1、 外文翻译 原文 Anti-corruption Policies and Programs Material Source: http:/www.thaigoodgovernance.org/upload/content/300/anti-corruption%20policies%20and%20programs.pdf Author:Jeff Huther Anwar Shah The Executive Board of the World Bank approved its anti-corruption strategy in September 1997. The strateg
2、y defined corruption as the “use of public office for private gain“ and called for the Bank to address corruption along four dimensions: Preventing fraud and corruption in Bank projects Helping countries that request Bank assistance for corruption Mainstreaming a concern for corruption in Banks work
3、 Lending active support to international efforts to address corruption Following the adoption of this strategy, concrete steps to prevent fraud and corruption in Bank projects have included: the introduction of a confidential hotline, tightening of procurement guidelines, intensive audits of project
4、s, and support for improving procurement systems in client countries. Mainstreaming a concern for corruption has taken place through the Banks economic and sector work which provides the analytic basis for country assistance strategy documents which, in turn, underlie the Banks lending programs. O f
5、 the analytical tools used in economic and sector work, institutional reviews, country financial accountability assessments and public expenditure reviews offer substantial scope for addressing the governance failures that permit wide spread corruption, country procurement assessment reports identif
6、y sources of corruption in procurement and recommend remedies, country economic memoranda can be used for relatively quick assessments of corruption sources, and country assistance evaluations may highlight areas where corruption concerns are undermining Bank work. In addition to economic and sector
7、 work, all country assistance strategy documents are now required to diagnose the state of governance and the risks that corruption poses to Bank projects. The Comprehensive Development Framework unveiled in 1999 underscores the importance of governance and public sector institutional reform issues
8、in the Banks development assistance dialogue. The World Bank Institute has initiated courses on corruption for developing country officials and conducted surveys on service delivery. The Bank has also put a greater emphasis on institutional reform and capacity building through its lending program. B
9、ank assistance for international efforts to curtail corruption has been mainly in the form of sponsorship of major conferences, dissemination notes and support for the adoption of the 1999 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The im
10、pact of corruption on public service delivery performance and poverty alleviation is widely recognized. A wide consensus has also recently emerged that corruption is a symptom of failed governance (see World Bank 2000) and hence curtailing corruption requires addressing the causes of mis-governance.
11、 Nevertheless, the menu of potential actions to curtail corruption is very large so a framework is needed that provides guidance on ordering potential actions. Prioritization of various actions depends on both the conceptual and empirical views of what works and what does not work in the context of
12、particular countries. Such a framework is also needed for evaluating both Bank and country anticorruption programs. This note proposes a framework for such evaluations. A Simple Evaluation Frame work ,to focus attention on the corruption aspects of development programs, we use a framework based on t
13、he incentives for opportunistic behavior by public officials. To distinguish between highly corrupt and largely corruption-free societies, consider the conditions that encourage public officials to seek out or accept corruption: The expected gains exceed the expected costs of undertaking a corrupt a
