cred
14、it - - Residential Solar/Fuel Cell Credit 10 10 Fuel Cells 50 10 Source: Office of Management and Budget (2009). Certain benefits are not counted as tax expenditures, for example the five year write-off of investments eligible for the new technology credits. III. Taxes versus Subsidies I begin by as
15、sessing the “carbon tax equivalent“ for production tax credits using $2009 per MCF a levelized cost framework. The levelized cost of an electricity generating project is the constant amount of revenue per kilowatt-hour required to cover all the costs of an investment project (including returns to eq
16、uity investors). Figure 1 shows how natural gas prices paid by electric utilities have fluctuated over the past seven years. They hit a (nominal) peak in June 2008 but since then have fallen by nearly fifty percent. The decline in gas prices makes wind that much less competitive against natural gas
17、generation. Figure 1. Real Gas Electric Power Price 14.00 12.00 10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 Jan-2002 Jan-2003 Jan-2004 Jan-2005 Jan-2006 Jan-2007 Jan-2008 Jan-2009 Source: EIA (2009) The other factor that influences the relative cost of wind and natural gas is capital costs. Based on data from EI
18、As Annual Energy Outlook, the capital costs of wind are nearly three times that of gas. It may be that future cost increases are comparable to those of gas (or perhaps even less) but wind is disadvantaged to the extent that its capital costs rise at a more rapid rate than that of its competitors. Ba
19、sed on the technology and economic assumptions detailed in the appendix, the levelized cost of a wind project is 2 percent lower than that for natural gas fired electricity in the absence of the production tax credit. This suggests that at current prices the production tax credit for new wind projec
20、ts is inframarginal. Table 2 reports the required production tax credit to ensure that the levelized cost of wind is no higher than that of natural gas for different gas price and wind capital cost assumptions. The capital cost escalation factor is the amount by which the wind overnight cost is assu
21、med to increase over its base value assumed in the appendix. Table 2. Cost Equalizing Production Tax Credit Capital Cost Escalation Factor 1.00 1.10 1.25 1.50 Fuel Cost ($/MCF) 5 0.017 0.022 0.030 0.044 6 0.008 0.013 0.021 0.035 7 - 0.004 0.012 0.026 8 - - 0.003 0.017 Source: Authors calculations. B
22、ased on the economic and technology assumptions contained in the appendix, Table 2 shows that the current production tax credit is sufficient to make wind cost- competitive with natural gas at a fuel cost of $6 per MCF and a cost escalation for wind capital costs of 25 percent. Given the current cap
23、ital costs assumed in EIAs Annual Energy Outlook, natural gas prices would have to fall below $5 per MCF before a production tax credit of 2.1 cents per kWh would be required. In other words, it appears that the production tax credit is an inframarginal subsidy under current economic conditions. Giv
24、en the problems with using subsidies to support low-carbon energy production, a natural question is what carbon tax would be required to obtain the same result as we get in Table2 with production tax credits. Table 3 presents that information. Table 3. Cost Equalizing Carbon Tax Capital Cost Escalat
25、ion Factor 1.00 1.10 1.25 1.50 Fuel Cost ($/MCF) 5 35 47 64 94 6 16 28 45 74 7 - 9 26 55 8 - - 7 36 Source: Authors calculations. One striking fact about Table 3 in comparison to Table 2 is the magnitude of the carbon tax required to be equalize the levelized costs of both technologies. Moreover, Ta