14、ct. Little weight is placed on the cost that corruption imposes on others. The first point is based on pure self-interest: corruption will only take place when officials expect to derive net positive benefit from the transaction. Successful anticorruption programs will lower the expected gains and r
15、aise the expected penalties of corrupt behavior. That is, anti-corruption programs must change the cost-benefit calculations of public officials who believe that the expected net benefits of corruption are positive. A self-interested individual will seek out or accept corruption if the expected gain
16、s outweigh the costs, i.e. when: E B = n x E G prob P x P 0 Where E is the expectations operator n is number of corrupt transactions G is the gain from the corrupt transaction prob P is the probability of paying a penalty P is the penalty for the corrupt activity Based on cost-benefit considerations
17、, anti-corruption programs can influence corruption through four mechanisms, reducing the number of transactions involving public officials, reducing the scope for gains from each transaction, increasing the probability of paying a penalty, or increasing the penalty from corrupt behavior. Reducing e
18、xpected gross benefits: The expected net benefit derived from corruption is context-dependent on the factors that influence a public officials expectations, a countrys historical treatment of corrupt activities, the quality of the judicial framework, the strength and scope of enforcement institution
19、s, and the potential for changes in these characteristics for escaping the procedures of legal recourse with illegal maneuvers. Thus relevant anti-corruption policies geared towards reducing the gross gains will vary with the institutional environment of each country. Transaction value can be reduce
20、d by scaling down of individual projects, requiring popular referenda for large projects with votes both on tax and expenditure allocation choices, de-monopolizing public services, promoting competition in the private sector, increasing the share of financing from domestic taxes or user charges,and
21、bringing a culture of new contract ualism to the public sector. Reducing the number of transactions: Policies which reduce the number of transactions that create opportunities for graft and private capture of public programs can include streamlining bureaucracy, economic or financial liberalization
22、(e.g. deregulation, freer trade, etc.), improving service standards, and decentralizing government services.Privatization can reduce the number of transactions but, as recent experience in Eastern Europe shows, the privatization process itself involves transactions which may strengthen the hold of v
23、ested and sometimes corrupt interests so businesses operating in a competitive environment, free of state financing, and with adequate governance safeguards may or may not emerge from privatization. Increasing the Probability of Paying Penalties: Increasing the probability of penalties is a three st
24、ep process: detection, prosecution, and exacting the penalty. In cases where corruption is extortion for jobs that should be done as a matter of public service, improved detection is straight-forward - increase citizen participation in the electoral process, establish citizens charters specifying ex
25、pected service standards, allow media independence, make interactions between the public and private sectors more transparent, and strengthen the rule of law so that both individuals and the media do not fear reprisals. Increasing the Magnitude of Penalties: There are corrupt societies which have st
26、iff penalties for corruption, suggesting the magnitude of penalties may not be a strong deterrent to corruption. In general, people may not respond much differently to, say, an increase in penalties from five to ten years in prison, as Malaysia did in 1997 with no discernible change in perceptions o
27、f corruption (as measured by Transparency International). In some countries, however, the legislation setting penalties may be ambiguous or penalties may be set at the discretion of judges. In either case, a country may discourage corruption by clarifying corruption penalties. While the Bank may pro
28、vide assistance in clarifying legislation, setting criminal penalties is outside the scope of its work. In cases where corruption is in the form of bribes to alter the normal course of government, increased transparency of government operations reduces the opportunity for undetected corruption (e.g.
29、 clearly defined bidding processes, open judicial proceedings, strict rules on gift-giving) and increasing the number of competitors reduces the potential gains while increasing scrutiny of bidding processes. Prosecution requires judicial independence and transparency. For the judicial system to exa
30、ct penalties, it must have sufficient resources and independence. To the extent that penalties are reputational, media independence is a crucial element to deterrence. While a more complete treatment would include the incentives of private sector agents who interact with public officials, policies a
31、ffecting private sector incentives are largely outside the scope of Bank work. Policies which increase the magnitude of penalties or the expected probability of paying penalties, however, are likely to have similar effects on the private sector as they do on the public sector. The focus on public of
32、ficials excludes consideration of policies, typically in countries with low levels of corruption, that penalize private sector efforts to participate in corruption in other countries. These policies are potentially relevant to anti-corruption efforts, but are outside the scope of our framework (and
33、most Bank work). In terms of domestic policies, we believe that the focus on public officials is appropriate even if well-designed policies may reduce the incentives of the private sector to engage in corruption. The argument is that a goverunent which cannot influence the incentives of its own offi
34、cials is unlikely to be able to reduce private sector incentives to engage in corruption. In the formulation above, an officials income does not have an effect on whether or not to engage in corrupt activities. Two concerns have been raised with this approach. One is that officials paid less than su
35、bsistence income are forced to undertake corrupt activities to survive, the second is that, at some high level of income, officials should be unwilling to risk that income to gain more through corrupt activities. Both arguments require an assumption that officials are motivated to follow the rule of
36、 law regardless of whether they see it as a threat to their income from corrupt activities. The argument put forward in this paper is that officials are not so motivated in countries in which the rule of law is weak. Addressing the governance failures which distort officials cost-benefit assessment
37、is likely to be the only route to success in countries with high levels of corruption and poor governance since direct dialogue on corruption is likely to be counter-productive (resulting in simply another level of corrupt officials under the name of anti-corruption offices). In countries with poor