26、ble 5 indicates that a carbon tax of $45 per metric ton of CO2 is comparable to the current production tax credit of $0.021 per kWh. The high carbon price required to be equivalent in impact to the production tax credit simply reflects the fact that wind in this model is replacing a relatively low-c
27、arbon fuel (relative to coal). If the purpose of a production tax credit is simply to make wind cost competitive with fossil fuel power sources, it should take into account the profitability of the wind project. The higher the capacity factor of the project, ceteris paribus, the more profitable the
28、project is. Table 4 reports capacity factors for wind projects installed in 2006 averaged across regions of the country. If our focus is on cost competitiveness Table 4 suggests that the production tax credit should be highest in New England and lowest in the Midwest of the United States. Im not sug
29、gesting that the United States should implement this policy but rather note this to illustrate the confused policy objectives behind this particular energy tax subsidy. Table 4. Regional Wind Capacity Factors Region Capacity Factor Midwest 40.8% Texas 30.4% California 36.9% Northwest 31.3% Mountain
30、34.7% East 29.4% Hawaii 45.0% New England 22.1% Source: Wiser and Bolinger (2008) What would a price based approach look like? The two competing options are cap-and-trade programs and carbon taxes. Political momentum favors the former approach while ease of administration and efficiency favors the l
31、atter. The interested reader is referred to Metcalf and Weisbach (forthcoming) for details on how a carbon tax could be implemented. Many of the design considerations also apply to cap-and-trade programs. Here I simply wish to note one argument against carbon taxes often raised by environmentalists:
32、 that a cap-and-trade program provides certainty in the environmental outcome while the carbon tax does not. In Metcalf (2009) I describe a carbon tax that meets long-term emission targets while providing the price certainty advantages of a tax. The Responsive Emissions Autonomous Carbon Tax (REACT)
33、 sets an initial tax rate at the beginning of the control period (say, 2012) and increases the tax at a standard rate of four percent plus inflation. In benchmark years (perhaps every five years) cumulative emissions since the beginning of the control period are compared to a target cumulative emiss
34、ions goal for that year. If actual cumulative emissions exceed the target in the benchmark year, the tax is increased at a “catch-up“ rate of ten percent plus inflation until the next benchmark year.If cumulative emissions in that year are below the target the rate drops back to the standard rate. I
35、f not, it stays at the higher catch-up rate. This policy approach ensures that long-run targets are met while price stability is achieved in the short run. Given the ability to predict emissions in the short run and the transparent nature of the tax, firms would be able to predict with considerable
36、certainty what the growth rate of the tax will be in the near term thereby providing greater clarity for their planning purposes. The REACT approach addresses the objection that a carbon tax does not ensure a hard cap on greenhouse gas emissions over the control period.An overall cap can be maintain
37、ed while insulating consumers and businesses from short-run fluctuations in carbon prices that add volatility to energy prices and undermine support for climate change legislation.It does this with a transparent mechanism for adjusting the price of emissions over the control period. IV. Conclusion T