38、governance quality, Bank staff can promote economic liberalization, judicial reform and greater public participation in public expenditure decisions without explicitly raising contentious issues of corruption and, one hopes, without threatening their existing relationships. In countries with modest
39、levels of corruption and governance quality, where the existing governance structure has the capacity to reform, Bank staff can focus on improvements in readily identifiable output indicators rather than uncertain measures of corruption as measures of success. In countries with high governance quali
40、ty, explicit efforts to reduce corruption are likely to be successful - commissions on corruption, ombudsmen, ethics offices, and the like can rely on an infrastructure of public accountability and transparency to ensure that their findings result in lower incentives to commit corrupt acts. 译文 反腐败政策
41、和方案 资料来源：http:/www.thaigoodgovernance.org/upload/content/300/anti-corruption%20policies%20and%20programs.pdf 作者 ： Jeff Hut e r Anwar Shah 1997 年 9月 ,世界银行执行董事会批准反腐败战略。该战略界定 “利用公职谋取私利” 为腐败，并呼吁世界银行，解决沿线四个方面的腐败问题： 在银行项目中防止欺诈和腐败 援助国家银行对抗腐败 在银行倡导关注腐败工作的主流 积极支持国际社会努力解决腐败问题 随着这一战略的实施，具体防止银行项目欺诈和腐败行为的步骤包括：建立
42、一个保密热线，采购指南，密集项目审核以及支持完善客户国家采购系统。 关注腐败的主流已经在世行的经济和部门工作中形成。这些工作为国家援助战略文件提供分析基础，而这些文件 反过来也为银行的贷款项目提供基础。在经济和部门工作所用的分析工具中，机构审查，国家财政问责制评估和公共支出审查为解决导致广泛蔓延的腐败的政府失策提供大量机会。国家采购评估报告主要确定采购的腐败源，并建议补救措施，国家经济备忘录可以相对快速地评估腐败源，国家援助评估会着重强调正在削弱银行的工作的腐败领域。除了经济和部门工作外，现在所有国家援助战略的文件都需要能诊断政府状态和银行项目所面临的腐败风险。 在 1999 年推出的综合发展
43、框架强调政府和公共部门的机构改革问题在银行的发展援助对话中的重要性。世界银行研究所已 针对腐败为发展中国家官员开创课程并对他们的服务进行调查。世界银行还对机构改革和通过其贷款计划进行能力建设给予了更大重视。世界银行为国际反腐努力的援助主要是以举办主要会议，传播笔记和实施 1999 年经合组织公约关于打击外国公职在国际商业交易中贿赂的形式来实现的。 腐败对公共服务的履行和贫困的减轻的影响，是举世公认的。 最近人们达成了一个广泛的共识，那就是腐败是政府无能的症状（见 2000 年的世界银行），因此，要想遏制腐败需要处理不当管理的原因。然而，减少腐败潜在的行动项目单，是非常大的，所以需要一个框架，来
44、指导有关 潜在行动的进行。各项行动的优先次序同时取决于概念和经验方面，对在特定国家里什么是可行，什么是不可行的意见。这样的框架，在评估银行和国家反腐败计划中也需要。这份照会为这样的评估提议了一个框架。 一个简单的评估框架，把重点放在发展计划的腐败方面，我们使用了政府官员的机会主义行为的激励机制为基础的框架。为了区分高 度腐败，基本上廉洁的社会，考虑鼓励公职人员寻求或接受腐败的条件 ： 预期收益超过实施腐败行为的预期成本。 不重视腐败对他人产生的成本。 第一点是基于纯粹的自私自利的：当官员希望从交易中获得净正利益的时候，腐败就发生了。成功的反腐败计划将降低预期收益，提高腐败行为的预期处罚。也就是
45、说，反腐败方案必须改变公职人员相信的腐败预期净效益是正面的成本效益计算方式。一个自私自利的人在预期收益大于成本时会寻求或接受腐败行为，即当： EB = nxEG - 概率 P x P 0 其中 E 为经营者的期望 n 是腐败交易的次数 ， G 是腐败交易的所得，概率P是付出处罚代价 P的概率，是腐败交易的处罚。 根据成本效益的考虑，反腐败方案可以通过四种机制的 影响腐败，减少涉及公职人员的腐败交易数量，缩小每场交易收益的范围，增加处罚概率，或加重对腐败行为的处罚。降低总的预期收益：期望的腐败所得净利益是与影响公职人员预期的因素息息相关的，一个国家对腐败行为的习惯对待，司法体系的质量，执法机构的
46、力度与广度，以及这些特性的可变化性，使得可以通过非法手段逃脱法律追索程序。 因此，有关的着眼于减少总收益的反腐败政策，将随每个国家的制度环境不同而不同。交易值可以通过减少个人项目来降低，要求对大项目进行大众公投，同时对税收和支出的分配选择进行投票，取缔垄断的公共服务，促进私营部门的竞争，在国 内税收或使用费中增加融资股份，并在公共部门中带来了新的契约文化 。 减少交易数量：减少交易（这些交易为移接或私人获取公共项目提供机会）数量的政策，包 括使官僚机构合理化，经济或金融自由化（例如解除管制，自由贸易等），提高服务标准，并下放政府服务。私有化可以减少交易数量，但最近在东欧的经验表明，私有化进程本
47、身涉及的交易，可能会加强既得利益，有时甚至腐败的利益持有，因为企业在一个竞争环境中运作，国家融资免费，以及在私有化体制中可能会或可能不会出现的大量治理保障措施。 增加受处罚的概率：提高惩罚的概率 是一个三步过程：侦查，起诉，和严格的执行。当腐败的案件是就业勒索时，应该作为一个公共服务事项完成，完善的检测制度是直接增加公民在选举过程中的参与，特许公民详细指明期望的服务标准，让媒体具有独立性，使公共和私营部门的相互工作透明，加强法治，使个人和媒体不用害怕报复。 提高罚款的幅度：有些腐败的社会里有严厉的反腐处罚，这意味着刑罚的幅度可能不会对腐败是一个强有力的威慑。一般情况下，人们对，比如说，将处罚从
48、服刑五年增加到十年，就像马来西亚在 1997 年实施的那样，但并没有明显改变对腐败的认识（由透明国际衡量的），回 应可能大致相同。然而，在一些国家，法定的处罚可能不明确或处罚可能由法官的判定来设定。在这两种情况下，国家可以通过明确腐败惩罚来减少腐败。而银行可以为澄清立法提供帮助，设立刑事处罚则在其工作范围之外。 当腐败是以贿赂的形式，用于改变政府工作的正常过程，那么提高政府运作的透明度，有利于减少了未被发现的腐败行为（如明确规定招标过程，公开的司法诉讼，严格的送礼规则），增加机会竞争者的数量以减少潜在收益，同时提高招投标过程的审查。起诉需要司法的独立和透明。司法系统要严格执行处罚，它必须有足够
49、资源和独立性。在某种程度上 ，惩罚是声誉上时，媒体独立是一个关键威慑因素。 而一个更完整的惩治将包括和政府官员互动的私营部门代表，作用于私营部门的政策大大地超出了银行的工作范围。然而，提高刑罚幅度或支付处罚的期望概率的政策，很有可能对私营部门有类似它们对公共部门所发挥的作用。通常在腐败程度比较低的国家，对公职人员的关注不会考虑到政策，它们惩罚致力于在其他国家进行腐败活动的私营部门。这些政策与反腐败努力有潜在关联，但超出了我们的框架（以及大部分银行工作的范围）。在国内政策方面，我们认为，即使设计良好的政策可能抑制私营部门的腐败行为，对公 职人员的关注是适当的。这个论点是，不能影响自身官员的腐败动机的政府是不太可能能够减少私营部门参与腐败的动机的。 在上述规划中，一个官员的收入并不影响他是否从事腐败活动。在这一做法中有两点值得关注。一是，收入不高的官员从事腐败活动是迫于生计，二是，高收入的官员应该不愿冒险，通过腐败的活动获得更多利益。这两个论断都需要一个假设的前提，那就是官员们都是积极遵守法律规定的，无论他们是否将它看成是对他们的腐败活动收入的威胁。本文的论点是，在法治薄弱的国家中，官员并没有那么积极