38、he current tax code relies on a large number of subsidies through accelerated depreciation, tax exemptions, production credits and investment credits to support low- carbon technologies.This approach is flawed on a number of levels.First, it lowers the price of consuming energy relative to other goo
39、ds.Second, the subsidies are not cost effective in that they do not equalize the subsidy cost per ton of CO2 that is not emitted. Third, to the extent that the subsidy is inframarginal it raises the cost to the federal government of achieving its policy objectives.Finally, subsidies interact in unex
40、pected ways with other state and federal policies in ways that either undermine the effectiveness of the subsidy or drive up the cost of the program. An approach that improves in the area of economic efficiency is a market-based approach such as a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax. The Responsive
41、 Emissions Autonomous Carbon Tax is one approach to implementing a carbon tax that addresses the concern that a tax-based approach does not guarantee that emission goals are achieved. If the United States does implement a carbon tax, an important question will be whether it preserves or eliminates t
42、he various subsidies to low-carbon fuels that are in the tax code. It is difficult to make a case for preserving them if carbon pricing comes into effect. 译文 促进低碳技术发展的税收政策 资料来源 :国税期刊 作者： Gilbert E. Metcalf I.简介 美国税法 为发展 低碳技术提供了很多的补贴。我 谈论 实现重要政策目标 的困境， 反对利用税提高价格的污染活动。特别是 ,补贴 是要降低能源成本 而不是提高 能源成本 。消费者的
43、反应 南辕北辙，很难达到 减少温室气体排放 的目的 (特别是 将 平均成本法用于电力 )。第二 ， 很难获得技术补贴 在这里定义为 一次补贴 等于 每吨的二氧化碳 的 避免。第三 ， 许多补贴的超 预期 。最后 ， 补贴 常常与其他政策 相互作用。 下一节描述了当前 促进低碳发展的 税收政策。 再 下一节 集中说明 税收和生产抵税 和 当前最大的税收补贴 受益者 ,可再生发电。我 在研究一些关于价格基础的文件后得出结论 。 我希望碳排放税可以被制定，并且使其在控制阶段能达到保护环境的目标。 II.现行的政策 在低碳技术的发展过程中，存在着各种各样的 税收 优惠 政策。我 选择 最重要部分 进行
44、讨论，而不是看重过去的 税收 收益，而 是 探讨 这些设置在过去的十年 中给 低碳能源 发展 带来 的 重大影响。 A. 运输燃料 大多数的税收规定 与 运输燃料 相关， 主要是减少 对 石油 的依赖 。但是一些可以说是减少二氧化碳的排放量。 另一种机动车信用证，如某些燃料电池车、可充电混合动力车 ,以及先进的精益燃烧技术的车辆提供投资抵减税额。与普通燃油车相比，符合规定的燃料电池车可得到 8000 美元到 40000 美元不等的额外的贷款。混合型汽车的贷款、轻型燃油卡车的燃料节约最大限度同样基于 3400 美元。 目前，乙醇消费税 (VEETC) 每加仑 乙醇汽车燃料的减免海关税收一个 45
45、分。按 10%的比率混合制成乙醇，每加仑混合燃料减少燃油税 4.5 美分。用玉米制造乙醇应被视为一个低碳技术引起一些争议。除了学分，以及其他 VEETC提供包括每加仑柴油信用为 1 美元，每加仑替代燃料混合物为 0.5 美元。 B.效能及其他 各种各样能源效率的投资信用存在于居民与商业无关的财产。信用等于30%的合格的成本投资 （ 门、窗、保温、火炉等 ） ，到 2010 年，拥有 1500 美元就 有资格投资。制造商依靠有效的改进可获得建造节能新厂房的贷款范围从1000 美元至 2000 美元不等 。 C.低碳能 源税的有利方面 表 1 提供一种估计的低碳燃料税支出与预算最近被提交 表 1
46、低碳能源税支出 项目 09 年度 09-13 年度 新技术款项 (Sec. 45 and 48) 1,000 5,010 醇类燃料和 VEETC 5,190 12,930 柴油 30 80 清洁燃料汽车 130 -50 公共事业保护补贴 120 560 CREBs 70 350 新国内建造效率 20 30 现房效率投资 - - 节能电器 - - 住宅太阳能 /燃料电池 10 10 燃料电池 50 10 资料来 源 ： 管理和预算办公室 （ 2009） 。某些利益不算作税式支出 ,例如五年注销投资有新技术。 III. 税 收补贴 我开始通过使用 levelized 成本的框架评估 “ 碳税收 ”
47、 相当于生产抵税。levelized 成本的发电项目要求每度电的收入能超过投资方案的所有成本 （ 包括返还给权益投资者的成本 ） 。 图 1显示了过去 7年天然气电力设施所的支付价格。 2008年 6月我们遇到了最高点，但自那时候开始的支付价格已经锐减了百分之五十。汽油价格的下降使风能源的竞争力下降。 $2009 per MCF 图 1 气体电力价格 14.00 12.00 10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 1月 -2002 1月 -2003 1月 -2004 1月 -2005 1月 -2006 1月 -2007 1月 -2008 1月 -2009 Source:
48、EIA (2009) 另一个影响风资源和天然气投资成本的因素。数据根据环境影响评价的年度能源展望获得，风资源的资本成本高于汽油近 3 倍。它的成本的增加在未来可能超过汽油，风资源在一定程度上处于不利地位，它比竞争者有更大的几率使资本成本增加。 基于技术和经济的假设，风力项目 的 levelized 成本为 2%，低于燃气电力生产课税扣除。这表明，当前的税收为风资源项目提供优惠。 表 2 报告所需的生产抵税政策 ,以确保风资源的 levelized 成本没有高于天然气成本的假设。资本成本增加的因素是指在附录假定风资源成本以基数价值增加。 表 2 成本生产抵税的均衡 资本成本增加因素 1.00 1
49、.10 1.25 1.50 燃料费 （ 美元 /千立方英尺 ） 5 0.017 0.022 0.030 0.044 6 0.008 0.013 0.021 0.035 7 - 0.004 0.012 0.026 8 - - 0.003 0.017 资料来源 ： 作者的计算。 根据对经济和技术的假设，表 2 显示当前生产抵税的风资源足以形成成本与天然气竞争，燃料成本 6 美元每千立方英尺和成本资本成本增加 25%。根据当前的资金成本假设的年度能源展望环境影响评价中 ,天然气价格要低于五美元每千立方英尺，在生产抵税的政策为 2.1 美分每千瓦小时的情况下是不可能完成的。换句话说，它显示了生产抵税的政策在当前的经济状况下是一种超边际补贴。 用补贴给予支持低碳能源生产，一个很自然的问题是碳税将必须获得同一结果如同 我们在表 2 中得出的 。 表 3 介绍此信息。 表 3 均衡
